

*Paper prepared for the Euroacademia  
International Conference  
Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*

*Vienna, 17 – 19 May 2012*

*This paper is a draft  
Please do not cite*

# **The Rise of Extreme-Right in Europe: The Cases of Germany and Austria and The Question of Turkey's Membership to the EU**

**\*Assist. Prof. Dr. Selcen Öner  
Bahçeşehir University  
Department of EU Relations**

## **Abstract**

The rise of extreme-right started after the end of the Cold War, its influence accelerated in post-September 11 environment. The manifestations of the rise of extreme-right can be observed firstly in their rising results in local elections and several national elections. Some of them have become coalition partners, some have been supporting several governments from outside. They are usually more successful in local elections. Another manifestation of their rise can be seen in increase in extreme-right organizations and extreme-right violence. In this article firstly the reasons of the rise in extreme-right in Western Europe, secondly new “other”s of the extreme right in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are analysed. Thirdly the rise of extreme-right in Germany and Austria will be compared. Austria and Germany are countries which have high number of Turkish immigrants and the public opinions in these countries are mostly against Turkey's membership to the EU. Lastly the perceptions of extreme-right about immigrants and its reflections on Turkey's membership to the EU will be discussed.

**Keywords:** Extreme-right parties, Germany, Austria, immigrant, Turkey's membership to EU.

## **Introduction**

There are various concepts which were used for referring to the extreme-right parties such as “radical right”, “populist”, “far right” or “right-wing populist”. In this article “extreme-right” will be used. Extreme-right tendency is a European wide issue, in this article extreme-right in Western Europe particularly in Germany and Austria will be focused on.

Extreme-right parties have been influential in many countries of Western Europe such as Austria, Belgium and France. They even became partners in coalition governments in some countries. In Eastern Europe extreme right parties have been increasing their influence too (Mudde, 2011:14).

The extreme-right parties are ultranationalist, authoritarian, radical and populist. Each of which has these characteristics to various extents. They are in favour of national homogeneity, they have exclusionist policies through constructing the dominant ethnic and religious group as “us” and other groups are constructed as “them”. Xenophobia is usually common among them. They are usually against pluralist democracy. For these parties social benefits and employment should be restricted only for people of the dominant ethnic group (Gowland, et al. 2006: 428-429).

The supporters of extreme-right are usually young, male and they usually come from lower or lower middle class of society. Economic crisis in Europe since 2008 and increasing unemployment rates in European countries increased anti-immigrant sentiments. Extreme-right parties claim that there is a negative influence of immigrants on decreasing salaries of workers, increasing unemployment rates and on welfare benefits of the citizens of their society (Schellenberg A, 2011: 67).

The “other” of Western Europe was communism during the Cold War, especially after September 11 it has been replaced by Islamophobia and Muslim immigrants. Extreme-right parties claim that there has been a decline of Europe through emphasizing high intensity of non-European immigrants especially Muslim immigrants, meanwhile they stress on aging populations in their countries. They claim that these Muslim immigrants have blurred and challenged national identities and European identity. Extreme-right parties were emphasizing racism, anti-Semitism, however, in the last decade they have been increasingly making references to Judeo-Christian roots of Europe and they claim that Jews can be integrated but it is hard to integrate Muslim immigrants.

The extreme-right parties are mostly EU-sceptic or even anti-EU. They endanger several principles of the EU such as plurality and tolerance; they challenge even the motto of the EU “unity in diversity”. They oppose multiculturalism, because for them it leads to disintegration of the country. They are in favour of a “Fortress Europe”.

Extreme-right parties have had an increasing tendency to use discourses which may appeal electorates from the centre such as the position of women in Muslim society, honoured killings and forced marriages. Meanwhile Christian Democrat parties which see that extreme-right is on the rise, have been influenced by their discourses. Thus, extreme-right and centre-right parties have been coming closer to each other.

In many European countries there has been a tendency to have tougher immigration policies and stricter citizenship rules. The rising influence of extreme-right has influenced Turkey’s accession process to the EU too. According to Eurobarometer surveys the least wanted immigrants are Muslim immigrants and Turkey is the least wanted country as a full member. Although Turkey is a secular country which has a predominantly Muslim population, Turkish membership to the EU has been usually reflected as an instrument of Islamization of Europe.

In this article firstly the reasons of rise of extreme-right in Western Europe, secondly the “other”s of extreme right will be analysed. Thirdly different manifestations of the rise of extreme-right in Germany and Austria particularly the discourses and policies of Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany will be focused on. Germany and Austria who have high number of Turkish immigrants and whose public opinions are among the most sceptical about Turkey’s membership to the EU will be compared.

## **The Reasons of The Rise of Extreme-Right in Western Europe**

The extreme-right parties have not achieved a ruling majority in any national parliamentary election, but some have been part of coalition governments in Austria, Denmark and Italy. They have also influenced the discourses of mainstream parties particularly those of Christian Democrats (Fligstein, et al., 2012: 115). In some of the Western European countries extreme-right parties are strong such as Austria and France, while in Germany extreme-right parties have a fragmented and weak structure, however extreme-right movements are strong and violence is very widespread (Minkenberg, 2011: 47). The extreme-right parties’ electoral success is usually located at local level such as those in Germany. Local or regional elections are so important for a long-term success in national elections (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011: 21).

Several socio-political crisis have been influential in rising influence of extreme-right in Europe, including crisis of distribution, crisis of political representation and the crisis of identity. These parties often present themselves as representatives of the “man in the street”. They accuse the mainstream political parties as “elitist” and “representing only their own economic interests” (Langenbacher and Schellenberg A 2011:12-15). It is too hard to cope with the increasing influence of extreme-right in Europe without overcoming these crises (Schellenberg, B 2011: 310). Especially after the last financial crisis there has been a “resurgence of nationalist-oriented politics” in Europe (Fligstein, et al., 2012: 118).

Increasing economic uncertainty in global economy, increasing number of immigrants after the war in former Yugoslavia, and after the Eastern enlargement of the EU and gradual erosion of the elite consensus between mainstream parties to exclude extremist parties have been influential in rising influence of the extreme-right parties (Howard, 2001: 21). For Mudde successful extreme-right parties usually have a moderate ideology, strong organizational structure and they have a charismatic leader. He gave the example of Front National (FN) in France (Mudde, 2007: 275-276).

### Electoral Results of Some of the Extreme-Right Parties in Europe

Country	Party	Highest Result (%)	Latest result (%)
<b>Austria</b>	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	10.7	10.7
	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	26.9	17.5
<b>Belgium</b>	Flemish Interest (VB)	12.0	7.8
<b>Bulgaria</b>	National Union Attack (NSA)	9.4	9.4
<b>Denmark</b>	Danish People' Party (DFP)	13.8	13.8
<b>Hungary</b>	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	16.7	16.7
<b>Italy</b>	Northern League (LN)	10.1	8.3
<b>Netherlands</b>	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.5	15.5
<b>Romania</b>	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	19.5	3.2

**Source:** Cited in Mudde, 2011: 13.

Using of media particularly internet has a crucial influence in increase of the level of support to extreme-right. The extreme-right parties and organizations try to establish international alliances. The alliance of “Cities against Islamization” is an example of transnational cooperation between extreme-right groups including those of Austria, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, France, Netherlands and England (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011: 22).

### The “Other”s of Extreme-right in Western Europe

The new “other”s have been constructed as “enemy from within” which are usually Muslim immigrants. In addition to these, extreme-right parties are mostly against globalisation, multiculturalism and EU. The “other”s of Europe in the post-Cold War era also include non-white immigrants, Roma, Jews (Fligstein, et al., 2012: 114) and homosexuals. The “other”s vary from country to country. For example, North African immigrants are the main “other”s for extreme-right in France (Williams, 2010: 112-113).

In Eastern Europe larger indigenous ethnic minorities are the main “other”s. For example for Greater Romania Party and Bulgaria’s *Ataka*,

“Roma” or “Turkish” minorities are the “other”s (Nedelcu and Miller, 2011: 58).

In post-September 11 not only extreme-right parties, also centre-right and social democrat parties criticized multiculturalism<sup>1</sup> with regards to encouraging emergence of ghettos through “self-segregation” (Kundnani, 2007: 27). The extreme-right parties are usually in favour of strict border controls and they are usually against giving social benefits to immigrants (Fligstein, et al., 2012: 115).

Some scholars argue that there is a positive correlation between immigration level and the level of electoral support for extreme-right parties.<sup>2</sup> However, some of the scholars found a weak relation or no correlation between the levels of immigration and electoral support for extreme-right.<sup>3</sup> Givens argues that while Germany’s extreme-right is not related a lot with the level of immigration, extreme-right in Austria and France are more influenced by the level of immigration (2005: 85). Mudde and Williams claim that extreme-right parties are not only dependent on rising immigration levels for their electoral success; it is also related with their ability to connect immigration to other meaningful issues (Mudde, 2007; Williams, 2006). Rather than “actual threat” from the immigrants, the “perceived threat” may increase support for extreme-right parties (Fligstein, et al., 2012: 116).

Some scholars argue that “Muslims” have replaced “Jews” as new transnational “other” in Europe.<sup>4</sup> Taguieff claims that Muslims are less able to be assimilated than Jews.<sup>5</sup> Taguieff claims that there has been a transformation from “biological racism” to a racism based on cultural differences (cited in Zuquete, 2008: 335). Some of the extreme-right parties especially those in Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden exclude anti-Semitism (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011:18). According to Williams, Turks, other Muslim guest workers and post colonial immigrants, who are perceived as a threat to the homogeneity of that society, became primary out-groups for extreme-right parties, thus the position of anti-Semitism as an “other” has decreased. According to extreme-right party manifesto analyses made by Williams, Muslims are the only group named specifically in extreme-right party discussions of their policy concerns (Williams, 2010: 120-128). The extreme-right emphasizes discrimination against women among Muslim immigrants, particularly focusing on forced marriages, honour killings through which they can extend their support in the society (Zuquete, 2008: 333).

## **The Extreme-Right in Germany and Austria**

Germany and Austria have similar political systems and similar immigration history from similar sending countries. Both implemented “guest-worker policies” from the beginning of 1960s until 1974 when “recruitment stops” were implemented. Both declared themselves as “non-immigration countries”. Since the beginning of 1990s the question of

immigration, integration and citizenship has been addressed in German and Austrian politics (Ludvig, 2004: 502-505).

Germany and Austria are similar also in terms of acquisition of citizenship. They both rely on “*jus sanguinis*” which refers to the principle of descent that is reflected in their nationality laws. Austria made some amendments on nationality in 1999 and Germany in 2000. Germany softened the principle by introducing limited “*jus soli*” (Ludvig, 2004: 499). However, Austria maintained principle of “*jus sanguinis*”. With the reformed regulations on nationality, purely ethnic definition of German nationality was changed; the citizenship can be acquired based on the principle of birthplace. This allows German citizenship for a child born in Germany to foreign parents, if at least one of the parents has lived legally in Germany for at least eight years and holds a permanent residence permit.

While in Austria extreme-right parties are really successful which has manifested in national elections, German extreme-right parties could not enter *Bundestag*.

**Results of FPÖ, BZÖ and NPD in the National Elections**

<b>Austria-FPÖ</b>	1999-%26.9	2002-%10	2006-%11.0	2008-%17.5
<b>Austria-BZÖ</b>			2006-%4.1	2008-%10.7
<b>Germany-NPD</b>			2005-%1.6	2009-%1.5

Source:<http://www.electionresources.org/at/>;  
<http://www.electionresources.org/de/>

**The Extreme-Right in Germany**

After the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War there was a restricted political space for extreme-right parties in Germany. Because of its Nazi past Germany has been more sensitive about extreme-right parties. Currently there are several extreme-right parties in Germany such as Republicans (REP) and German People’s Union (DVU) but in this article NPD which has the biggest support among extreme-right parties in Germany will be focused on.

In Germany the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) has a well established anti-immigration position, there are crucial problems about integration of immigrants, there is restricted political space for extreme-right, thus, extreme-right has become more radicalized (Nedelcu and Miller, 2011: 62). They are usually accused of corruption and having incompetent staff, moreover they have been usually discredited because of their close relations to Nazism (Schellenberg, A 2011: 76).

Compared to other western European countries, the electoral success of extreme-right parties in Germany is relatively small. None of the extreme-right parties could enter the *Bundestag*. They have not made an impact at European Parliament elections except the REP which get 7.1% in 1989 elections. However, at local and regional level Germany’s extreme-right parties are strong. Deputies from NPD, DVU, REP and the *Stop*

*Foreigners* action group and *Pro-Cologne* group have seats in several local assemblies and in municipal councils. Till mid-1990s extreme-right parties had better results in West Germany than East Germany. However, since the end of 1990s they have had higher results in East Germany than West Germany (Schellenberg, A 2011: 64-67).

NPD was established in 1964. Many members of NPD were former Nazis. The initial programme of NPD was including pro-Nazi, anti-Communist and Catholic elements. Udo Voigt has been the chairman of the party since 1996. During his leadership a new party programme was prepared which has been still maintained.

In the NPD party programme the threats for the existence of German nation are stated as “the decline in birth rates, quickly spreading alienation, the enforcements of international organizations and dreadful effects of globalization” (2010: 5). The NPD is even against giving permanent residence permit to the immigrants. In the party programme it is stated that:

“German should stay the country of Germans and when it was not like this it has to be return back to this character again. Permanent residence permit should not be given to the foreigners in Germany...they have to be pushed to return back to their countries...Germany’s alienation on ethnic basis through immigration has to be prevented decisively like cultural alienation which is caused by Americanization and Islamization” (2010: 5).

In the party programme Islamization was mentioned as a threat to German identity. It is argued that:

“Structural and cultural changes which are caused by buildings of foreign religions have to be stopped. The main threat for German identity and culture does not come from Islam, rather Islamization” (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 13).

In the party programme of NPD, immigration is reflected as a challenge to the social state structure of Germany. It is stated that “we, the Germans have to choose between to be a social state or to be an immigration country” (2010:6). It is argued that:

“The foreigners should be left out from the German social security system, rather they should be under the framework of new social security law...Those who apply for refugee status should not have social security rights” (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 11).

The NPD is against moving away from the principle of “*jus sanguinis*”. In the party programme it was argued that:

“Because of many naturalizations German citizenship rights are abused and even the right of existence of German nation is nearly to be questioned. In order to overcome this decay, the previous citizenship system of ‘*jus sanguinis*’ has to come into force again. ‘Multicultural’ society is



unsuccessful. In many cities parallel societies and ghettos are emerging, thus German people in these regions have become minorities in their own countries" (2010: 12).

The NPD is against integration of immigrants. In the party programme it was stated that "the foreigners who come from different countries for several job opportunities have to protect their identities. This will facilitate their return to their countries" (2010: 13). NPD is even against education of German students and children of the immigrants at the same schools. It is claimed that "...the children of foreigners decrease the level of the classes with their low level of German language skills, thus, they negatively influence language and reading skills" (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 17).

NPD is against "othering" of Germany's Nazi background. It is emphasized in its party programme that:

"...we reject the idea of guiltiness which has been accepted by the state...this thought encourages hate towards 'us' among Germans especially among young generations...We, the Germans are not a nation of criminals" (2010: 14).

The supranational character of the EU is criticized by NPD. It is argued that "the transfer of right of legislation from federal parliament and landers to the EU means giving up national sovereignty" (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 13). According to NPD Germany should even leave the EU and NATO (NPD Party Programme, 2010: 5).

At the party's national conference in 1998 three strategic goals were determined: "Battle for the streets", "battle for minds" and "battle for voters". In addition to these, fourth goal was added in 2004 which is unifying extreme-right for "battle for organized will". Thus, it was recognized that electoral success could be achieved by cooperation with other extreme-right parties and associations (Schellenberg, A 2011: 58-59). However, some extreme-right parties in Europe have maintained a distance from NPD because it is perceived as a member of a radical form of the extreme-right (Schellenberg, A 2011: 77-78). The possibility of banning NPD is still under discussion in Germany.

The extreme-right offences have increased a lot in Germany. After the attacks on hostels of asylum seekers and racist murders in Solingen and Mölnn some of the extreme-right organizations were prohibited. As a response extreme-right groups stopped applying for official status, instead more flexible associations which refer to a group of 10-30 persons in a loose network is preferred. Through having loose autonomous structure, they can escape from state repression, but recently few of these groups were prohibited (Schellenberg, A 2011: 68-72). The German Constitutional Court has been successful in terms of limiting the spread of organized extreme-right movement (Howard, 2001: 29). However, it is not enough to overcome extreme-right violent attacks.

Consequently unlike their counterparts in other European countries extreme-right parties in Germany are not successful at national elections; rather they are usually strong at local levels. NPD has been successful particularly in rural areas of eastern Germany. Through using internet and transnational networks radical-right groups try to escape from suppression in Germany. There is a high level of violence for extreme-right purposes and anti-Semitism is still crucial for extreme-right in Germany. Because of the internal problems of extreme-right parties and ongoing repression by the state, electoral success of extreme-right parties at national level will not be so easy in the foreseeable future (Schellenberg, A 2011: 79).

### **The Extreme-right in Austria**

In Germany and Austria the manifestations of the rise of extreme-right are different from each other. In Austria extreme-right parties are strong which manifests in their national election results. Even they became partners in coalition governments. There are several extreme-right parties in Austria, but in this article, FPÖ which has the biggest support among extreme-right parties will be focused on.

In the postwar there was an elite consensus among the mainstream parties in both Germany and Austria about not to tolerate extreme-right parties and movements. In both of these countries there were small extreme-right parties which existed from the early postwar period onwards but they were excluded. In Germany the elite consensus was enforced by the Constitutional Court. In Austria the elite consensus was not implemented by the Constitutional Court, rather two leading parties (Social Democrats and People's Party) cooperated to exclude potential competitors, which is referred to as *Proporz* system. According to this system for career advancement and privileges in politics and civil service, membership in one of these major parties has a crucial influence. As long as these parties continued to cooperate, there was little opportunity for the extreme-right parties to threaten stability of the system. The FPÖ which was established in 1956 as a continuation of the post-Nazi "Association of Independents", was excluded by the mainstream parties for a long period. This changed in the late 1970s when the Social Democrat Chancellor Kreisky tried to weaken the People's Party by lifting up FPÖ. Between 1983 and 1986 the Social Democrats which was led by Vranitzky included FPÖ as a junior partner in the coalition government. The participation of FPÖ in the government legitimated it and elite consensus collapsed. In 1986 Haider became the leader of FPÖ. Between 1986 and 1999 the Social Democrats and People's Party formed an ineffective "grand coalition", while FPÖ had an opportunity to enhance its credibility as the major party in the opposition (Howard, 2001: 22-24).

In November 1999 elections FPÖ get 27% of the votes and it became partner of the coalition government with Christian Democrats. When FPÖ became partner of the Austrian government in January 2000, other member states of the EU announced that they would protest the inclusion of

FPÖ in the Austrian government by suspending bilateral links with Austria, reducing contact with Austrian ambassadors and by opposing Austrian candidates for international positions (Howard, 2001: 25-26). The Austrian President Thomas Klestil pushed Haider to sign a declaration supplementary to the coalition agreement which was stating that the future government would uphold all European and international human rights conventions (Schulz, 2011: 28). The report of the EU's three wise men convinced other member states about removing the diplomatic sanctions against Austria in September 2000 (Howard, 2001: 31). The reaction of the EU had a symbolic importance which showed that extreme-right policies are against the principles of the EU.

In 2002 because of the disputes within FPÖ several members of FPÖ resigned which led to collapse of the government. Haider resigned as FPÖ chairman. In 2002 elections FPÖ lost more than half of its votes but it became a coalition partner of Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP) again. FPÖ split into two parties FPÖ and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) which was again led by Haider.

In the party programme of FPÖ the main goals of the party are stated as "protecting our homeland of Austria, our national identity and autonomy as well as our natural livelihood" (2011). It is emphasized that Austria is not a country of immigration. However it is not against integrated immigrants. It is stated that:

"Legal and legitimate immigrants who are already integrated, who can speak German language, who fully acknowledge our values and laws and have set down cultural roots should be given the right to stay and obtain citizenship" (Party Programme of FPÖ, 2011).

However, it is added that "foreigners convicted of a crime in Austria must be deported to their homeland" (Party Programme of FPÖ, 2011). Current FPÖ leader Strache talks about the threat of Islamism. He argues about the demise of the Occident. He claimed that "we shall end up in a mono-cultural future of Islamism, if we do not fight back" (cited in Strasser, 2008: 183).

FPÖ perceives that Europe does not refer to EU. It is stated in its party programme that:

"We...firmly reject any artificial synchronization of the diverse European languages and cultures by means of forced multiculturalism, globalization and mass immigration. Europe shall not be reduced to a political project of the EU" (2011).

Consequently compared to Germany the extreme-right parties in Austria are much stronger and they have more moderate and populist character.

## The Extreme-Right in Germany and Austria and Turkey's Membership to the EU

Especially after the last economic crisis in the EU, the public opinions in the member states are mostly sceptical towards further enlargement of the EU. In Spring 2011 enlargement of the EU is supported by only 42% of the citizens of the EU, while 47% were against. The countries which are mostly against further enlargement are Austria (72%) and Germany (71%) (2011: 55). Turkey is the least wanted country among the candidate countries of the EU.

**For each of the following countries would you be in favour or against it becoming part of the EU in the future?**

Iceland	60%
Croatia	47%
Ukraine	37%
Montenegro	36%
FYR Macedonia	35%
Bosnia	35%
Serbia	34%
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>30%</b>
Albania	29%
Kosovo	29%

**Source:** Standard Eurobarometer 74, Autumn 2010, p.62.

In Germany and Austria there are high number of Turkish immigrants and public opinion is mostly against the membership of Turkey to the EU. Germany is a founder member of the EU and it is one of the most influential countries in the enlargement policy and it has the largest number of Turkish immigrants among European countries. The highest number of immigrants in Germany is from Turkey (Facts About Germany, 2012). Germany and Austria are among those EU states which are the least supportive of Turkey's membership to the EU. As Delanty argues, the controversy over Turkey's bid for EU membership is linked to fears of influx of immigrants from Turkey after its membership. Also it has trying to be connected with Islamization of Europe in spite of secular character of Turkey (Delanty, 2008: 681).

**The EU Countries which Supported Turkey's Membership to the EU  
The Least**

	<b>Autumn 2004</b>	<b>Spring 2009</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>27%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>25%</b>
France	39%	31%
Luxembourg	38%	27%

As a response to a labour shortage in the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkish immigration began in early 1960s. Germany signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey in October 1961 which regulated the short-term immigration of Turkish workers. After Germany, Austria in 1964 and several other European countries such as Netherlands and France signed bilateral agreements with Turkey. The immigration that had been temporary had become long term (Wets, 2006: 85).

The extreme-right parties are mostly against Turkey's membership to the EU which is in accordance with their position against immigrants particularly Muslim immigrants. Christoph Blocher who is leader of Swiss People's Party of Switzerland argued that "we had the Turks at the gates of Vienna once, we do not need that again" (cited in Schulz, 2011: 31). Jean Marie Le Pen, former leader of FN claimed the possibility of "true Islamic invasion of Europe" which will lead eventually Turkey's membership to the EU (cited in Zuquete, 2008: 331).

FPÖ emphasized that unlike mainstream parties it rejected Turkey's membership to the EU. There are usually historical references while arguing against Turkey's membership in Austria. Haider stated that "for what reasons did our ancestors defend our country against the Turks if we are now letting them in again?" (cited in Gingrich, 1998: 104). During the campaign for the Vienna city council elections in 2005 FPÖ used discourses against immigration, Turkey, Turks and Muslims. BZÖ had been against the negotiations with Turkey from the beginning too.

In 2005 representatives from seven extreme-right parties<sup>6</sup> signed Vienna Declaration of Patriot and Nationalist Movements and Parties. In this declaration they stated that they are against enlargement of the EU to the regions outside Europe, immigration should be stopped as soon as possible, social rights of the immigrants should be restricted and they asked for rejection of the Constitutional Treaty (Fligstein, et al., 2012: 115).

Social Democrat Party of Austria (SPÖ) is in favour of a kind of "privileged partnership". On the other hand, Austrian President Heinz Fischer and the mayor of Vienna Michael Haupl supported negotiations between Turkey and the EU (Strasser, 2008: 180-181). The Austrian government (Coalition of ÖVP-FPÖ) was against the start of negotiations between Turkey and the EU at the European Council Summit. At the end,

they were convinced when it was accepted that the negotiations with Croatia will also start on 3 October 2005. The current coalition partner ÖVP stated their support for holding a referendum for Turkey's membership at the end of the negotiation process.

On 23-24 October 2010 in Vienna a meeting was organized with the hostage of FPÖ in order to increase cooperation between the parties from the right. In this meeting especially Christian Democrat parties were more influential. The extreme-right parties did not participate from Germany, France and Netherlands. They decided to start referendum campaign for Turkey's membership to the EU. The FPÖ leader Strache made a press meeting and stressed that it would be wrong to accept "non-European" countries to the EU and he claimed that this type of a union would represent "Europe-Asia-Africa Union".<sup>6</sup>

The political parties which support the membership of Turkey to the EU are usually Social Democrat Parties and Greens. Those, who are against the membership of Turkey are mostly Christian Democrat and extreme-right parties.<sup>7</sup> As Hainsworth argues, extreme-right parties have influenced the "agendas, policies and discourses of major political parties and governments" (2000: 14). The mainstream parties particularly centre-right parties have been influenced by the rhetoric of extreme-right parties especially about immigration issues and Turkey's membership to the EU (Mudde, 1999). Thus, extreme-right and mainstream rhetoric have been becoming closer to each other.

## **Conclusion**

In contemporary European politics extreme-right is not at the periphery anymore (Nedelcu and Miller, 2011: 64). The extreme-right parties have been part of coalition governments or supporting several governments from outside. The FN became the third party in Presidential elections in April 2012 by gaining 18% of the votes. In Netherlands when the extreme-right party withdrew its support, the Dutch government collapsed in April 2012. All these instances reflect the growing influence of extreme-right in European politics.

Especially after September 11 there has been a tendency towards stricter immigration policies and citizenship regulations in Europe. These policies have led to further problems in integration of immigrants. When immigrants can not integrate, it leads to increasing xenophobia and anti-immigrant tendency in host societies which provides a suitable environment for extreme-right movements and political parties. These lead to emergence of a vicious circle which is too hard to overcome in the near future.

In the countries such as Germany and Austria where there are high numbers of Turkish immigrants and many of those could not be integrated, the public opinions are mostly against the membership of Turkey to the EU. The main reason is the fear of influx of further immigrants if Turkey will become a member of the EU. Thus, anti-immigration discourses and

opposition towards Turkey's membership to the EU have been usually used in parallel with each other by extreme-right and also by Christian Democrat parties.

In order to cope with extreme-right a "multi-layered strategy" is necessary. Extreme-right tendencies in each European country have unique characteristics. Thus, there is a necessity to make further comparative analysis among European countries. Strengthening civil society and education on democracy and human rights are some of the measures which can be taken in order to cope with increasing influence of extreme-right tendencies in Europe (Schellenberg, B 2011:317). Education and media have a crucial role in constructing prejudices against "other". The young generations are the main focus of extreme-right organizations. The higher people's education, it is less likely that they will support extreme-right organizations and parties (Langenbacher, 2011: 324).

Consequently one of the most important results of political, economic and identity crisis of Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the rise of extreme-right all over Europe. These crisis in Europe have to be overcome as soon as possible, the mainstream political parties have to be careful about using extreme right rhetoric and the member states of the EU should act together in order to resist the rise of extreme-right parties and violence in Europe that is one of the biggest challenges to the future of EU which is the biggest peace project in the world.

---

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> In multiculturalism various cultural communities live side by side on an equal basis. Each community maintains its own traditions and values without much interaction with other communities. The lack of interaction and exchange between communities may lead to isolation and alienation among them.

<sup>2</sup> For further detail see Gibson, R. (2002), *The Growth of Anti-immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, Ceredigion: Edwin Mellen; Golder, M. (2003) "Explaining Variation in Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 36, pp. 432-466; Lubbers, M., Gijssberts, M. And Sheepers, P. (2002) "Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe". *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol.41, pp. 345-378.

<sup>3</sup> For further detail see Kitschelt, H. (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press); Swank, D. and Betz, H. (2003) "Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe", *Socio-Economic Review*, Vol.1, pp. 215-245.

<sup>4</sup> For further detail see Dominic Boyer, "Welcome to the New Europe", *American Ethnologist*, Vol.32, No.4, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> For further detail see Pierre-Andre Taguieff, *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and Its Doubles*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

---

<sup>6</sup>For further detail see

[www.ikv.org.tr/.../avrupada asiri sag partiler turkiyenin ab uyelig...](http://www.ikv.org.tr/.../avrupada_asiri_sag_partiler_turkiyenin_ab_uyelig...),

Retrieved on 8 March 2012.

<sup>7</sup> For further detail see Selcen Öner, *Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity*, Lanham Maryland: Lexington Pub., 2011.

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

Delanty, Gerard, "Fear of "Other"s: Social Exclusion and the European Crisis of Solidarity", *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol.42, No.6, December 2008.

Elections to the German Bundestag, <http://www.electionresources.org/de/>, Retrieved on 28 January 2012.

"Facts About Germany", <http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/society/main-content-08/immigration-and-integration.html>, 22 April 2012.

Federal Elections in Austria, <http://www.electionresources.org/at/>, Retrieved on 8 March 2012.

Fligstein, Neil; Alina Polyakova and Wayne Sandholtz, "European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.50, Number S1, 2012.

Gingrich, A. "Frontier Myths of Orientalism: The Muslim World in Public and Popular Cultures of Central Europe" in Baskar Bojan and Brumen Borut (eds.), *Mediterranean Ethnological Summer School*, Vol.2, Ljubljana: Institute for Multicultural Studies, 1998.

Givens, Terri, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Gowland, David; Richard Dunphy and Charlotte Lythe, *The European Mosaic*, London: Prentice Hall, 2006.

Hainsworth, P. "Introduction: The Extreme Right" in P. Hainsworth (ed.), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From The Margins to the Mainstream*, London: Pinter, 2000.

Howard, Marc Morje, "Can Populism be Suppressed in a Democracy?", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.14, No.2, 2001.

Kundnani, Arun, "Integrationism: The Politics of anti-Muslim Racism", *Race&Class*, Vol.48, No.4, 2007.

Langenbacher, Nora and Britta Schellenberg, "Introduction: An Anthology about the Manifestations and Development of the Radical Right in Europe"



---

in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Is Europe on the "Right" Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011.

Ludvig, Alice, "Why Should Austria be Different from Germany? The Two Recent Nationality Reforms in Contrast", *German Politics*, Vol.13, No.3, September 2004.

Minkenberg, Michael, "The Radical Right in Europe Today: Trends and Patterns in East and West", in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Is Europe on the "Right" Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011.

Mudde, Cas, "The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue". *West European Politics*, Vol.22, No.3, 1999.

Mudde, C., *Populist Radical Right Parties*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Mudde, C., "Radical Right Parties in Europe: What, Who, Why?", *Participation* (Bulletin of the International Political Science Association), Vol.35, No.1, October 2011.

Nedelcu, Harry and Chris Miller, "Migration and the Extreme Right in Western Europe", *Review of European and Russian Affairs*, Vol.6, No.1, 2011.

Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 18 June 2011, [www.fpoe.at](http://www.fpoe.at). Retrieved on 12 February 2012.

Party Programme of National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), 2010, <http://www.npd-sh.de/index.php>. Retrieved on 16 February 2012.

Schellenberg, Britta (A), "The Radical Right in Germany: Its Prohibition and Reinvention" in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Is Europe on the "Right" Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011.

Schellenberg, Britta, (B) "Strategies against The Radical Right and for a Pluralist, Forward-Looking Europe" in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Is Europe on the "Right" Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011.

Schulz, Martin, "Combating Right-wing Extremism as a Task for European Policy Making" in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Is Europe on the "Right" Path?: Right-wing Extremism and Right-wing Populism in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011.

---

Standard Eurobarometer 62, European Commission, Autumn 2004.

Standard Eurobarometer 71, European Commission, Spring 2009.

Standard Eurobarometer 74, European Commission, Autumn 2010.

Standard Eurobarometer 75, European Commission, Spring 2011.

Strasser, Sabine, "Europe's Other: Nationalism, Transnationals and Contested Images of Turkey in Austria", *European Societies*, Vol.10, No.2, 2008.

Wets, Johan, "The Turkish Community in Austria and Belgium: The Challenge of Integration", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.7, No.1, March 2006.

Williams, Michelle Hale, *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2006.

Williams, M. H., "Can Leopards Change Their Spots? Between Xenophobia and Trans-ethnic Populism among West European Far Right Parties", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.16, 2010.

Zuquete, Jose Pedro, "The European Extreme-Right and Islam: New Directions?", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.13, No.3, October 2008.

**Short Biography of the Author:** Selcen Öner is currently working as Assist. Prof. Dr. at Bahçeşehir University at the Department of EU Relations. She finished her PhD at Marmara University at the Department of EU Politics and International Relations of the EU Institute in 2008. She finished her MA at Marmara University at the department of Political Science and International Relations in 2002. She had her undergraduate degree from Istanbul University, department of International Relations in 1999. Her research interests are Turkey-EU relations, European identity, EU politics, civil society in Turkey, Turkish foreign policy, Europeanization and extreme-right in Europe. Some of her recent publications are:

*Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity*, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Pub., July 2011.

"Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy and Increasing Multidimensional Approach", *EurOrient*, No-35-36, 2011.

Öner, Selcen. "'Unity and Diversity' in the European Union: The Case of Turkey's Membership", *Forum Bosnae*, No. 51, December 2010.