

*Paper prepared for the Third Euroacademia International Conference
The European Union and the Politicization of Europe*

Lisbon, 26 – 27 September 2014

*This paper is a draft
Please do not cite*

Where Does the Europeanisation of CEEC Security Discourse Stop? A Case Study of Romania

IULIA JOJA*

PhD candidate, NSPAS Bucharest

Europeanisation theory states that the appropriation of European values by aspiring countries works in two steps: first, the values are integrated on the discursive level – the Europeanisation of discourse; second, they become an inherent part of the country's identity. This process has been more or less visible in all Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) during their integration, depending on the level analysed.

This paper argues that while market economy and good governance are goals that CEEC have been eager to achieve, Europeanisation has been less profound on the security and defence level, especially when it comes to countries bordering the EU space. The reasons for this are twofold: on one hand the CSDP has stalled due to a lack of political will, on the other it has not provided the security that bordering CEEC have been seeking. Lately, Russia's aggressive actions at the EU border have been adding to their feeling of insecurity.

Romania's position with regard to CSDP specifically, and to European values on the security policy level generally, is reflective of this issue: while always stating that NATO and CSDP should avoid duplicating resources and type of activities, after its EU integration in 2007 Bucharest has been gradually shifting from the securitisation of asymmetric threats to an emphasis of regional conventional threats. This process has been enforced by declarations – in official statements as well as in strategic documents - that express frustration with regard the EU's double standards when it comes to the promotion of values and norms in its Eastern neighbourhood.

The paper will show through the discourse analysis of Romanian security policy how this process – also present in other EU border countries - is relevant to the direction in which EU security policy might develop over the next years.

Key words: Europeanisation, CEEC, Romania, security policy, discourse.

Introduction

Europeanisation has evolved into one of the most relevant processes of domestic change, especially among the the former socialist countries that have joined the EU over the last decade. Europeanisation theory states that the appropriation of European values by candidates and members of the Union works in two steps: first, the values are integrated on the discursive level – the Europeanisation of discourse; second, they become an inherent part of the country's identity through action.

This article focuses on the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy (EFSP) specifically. It shows that unlike the Europeanisation of policy areas such as economy or agriculture, foreign and security policy is an area of normativity par excellence that produces shared norms and values. It is a process that takes place in a timely and incremental manner, first by changes in discourse, and ultimately by changes in national identity. The article argues that the outcome of EFSP is not necessarily a greater adherence to European values, but it can also comprise disillusionment and a process-reversing tendency.

While the EFSP of older EU member states has been extendedly studied, that of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) has been the matter of less attention¹. Because of the strong incentives implied by the conditionality of the Eastern integration process, during this time CEEC have been Europeanising their policies faster than member states. Moreover,

domains subjected to the *aquis communautaire* or directly associated with growth and stability have gone through a “deeper” Europeanisation.

On the contrary, Europeanisation has been less profound on the security and defence level, especially when it comes to countries bordering the EU space. The national foreign and security policies of CEEC went through a rather adaptative and less profound process, aimed at “fitting” the image of the country to the European community’s expectations, in order to ensure their acceptance in this community. Because of the superficiality of this adaptational process, the foreign and security policies of CEEC - traditionally driven by pragmatism and hard security calculations - have not been Europeanised in terms of transforming their threat perception security calculations.

Beyond the nature of foreign and security Europeanisation per se, there are two reasons for a reduced Europeanisation of this area: on one hand, the CSDP has stalled due to a lack of political will; on the other, it has not provided the security that bordering CEEC have been seeking. Moreover, the insecurity perceived by CEEC bordering the EU has escalated over the past months due to Russia’s aggressive actions in the Eastern neighbourhood and is aggravating their discontent concerning the Union’s security policy.

Romania’s position with regard to CSDP specifically, and to European values on the security policy level generally is reflective of this issue: while always manifesting an understated preference for NATO (and its intrinsic security guarantees), after its EU integration in 2007 Bucharest has been gradually shifting its foreign and security policy from the securitisation of asymmetric threats to an emphasis of regional conventional threats. Romania’s shift away from Europeanisation has been enforced by two problems. First, Bucharest’s perception of the Union’s inability to act upon its values and of its double standards in the Eastern neighbourhood is determining the distancing of Romania’s foreign and security policy away from European (post)modern values and towards a security thinking characteristic of the Cold War. Second, the frustration of national decision-makers and public opinion related to the perceived failure of Romania to influence EU foreign and security policy since its integration has been limiting Romanian EFSP. These two major factors are leading to the country’s reluctant promotion of CSDP and a stagnation of EFSP.

The first part of this study explains how EFSP works – how European norms and values are reflected in national foreign and security policies and how they can transform discourse and national identity. In the second part the case study of Romania shows that while Europeanisation may transform national identities, EFSP is limited and may manifest reversing tendencies.

Europeanisation: Delimiting the Terms and Understanding the Process

Over the last two decades, Europeanisation has become one of the most relevant sources of domestic change in CEEC (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007, 99). In their attempt to prove to be as “European” as the West, CEEC arguably Europeanised policy areas in a hasty and at times chaotic process. Favourable to this process was the fact that during their integration process CEEC had stronger incentives, due to the conditionality posed by the EU. Unsurprisingly, when CEEC were finally accepted in the European community, Europeanisation slowed down and the differences between just adapting to European norms and structurally transforming national values became increasingly highlighted. In some CEEC, such as Romania, the EFSP – arguably the policy area where European values are most visible - is stagnating and shows elements of a reversing tendency. In order to study this phenomenon - which has received only little attention until now -, a delimitation of the Europeanisation theory in the context of national foreign and security discourse needs to be undertaken first.

Europeanisation – a Matter of Definition

Europeanisation is a concept that has been defined multiple times, but there is no universally accepted definition. Generally, Europeanisation is defined as a process of change within a state’s discourse, identity and public policies, motivated by the EU and consisting of the construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of rules, policy paradigms, shared beliefs and norms (Ladrech 2010, 2; Radaelli 2003, 30). In this article, Europeanisation is understood as the process of incorporating European values in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, and public policies.

Within EFSP specifically several dimensions can be distinguished (Wong, 2007): the adaptation and policy convergence of EU norms by candidate/member states (downloading), the national projection of norms to the EU level (uploading) and the emergence of shared norms and definitions of European and national interests among the policy-making elites

(crossloading). While downloading and uploading are vertical processes between the national and the EU level, crossloading is a horizontal one on the candidate/member states level.

Foreign and Security Policy Europeanisation – a Matter of European Values

The EFSP in particular is arguably an area of normativity par excellence. Its strong normative aspect is given by the fact the EFSP and of its discourse is constituted of what Europe stands for: values and norms. European values are also what defines the frame of interaction between the EU and third entities. The aim of EU foreign and security policy according to the Lisbon Treaty (TEU Art. 2) is to

“uphold and promote its values and interests [in its relations with the wider world] and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It [the EU] shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights...”.

Values and norms are articulated in foreign and security policy through discourse, i.e. in strategies and official statements. Decision-makers construct through discourse a relationship between the (national) security identity and the European values, e.g. a relationship definable by overlapping or opposing values.

While identity is constructed in relation to (European) norms and values, the process of Europeanisation itself produces *shared* norms and values and hence shapes discourses and identities (Olsen 2002, 935). The Union’s foreign and security policy identity is defined through liberal values (Larsen 2004). According to the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, Art. 1a)

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

These values are defined as having to be protected and promoted internationally and foremost in the EU neighbourhood. According to the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003, 1),

“European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.”

As EFSP is constructed through the promotion of EU values (as they are defined in the TEU), in this article EFSP is understood as a process through which European values are first downloaded by the candidate/member state and crossloaded from other states, to become a structural framework of interaction, and finally to lead to a shared threat perception and the promotion of shared interests and security policy instruments. The EFSP takes place in a timely and incremental manner, first by changes in discourse, and ultimately by changes in national identity.

The shared norms and values translate in practice into a shared view of security and threats, as well as into common instruments used to tackle challenges and threats. EFSP is understood in this article as: a comprehensive understanding of security, the perception of threats and challenges as unconventional and asymmetric (inherent to globalisation trends) and the main instrument to address these as crisis management (European Council 2003).

Europeanisation Discourse – a Matter of Degree

Discourse, understood as the codes by which actors inter-relate, can be identified through the study of a nation state’s official documents and the speeches of its political leadership (Waeber 2002, 26). Changes that take place in the dominant national security discourse (Risse 2001, 201-202) of an EU member are indicative for changes in the national identity of a state (Rieker 2006, 514). Hence, alterations in an EU member state’s discourse with regard to the relationship between national identity and European values are symptomatic for the degree of EFSP: a greater emphasis on European values suggests greater Europeanisation, while a distancing from them indicates a decreasing degree of Europeanisation.

However, as Rieker points out, not all changes in discourse that are the result of Europeanisation necessarily constitute a change in identity. Therefore, it is important to differentiate between degrees of Europeanisation: the process can take place solely through adaptation (strategic adjustments are made in order to “fit” European values in) and/or transformation (a change in identity) (2006, 514). These two forms of Europeanisation can also be considered parts of the same

socialisation process, through which an EU candidate/member initially instrumentally adjusts its discourse to the norms of the EU, and then, in time, becomes convinced by this discourse (ibid.).

Distinguishing between the two stages is possible when considering that norms and values become “cognitive and normative frames” (Surel 2000) that trigger transformative effects in relation to interests (Radaelli 2003, 26) and ultimately to identity, so that the actor starts to think and behave in the framework of the adopted norms. Once the socialisation process is complete, and the actor sees the international scene through the lens of European values, it may define its relationship to these values in a largely varying manner, including distancing and/or disillusionment.

The Europeanisation of Romanian Foreign and Security Discourse: From Start to Stop

The CEEC Europeanisation has been faster and more effective during the integration process, because of the stronger incentives CEEC were exposed to due to conditionality. Areas subjected to the conditionality of the *aquis communautaire*, or which CEEC associated with growth and stability, have gone through a more profound Europeanisation, while the national foreign and security policies of CEEC went through a more adaptive and slower process. Especially countries bordering the EU space (partially) maintained their conventional threat perception due to their geographical proximity to an increased number of challenges. Also, the CSDP did not offer these states the security guarantees sought by them. Moreover, attempts to develop the European security policy in the Eastern neighbourhood stalled because of its members' lack of political will.

Romania's position with regard to CSDP and the promotion of European values on the security policy level is reflective of this issue: while always stating that NATO and CSDP should avoid duplicating resources and type of activities, after its EU integration in 2007 Bucharest has been gradually shifting its foreign and security policy from the securitisation of asymmetric threats to an emphasis of regional conventional threats. Romania's shift away from Europeanisation and a marked comprehensive security, back to rather utilitarian security calculations and to a traditional threat perception regarding Russia has been enforced by two factors: the perception of EU double standards with regard to its Eastern neighbours, as well as the failure of uploading its national interests to the EU level.

Both these factors are generating the distancing of Romania's foreign and security policy away from European (post)modern values towards the traditional Cold War thinking, a phenomenon which is reflected in the country's strategic documents, as well as in official statements of the Romanian President, the principal foreign and security policymaker. Such a tendency to slowly withdraw from CSDP and to stall the EFSP might have a significant impact on the evolution of the EU security policy.

Romania Before Integration: A Late Start

Romania's modern history has been marked by experiences that endorsed its strongly defensive and neighbour-mistrusting strategic culture. With a self-image of bridging the East and the West, Bucharest has historically favoured closer relationships with Western European countries. Even during Communism, Bucharest maintained the perception that Russia is always a challenge and sometimes a threat, to the point that during Ceausescu's dictatorship Bucharest's relation with Moscow reached historical lows. This led to an internationally independent foreign policy, but also to a regional isolation and a militaristic security policy.

Consequently, Romania went through a tougher transition than other CEEC, having the disadvantages of a history of an exceedingly authoritarian communist regime, the only violent revolution in the region and the clinging of former communists to power beyond 1990. These disadvantages put Romanian foreign and security policy orientation in a grey zone during the first years after the regime change. Bucharest was caught in a Cold War thinking; reflective of this security culture, the first national security strategy of democratic Romania (Integrated Conception of Romanian National Security 1994) promotes territorial defence and an out-of-date approach for a post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, the document expresses Bucharest's view of the world in the early '90s: it suggests Romania's fear of isolation by calling upon the (Western) European community to not marginalise, but integrate it; yet it rejects any need for embracing European values². As a result, the West perceived the country's security orientation as ambiguous and unconvincing.

Romania During EU Integration: A Promising Europeanisation

After the Constantinescu regime came into power in 1996, it endorsed a major shift in Romanian foreign and security policy orientation that has been maintained beyond the President's mandate. The dominant discourse became very liberal, emphasising European values, market economy and the improvement all neighbourly relations. Romania's new foreign and security paradigm of European and Euro-Atlantic integration was embraced cross-party. The discursive Europeanisation of the national foreign and security policy was meant to convince the West that Romania was on the right (and fast) track to becoming a stable European democracy. Many of the discursive elements that were introduced at the end of the '90s and developed after 2000 in order to shape the country's image as European have become now part of the national identity.

Moreover, Constantinescu's regime endorsed a substantial participation in international missions – first under UN umbrella, then in the framework of NATO and EU – that has been continued later by President Ion Iliescu and President Traian Basescu. This commitment to international security and to raising the country's profile within multinational organisations enabled Romania to emphasise crisis management and asymmetric threats as an intrinsic part of its national security policy and thus to further Europeanise its discourse.

Romania's paradigm of integration meant for public opinion, as well as for decision-makers, that the country is (re)accepted as an integral part of the Western and foremost European community. Romanian Europeanisation discourse can be followed (and differentiated from that of NATO integration) through the discursive uses of, firstly, the importance of liberal values and democratisation and, secondly, a shift towards asymmetric threat perception, comprehensive security and crisis management (as characteristic elements of EU security policy).

While the values are highly present in the statements and the strategic documents starting with 1996 (including in the 1999 and 2001 national security strategies) and developed in time into metaphors inherent to Romanian security culture and identity³, the characteristic elements of EU security policy have gained momentum especially in the light of the Kosovo war and 9/11. However, unlike the (European) values, that have become part of the national identity and constitute now a structural framework, the postmodern view on security did not settle into Romania's security identity.

Romania After Integration: Balancing Between Postmodern and Traditional Threats

At the time of the country's EU integration in 2007, Romania was a NATO member for three years. President Traian Basescu, who won the election in 2004 with the promise of fighting corruption and of EU integration, set in motion a new shift in national foreign and security policy towards defining Romania's role as member of the European and Euro-Atlantic community.

With the integration into NATO and EU, Romania had fulfilled its main foreign and security priorities. Hence, in 2007 a priority vacuum governed Romanian strategic thinking. The very process of searching for a new foreign and security paradigm and the attempt to reshape the national identity accordingly have since then become a component of contemporary Romanian security culture.

A stepping stone in the Romanian identity search represents the National Defence Strategy (NDS 2010); the document conceptually introduces the need for a more active role of the country on the international scene, while promoting a responsible and predictable role in relation to its Western partners and Allies. This concept of identity assertion in the framework of European values is translated into a greater regional involvement of Romania through the Europeanisation of its neighbourhood; i.e. the promotion of European values in the extended Black Sea region.

Overall, the NDS 2010 reflects a shift towards a more assertive self-image, as well as a perception of growing regional insecurity: it emphasises territorial defence to the same extent as crisis management and provides for the participation in international (combat) missions in the framework of ad hoc coalitions. Moreover, Russia is extendedly envisioned (for the first time in Romanian strategic documents) as a regional challenge in relation to a list of problems⁴.

The national foreign and security policy reorientation is also constituted by a growing Atlanticism. Increasingly, Washington is perceived by Bucharest as a power able and willing to support Romanian security needs. Since its EU integration, the strategic partnership with the US has been nurtured and developed by Romania, being now considered as a top national interest and as offering an additional (informal) security guarantee.

With regard to the Union, even though Bucharest's fear of isolation has prompted the country to participate in EU missions and to promote CSDP discursively, it is far from being a hardliner Europeanist. Since the launch of ESDP,

national strategic documents and official Romanian statements underline the need to avoid duplication with NATO and for the Alliance to maintain exclusivity over combat missions and “hard security”, while ESDP/CSDP should stick to crisis management and monitorisation. This position is indicative for Bucharest’s Atlanticism, as well as its reluctance concerning the effectiveness of CSDP missions.

Moreover, CSDP’s emphasis over the last years on Mediterranean and African security has been perceived by Bucharest as detrimental to Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood security and as leading to a lack of achievements in the region. Romania’s security priority to stabilise and Europeanise its own region could therefore not be pursued with EU instruments. Bucharest’s frustration can be attributed to the EU’s shortage of consideration for its new member states’ security interests, as much as to a lack of success in uploading its national interests to the EU level. The limited degree of overlap between Romanian and European interests in foreign and security policy has negative effects on the Europeanisation of Romania and turns in practice into a further Atlantisation of the country’s foreign and security policy.

Romania in the Current Ukraine Crisis: A Revival of Traditional Security Thinking?

The frustration with the failure to upload Romania’s regional interests to the EU level led to a pause in the down- and crossloading of Europeanisation to the national level. The lack of a shared definition of national interests on one side, and European ones, on the other, has been increasingly present in Romanian discourse over the last years. The framework for this evolution was offered by a change in the nature of the relationship between Romania and the EU. While during integration conditionality has imposed a teacher-student relationship, reflected in Bucharest’s efforts to Europeanise its security discourse and identity and to convince the European community of its values, after integration the relationship evolved into a partnership.

Even though Bucharest’s blossoming assertiveness is constrained by its inherent fear of isolation, it has been amplified by recent events in Ukraine. For Romanian security culture Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine is part of the instability inherent to the extended Black Sea region. In line with this view, Bucharest’s arguably worst perceived failure of uploading its security priorities to the EU’s level was the Black Sea Synergy (Commission of the European Communities 2008). Since before its integration in 2007, the country has been pushing for a greater presence of the Union in the Black Sea, considering it vital for the stabilisation of the area. After promoting on the national level a great number of regional initiatives, Bucharest wanted to move the issue up to the EU level, in order to increase the European commitment to its Eastern neighbourhood. Even though the 2008 Georgian war confirmed the country’s arguments with regard to the regional insecurity, the EU Black Sea Synergy never became an EU strategy for the region, as Romania intended. The Union’s lack of responsiveness concerning the region’s instability made Romania turn to NATO, where it managed over the next few years to put energy security (2008) and the strategic importance of the Black Sea (2014) on the agenda.

Moreover, Europe’s reaction to the Georgian war and the current Ukrainian crisis is seen by Bucharest as a proof of double standards. What Europe stands for and promotes – European values – is taking second place when dealing with its Eastern neighbourhood. Due to the member states’ dependence on Russian resources, European countries are tempted to forget the normativity they adhered to. For the CEEC on the other side, which were deprived of values values during Communism, the issue is emotionally charged. Therefore, some of them are inclined to take these double standards in relation to Russia even harder. The fact that countries such as Poland, who’s economy depends to a greater extent on Russia than that of Germany, have been far more willing to impose sanctions on Russia and have prioritised European values above economical interests is adding to the complexity of this issue and to Romania’s increasing frustration.

The approach of Bucharest in relation to European country’s prioritisation of their material interests above European values is expressed in President Basescu’s recent statement in the context of the Malaysian Air plane crash in the Ukraine:

“The problem [of Ukraine] is that it is the responsibility of the European Union. Could the EU have done more than it did until now? And my answer is definitely "yes". Sanctions should have been introduced long ago [...] Of course, there have always been arguments. Arguments such as: a country has large investments, another country has to deliver sophisticated equipment, another country is dependent on gas, others simply said it is better to be well off with the European Union and the Russian Federation at the same time, and to have a soft position [...] But in the EU we talk about values. [...] And I would like to know which is the highest value of the European Union. Is not the highest value the European citizen? Is not the highest value the safety of European citizens? Of course we also have economic values [...] But it came to a point where we had to chose between the safety of citizens and economic interests. It is time for Europe to put the situation of its citizens first.” (Romanian Presidency. 21 July 2014)

He made a similarly strong statement later on, urging the European community to see the Ukrainian crisis as a conventional threat that needs to be addressed with hands-on security calculations:

“I will say this without hesitation, the democratic states have to overcome the moment of declarations of good intentions. I believe the Ukrainian army is fed up with the headphones and non-lethal weapons it has been sent; it is time, if we want to help democracy in Ukraine, if we want to give a chance to the Ukrainian people to continue the road to the European Union, to act as did the Russian Federation, namely to provide the Ukrainian army with any means may be made available to help them in this fight.” (Romanian Presidency 29 August 2014)

In addition, in the context of the military aggression, Romanian decision-makers emphasised the need to increase the defence budget for territorial defence, to the detriment of the postmodern threat prevention characteristic of the EU. Given the current CSDP paralysis in the context of Ukraine and the lack of political will of many EU member states to take a strong stance against Russia, it is very likely that countries such as Romania will continue to shift away from CSDP and its comprehensive understanding of security and increasingly emphasise the regional conventional threats they are faced with.

Conclusion

Since its EU integration, Romania’s foreign and security policy has gradually shifted from the securitisation of asymmetric threats to an emphasis of regional conventional threats. While recent instabilities in the Union’s neighbourhood have enforced Romanian reluctance with regard to Europe’s security policy, the country’s changing security understanding has been motivated by two factors. First, Bucharest did not succeed in uploading its security policy to the EU level. Especially the failure to convince the European community of the need to increase its involvement in the extended Black Sea region contributed to Bucharest’s frustration with the European security policy. Second, the Union’s perceived double standards and lack of political will in relation to the Eastern neighbourhood have halted Romania’s involvement in the European security policy over the last years. These factors have significantly contributed to the stagnation of Bucharest’s Europeanisation in the aftermath of integration.

The dominant Romanian security discourse, which pre-integration embraced not only European values, but also the (post)modern view on security characteristic of the Union, has grown after 2007 more reluctant with regard to CSDP. Recent events in Ukraine have enforced Romanian doubts concerning Europe’s security policy and have further limited its EFSP.

Romania’s foreign and security policy (re)orientation towards pragmatism and Realpolitik is significant for the future evolution of CSDP and Europe’s security thinking. At the Union’s level, it reflects the paralysis of CSDP in the Eastern neighbourhood and points to the need for change of the European security policy. Also, it opens up a series of questions concerning the future of Europeanisation as a process. Lastly, Romania’s shift could be indicative of the Europeanisation trends in other CEEC, especially those bordering the Union’s Eastern space.

With regard to Romania, its EFSP suggests that the transformation of national identity in terms of European values is not necessarily linked to a change in the understanding of security. While Romania instrumentally adapted its security discourse pre-integration, the country’s policy shift after 2007 shows that Europeanisation transformed its structural framework of action, but not its understanding of security. On the contrary, the elements characteristic of a European understanding of security are being reduced and replaced in Romanian discourse, indicating a reversing tendency of Europeanisation.

References

- Bauer, Michael W., and Christoph Knill and Diana Pitschel. “Differential Europeanization in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Diverse EU Regulatory Governance Patterns”, *Journal of European Integration*, 29, no. 4 (2007): 405-423.
- Biehl, Heiko, and Bastian Giegerich, and Alexandra Jonas. 2013. *Strategic Cultures Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Boerzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2003. “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe.” In *The Politics of Europeanization*, edited by K. Featherstone, and C. Radaelli, 57-81. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Iulia Joja – *Where Does the Europeanisation of CEEC Security Discourse Stop? A Case Study of Romania*

Commission of the European Communities. 2008. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Report on the First Year of Implementation of the Black Sea Synergy. http://eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/doc/com08_391_en.pdf. Accessed 20 August 2014.

European Council, 2003. *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*. Brussels: European Council.

Grabbe, Heather. "How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8, no. 6 (2001): 1013-1031.

Grabbe, Heather. 2003. "Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process." In *The Politics of Europeanization*, edited by K. Featherstone, and C. Radaelli, 303-329. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Grabbe, Heather. 2006. *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Howells, Kerry E. "Developing Conceptualisations of Europeanization: Synthesising Methodological Approaches", *Queen's Papers of Europeanization*, 3(2004), 1-13.

Hughes, James, and Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon. 2004. *Europeanization and Conditionality in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Integrated Conception of Romanian National Security. 1994. Bucharest: Romanian Presidency.

Ladrech, R. 2010. *Europeanization and National Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Larsen, Henrik. 2004. "Discourse Analysis in the Study of European Foreign Policy." In *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, edited by Ben Tonra, and Thomas Christiansen, 62-80. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

National Defence Strategy. 2010. <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf>. Accessed 20 August 2014.

National Security Strategy. 2007. <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>. Accessed 20 August 2014.

Olsen, Johan. "The Many Faces of Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 4 (2002), 921-52.

Radaelli, C. 2003. "The Europeanization of Public Policy." In *The Politics of Europeanization*, edited by K. Featherstone, and C. Radaelli, 27-56. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Rieker, Pernille. 2006a. *Europeanization of National Security Identity: The EU and the Changing Security Identity of the Nordic States*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rieker, Pernille. "From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy", *Security Dialogue* 120, no. 4 (2006b), 509-526.

Risse, Thomas. 2001. "A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities." In *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, edited by Maria Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse (198-216). Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.

Romanian Presidency. *Press statement of President Traian Basescu* (21 July 2014). Author's translation. http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=15162&_PRID=ag. Accessed 20 August 2014.

Romanian Presidency. *Press statement. Speech of President Traian Basescu at the Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy* (29 August 2014). Author's translation. http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=15202&_PRID=lazi. Accessed 30 August 2014.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2007. "Candidate Countries and Conditionality." In *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink, 88-101. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Surel, Y. "The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making", *Journal of European Public Policy* 7, no. 4 (2000): 495-512.

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. 2007.

Wæver, Ole. 2002. "Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy. Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory." In *European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States*, edited by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, 20–49. London and New York: Routledge.

Wong, Reuben. 2007. "Foreign Policy." In *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink, 321-334. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

* Iulia Joja is currently a PhD candidate at the National School for Political and Administrative Studies Bucharest with a thesis on Romanian security culture 1990-2014. She has studied Political Science and International Relations at the Freie Universität Berlin and the NSPAS Bucharest and holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from King's College London (War Studies Department).

Iulia Joja has worked between 2012 and 2014 as an adviser for security and defence at the Romanian President's office, where she focused on Romania's strategic profile, as well as on Romania's participation in European and NATO security. Previously, she has been working at the United Nations, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Parliament and NATO ACT.

¹ The studies on CEEC have been focusing on Europeanisation generally and the impact of conditionality. These include: Bauer and Knill and Pitschel 2007; Grabbe 2001; Grabbe 2006; Hughes and Sasse and Gordon 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007.

² The 1994 Strategy is also the only strategic document in Romania's democratic history that does not guarantee human rights and liberties.

³ Examples of these are the "modernisation" of Romania, becoming a "responsible and predictable partner", President Basescu's campaign "the fight against corruption", good governance.

⁴ The 2008 Georgia war, the 2009 Ukraine gas crisis, the 2009 Estonian cyber attack and the frozen conflicts.