

*Paper prepared for the Euroacademia International Conference
Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*

Vienna, 17 – 19 May 2012

This paper is a draft

Please do not cite

A Very Reserved Westernism: Ukrainian National Project in Late Russian Empire

OlhaMartynyuk, PhD candidate in History

National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

Abstract

Due to the limited resources and seemingly low support among the local population the success of the Ukrainian national project in late Romanov Empire depended on the effective cooperation of Ukrainian activists with the liberal and democratic parties on the imperial level and effective competition with Russian nationalist conservative parties on the local. In this political setting, Ukrainian activists opted not to state overtly their ambitions to build a separate Ukrainian national state based on political values of democracy. Neither they opted to emphasize the intrinsic difference and superiority of Ukrainians towards Russians. Instead, they elaborated a number of ways to delineate Ukrainians indirectly. Using the common trend to criticize bureaucratization, they described its mores as intrinsically Russian. The negative aspects of Ukrainian reality like poverty, intersection of ethnic and class inequalities, ignorance, anti-Semitism, terrorism the Ukrainian nationalists treated as the result of colonizing power of Russian bureaucracy. Without openly presenting Russia as an Eastern despotic state Ukrainian activists compared it with the other, more distant images of the eastern despotisms, linked Russia's history and traditions to them, while at the same time presenting Ukraine as an outpost of European civilization. They discarded the stereotypes of Malorussia as a docile and apolitical people of the South and by renaming the Malorussia into Ukraine tried to ascribe new active and masterful features to it. Finally, they juxtaposed Ukrainian folklore, traditional arts and popular theatre to Russian culture viewing the latter as generally vulgar, insensitive and coercive.

Key words:

Ukrainian national activists, representation of Russia, Westernism, bureaucratization, despotic state

One of the results of Revolution of 1905 in Russian Empire was reactivation of the discussion between Westernists and Nationalists about the future path of state's development. The main proponents of revolution – constitutional democrats (*Kadets*)– supported the idea that Russia should follow the Western European patterns of economic and political growth, which presupposed capitalist mode of production, strong middle class, individual freedoms and institutions of political representation. Their opponents –various right-wing conservative and nationalist parties – to the contrary, denounced these gains claiming that the Western political institutions contaminate intrinsically Russian mode of life, they demanded retreat to the autocracy and presence of Orthodox Church in all spheres of livelihood.

At the same time Ukrainian liberal national activists after the Revolution of 1905 gained for the first time the right to publish in Ukrainian language, which opened opportunity to launch a wide campaign of national agitation. The period between 1905 and 1918 was particularly rich on knowledge production aimed at defining Ukrainian nation, its boundaries, language, traditions and political culture. Although Ukrainian nationalists managed to sustain daily newspaper in Kiev, regular periodicals in Saint-Petersburg and Southwestern Russia¹, disseminate thousands of books and popular brochures, their resources and political support remained very limited. After 1908 they had barely any representative of in the State Parliament, and therefore their cooperation with the constitutional democrats was of a crucial importance for the political success. Kadets did not recognize the main goal of Ukrainian activists – a wide administrative autonomy of Ukraine within the federative state of Russian Empire, however they were eager to promote more rights to the use of Ukrainian language in public administration and schooling of the region. In exchange Kadets relied on Ukrainian nationalists and other liberal groups of the Southwest of the Empire in their competition against Russian nationalist conservative groups, which were particularly well-established in Southwest.

Ukrainian national activists had to be exceptionally careful in the way they presented Russia and Russians in their political texts. On one hand they defined the Ukrainians as opposed to Russians, using Russia as the “Other”, something that Ukraine in fact is not and should separate from. In their private communications Ukrainian nationalists oftentimes regarded Russia as Asiatic Eastern despotic state and disbelieved in its ability to function as a democracy.² In regard of the Kadets’ unwillingness to recognize Ukrainian claim for wide autonomy Ukrainian nationalists had sayings “The Russian democracy ends where the Ukrainian question begins” and “No matter you say, in every Russian (*katsap*), no matter how progressive he is, is founded a convicted centralist”³. On the other hand, they were bound with political cooperation with Westernist Kadets who weren’t essentializing Russian problems and viewed its future optimistically under the condition that it abandons its existing political institutions in favor of more advanced practices of West-European states.

Other reasons for why Ukrainian nationalists opted for very delicate and covert ways of denigrating Russia can be explained by their rivalry with local Southwestern right-wing parties, in particular with the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists. The former and the latter struggled over the national identity of one and the same population. While Ukrainians claimed that the region of Malorussia (Little Russia or Southwest) constituted historically a distinct region inhabited by Ukrainians who have their own language, national and cultural traditions, the Russian nationalists claimed that Malorussia was an integral part of the Russia and even, its people are intrinsically Russian and even more devoted and loyal to the nation, Malorussian is only a dialect of Russian language, and all in all they have the same religion. The conservative Russian nationalist groups, based in Kiev, even long before the 1905 Revolution presented Ukrainian nationalists in their publications as a small group of separatists with no real support on the ground acting in the interests and with money of Poles, or Austrian Empire or Germany, aiming at breaking down not only the unity of Russian Empire, but more importantly the unity of Russian people⁴. In this competition Ukrainian nationalists tried to vindicate themselves showing their organic connection to Ukrainian people and denying the facts of any support from foreign states⁵. Therefore, an open Westernist anti-Russian stance in this situation might have had been further used by Russian nationalists as an argument of artificial and treacherous nature of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, some of the Russian nationalists worked as official censors, and they regularly fined Ukrainian newspapers and brochures for open criticism of the state, therefore Ukrainian activists had to pick information and presentations very carefully⁶. Finally, Ukrainian nationalists were trying to build a nation on the peasant class in the circumstances when the bourgeoisie was constituted predominantly by Jews, Poles and Russians (or as they regarded it Russified Ukrainians). The message of democratic and liberal values might have not been particularly appealing to lower classes. Especially taking into consideration, that the peasantry in late XIX-early XX cent. was susceptible to the ideas of forced redistribution of land, physical expropriation of Jewish property and denying representative political institutions in the name of monocratic rule.

In short, the Ukrainian national activists had ambitions to transform the Southwest of the Russian Empire into a liberal modern self-sustaining Ukrainian society with a developed structures of political representation involving active political participation of its citizens, but the limited resources that they had, strong position of Russian nationalists on the ground, as well as weak political support of the local population made them build up their strategies in the situation of contest and imitation among local and imperial political actors. In the period between 1905 and 1917 Ukrainian nationalists in their political texts, academic works on history, anthropology and language elaborated a way to present Ukraine as democratic nation as opposed to despotic Russia, yet without making strong claims and demanding separation from the state.⁷

Mores of Bureaucracy as Mores of Russians

The criticism of the “over-bureaucratization” was a common ground for merely all the political parties in early XX cent. Russian Empire. Although there is a contemporary research proving that the number of bureaucrats as compared to the general number of population in Russian Empire was much smaller than in other continental Empires, and that a larger bureaucratic apparatus would be needed to implement modernizing reforms⁸, early XX cent. critics presented bureaucracy as an outnumbering and stagnant. The typical mores ascribed to the bureaucracy by all parties were inability to conduct reforms, unprofessionalism, corruption, irresponsibility, rigidity and insensitivity to the needs of the society, oppressing the creative potential of the people, and provocation of radicalism and terrorism. The difference in the criticism by liberals and nationalists was that the latter also claimed Russian bureaucracy to have been cosmopolitan, which meant that it supported all nations of the Empire, and particularly Jews, but not Russians.⁹

Unlike Russian nationalists, Ukrainian nationalists viewed bureaucracy as a class supporting Russians over the other nations. They presented bureaucracy as a colonizing power which was constantly trying to ruin all the national and cultural diversity of the state, working to homogenize it and ruin inner diversity. They constantly emphasized that the

oppressive measures from the second half of the XIX cent. imposed on the Ukrainian movement, e.g. prohibiting the use of Ukrainian language in publications, caused a number of adverse effects for the Ukrainian people. Firstly, the denial of access to the literature and public communications in Ukrainian language led to the Russification of upper classes and alienation of the lower classes. Secondly, the artificial restrictions led to the high participation of Ukrainians in terrorism of 1860s. Thirdly, because Ukrainians had to be educated in Russian tongue and not their mother tongue, their level of education was much lower than in Central provinces of Russian Empire and caused ignorance, manifested in anti-Semitism and Cholera riots.¹⁰ In this sense the backwardness and the barbarism which could be seen in Ukraine was regarded as a response to the rigidity and coercion of bureaucratic regime. It was a view that the democratic in nature Ukraine was occupied by foreign tyranny. However, unlike the later similar discourses in Central Europe¹¹, the power of bureaucratic regime was traced many centuries back, so that the adverse realities of Ukraine were viewed as long-term consequences of it.

Moreover, the Ukrainian leader and an author of 10-volume history of Ukraine Mykhaylo Hrushevsky claimed that if not the rigidity of the bureaucratic regime, the Ukrainian demand for self-esteem wouldn't exist at all:

*"[The Ukrainian separatism] was brought into being by Moscow bureaucratic politics, and the Ukrainian separatism will be over only when the end will be put on this politics of oppression and enslavement, which the Petersburg bureaucracy inherited from Muscovite bureaucracy."*¹²

In this quote the mores of Russian bureaucracy are essentialized. Unlike Russian nationalists who explained its vices by artificial transplanting of bureaucratic institutions in Russia by Peter I on the "organic" Russian traditions of rule, Ukrainian nationalists regarded the bureaucracy to be the historical Russian trait. In a number of cases Ukrainian nationalists also compared the Bureaucratic regime to the nomadic rule, in particular using the term "Bureaucratic horde"¹³.

Different Easts

When speaking in geographical terms, Ukrainian nationalists almost never located Russia on the "East", but rather in the "North" or "North-East"¹⁴. Yet, they often connected Russia to the other Eastern images. In this respect a short fairy-tale, published by Petro Stebnytskyi, is very telling. The message of the fairy-tale was, once again, to depict the unviability of the bureaucratic state regime, however the ways in which Russia was compared to the vague image of Muslim state is very peculiar. During the years of bad harvests the people of a distant Far East country asked their sultan Al-Djafar to help with food from his own possessions. The sultan hesitated first, but later on agreed and gave all what he had. This first made people happy and grateful, but soon after they were bitterly disappointed. Sultan's ancillaries failed to distribute equally sultan's goods, and thus people still remained with nothing. Moreover, when they came to the central square the sultan's troops started to fire.¹⁵ This fairy-tale clearly connects the Russia with an image of Oriental despotic regime, but bares a positive rather than negative image of the monarch. The figure of the Tsar Nickolas II (sultan Al-Djafar) was not a target of a criticism of Ukrainian nationalists, as it was not for the liberal and conservative parties.

However, more important image of the East was associated with the nomadic peoples of the Central Asia. The author of the monumental work on History of Ukraine Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi presented Ukraine as a sedentary society which was for centuries been confronted with the nomadic invasion from the East, as well with the Turkic attacks from the South. As he presented it, the regular attacks gradually weakened Ukrainians who were at the outpost of the European sedentary civilization.¹⁶ The Ukrainian nationalists brought up to live the myth of Cossacks – democratic and freedom-loving warriors from XV-XVIII cent. who defended the Southern frontier from the Turks and eastern frontier from Asian nomads. Russia in this mental map was a state that arose after XIII cent. as a result of weakening of Ukrainian state after Mongol invasion.¹⁷ In fact, it was presented as a national trauma that in the mid XVII cent. Cossacks fell under the influence of Moscow and that in late XVIII cent. the Russian Empress Katherine II dismissed these military units. So, the Russia was presented rather as a Northern State which benefited from the invasion of Ukraine by nomads from Central Asia and Ottoman Empire.

Another "Eastern" image that was widely used in connection to Russia was Siberia. Siberia was viewed as a Russian colony where the natural resources were extracted from and into which Russia sent out undesirable people. Siberia was an image of a distant land which is naturally very rich but whose inhabitants are merely all prisoners. Thus, the Russia was seen as a colonizer, ruthless power that is incapable of effective management. Siberia was presented as the worst example of a colony. To a certain extent this discourse was a response to the program of resettlement of Ukrainian peasants into Siberia and in this way solving the question of land hunger.

Subverting Stereotypes

Ukrainian nationalists played on stereotypes which existed in XIX century about Malorussia in Russian Empire. In the many works of art, literature and popular culture the inhabitants of the Southwestern part of the Empire were presented as “People of the South” - witty, with good sense of humor, sensitive, kind, hospitable, skillful in music, enjoying warm climate and good cuisine. Schools of painters presented this region as idyllic rural area with white mud-huts and unpretentious peasants.

Although there existed many more stereotypes about Malorussia with much more convoluted political meanings¹⁸, Ukrainian nationalists revolted against the cluster of meanings which described the nation in feminine and other diminutive terms. For them the term “Malorussia” itself was a word with derogatory meaning since it literally meant “Little Russia”. By changing it into “Ukraine” they expected to change the image of the nation. For Ukrainian nationalists Malorussian meant first and foremost a lack of political consciousness, compliance with the dominant rule and inability to make decisions. Ukrainians, to the contrary, were imagined as nationally conscious, politically active and decisive. The invention of the myth of Cossacks – brave and free-loving warriors – added to more masculine features of the Ukrainian nation as opposed to the feminine image of Malorussians.

Regarding the stereotypes of Southern and Northern people, the ideas presented by two physical anthropologists Fedir Wowk and Ivan Sikorskiy is very interesting. The former – representative of Ukrainian nationalist group – produced two monumental works on physical anthropology and ethnography of Ukrainians. He claimed that Ukrainians constitute a distinct anthropological type which is characterized by dark hair, dark eyes, tall or above-average height, brachycephaly, narrow face, straight and rather narrow nose, relatively short arms and long legs¹⁹. These traits differed Ukrainians from Russians – which were considered to be blond, blue-eyed, short, brachycephalic and short-legged. Wowk suggested that Ukrainians anthropologically are close to the ancient Slavs than Russians. They didn’t fuse with Finns as Russians and Belorussians did. “Southern branch of Eastern Slavs” (later Ukrainians) had contacts with Iranian and Turkic tribes, but the assimilation was not deep. Therefore, modern Ukrainians possess more of originally Slavic qualities²⁰.

Physical anthropologist Ivan Sikorsky, who was a member of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, also viewed the difference between the Malorussians and Russians (*Velikorosy*) in the fact that Southern Malorussians had traits from Iranian and Turkic tribes while the Russians possessed traits of Finns. He also supported the view that the Malorussians possessed more of original Slavic features. Yet, he claimed that Finns belonged to a white race, not Mongolic and in the result of mergence with Finns the Northern Slavs (later Russians) borrowed the psychological features of harshness, fidelity to duty, terseness. As a result, Russians had stronger will and were better in self-control, thus were able to form a strong nationhood. Malorussians for not being capable of building a strong-state but possessing features of flexibility and intelligence had to stay politically with Russians for the sake of perfecting the race.²¹

This debate shows that while Ukrainian nationalists attempted to present themselves as the genuinely Slavic nation as opposed to Russians who possessed Eastern Asian traits, the Russian nationalists presented themselves as Northern type, but in this they referred to the image of Scandinavia rather than Muscovy, the Northern type for them presupposed strong will, ability of self-control and creating a strong state.²²

Popular culture vs. High culture

Being under the influence of Romantic ideas about the nation, Ukrainian national activists questioned Russian high culture by juxtaposing it to Ukrainian folklore, traditional arts and popular theatre. Although they recognized brilliance of some Russian writers, they generally regarded Russian culture as poor and vulgar. They presented Russian *obshchina* as villages where peasants have rough manners, with high rate of alcoholism and rude way of addressing each other. To the contrary, in Ukrainian villages they saw natural chastity, mutual understanding based on tolerance and artistry²³.

Not only they thought that Russians had very different folk traditions, but they claimed, that Russians are incapable to understand Ukrainian folk traditions. In 1910 an author Pavlo Nedolia wrote down his impressions from a Russian/Malorussian troop staging the Ukrainian play “Natalka Poltavka”:

“We could forgive prominent artists: not knowing their roles, twisting Ukrainian words into the Russian manner, impossible caricatures and other thespian charms of the “Malorussians.” But one thing we can in no way forgive: this senseless, frenzied and useless hopak dancing with which famous “Malorussians” have rewarded the public. Everyone capered, starting from the wise and god-fearing Natalka and ending with the no-less-god-fearing old Horpyna[...], or let’s say they danced. This was such a disgusting and unbearably painful spectacle that it reminded one not of artists but rather of savages who have gotten a taste of moonshine and are heading off to celebrate.”²⁴

Summary

Due to the limited resources and seemingly low support among the local population the success of the Ukrainian national project in late Romanov Empire depended on the effective cooperation of Ukrainian activists with the liberal and democratic parties on the imperial level and effective competition with Russian nationalist conservative parties on the local. In this political setting, Ukrainian activists opted not to state overtly their ambitions to build a separate Ukrainian national state based on political values of democracy. Neither they opted to emphasize the intrinsic difference and superiority of Ukrainians towards Russians. Instead, they elaborated a number of ways to delineate Ukrainians indirectly. Using the common trend to criticize bureaucratization, they described its mores as intrinsically Russian. The negative aspects of Ukrainian reality like poverty, intersection of ethnic and class inequalities, ignorance, anti-Semitism, terrorism the Ukrainian nationalists treated as the result of colonizing power of Russian bureaucracy. Without openly presenting Russia as an Eastern despotic state Ukrainian activists compared it with the other, more distant images of the eastern despotisms, linked Russia’s history and traditions to them, while at the same time presenting Ukraine as an outpost of European civilization. They discarded the stereotypes of Malorussia as a docile and apolitical people of the South and by renaming the Malorussia into Ukraine tried to ascribe new active and masterful features to it. Finally, they juxtaposed Ukrainian folklore, traditional arts and popular theatre to Russian culture viewing the latter as generally rude, insensitive and violent.

¹Note on the use of terms. The geographical terms “Southwestern Russia” and “Malorussia” (“Little Russia”) are used as synonyms. Ukraine is the term introduced by Ukrainian nationalists instead of Malorussia and Southwestern Russia. It refers to the same territory, but reflects the Ukrainian nationalists’ position in the debate. In the discourse of Russian nationalism the term “Russia” at the beginning of XX cent. included Malorussia (Ukraine), however in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism the term “Russia” (and *Velikorossiya*) referred to Russia excluding Ukraine (Malorussia, Little Russia).

²See Chykalenko, Yevhen. *Shchodennyk*. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Kyiv: Tempora, 2004.

³*Ibid*, P. 320.

⁴These newspapers were “Kievlianin” (published in Kiev) and “Novoevremia” (Saint-Petersburg). Both were organs of the Russian moderate right-wing conservative parties supporting the politics of prime-minister Petr Stolypin.

⁵Kotenko, Anton, Olha Martynuk, and Alexei Miller. ““Maloross”: Evoliutsiia Poniatiia Do Pervoi Mirovoi Voiny.” In “*Poniatiia o Rossii*”: *K Istoricheskoi Semantike Imperskogo Perioda*, 2:496. Moscow: Novoeliteraturnoe obozrenie, 2012. <http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2011/108/ko3.html>. Access 25.04.2012

⁶The chief censor Sergei Shchegolev, member of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, published a book in 1912 about the artificial character of Ukrainian movement. Shchegolev, S.N. *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap yurznorusskogo separatizma*. Kiev: I.N. Kushnerev, 1912.

⁷I will base my analysis approaches set in the following works. Neumann, Iver B. *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation*. Manchester University Press ND, 1999.

Miller, Alexei. *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism. Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008.

⁸Velychenko, Steven. “Chislennost’ Biurokratii i Armii v Rossiyskoy Imperii v Sravnitel’noy Perspektive.” In *Rossiyskaya Imperiya v Zarubezhnoy Istorii*, 83–117. Novye Granitsy. Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2005. P. 83–117

⁹Kotsiubinskiy, Daniil. *Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale XX stoletiya: Rozhdenie i gibel’ ideologii Vserossiyskogo natsionalnogo soyuza*. Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2001. P. 133–140

¹⁰Hrushevskiy, Mykhailo. *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i Ukrainskiy Vopros*. Saint-Petersburg, 1907. P. 28, 32–33, 38, *Ukrainskiy Vopros*. Saint-Petersburg, 1914. P. 63

¹¹For example similar discourse by Milan Kundera. Neumann, Iver B. “Russland Positionieren: Nördlich Oder Östlich Der Mitte?” In *Europa Und Die Grenzen Im Kopf*. Wieser Enzyklopädie Des Europäischen Ostens 11. Klagenfurt, 2003. P. 42

¹²Hrushevskiy, Mykhailo. *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i Ukrainskiy Vopros*. Saint-Petersburg, 1907. P. 96

¹³*Ibid*, 58. *Ukrainskiy Vopros*. Saint-Petersburg, 1914.

¹⁴See also Lemberg, Hans. “Zur Entstehung Des Osteuropabegriffs Im 19. Jahrhundert Vom „Norden“ Zum „Osten“ Europas.” *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 33, no. 1. Neue Folge (January 1, 1985): 48–91.

-
- ¹⁵ Petro Stebnytskyi, "Bytyshliakh," in Petro Stebnytskyi, *Vybranytvory*, (Kiev: Tempora, 2009), p. 234-244
- ¹⁶ Hrushevskyi, Mykhailo. *IstoriyaUkrayiny-Rusi*. Vol. 1. 10 vols. 2nd ed. Lviv: DrukarniaTovarystvaim. TarasaShevchenka, 1904.
- ¹⁷ At this point Ukrainian nationalists attempted to change the paradigm of Russian history, the beginning of which was derived by Russian historians from the medieval state Kievan Rus. OlexiyTolochko, "DovhaistoriyaUkrayiny," in *Ukrayina I Rosiya v istorychniyaperspektyvi*, ed. V.M. Lytvyn, I.M. Dziuba, Ya. D. Isayevych. V.1. (Kyiv:NaukovaDumka, 2004). http://history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/UaRu/1/5_1.pdf (accessed 30.01.2012)
- ¹⁸ Kotenko, Anton, OlhaMartynyuk, and Alexei Miller. "'Maloross': EvoliutsiaPoniatii Do PervoiMirovoiVoiny." In "*Poniatii o Rossii*": *K IstoricheskoiSemantikeImperskogoPerioda*, 2:496. Moscow: Novoeliteraturnoeobozrenie, 2012. <http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2011/108/ko3.html>. Access 25.04.2012
- ¹⁹ FedorVolkov, "Antropologicheskiesobennostiukrainskogaroda." In FedorVolkov and others, eds., *Ukrainskiynarod v ego proshlom I nastoyashchem*, Vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1916), 452
- ²⁰ Ibid, 453
- ²¹ Ivan Sikorsky, "*Russkie I ukraincy. (Glavaizetnologicheskogokatehizisa): doklad v kluberusksihnazionalistov v Kieve 7 fevralia 1913 goda*," (Kiev, 1913). <http://russian.kiev.ua/books/sikorsky/catechism/catechism01.shtml> Access 25.04.2012 There was also another view on this question within the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalist. AnatoliySavenko, a spokesman of the club, claimed that Russians actually preserved more of originally Slavic traits while Ukrainians merged with Turks. He considered the latter fact contributed to Ukrainian separatism. Savenko, Anatoliy. "Zametki #65." *Kievlianin*. Kiev, May 3, 1909.
- ²² Lemberg, Hans. "ZurEntstehung Des OsteuropabegriffsIm 19. JahrhundertVom „Norden“ Zum „Osten“ Europas." *JahrbücherFür Geschichte Osteuropas* 33, no. 1.NeueFolge (January 1, 1985): 64-66.
- ²³ *UkrainskiyVopros*. Saint-Petersburg, 1914.
- ²⁴ PavloNedolia, "Malorosy, soyuznyky i natsional' nasvidomist'" in *Rada*, May 21, 1910

Bio-note

OlhaMartynyuk is a PhD candidate in history in the National Technical University of Ukraine "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute". Her research is focused on interethnic relations, urban development and the public sphere in Late Imperial Kiev. Previously she has conducted a research within MA programs in Central European University and National University of Ukraine "Kyiv Mohyla Academy" on the relations between Ukrainian and Russian national groups in Kiev (1905-1917). She has written in co-authorship with Alexei Miller and Anton Kotenko a book chapter "The Evolution of Notion of MalorossBefore World War I" (Kotenko, Anton, OlhaMartynyuk, and Alexei Miller. "Maloross: EvoliutsiyaPoliatiya Do PervoiMirovoiVoiny." In "*Poniatiya o Rossii*": *K IstoricheskoySemantikeImperskogoPerioda*, 2:392-443. Moscow: Novoeliteraturnoeobozrenie, 2012)