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Transformation of German-European identity in the Eurozone crisis: an empirical study of public opinion in Germany

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Abstract

Has the Eurozone crisis, which has begun in 2010, already had some influence on the transformation of the relatively stable relationship between national and European dimensions of German collective identity? Has the strength of the European identity somehow changed in Germany? Can one observe rising instillation of “European values” in German national identity or widening gap between sense of Germanness and Europeaness? On one hand, the issue of European integration gained immensely on salience thanks to the unprecedented media attention which could lead to strengthening of European identity in Germany. On the other hand, there is quite a significant opposition to the financial help to peripheral member states in German publics which could be interpreted as weakening of the sense of mutual European solidarity and European dimension of German collective identity. The main research questions of this contribution are whether the Eurozone crisis has led to decline or rise in European identity in Germany and any substantial changes in the complementarity of national and European dimensions of German collective identity. The research is based on the quantitative data from attitudinal surveys and their proper interpretation following from the appropriate set of statistical analyses (logistic regression, crosstabulation). I conclude that in fact, there is no apparent tendency neither with regard to strengthening nor weakening of the European identity in Germany observable during the crisis despite the fact that the support for membership or trust in the EU and European Commission are declining. At the same time one can observe declining complementarity between national and European dimensions of German collective identity. However this tendency seems to reach beyond the crisis. I contend that in the case the crisis is protracted, one can expect negative effects of the crisis on the extension of the European identity in Germany.

Key words

Eurozone, crisis, Germany, European identity, national identity

Introduction

The Eurozone crisis has already had an immense influence on the development of the European integration. Earlier unconceivable drafts have been passed by co-legislators (e.g. the so called Six-pack and Two-pack – see European Parliament 2013; European Commission 2012b), the European Commission has come up with a “Green paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds” (see European Commission 2011a) and with a “Blueprint for deep and genuine economic and monetary union” (see European Commission 2012a) and the European Central Bank has undertaken special and unusual operations in order to lower the pressure on interest rates of some Eurozone countries’ bonds (European Central Bank 2012). Substantial financial help (in the form of loans) from various sources (e.g. European Financial Stability Facility - EFSF, European Financial Stabilization Mechanism - EFSM, European Stability Mechanism – ESM; see European Financial Stability Facility 2013 and European Commission 2013) has been introduced to the most indebted Eurozone countries and the European Council has agreed on the main guidelines for the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as one of the main pillars of the emerging banking union (Council of the European Union 2012). These decisions and measures have been made under the high pressure of financial markets and with large disgust of public opinion in some countries. The austerity measures in countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy or Cyprus have caused a lot of anger among their inhabitants (Smith 2012). At some point of the crisis various economists and politicians were making open statements about the possibility of the breakup of the Eurozone and its plausible damaging impacts on the development of the European integration in its entirety (“No Time to Lose: Juncker Says Crisis Has Reached ‘Decisive Point’.” 2012).

In relation to the crisis it is often spoken about identities, stereotypes, cultures etc. On one hand, there is quite a passionate discussion, whether there is some kind of common European identity and European demos, which would justify the transfer of various powers from national to the supranational level of governance (McCormick 2010, 9, 216-220; Delanty and Rumford 2005, 54; De Beus 2001, 288-289; Cram 2009, 110, 124). However, on the other hand, possible effects of this crisis on the perceptions of collective identities by the European citizens have not been discussed enough. The Eurozone crisis began three years ago and it is not clear whether it is approaching to its end. Therefore, it is clear that any final conclusions about the effects of the crisis on the collective identities of Europeans

cannot be drawn. However, some first steps should be made in this kind of research in order to find out, whether the crisis might have already brought some changes to perceptions of identities or whether we still might expect some of them.

Germany has a special position in the context of the crisis. It is the biggest contributor to the emergency funds (see European Stability Mechanism 2013) and it represents one of the economies, which have most successfully managed the financial and economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 (See German economic indicators at Trading Economics 2013). At the same time, it can become an easy target for historical reminiscences in various countries (f. e. see Flock 2012). The Eurozone crisis seems to be widely discussed in the German public. In this context it is crucial to find out, whether these discussions have influenced Germans' collective identities. Is "Europeanness" still an essential element of German national identity as it used to be (see Risse 2003, 498) or can we observe any substantial changes in this matter? This question is crucial, when one accepts that European identity represents an indispensable core for any political community of Europeans (see De Beus 2001, 288-289).

The main research questions of this contribution are whether the Eurozone crisis has already had an impact on Germans' European identity and on the relationship between national and European dimensions of Germans' collective identity. More specifically, in the context of the crisis, do we observe decline or rise in European identity in Germany and any substantial changes in the complementarity of national and European dimensions of German collective identity? Although I accept that predictions are a very contentious part of social sciences, I broaden the above-mentioned research question to include an investigation of potential future tendencies with respect to the strength of European identity in Germany. The research is based on the quantitative data from attitudinal surveys (Eurobarometer) and its proper interpretation following from the appropriate set of statistical analyses (crosstabulation and logistic regression).

In the first part of the paper I shortly focus on the theoretical basis of this mainly empirical study. Especially, I draw upon the interpretation of Easton's theory of political support in the context of European integration by Bernhard Wessels. Moreover, the relationship between economy and identity is examined in order to support the claim that economic crisis can influence the re/construction of collective identities. Furthermore, various models of the relationship between dimensions of collective identities are discussed.

Second part is devoted to the problem whether any relationship between specific and diffuse support for the European integration exists in Germany during the times of crisis.¹ One would expect that those who think that the crisis is managed well by the EU, those who trust the European institutions and the EU and those who appreciate the membership of their country in the EU (as a good thing) will consider themselves more often as European citizens than those who reject all these claims. The analysis is based on the method of binary logistic regression and is using the data from Eurobarometer 75 gathered in spring 2011 (the data are available at Leibniz Institute for Social Science 2013a).

In the third part of the article the tendencies in various indicators of the support for the EU in German public opinion are examined. On one hand, the feeling of the European identity is measured directly by the indicators as "attachment to the EU" or "citizenship of the EU". On the other hand, one can have some expectations about the future trajectory of the extension of the European identity in Germany from the recent changes in the indicators as trust in the EU or membership support. Following the conclusions of the second part it is possible to make some humble predictions of the development of the European identity in Germany.

The fourth part of the paper discusses the development of the complementarity of the national and European dimensions of German collective identity. As follows from the theoretical part, complementarity represents very useful instrument for finding out whether there is any rising Euroscepticism in the public opinion of any country.² Exclusive national identity in contrast with the dual identities (German-European, European-German) implies higher level of Euroscepticism which means that those who possess only exclusive national identity tend to be more Eurosceptic (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 417). Therefore, it is instrumental to examine whether there is any trend of increase or decrease of complementarity of the national and European dimensions of German collective identity. Unfortunately, there is not enough data for drawing any undoubted solution. However, one can at least come to some preliminary conclusions.

Theoretical discussion

European identity and theory of political support

In his discussion of various kinds of Euroscepticism, Bernhard Wessels draws upon Easton's hierarchical distinction of three levels of political objects (authorities, regime, community) and two modes of orientation (specific and diffuse). The specific mode of orientation is connected with authorities; the diffuse mode of orientation is associated also with the regime and community (Wessels, 2007, 289).³ In this context, Wessels verifies two hypotheses, the

“cumulation” hypothesis and the “buffer” hypothesis. In line with the buffer hypothesis those with strong European identity (as a core element for political community) tend to be less Eurosceptic at the level of authorities and regime (Wessels 2007, 290-291). Moreover, the strongest buffering effect can be found at more general levels of political support, i.e. the support for political regime. It is weaker at more specific levels of political support (the perception of effectiveness and responsiveness of authorities).⁴

However, in this paper we are more interested in the reverse causal relationship that is the influence of supposed Eurosceptic views (connected with the crisis) on the development of European identity in Germany. In this context, the cumulation hypothesis seems to be much more of use. It suggests that the discontent on more specific levels spills over to more general levels of political support (Wessels 2007, 290-291). Accordingly, one can expect that the perception of the low capacity of the EU to solve the crisis (as a measure of effectiveness of the EU authorities)⁵ transforms in the lower trust in the European Commission and the EU as a whole (as measures of responsiveness of the EU authorities),⁶ which mirrors in the more critical stance to the membership in the EU (as a measure of support for regime)⁷ and finally in the decrease of the identification with the EU.⁸ On this basis I perform logistic regression in the second part of the paper followed by the examination of tendencies in the development of the above-mentioned indicators in the third part.

European identity, economic rationality and euro

One of the most interesting discussions of the impact of the European economic integration on the development of European identity has been provided by Thomas Risse in his article “The Euro between national and European identity” (Risse 2003). Although this article was presented already in 2003, it is worth of special attention in the times of the Eurozone crisis. Following the notion of entitativity,⁹ Risse came to the conclusion that the introduction of euro had already increased the collective identification of the Europeans with the EU (Risse 2003, 493). It follows the apparent question of whether the crisis of the Eurozone contributed to the decline of European identity or whether the increased attention to the issue of European integration caused somehow paradoxical effect of bolstering the European identity just because of the feeling of threat to the whole project of European integration.

The relationship between (collective) identity and economic rationality has been discussed by plenty of scholars. Some argue that identity and rational economic interest stay in mutual opposition (Caporaso and Kim 2009, 21-22). Others claim that the concept of identity is simply a kind of widening of the limited rationalist view of human and that economic interest can even support an identity (Cram 2009, 111-112). In this context, Ruiz Jiménez et al. (2004, 3-5) differentiate so called “instrumental identity”, which is based on the economic rationality, from other kinds of identities (cultural, civic and affective-symbolic). In this article, I build upon this line of argument. Economic rationality is part of human identity and therefore Eurozone crisis can potentially cause quite significant transformation of German-European identity.

European and national identity

The notion of collective identities is quite a complex theoretical issue, which should be reflected by this paper. Therefore, it is of high importance to realize that different dimensions of collective identities do not have to stand only in a conflictual relationship (e.g. Delanty, Rumford 2005, 51; Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004, 2; Risse 2003, 488). More specifically, it is possible to feel very strong national identity and at the same time to be strongly attached to Europe (e.g. Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004, 8). This fact is taken into account by various models of the relationship among collective identities, e.g. models of nested identities, concentric circles, layer cake, crosscutting identities or marble cake.¹⁰ It is widely believed by scholars that the holders of exclusive national identities are more reserved to the European integration than those with dual identities (national and European), although it also depends on the context of the country which one examines (e.g. Hooghe, Marks 2004, 417). In any case, it is theoretically justified to search for the changes in the complementarity of national and European identity in Germany in order to find out whether there is any tendency to assume more often exclusive national identity by the citizens of this powerful EU country. If this were true, one might expect some erosion of the firmly pro-European stance of German public. In line with the assumption of relatively stable nature of collective identities (Smith 1992, 59), it would not only mean some temporary weakening of the support for the EU institutions, but also more fundamental transformation of the support for the whole project of European integration.

Empirical testing of the theory of political support: the case of Germany

In this part of the contribution I address the question, whether Wessels’ application of the theory of political support in the context of European integration also corresponds with the case of Germany in the years of the Eurozone crisis. The only available data which are sufficient for this purpose has been obtained from the standard Eurobarometer 75, a survey that was accomplished in spring 2011.¹¹ The data are analysed with the use of the binary logistic regression.¹² The strength (or extension) of the European identity can be measured by various indicators. However, Eurobarometer

75 includes only one of them, namely “the citizenship of the EU”.¹³ The use of this indicator for measuring European identity is considered as problematic by some scholars (Ruiz-Jiménez et al. 2004, 5). However, it is the only option left, when one wants to test hypotheses proposed by Wessels. Moreover, Wessels (2007) himself makes use of this indicator.

Four independent variables are included in the analysis. Firstly, “effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis”¹⁴ should correspond to the most specific kind of support for the EU authorities. Secondly, “trust in the European Commission”¹⁵ could be conceived as a measure of more general orientations to the EU authorities. Thirdly, “trust in the European Union”¹⁶ is included in the logistic regression as a measure of even more general orientations to the EU authorities. Fourthly, “the support for the membership in the EU” is considered to be an indicator measuring the support for the regime.¹⁷

The binary regression constructed in this way fulfils all the necessary statistical conditions for being considered a useful model. Firstly, the model is statistically significant (it improves significantly upon chance in predicting category membership) which follows from the omnibus test of model coefficients. The p-value of this test is less than 0,001 (see Table 1 in Appendix). The model summary provides us with the measure of Nagelkerke R-square with the value of 0,388 (see Table 2 in Appendix). It means that the model explains almost 39% of the variance of the dependent variable (“citizenship of the EU”), which can be considered as a large effect (see Gray and Kinnear 2012, 407). Moreover, Hosmer and Lemeshow test confirms that all the systemic variance is explained by the model with the p-value 0,535 (see Table 3 in Appendix).

With regard to the explanatory power of various independent variables (see Table 4 in Appendix), it is clear that the strongest variable is the support for the membership in the EU with Exp(B) value of 4,9. This means that the odds for feeling as a citizen of the EU are almost 5 times higher when the respondents think that the membership of Germany in the EU is a good thing than if they think it is a bad thing. Also the other independent variables are statistically significant although they are of lower strength. The second strongest variable is the trust in the EU (with Exp(B) = 2,56) followed by the trust in the European Commission (with Exp(B) = 2,14) and by the effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis (with Exp(B) = 1,87). As a result of the binary regression analysis one can come to the conclusion that the more general orientation the independent variable expresses, the stronger it is when explaining the dependent variable (European identity). This is in line with the buffer hypothesis, proposed by Wessels. The European identity buffers more the Euroscepticism at more abstract level than at more specific level of political support. For example, those who think that the EU solves the crisis effectively are more prone to feel as citizens of the EU. However, much stronger effect has the fact that one feels the membership of the country in the EU is a good thing, and that one trusts the EU.

In order to confirm the cumulation hypothesis, it is necessary to find out whether there are any relationships among the independent variables. Using the crosstabulation one can come to the conclusion that the perception of the effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis is significantly (p-value of the Chi-square test less than 0,001) and quite strongly (Phi and Cramer’s V, both amount to 0,385) related to the trust in the European Commission (see Table 5). The similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the relationship between the effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis and the trust in the EU (p-value less than 0,001; Phi and Cramer’s V, both amount to 0,354; see Table 6). Concerning the relationship between more abstract levels of political support, namely the trust in the EU and the support for the membership in the EU, it is also statistically significant and relatively strong (p-value less than 0,001, Phi and Cramer’s V 0,444; see Table 7). The same applies for the relationship between the trust in the European Commission and the support for the membership in the EU (p-value less than 0,001, Phi and Cramer’s V 0,465; see Table 8). In this way, the cumulation hypothesis is confirmed and one may expect that there is some spillover from specific to the general level of political support. At the end of the day this spillover effect may have important influence on the strength (and extension) of the European identity in Germany.

Unclear tendencies during the crisis

The obvious question is whether there are any tendencies with regard to the measures of effectivity of the EU, trust in the EU or its institutions (the European Commission) and support for the membership of Germany in the EU in relation to the Eurozone crisis which could ultimately undermine the perception of the European identity in Germany.

Unfortunately, there is a desperate lack of appropriate data and therefore, it is only possible to suggest some tendencies for the future research. First of all, there is no apparent decline or increase in the indicators measuring the dissemination of the European identity in the German population. “Attachment to the EU”¹⁸ has been moving between 52% and 56% (since 2007) without any apparent tendency during the Eurozone crisis (see Figure 1 in Appendix). The same is true for the measure of “Future citizenship feeling”¹⁹ because the proportion of Germans who at least to some extent express their European identity (in combination with the national one or without it) varies between 59% and 69% (since 2007) without any apparent tendency during the crisis (see Figure 2 in Appendix). Nor the third indicator for the European identity (“Citizenship of the EU”; utilized in the previous part of this paper) has changed

substantially since 2009 (see Figure 3 in Appendix). The proportion of Germans, who feel that they are citizens of the EU, is almost invariable regardless the crisis (between 71% and 74%).²⁰

With regard to the membership (see Figure 4 in Appendix),²¹ it is clear, that there was quite a significant decline in the proportion of German respondents who thought that the Germany's membership in the EU was a good thing between autumn 2009 (60,2 %) and spring 2010 (50,2 %; at the beginning of the Eurozone crisis). However, the support for the membership slightly recovered until spring 2011 (54%) and unfortunately, we do not have any new data. In any case, the figure displays some mild tendency to the higher scepticism of Germans about membership of their country in the EU.

When one moves to the more specific level of political support (expressed by the indicator "Trust in the EU"),²² it is possible to see quite a clear tendency to decreasing trust in the German public opinion (see Figure 5 in Appendix). Moreover, it is apparent that this tendency started with the Eurozone crises (between autumn 2009 and spring 2010). On the basis of this figure one can come to the conclusion that Germans start to be more Eurosceptic at more specific level of political support.

This tendency is confirmed also by the measure of "Trust in the European Commission" (see Figure 6 in Appendix).²³ However, one can see that the trend has changed since autumn 2011 and the trust in the European Commission has rapidly increased. In this context it has to be mentioned that it is not clear whether the Eurozone crisis is approaching to its end. However, it is quite apparent that the crisis has somehow calmed down in the course of 2012 which could be considered as an explanation of the rising trust in the European Commission.

With regard to the effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis,²⁴ one has to be very careful with the interpretation of quite insufficient data base. Nonetheless, Germans seem to be increasingly sceptical about the way the crisis is solved by the EU (see Figure 7 in Appendix).

In sum, it is not possible to confirm Wessels' cumulation hypothesis with the available longitudinal data. However, it can be concluded that all the indicators measuring the dissemination of the European identity in Germany suggest that the Eurozone crises has not yet undermined the affiliation of German citizens to the EU. At the same time, one could be quite alarmed by the development of indicators measuring more specific levels of political support for the EU. There is a mild decrease in the positive evaluation of Germany's membership in the EU, quite a serious decline of the trust in the EU, a very volatile trend with regard to the trust in the European Commission and increasing scepticism concerning the effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis. In conjunction with the results of the binary logistic regression (included in the previous part of the paper), one can come to the conclusion that the European dimension of German collective identity will be undermined if the crisis is protracted.

Complementarity of the national and European dimensions of German collective identity

As follows from the theoretical understanding of different dimensions of collective identity as both mutually conflictual and complementary, the level to which the German national and European identities are in complementary relationship should be studied. Such an approach might be more suitable for the evaluation of the potential effects which the changing patterns of collective identities may have on (German) public opinion and its support for the idea of European integration.

Unfortunately, one can measure the complementarity of German national and European identity only at the beginning of the Eurozone crisis (spring 2010), although data for 2012 also exist. However, these data are still under the embargo of the European Commission (see Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences 2013b). Therefore, it is only possible to compare the complementarity of German national and European identity before crisis with their complementarity in 2010 when the scope of the crisis only started to be apparent.

For this reason I can offer only some kind of preliminary analysis here which should be completed with the new data as soon as they become available. From Figure 8 (see Appendix) it seems to be apparent that there is some longer term tendency to decreasing strength of the relationship between "the attachment to the EU"²⁵ and "the attachment to Germany".²⁶ All of the measures of association which were derived from the crosstabulation of the two variables are declining which means that the complementarity of German national and European identity is lowering since 2006. However, one can hardly suggest that this development is somehow connected with the Eurozone crisis. Whether this tendency has changed in the context of the crisis will have remained highly unclear until the European Commission will lift the embargo on the data from 2012. In any case, the positive values of the various measures of association indicates that despite the decrease in complementarity of German national identity and European identity, they are still more in complementary than conflictual relationship.

Conclusion

However surprising it might look like, the Eurozone crisis has not yet had any positive or negative influence on the perception of the European identity in Germany. At least all the indicators (usually used for measuring the dissemination of the European identity in a population) are very stable and we cannot observe any apparent change in tendencies which would correspond with the time span of the crisis. Nonetheless, there is no place for complacency or for underestimating the potential effects of the crisis on the future of the European integration. The conclusion is based on a very limited data base which means that the tendencies should be further examined.

Moreover, there are some indicators that point to the rising Euroscepticism of German population with regard to the effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis, trust in the EU and in the European Commission and evaluation of Germany's membership in the EU. In line with the logistic regression analysis and crosstabulation (see second part of the paper), those who support the EU on the most specific level, support it also at more abstract levels and in this way their European identity is bolstered, finally. Analogically, when the EU is perceived as ineffective it leads to the perception of untrustworthiness of its institutions and the EU as a whole, to questioning of the country's membership in such an organization and finally to undermining of the European identity of the citizens. It could be hypothesized that the longer the crisis is going to last, the more detrimental effect it is going to have on the European identity of (not only) German citizens.

With regard to the complementarity of German national identity and the European identity, it should be noted that a decline can be observed between 2007 and 2010. It means that there is an increasing number of those in German society who are attached to only one of the two identities while rejecting the second one. This development could lead to increased tensions with regard to the European integration and rising Euroscepticism. In any case, researchers should pay attention to this tendency and examine it further on the basis of new data, to find out, whether the tendency has been somehow changed by the Eurozone crisis.

Although Germany plays a crucial role in the Eurozone crisis, there are different places in the EU where the crisis has caused substantial economic and social suffering. These countries should be examined as well because the imminence of the crisis there might have had substantial effects on the perception of the European identity in those countries. This paper could inspire such a research from the methodological point of view, though the proposed perspective is incomplete and needs further refinement.

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Bio-note

Daniel Kný is a Ph.D. student at the department of political science at the University of Economics in Prague. He concerns with the problem of EU referenda through the perspective of collective identities in his dissertation. This orientation follows from the previous research included in his bachelor and master theses. Kný devotes also to the theoretical conceptualization of party-based Euroscepticism and to the political, economic and social causes and consequences of the current Eurozone crisis, its development and possible solutions.

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Appendix

Table 1: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	238,899	4	,000
	Block	238,899	4	,000
	Model	238,899	4	,000

Table 2: Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	646,765	,262	,388

Table 3: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	4,101	5	,535

Table 4: Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1a						
Effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis	,630	,216	8,485	1	,004	1,877
Trust in the EU	,941	,296	10,148	1	,001	2,564
Support for the membership in the EU	1,591	,221	51,719	1	,000	4,908
Trust in the European Commission	,761	,260	8,567	1	,003	2,141
Constant	-,853	,166	26,278	1	,000	,426

Table 5: Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal		
Phi	,385	,000
Cramer's V	,385	,000
Contingency Coefficient	,359	,000
N of Valid Cases	1121	

Table 6: Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	,354	,000
	Cramer's V	,354	,000
	Contingency Coefficient	,334	,000
	N of Valid Cases	1294	

Table 7: Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	,444	,000
	Cramer's V	,444	,000
	Contingency Coefficient	,406	,000
	N of Valid Cases	988	

Table 8: Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	,465	,000
	Cramer's V	,465	,000
	Contingency Coefficient	,421	,000
	N of Valid Cases	849	

Figure 1: Attachment to the EU




Figure 2: Future citizenship feeling




Figure 3: Citizenship of the EU




Figure 4: Support for the membership in the EU




Figure 5: Trust in the EU




Figure 6: Trust in the European Commission




Figure 7: Effectivity of the EU in combating the crisis





Figure 8: Measures of association



Notes:

¹ For the distinction of “specific” and “diffuse” political support, see the theoretical part of the paper.

² There is quite a wide range of scientific literature on the term “Euroscepticism”. See e.g. Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Wessels 2007. Despite this fact I use the term quite loosely in this article to express a kind of opposition to the EU.

³ The specific mode of orientation refers to output-directed evaluations, i.e. the satisfaction of the members of a system from the perceived output and performance of the political authorities. The diffuse mode of orientation is more concerned with what the object is, not what it does (Wessels 2007, 289).

⁴ When examining his hypotheses, Wessel distinguish effectiveness of the institutions (as a kind of specific orientations toward authorities) from their responsiveness (as an expression of more generalized orientations). See Wessels 2007, 291.

⁵ I have chosen this indicator as a measure of effectiveness of the EU authorities because of the context of this paper, which is the Eurozone crisis. Wessels used different indicators in different context: the importance of political composition of the European Parliament with regard to political parties and concrete political personalities (Wessels 2007, 42).

⁶ Wessels used similar indicators for responsiveness of EU authorities: the trust in the EU institutions and the perception of the European Parliament as taking into consideration the concerns of European citizens (Wessels 2007, 41).

⁷ Similarly to Wessels I used the appreciation of the country’s membership in the EU as a measure of the support for regime.

⁸ In line with Wessels, I used one of his two indicators for measuring European identity (citizenship in the EU) for the logistic regression in part two of the paper. However, I use also other measures of European identity in the third and fourth part.

⁹ The notion of entitativity expresses the fact that the imagined community is becoming real by penetrating into the daily life of the citizens (Risse 2003, 490).

¹⁰ These models are discussed more into detail by Risse (2003, 490-491). There is no space for deeper discussion in this paper, however, it should be noted that one can distinguish on one hand the models of nested identities, concentric circles and layer cake, which represents the relationship among clearly separable components or levels of collective identities and on the other hand the model of marble cake, which expresses the idea that different components and levels of collective identities are mutually enmeshed and blended into each other (see Maier and Risse 2003, 15-16). Moreover, one should bear in mind that the model of marble cake has been mentioned by various scholars in relation to the German-European identity (e.g. Risse 2003, 491, 498). In further research beyond this paper it should be examined whether the European components entrenched in German national identity are not slowly torn out from it in the context of the Eurozone crisis.

¹¹ The data from Eurobarometer 75 are available at Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences (2013). The exact wording of the questions can be found at European Commission (2011c). The simple and basic interpretation of the results without using any explanatory statistical methods is available at European Commission (2011b).

¹² For the execution of the analysis I used statistical package SPSS. The interpretation of the results is based on the statistical publication authored by Gray and Kinnear (2012, 564-600).

¹³ The exact wording of the question was as follows: „For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You feel you are the citizen of the EU.“ There were four options for the respondents: „Yes, definitely“, „Yes, to some extent“, „No, not really“, „No, definitely not“. These answers were recoded to two categories “yes” and „no“ in order to be usable for the binary logistic regression (European Commission 2011c, 188).

¹⁴ The exact wording of the question was as follows: “Since the beginning of the economic crisis, would you say that each of the following actors has acted effectively or not to combat the crisis up till now? The European Union...” There were four options for the respondents: „Yes, very effectively“, „Yes, fairly effectively“, „No, not very effectively“, „No, not at all effectively“. These answers were recoded to two categories “effectively” and “not effectively” in order to simplify the execution and interpretation of the binary logistics regression (see European Commission 2011c, 160).

¹⁵ The exact wording of the question was as follows: “For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Commission...” There were two options for the respondents: “Tend to trust”, “Tend not to trust” (see European Commission 2011c, 55).

¹⁶ The exact wording of the question was as follows: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Union...” There were two options for the respondents: “Tend to trust”, “Tend not to trust” (see European Commission 2011c, 44).

¹⁷ The exact wording of the question was as follows: “Generally speaking, do you think that Germany’s membership of the European Union is/would be...?” There were three options for the respondents: “A good thing”, “A bad thing”, “Neither good, nor bad”. However in the binary logistic regression I took into account only the answers “A good thing”, “A bad thing”, the missing values were assigned to the rest of the respondents (see European Commission 2011c, 37).

¹⁸ The exact wording of the question was as follows: “Please tell me how attached you feel to: ... the European union.” There were four options for the respondents: „Very attached“, „Fairly attached“, „Not very attached“, „Not at all attached“. Figure 1 shows only sums of those who are “attached” and “not attached” to the EU (see European Commission 2012c, T163).

¹⁹ The exact wording of the question was as follows: “In the near future, do you see yourself as...?” There were four options for the respondents: “German only”, “German and European”, “European and German”, “European only” (see European Commission 2012c, T173). For the purposes of this paper it is useful to distinguish only two categories: “German only” as an expression of exclusive national identity and “Dual and European identities”, which represents the sum of respondents who choose the answers “German and European”, “European and German”, “European only”. In line with the theory, one can expect that those who possess dual identities or European identity will tend to the support of European integration as a whole while those who possess exclusive national identity will support the European integration less likely.

²⁰ Generally, the data for constructing the figures were obtained from Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences, 2013. In some cases, the data are not available there and therefore I gathered them from the tables, which are published by the European Commission at the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. See European Commission 2012c, T49, T62, T150, T163, T164, T173 and European Commission 2012d, T42, T60.

²¹ For the exact wording of the question see previous part of the paper, footnote 17.

²² For the exact wording of the question see previous part of the paper, footnote 16.

²³ For the exact wording of the question see previous part of the paper, footnote 15.

²⁴ For the exact wording of the question see previous part of the paper, footnote 14.

²⁵ For the exact wording of the question see previous part of the paper, footnote 18. With regard to “the attachment to Germany” the wording of the question is analogical. The resulting data were treated as ordinal with four categories („Very attached“, „Fairly attached“, „Not very attached“, „Not at all attached“) for both of the variables. Accordingly, the measures of association for ordinal data were utilized (see Gray and Kinnear, 409-411; Miller et al. 2002, 143-144).

²⁶ The data were obtained from Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences (2013a) and the statistical analysis was proceeded with the use of statistical package SPSS. The contingency tables were not included in Appendix for the reason of parsimony. However, they can be provided by the author of this paper on the following e-mail address: xknyd00@vse.cz. It remains to be noted that all the results of this statistical analysis are statistically significant according to p-value of Chi-square test.