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Exhibition *Paris-Moscow, 1900-1930*

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Abstract

In 1979 the National Museum of Modern Art located in the Centre Pompidou in Paris displayed one of the major exhibitions of its history: the exhibit *Paris-Moscow, 1900-1930*. Curated by Pontus Hulten, this exhibition aimed at showing the cross-influences characterizing the French and Russian avant-garde at the rise of Modern art.

In 1981 in Brezhnev's USSR during a significant rise in censorship, strictness and political surveillance, the exact same exhibit was presented in Moscow. Consequently, it raises one question: how does such a striking and innovative exhibit succeed and take place during the Cold War?

The answer is quite simple: it was a fight for freedom and dialogue. The French team was eager to establish normal relationships with its Soviet colleagues and to favor exchanges between France and the USSR. Therefore, it stressed the power of art and cultural diplomacy. Could art be a means to achieve peaceful relations and improved exchanges leading to more freedom when politics and economics failed? The exhibition *Paris-Moscow, 1900-1930* seemed to be one striking positive example.

Thanks to the discovery of new archives at the Centre Pompidou Paris and throughout Valéry Giscard d'Estaing recently published "mémoires" and dwelling upon interviews of French ambassadors and curators in charge of the exhibit in 1979, my essay highlights the issues at stake during the preparation and the displaying of a mutual exhibit between France and the USSR during the Cold War.

Key words

Cultural diplomacy

Soviet avant-garde

Exhibition

Centre Pompidou

Cold War

Introduction

Jacques Rigaud, who used to be the Director of the Office for the French Minister of Culture under George Pompidou, wrote in 1979 a report for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he stresses the role of culture and art within the realm of international exchange. For him, culture is of equal importance to politics and economics as a medium of international diplomacy. His thoughts on the subject are summed up by his claim: "Diplomacy cannot ignore art".

Conceptions of culture, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations are still at the core of important debates in history and history of art. Loosely speaking, cultural relations can be understood in this context as a component of cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy should be understood as all the artistic and cultural means used by governmental or non-governmental actors to promote and develop mutual and positive understanding in a long-term relation between two countries. Art can therefore be a way of transgressing international boundaries and defying alterity.

One of the most interesting and challenging examples of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War can be observed in the organization and execution of the exhibition *Paris-Moscow, 1900-1930* displayed in 1979 at the National Museum of Modern Art located in the Centre Pompidou in Paris. Curated by Pontus Hulten, this exhibit aimed at showing the cross-influences characterizing the French and Russian vanguards at the rise of Modern art. It displayed *The Black Square* of Malevich, posters from Moor, letters from Osip Mandelstam, porcelain plates designed by Adamovich, chairs made by Rodchenko, tables made by Le Corbusier, Tatlin's Tower—rebuilt from scratch— movies from Vertov, and clothes created by Sonia Delaunay. Two thousand five hundred works of art and documents were displayed. It also highlighted the emergence of Russian symbolism, suprematism, futurism, and constructivism. Through a series of crucial theoretical and aesthetic documents, in addition to the works of art on display, the exhibition demonstrated how the Soviet vanguards broke with the artistic languages of the past and, simultaneously, offered new concepts for organizing an uncertain and emerging way of life. Not only did the Parisian and Russian avant-gardes fundamentally change the vocabulary of expressive means, but they also transformed the very understanding of the material environment and its social potentialities.

During the preparation of this exhibition, both curating teams struggled. On one hand, the Soviet curator and his team tried to slow down the project because the content of the exhibit in itself represented freedom and liberty embodied by the vanguard artists and their works of art. On the other hand, the French team requested paintings, books or documents

that were long banned and forbidden in the USSR. Nevertheless, they managed to produce a challenging exhibition that lasted as one of the major exhibitions of the Centre Pompidou.

This extraordinary exhibition raises some questions. How could such a striking and innovative project succeed and take place during the Cold War? Why was the Centre Pompidou willing to collaborate with an Eastern dictatorship during the Cold War? Why was the Soviet Union ready to compromise with a Western country? How can a cultural institution become a means to transgress dichotomies and bring two countries closer?

First we must consider the general setting of the exhibition. An exhibition between France and the USSR, and depicting the artistic relations between Paris and Moscow between 1900 and 1930 could only take place thanks to previously strong and well-established political frames and diplomatic governmental structures. The Centre Pompidou and the French curatorial teams also played important roles as triggering elements. Second, we will see how this exhibition was prepared and developed and how it came to be that deep cultural relations were initiated through the process of its preparation. When it comes to cultural diplomacy, governments are often seen as the main actors, especially during the Cold War in what the author Jean-François Sirinelli called the “Cold War Culture”ⁱⁱ. My subject aims to show that the benefits and positive effects of cultural diplomacy in this case were due to non-governmental actors. The governments of France and the USSR only set up an international context in which the exhibition was allowed to take place. Third, cultural diplomacy is embodied in the content of the exhibition itself. What is perhaps the most interesting form of cultural diplomacy is in the very fact that the curatorial presentation of the works of art highlighted moments of cultural diplomacy. It culminated in a bold claim that relations between Russian, Soviet and French artists in this time period were responsible for Modern Art itself.

To attempt to answer these questions, the archives of former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the archives of the Centre Pompidou have been used. Interviews of a former French Ambassador in Moscow between 1979 and 1981, Sir Henri Froment-Meurice, and interviews of most of the members of the French curating team were used too. The absence of Russian and Soviet archives at the moment necessarily limits this study to the French point of view.

The general setting of the exhibition

The Cold War did not prevent France and the USSR from having rich and developed cultural relations. In the ’70s, a range of cultural events between France and the USSR were organized. In 1976, in Paris, at the Grand Palais, an exhibition was displayed: *Russian Painting and Romanticism*; this was followed in 1978 by the exhibition *Realism and Poetry in Russian Paintings*. In 1979, French curators displayed exhibitions in Moscow about French Paintings between 1909 and 1930, and an exhibition about the Walter Guillaume Collection in 1981. Such cultural events were common and organized around a clearly articulated set of rules during the ’70s.

From the 19th century forward, French diplomacy strived to maintain consistent diplomatic relations with Russia and, later, the USSR. There was a long history of lasting friendship between France and Russia beginning with Peter the Great and Catherine II and especially developed under the rule of Elisabeth. After the Second World War, General Charles de Gaulle played an important role in transforming this friendship between the Soviet Union and France into an actual political project. Treaties were signed between General de Gaulle and Stalin in 1944 and later in June 1966, in which close cultural cooperation was officially set up. In between, cultural exchange programs were fixed in 1958 and for instance the exhibitions *The Art of the Scythes* in Paris and *Sixty Years of Soviet Painting* organized at the time were a tremendous success. Historiography and myth often give the General de Gaulle the main—if not the only—role in opening the pathway for diplomatic relations with the USSR. In reality, a lot of cultural relations existed between the two countries since the creation of the Soviet Union. Indeed, French artists, intellectuals, and writers were attracted by what was called « la Grande lueur à l’Est »—The Great Light in the East—when Russia became the world-wide standard-bearer of Communism. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, the gap between cultural relations and cultural propaganda was extremely thin at the time.

After 1971, the French President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing maintained this privileged relationship with the Soviet Union and created a diplomatic context that favored unique cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. Contrary to General de Gaulle’s approach, which built up exchanges with the USSR while thinking that Communism would pass and Russia would remain, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s approach always recognized the Soviet Union as an ongoing political reality and accepted it with its values and ideology. In November 1975, the French newspaper *Le Figaro* published an interview with the French President saying that he didn’t intend to alter the soviet system but was willing instead to have peaceful and normal relations with Eastern Europeⁱⁱⁱ. His concept of “détente idéologique” relies on accepting the other’s system of values. This political stance, characterized by understanding and openness, was reinforced by official treaties and cultural cooperation. Artistic activities, ballet, fairs, circuses, theatrical plays, movie screenings and exhibitions were organized between France and the USSR.

If the President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was willing to build cultural bridges between his country and the Soviet Union, the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was ready to do the same. Indeed, and especially after the Helsinki Conference

in 1975, the '70s in the USSR were marked by an attempt to broaden its relations to the West. In the cultural field, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France declared that it was difficult to restrict the Soviets, many of whom were eager to display a great number of exhibitions in France. It was even said that « if the Soviets were allowed to, they would schedule exhibitions in Paris until 1985 and they would program a wide variety of cultural events in provincial towns^{iv} ».

Nevertheless, even if they played an important role in creating the necessary political and diplomatic frame, French governmental agents were not the only ones acting in favor of increasing cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. The Centre Pompidou played a major role in the setting up of international exhibitions. In 1969, President Pompidou made the decision to dedicate the Plateau Beaubourg area of Paris to the construction of a multidisciplinary cultural center of an entirely new type. It can be defined as an artistic platform composed of four different departments: The National Museum of Modern Art (le MNAM, Musée National d'Art Moderne), the Centre for Industrial Creation (CCI, le Centre de Création Industrielle), The Public Library (BPI, la Bibliothèque Publique d'Information), The Department of Music (l'IRCAM, l'Institut de Recherche et de Coordination Accoustique Musicale). The National Museum of Modern Art directed by Pontus Hulten was in charge of displaying the exhibitions.

Created in 1975, the Centre Pompidou was characterized by its modernity and originality. This new cultural institution defied every other traditional form of cultural institution in France at the time, in terms of architecture but also internal organization. From the moment of its inception, the Centre Pompidou has been a unique, modern, innovative, and independent institution. The Centre Pompidou and the National Museum of Modern Art did not belong to the French Reunion of National Museums (RMN, la Réunion des Musées, Nationaux)^v. Consequently, they were independent and did not fall under the direct authority of the Ministry of Culture. In this way, the National Museum of Modern Art effectively enjoyed total freedom in its choices of exhibitions and cultural partners.

Between 1977 and 1981, the National Museum of Modern Art clearly and freely defined its policy, which was marked by the pursuit of international partners and modern innovations. Four major exhibitions were displayed during those four years: *Paris-New York*, *Paris-Berlin*, *Paris-Moscow* and *Paris-Paris*. They were all decided by Pontus Hulten who was fascinated by cultural exchanges transgressing boundaries. Therefore, he was constantly looking for international partners to set up exhibitions. Director of the National Museum of Modern Art from 1973 to 1981, Pontus Hulten gave the Museum its initial shape and uniqueness. Originally from Sweden, he was already known for his innovative projects at the Moderna Museet in Stockholm (1957-1972) and was named at the head of the National Museum of Modern Art in 1973. He described his project of four major and international exhibitions as an attempt to display a “visual analysis of the 20th century^{vi}”. He was willing to draw parallels as well as study the differences, the contrasts, the attractions and the repulsions between Paris and three other major cities, New York, Berlin and Moscow. Pontus Hulten only apprehended art as a constant movement. He was convinced that creation stems from those exchanges. It led him to study closely a number of issues involved in cultural exchange: meetings, departures, influences, and confrontations. For him modernity is characterized by the artistic creations produced out of cultural and international exchanges.

Even if the figure of Pontus Hulten weighed heavily upon the decisions of the National Museum of Modern Art and triggered the exhibition with Moscow, it must be kept in mind that the French curatorial team and the French working team surrounding him were also a crucial element in the opening of the Museum to Eastern Europe. The main members of the team were in their twenties or thirties at the time, meaning that they grew up in a context in which the Soviet Union had ceased to be the threat that it formerly was. Social mutations and changes, and especially during the '60s, conveyed a different image of Eastern Europe than what used to be shown right before the Second World War. They were also the products of the “Trente Glorieuses,” a generation characterized by a general hope about the future and the encounter with the other.

On the Soviet side, even if the lack of archives and information has slowed down our understanding of the situation, the few letters and documents available stress that nothing was done without the consent of the administration and the Ministry of Culture and Foreign Affairs. Therefore, if the vanguard paintings were accepted and displayed, it might be guessed that the Soviet curatorial team strongly believed in the project and knew how to defend it in front of the Soviet administration.

As much as those three elements—the governments, the museum located in the Centre Pompidou and the curatorial teams—are necessary in the building up of the exhibition *Paris-Moscow*, they are not at the core of this artistic and diplomatic issue. Indeed, everything came from the curatorial teams and everything was achieved thanks to their daily struggles and fights for dialogue and understanding.

As Jean-Hubert Martin, curator at the National Museum of Modern art at the time, puts it: “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not very important in the decision process of the exhibition. This project, this event is due only to the French curator Pontus Hulten who gave birth to the idea of an exhibition about the Parisian and Russian and Soviet vanguards.^{vii}” The diplomatic set up only allowed the curators Pontus Hulten and Khaltourin and their teams to think, conceive, prepare and display the exhibition *Paris-Moscow*.

The preparation of the exhibition

The most complicated part of the preparation was coming to agreement about the list of work of arts displayed, the introductory texts presented throughout the exhibition and the content of the catalogue. A written report of a meeting organized in June 1978 sheds light on the difficulties encountered:

“the two curatorial teams just exchanged their own list of works of art they want to see displayed in the exhibition. They both seem satisfied with the list of work of arts and the various ideas submitted. But it is easy to see some tensions and everything hangs on a thin thread.”^{viii}

Indeed, during the one year and a half of preparation, the French team had to negotiate and “trade” some of the major paintings of the exhibition. The common feature indicated by the organizers of the exhibit was the omnipresence of Soviet ideology imposed by the Soviet team. Khaltourin, the Soviet curator for the exhibition, also served as the Director of Foreign Affairs in the Ministry of Culture. He held a very highly ranked position in the Soviet system. Therefore, he had to ensure that the statements made throughout the exhibition would follow the lines of Soviet ideology. At the same time, he was fascinated by the vanguards and was willing to display them. Consequently, he was constantly going back and forth on the choice of the paintings, being influenced also by the decisions of his superiors. For instance, in December 1978, the French curator Pontus Hulten submitted his ideas for the exhibition to the Soviet Minister of Culture and the answer, brought by the French Ambassador was the following:

“Demitchev, the Minister of Culture, first made a general answer to your propositions and after asking his co-workers, he let us understand that the Soviets could not accept all your ideas. According to Soviet ideology, some works of art are considered too “modernist” and represent an unbearable challenge for the Communist Party.”^{ix}

A written report of a meeting in November 1978 recounted that the list of works of art chosen by the Soviet team for the second part of the exhibition, 1917-1930, had 80% of realist-socialist paintings and less than 20% of abstract paintings^x. Most of the avant-garde paintings had long been considered too “decadent” or “bourgeois”. When the Soviet team was too reluctant, they would pretend the painting was damaged or unavailable, even when they had first agreed on displaying it.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the Matisse paintings rejected by the Soviet team at first and then negotiated by the French team. Those paintings had an extremely important historical value and they were at the core of the exhibition. The quality and the meaning of the exhibition would have been almost entirely undermined without those paintings as they embodied the French avant-garde and their relation to the Russian artistic movements. Russian artists were called “The Russian Matisse”. In March 1979, Pontus Hulten sent a telegram requesting the help of the French Ambassador in Moscow:

« One extremely important issue still remains: it is about the following paintings:

- *La Danse* by Henri Matisse
- *La Musique* by Henri Matisse
- *Composition VII* by Vassily Kandinsky
- *Les Trois femmes* by Pablo Picasso

I consider those paintings crucial for the success of our exhibition, especially when it comes to Matisse. It is more than obvious that without those paintings, we would have to face a serious issue. It seems to me that the Soviet Minister of Culture is the only one who can allow us to obtain the paintings. Therefore, I would be grateful if you could personally step in as soon as possible and ask the Soviet Minister Demitchev (...)”^{xi}

Such issues mainly arose in the Section of Painting and Literature. The hesitations of the Soviet curators and chiefs were highlighted by the fact that they kept going back and forth on their decisions. A letter from Serge Fauchereau – who was in charge of the Section of Literature-to the Soviet curator in March 1979, two months before the opening of the exhibition, shows the difficulties faced by both teams:

“You offered a list of documents to be displayed that you withdrew without any explanation, while I was presented with most of those documents when I last came to Moscow and Leningrad and you were thrilled about having them displayed. I cannot believe that the cultural institutions that offered those documents suddenly stepped back, willingly. Therefore, let’s agree not to do such sudden arbitrary changes. Let’s work honestly within the frame of the treaties signed. What would you say if I myself kept changing the documents we decided together we would display? (...) I write to you as a friend, I do not understand your change of mind. I feel like a child who has been asked to look closely at the cakes to then be told that he will not have any. What is the purpose of such an act?”^{xii}

The problems triggered by the omnipresence of Soviet ideology also occurred when it came to the content of the texts presented in the catalogue or throughout the exhibition. Some names could not be mentioned, even if they were highly important when it came to describing Soviet History. Gide and Trotsky seemed to have been the most complicated

ones: Trotsky for well-known reasons and André Gide because he made a cutting criticism of the USSR in the thirties and forties. A letter from February 1981 between the French Ambassador and the Minister of Culture explains that the portrait of André Gide could appear in the catalogue because the French team agreed to withdraw the portrait of the artist M. Tsvetaeva^{xiii}. The correspondences found in the archives shed light on the compromises constantly made by the two teams.

Moreover, some aspects of Soviet history had to remain silent. For the individuals acquainted with the political, economic and social conditions in the USSR under Lenin and Stalin, the exhibit was filled with omissions. Indeed, at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia experienced huge changes simultaneously marked by progress and creative and artistic novelties but also harsh events. The civil war in 1918, the famine in 1921, the economic crisis in 1922, the political strictness of Lenin, the rising of the Soviet dictatorship, the creation of the Gulag and the arrival of Stalin darkened Russian history between 1900 and 1930. This was neglected throughout the exhibit. They also concealed the exile of Kandinsky, the suicide of Mayakovski caused by the Soviet regime and the imprisonment of Malevich, and they excluded the names of various artists. They omitted Bakhtine and Akhmatova's imprisonments, Meyerhold's murder at the hands of KGB affiliates, and Arvatov and Tretriakov ending up in a Gulag.

The content of the exhibition

It took both teams a lot of energy and will to get through this enormous artistic project. The present study of this exhibition aims to show that, in this precise case, transgressing alterity and boundaries was truly about the ideas, struggles and beliefs of a few men and women. Their motivation was quite simple: as Pontus Hulten put it himself, it was a fight for freedom. The content of the exhibition in itself represented freedom and liberty embodied by the vanguard artists and their artwork and was therefore a means to cultivate transnational identities between Paris and Moscow.

For his exhibit, Pontus Hulten aimed at displaying the most detailed and precise overview of the relations between French and Russian art at the beginning of the century. As a consequence, the spatial organization of this exhibition was fascinating and one of the first of its kind. The exhibit was divided into two distinctive parts. The first one concerned the period running from 1900 to 1917 and the second one, from 1917 to 1930. The fracture was represented by the October Revolution. The central place between those two parts was a rotunda with Tatlin's Tower and the agit-prop posters, plates and photographs. All the French and Russian and Soviet works of art are intermingled throughout the exhibition.

A closer study of the part dedicated to the visual arts in the exhibition points out how the main idea of the exhibition is an act of cultural diplomacy in itself. Indeed, Pontus Hulten wanted to highlight that the relations between Paris and Moscow between 1900 and 1930 gave birth to the rise of Modern Art. It is within the frame of those artistic exchanges and creative dialogues and interactions that the history of art transformed. Pontus Hulten believed that those exchanges were the epitome of modernity:

“In 1900, the XXth century begins. (...) 1900, the generation of our first great artists, the pioneers of our century, is 20. Picasso is about to turn 20. Braque is 18, Dufy is 23, just as Vlaminck and Malevich is 22. Tatlin is 15 and Marcel Duchamp, the youngest, is 13. (...) In those first years of our century, Chagall paints in Vitebsk his first painting: three years later he is in Paris where Picasso finishes his *Les Femmes d'Alger*. The year after, Archipenko, coming from Moscow, is moving in Paris and Marinetti writes the first Futurist manifesto. (...) After the rush of the first years of our century, a few men are settled, in France, in Russia, spread in Europe: the awareness of their work is pulling the century forwards. It is the sign of great beginnings.^{xiv}”

Pontus Hulten managed to deconstruct the boundaries between Paris and Moscow while depicting the national specificities of both countries. In the claim he tried to make in his exhibition, he showed that the first exchanges between French and Russian vanguards were mainly due to Russian art merchants and patrons. Sergei Diaghilev, creator of the Russian Ballets and famous Russian art critic, gave his ballets in Paris and presented the Parisian artistic life to some young Russian painters. Bask, Benois, Roehrich, Korovin and Goncharova took part in this experiment.

Going back to Russia, Diaghilev brought back samples of the French symbolist movement called “Art nouveau”.

Apart from the figure of Diaghilev, Russian art merchants played a crucial role in the exchanges between French and Russian artists. Indeed, to name only the two most famous, Ivan Morozov and Sergei Shchukin had a tremendous collection of French paintings. This incredible passion for French artists led them to own more than three hundred and fifty French paintings, from Monet's to Picasso's, and in 1911 Matisse made the paintings *La Danse* and *La Musique* for Shchukin's house in Moscow. Russian artists became attracted by Paris. They emigrated to the city and created an “Ecole russe” there. Exhibits were frequently organized between the two capitals and Matisse, Picasso, Gleizes, Léger, Le Fauconnier, Derain, Vlaminck and Gris met and bonded with Malevich, Kandinsky, Larionov, Popova, Lentoulov, Machkov, Kontchalovski and Falk.

At that time, papers were published that increased the expansion of the cultural and artistic links between Paris and Moscow. Nicholas Riabouchinsky, a famous Russian art merchant and collector, started the newspaper *La Toison d'Or*, published both in French and Russian. It had a striking influence on French and Russian vanguards between 1906 and 1910. These artistic exchanges were not always peaceful as new groups appeared and opposed each other. It was the time of manifestos. Movements such as *The Jack of Diamonds*, *The Blue Rose*, and *La Queue de l'Ane* were three major examples of the creation of Russian vanguard movements.

By 1913, the Russian vanguard had assimilated and surpassed the French avant-garde. Artists such as Larionov, Goncharova, Tatlin and Malevich explored rayonism and suprematism. The exchanges increased between the “Ecole russe” in Paris and the Vasilieff Academy, and Archipenko, Chagall, Soutine, Survage, Larionov, Zadine, Lipchitz met Parisian artists in Montmartre and La Ruche. They had to stop in 1914 when World War One ceased any form of artistic contact between the two capitals. The relations started again in the twenties when French artists became fascinated with the Soviet vanguards spurred by the enthusiasm of the October Revolution. The Soviet vanguards dedicated every form of art to the building of this new society. They decorated trains, buildings, bridges, monuments, boats and windows with revolutionary and propaganda art. They used windows of empty shops to display propaganda posters in Rosta windows.

Conclusions

The exhibition was said to be a tremendous success. Nevertheless, the Director of the Centre Pompidou did not attend the opening session of the exhibition when it was displayed in Moscow in 1981 due to changes imposed by the Soviet Union. The Parisian press and a fair amount of French scholars, intellectuals, professors and Russian dissidents exiled to France attacked the content of the exhibition. Therefore, the impact and the positive results of such a project can be questioned.

What seems to matter the most is that both the French and the Soviet curatorial teams were eager to establish normal relationships and to favor exchanges with the USSR. They were perfectly aware that the exhibit was not perfect; it lacked a fair amount of true facts and key elements, but it was still an astonishing opening for the Soviet Union and a great discovery of the Russian and Soviet vanguard paintings for the French public. When the exhibit was displayed in Moscow in 1981, the Soviet public discovered the paintings for the first time since 1930, when they had been hidden in museum cellars. Henri Froment-Meurice, the French Ambassador in Moscow in the 1970s summed it up by saying that “every form of cultural exchange with a dictatorship, even the smallest, even a not perfect one, is always better than isolation.”^{xv}

Mathilde Poupée is currently working on her Master Thesis at the History Department at the Université Paris-Est Créteil and at the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris. The topic of the dissertation is cultural diplomacy and the issues at stake during the exhibition *Paris-Moscow, 1900-1930* displayed at the Centre Pompidou in 1979 and in Moscow in 1981.

ⁱ Roche François, Pigniau Bernard, *Histoire de la diplomatie culturelle des origines à 1955*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1995 p. 118

ⁱⁱ Sirinelli, Jean-François, *Culture et Guerre Froide*, Paris, PU Paris Sorbonne, 2008

ⁱⁱⁱ Schreiber, Thomas, *Les actions de la France à l'Est ou l'absence de Marianne*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000, p. 149

^{iv} Archives du Centre Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-193*, CARTON 92022/116, Notes, PV, réunions, Note pour Jean Millier de Jean-François de Canchy, 26 mai 1978

^{vv} Archives Nationales, *Archives de la présidence de la République Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, 1974-1981*, 5 AG 3 2042-43 CD 3-4, Décret n° 76-83 du 27 janvier 1976, Article 1

^{vi} *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930, arts plastiques, arts appliqués et objets utilitaires, architecture, urbanisme, agitprop, affiche, théâtre-ballet, littérature, musique, cinéma, photo créative*, Editions du Centre Pompidou et éditions Gallimard, Paris 1991, p. 16

^{vii} Interview with Jean-Hubert Martin, curator at the Centre Pompidou and former director of the National Museum of Modern Art between 1987 and 1990

^{viii} Archives du Centre Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930*, CARTON 92022/116, Dossier des Protocoles, Protocole du 28-30 juin 1978

^{ix} Archives du Centre Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930*, CARTON 92022/116, Dossier des protocoles, 16 janvier 1979, Lettre de André Burgaud à Pontus Hulten 13 décembre 1978

^x Archives du Centre Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-193*, CARTON 92022/116, Notes, PV, réunions, Compte-rendu de la réunion de travail du Mardi 21 novembre et mercredi 22 1978 novembre pour la section Arts plastiques

^{xi} Archives du Centre Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930*, CARTON 92022/116, Correspondance 1977-1980, Télégramme de Pontus Hulten à Monsieur Bruno de Leusse, 14 mars 1979

^{xii} Archives du Centre Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930*, CARTON 92022/116, Correspondance 1977-1980, Lettre de Serge Fauchereau à Monsieur Khaltourine, 13 mars 1979

^{xiii} Archives du Center Pompidou, Archives de l'exposition *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930*, CARTON 92011/087, Protocoles d'accords, Lettre de Henri Froment-Meurice à Jean-François Poncet, 24 février 1981

^{xiv} *Paris-Moscou, 1900-1930, arts plastiques, arts appliqués et objets utilitaires, architecture, urbanisme, agitprop, affiche, théâtre-ballet, littérature, musique, cinéma, photo créative*, Editions du Centre Pompidou et éditions Gallimard, Paris 1991, p. 16

^{xv} Interview with Monsieur Henri Froment-Meurice, Ambassadeur de France en poste à Moscou de 1979 à 1981 et auteur de *Vu du Quai*, Mémoires 1945-1983, Paris, Fayard, 1998 et *Journal de Moscou, ambassadeur au temps de la Guerre Froide*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2012