LONG RUN PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR: A FOCUS ON MECHANISMS

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Abstract: I argue that identity-forming formal institutions leave lasting cultural legacies. I illustrate the argument with evidence from a natural experiment of history that divided a homogenous population of ethnic Ukrainians between Austrian and Russian empires in the late 18th century before reuniting them once again in the 20th. Marshaling evidence from a survey of 800 individuals over the age of 70 who reside within 15 miles of the defunct imperial border I propose and test a theory of political identity transmission. I find that families, as long as they remain embedded within likeminded communities, play a vital role in transmitting historical political identities. By contrast, state institutions, and especially schools, are dominant in identity building and transmission in families where historical political identities have not taken root. Schools, though, can be rendered ineffective by local elites, if the latter do not support state-promoted ideology, and by churches.

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I. Introduction

In this paper I propose to explore the impact of institutional imperial legacies on contemporary mass attitudes and political behavior. My aim here is to test the proposition that historical political identities are capable of persisting long after formal institutions that gave rise to them have disappeared and to demonstrate that these identities continue to shape behavior even in the face of major changes in institutional and material environments. The setting for this paper is a natural experiment of history that unfolded in western Ukraine starting in the late 18th century when a homogenous population of ethnic Ukrainians found itself divided between Austrian and Russian empires for 150 years. In 1939, these two communities were reunited within the Soviet Union. I ask whether pre-Soviet institutions left a lasting cultural legacy, and, if so, by what mechanisms that legacy persisted into the present. To test for identity persistence and transmission I surveyed 813 individuals over the age of 70, who reside in villages within a maximum distance 30 miles of the defunct Austrian-Russian imperial border. My focus in this study, by contrast to previous work, is on the elderly because I am specifically interested in how community life altered at the time of early Sovietization.

I demonstrate that communities that today reside either side of the defunct imperial border differ substantially on the master cleavage of attitudes toward Russia. This cleavage translates into major differences in foreign policy preferences, interpretation of the recent past, and voting behavior. Neighboring communities differ from one another by 30 to 70 percentage points depending on the issue. I show how diametrically opposed political identities have persisted throughout the Soviet period as a result of family transmission of anti-Russian attitudes and school transmission of pro-Russian sentiments. I also demonstrate that local elites who do not share the

dominant state ideology undermine its spread and promote the historical political identity in its place. Similarly, I show how churches can, under the right circumstances, provide a refuge for anti-establishment identities.

Over the past decade there has been a surge of interest in the institutional path-dependent colonial and imperial legacies. Among excellent studies liking historical causes to contemporary political and economic outcomes is work on patterns of settler mortality and contemporary levels of economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Easterly and Levine 2003), colonial patterns of labor coercion and land holding and contemporary levels of inequality and development (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Dell 2010, Acemoglu et al. 2012), and varieties of missionary activity and contemporary levels of human capital and democratization (Lankina and Getachew 2011, Woodberry 2012). However, institutional continuity might be more of the exception than the rule. Complete institutional overhaul is common in history; major institutional shifts occur following wars, revolutions, state collapse, and even when venerable formal institutions[1] simply fall out of usage with the passage of time. An important question that arises then is whether some types of long-lived formal institutions might leave behind a legacy—normative, ideological, or cultural—that allows them to influence the contemporary polity from beyond the grave.

There is now a growing body of literature, a lot of it in economics, suggesting that formal institutions might leave a cultural legacy. In their study on patterns of slave trading in Africa, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that areas particularly badly hit by slavers have high levels of mistrust. Becker and coauthors (2011) argue that former Habsburg territories have higher respect for institutions and lower

[1] I define formal institutions here as physical organizations with headquarters and dedicated personnel.

tolerance for corruption than neighboring regions, whereas Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007) note that, controlling for income, Germans who grew up in the DDR have a higher preference for welfare. Darden (forthcoming) links the content of historical school curricula to contemporary levels of conflict in Eastern Europe. A major weakness that runs through all of these fascinating studies and other similar work is that the mechanism connecting long-defunct formal institutions and contemporary attitudes or behavior is usually heavily underspecified. In this paper, I propose to address this weakness.

The paper opens with a discussion of the natural experiment on which this study is built and goes on to outline the formal institutional "treatments" that gave rise to persistent political identities. I then present a theory of identity formation and transmission and describe the survey design. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to presentation of results and discussion of the findings. The limitations of this argument are discussed in the conclusion.

II. Natural Experiment of History

The historical context that I make use of in this project came about as a result of a partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between the Austrian and Russian empires and the Kingdom of Prussia in the last quarter of the 18th century. The Partition was a natural outcome of great power politics and imperial expansionism and brought about the dissolution of pre-modern Europe's largest state by landmass. More specifically, over the course of the Partition, the area that that today is western Ukraine and is the focus of this inquiry was transformed from Poland's heartland into an imperial borderland at the intersection of the Austrian and Russian empires.

The process by which the Austrian-Russian imperial border was settled meets the "as-if" random requirement, which is a defining feature of a natural experiment (Dunning 2012). The size and shape of the tracts of territory that were acquired by each of the partitioning powers were a product of power relationships between these states and not of pre-existing boundaries. Piotr Wandyzc, a leading historian of Poland, noted that "the newly drawn borders corresponded to neither historical, ethnic, economic, nor geographical criteria" (1974: 11).

Prior to the partition, the population of the future imperial borderlands was homogenous, as was the institutional environment in this region, which had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since the latter's formation in 1569.[2] At the time of the partition, ethnic Ukrainians made up 70-80% of the population of this region (Magosci 1996). Settled exclusively on the land, they subsisted as feudal serfs to powerful Polish landowners and lacked basic rights including the right to own property. Local institutions were captured by Polish landowners, who had the right to appoint court officials, village priests, and tavern keepers, and the peasantry did not have the right of appeal to the Crown (Sysyn 1985). The Ukrainian peasantry had their own religious rite—Greek Catholicism, a tradition based on Orthodox practices but administratively subservient to the Vatican–which set them apart from their masters and Polish peasants to the west.

III. Historical Treatments

[2] Prior to that the regions of Galicia and Podolia were part of the Kingdom of Poland and the region of Volhynia part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania since the mid-14th century. Since the time of the first chronicles in the mid-10th century and before Polish and Lithuanian conquests in the region, all three regions were part of a Slavic principality ruled by Viking princes (Magosci 1996).

Different state responses of the Austrian and Russian empires to the common dilemmas of mutual containment and the internal threat of Polish secessionism[3] gave rise to different historical formal institutions, which in turn shaped diametrically opposed political identities that have persisted into the present. The two empires pursued different institutional strategies in dealing with an identical set of problems due to major differences in state capacity.[4] Differences in historical formal institutions, and specifically churches, schools, and eventually political parties, therefore constitute the divergent historical 'treatments.' The outcome of these divergences was that by the early 20th century the Ukrainians of the Austrian empire were animated by the desire for independent statehood, so much so that they proclaimed a short-lived Western Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1918. Western Ukrainians then continued to defend their right for self-determination well into the 20th century first against Poles, then Germans and Russians. By contrast, Ukrainians of the Russian empire embraced statehood unwillingly only under direct military threat in January 1918. Russian Ukraine then quickly fell under the sway of Germany and eventually of the Soviet Union without much popular resistance. This paper explores the long-lasting effects of the divergent identity building 'treatments': a propensity for resistance to Russian control in the former Austrian parts of contemporary Ukraine and a propensity to embrace Russian political and cultural influence in the former Russian areas.

[TABLE 1]

[3] The Polish noble class was both populous (there were 600,000 Polish nobles in the Russian segment alone in 1795 against 150,000 members of the noble estate in the remainder of the Russian Empire (Thaden 1984: 33)) and highly aggrieved by loss of independent statehood. Poles organized uprisings in the Russian Empire in 1830 and 1863 and in the Austrian Empire in 1846 (Magosci 1996).
[4] In 1860, Russia had 1.1 to 1.3 public officials per 1,000 subjects against 2.8 in Austria already in 1840 (Starr 1972: 48).

The Austrian-Russian imperial borderlands in western Ukraine were made up of three distinct historical regions: Galicia on the Austrian side, and Volhynia and Podolia on the Russian. The historical trajectory of these regions is outlined in Table 1, and their physical location can be gleaned from Map 1 that comes later in the paper in the section on measurement. All three regions were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the latter's partitioning, and all three came together once again in 1939 when Ukraine acquired its contemporary borders. In the interwar period, Galicia and Volhynia reverted to newly independent Poland, whereas the region of Podolia came under Soviet control along with the rest of Ukraine. Given the historical trajectory of these three regions, it is useful to think of historical "treatments" as composites that include imperial and interwar periods. The two components of the 'treatment' are not equally important, because political identity tends to take root during the initial period of prolonged exposure to politicizing state institutions (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Darden forthcoming). What that means is that the Austrian period was more important for Galicia, whereas the interwar period was pivotal in Volhynia and Podolia.

[TABLE 2]

The full complexity of the institutional evolution of these three regions is summarized in Table 2 and is explored in detail in book-length treatment of this project. To sum up, on the Austrian side, state authorities fostered an independent Ukrainian political and cultural community by supporting the Greek Catholic church, founding earliest ethnic Ukrainian political parties, and underwriting the spread of the

Ukrainian periodical press (Wandycz 1974). By contrast, Russian imperial authorities banned the Greek Catholic church, prohibited all political parties, and banned publications in the Ukrainian vernacular (Magosci 1996). The awakening of a communal political identity in formerly Russian Volhynia and Podolia took place during the interwar period. In Podolia, which transitioned to Soviet control, this took the form of forced literacy campaigns[5] and *korenizatsiia* policy. The aim of *korenizatsiia* was to create a national community that was "proletarian in content, national in form" (Martin 2001: 90). That translates into the continuation of the tsarist imperial policy of promoting the notion that Ukrainians were as younger brothers to their Russian brethren along with promotion of messages of support for Soviet institutions. Polish authorities in Volhynia effectively copied the Soviet policy of *korenizatsiia*, while suiting it to their needs. There, Ukrainians were taught that they were as younger brothers to their Polish neighbors and that Russians were aggressors. The Volhynia Experiment did not last long (1926-1939), but it was intense, encompassing as it did the Orthodox churches, the school system, and political parties (Snyder 2005).[6]

IV. Theory of Identity Persistence

The processes underlying formation and persistence of political identities are outlined schematically in Figure 1. Stages 1 to 4 describe the process of identity formation—creation of identity-promoting institutions and cooptation of local elites for the purpose of identity transmission and norm policing. That part of the theory draws on

[5] Literacy rates rose from single digits in 1897 to 98% in 1938 (Magosci 1996: 543, 563).
[6] Polish authorities made efforts to extend the same assimilationist policies to Galicia. However, in Galicia, the Polish policies did not take root, as Ukrainians of Galicia already had a well-articulated political and cultural identity nestled within a dense network of Greek Catholic churches, privately run political organizations, and educational and commercial societies.

existing classical studies of national and political identity formation (Weber 1976, Hroch 2000, Anderson 1991). I described the empirical pathways through which these processes played out in the preceding section. Of greater interest from the perspective of this paper is the question of how political identities persist once formal institutions disappear after giving rise to and sustaining these identities. In other words, what happens after Stage 5, a watershed moment of wholesale institutional change of the kind that all three regions under study experienced with the arrival of Soviet authorities?

[FIGURE 1]

I hypothesize that certain types of pre-watershed political identities will persist even after major institutional reform if (i) pre-reform family and community networks remain intact *and* (ii) local elites are permitted to physically remain within their communities and maintain their prominence. Not all political identities are strong; only salient identities that come to define the community and permeate multiple domains of social interactions from the public arena to the household have a particularly high chance of survival. National identities are an archetype of a strong salient identity in that they define individuals vis-à-vis their community and the broader world.

The Soviet Union furnishes a particularly hard test for the theory of identity persistence because Soviet authorities made a concerted effort to eradicate all preceding systems of social, political, and economic relations. Soviet institutional reforms were all-encompassing. Like any totalitarian state, the Soviet Union sought to

control public and private lives of its citizens through youth groups, collective farms, and a dense network of professional associations. However, the Soviet case is far from *sui generis*. All formal institutional regimes fall apart at one stage or another, material relations change as a result of economic development or technological breakthroughs, and yet some types of political identities exhibit a remarkable tendency to persist.

What are the processes that enable identity persistence beyond institutional watersheds? Classical studies of identity persistence come from the literature on cross-generational continuity of partisan identities. Research on the US (Jennings and Niemi 1968, Glass et al. 1986) and Western Europe (Westholm and Niemi 1992, Zuckerman et al. 2006, Rico and Jennings 2012) suggests that partisan identities, ideological positioning on the left-right scale, politicized regional identities, and religiosity levels can all be effectively transmitted within the immediate family for generations. There is also limited evidence that schools and peer networks play an important role in identity transmission (e.g. Jennings et al. 2009). Drawing on political psychology literature, I hypothesize that parents play a vital role in intergenerational transmission of political identities, especially when these identities are at odds with what is popularized by state institutions:

H1: Parents are crucial to successful transmission of historical political identities.

Schools are the state institutions at the forefront of the fight to eradicate historical political identities in societies where education is politicized. This gives rise to the second hypothesis:

H2: Schools transmit and maintain state-sponsored political identities.

Churches also likely play an important role in the dissemination and preservation of political identities given that religious attitudes are particularly stable across

generations (Bengtson et al. 2009). Furthermore, we know from Wittenberg's study (2006) on persistence of the conservative voter base in Hungary under Communism that churches can act as crucibles of political loyalty.

> H3: Churches assist with the persistence of historical political identities.

In an extension of a classical insight from the studies on political socialization that peer networks influence the substance of attitudes that are being adopted, I argue that family persistence alone is not sufficient for persistence of identities. Families are nurtured by communities within which they are embodied, therefore I hypothesize that:

> H4: Survival of historical political identities is premised on persistence of families and reference communities within which families are embedded.

When material and institutional incentives line up to encourage identity change, even well internalized attitudes and behaviors must weaken. I hypothesize that an important reason why historical political identities persist in the face of incentives for change is that local elites who police and nurture dominant identities impose costs on those who deviate from dominant social and political norms:

> H5: Local elites from the pre-watershed period must survive for historical political identities to persist.

V. Measurement

(i) Survey Design

The mechanisms behind identity persistence and the dependent variables are measured via a survey of settlements that are located within 15 miles of the historical border. I sampled settlements located within such close proximity of one another in

order to control for possible unobservable variation on such variables as soil fertility, type of agriculture, infrastructure development, presence of economic opportunities, and the like. The survey area is presented graphically in Map 1; it is divided into fourteen approximately equally sized segments. Odd numbered segments 1-13 are situated in the historical region of Galicia immediately to the west of the historical Austrian-Russian border. Even numbered segments 2-10 are part of the historical region of Volhynia, and segments 12 and 14 are in historical Podolia.

I have traveled extensively across the whole of the survey area over five years of fieldwork interviewing locals and observing local practices. All the segments are very rural with agriculture providing the main source of employment; there are no obvious differences in physical or economic infrastructure between the segments. Contemporary oblast boundaries map closely onto the defunct imperial border, but the concomitance between imperial and contemporary internal administrative boundaries does not pose much of an analytical challenge because all major economic and social policies were centralized during the Soviet period and are still centrally administered today.

[MAP 1]

In my other work, I have presented evidence from a fully representative survey of the population residing within immediate proximity of the historical imperial border. Here, in order to better explore how locals reacted to the arrival of Soviet institutions I limited the survey sample to individuals over 70 years of age who had direct experience of early Sovietization. Overall, 813 respondents were interviewed in 81 villages. On the Austrian side, 403 respondents were sampled from

40 villages in historical Galicia; on the Russian, 250 individuals were interviewed in 25 Volhynian villages and 160 in 16 Podolian villages. The sampling frame excluded the city of Ternopil and smaller towns, of which there are very few, as I wanted to focus on identity persistence in the context of close-knit rural communities. The number of respondents within every segment was determined via the probability proportional to size method, whereby the more populous segments were assigned a higher number of respondents.[7] In short, this survey is representative of village residents over the age of 70 residing in the immediate vicinity of the defunct imperial border.

(ii) Descriptive Statistics

A general description of survey respondents is provided in Table 3. An average respondent is a woman of almost 80 years of age with about seven years of schooling and a slightly below average income who spent her professional life working on a collective farm in a village where she had been born. I report means for every descriptive variable separately by region and standard deviations in brackets next to the coefficients. In the three columns on the right, I present *t*-statistics for difference of means tests for each of the possible pairings of the three regions. In this study, it is important to distinguish between differences in descriptive variables that are a product of historical 'treatments' and those differences that might challenge the very notion that the three regions are comparable on basic demographic covariates.

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[7] At the village level, interviewers located respondents by asking locals to point them in the direction of elderly village residents. In practice, this method of respondent selection is close to random[7] because interviewers begin their search for respondents in different parts of the settlement, and a quota of 10 respondents per village in settlements that average only 650 residents is often almost exhaustive of the total population of cogent individuals of an advanced age.

[TABLE 3]

On a number of covariates—percentage of female respondents, those who self identify as Ukrainian, and the number of teachers in regional samples—the three regions are statistically indistinguishable from one another. Pairwise difference of means scores suggest that the three regions are somewhat different on several other important variables—percentage of respondents who worked in agriculture prior to retirement, the number of those who only communicate in Ukrainian at home, and respondents' age—but these differences are relatively small and, more importantly, insignificant in substantive terms. Differences in self-reported income levels pose more of a challenge. Elderly residents of Russian Podolia appear to be 1.5 points wealthier on a 10-point scale than their neighbors in Austrian Galicia, despite the fact that during the Soviet period the two populations were employed in identical occupations and therefore today receive identical pensions. Evidence from open-ended interviews suggests that, in this instance, differences in self-reported income are more of a product of different frames of reference for what constitutes average income (5 points on the scale) than of actual differences in material living conditions between the three regions.

Several large and highly statistically significant differences across the three regions are due to variation in the historical 'treatments.' This is notably the case when it comes to religious denomination. Almost all the Greek Catholics in the sample reside in Galicia. As a corollary, almost all the respondents in the historical regions of Podolia and Volhynia are Orthodox Christians. Although considerably smaller in magnitude but also statistically significant is the difference in educational

attainment. The residents of Podolia have, on average, one more year of education than their neighbors from Galicia or Volhynia. This difference is due to the fact that between the two world wars, when many of the respondents began their schooling, Soviet schools in Podolia reached more Ukrainian students and kept them in school longer than Polish schools in Galicia and Volhynia.

The theory of transmission of political attitudes and behaviors presupposes existence of stable communities where political identities can be effectively disseminated and policed. Therefore, it is important to ask how well rooted the respondents are in their respective communities, particularly given the fact that survey settlements are located within such close proximity to one another thus making movement between them easy and also given that western Ukraine experienced two world wars, a civil war, and Soviet deportations all in the space of several decades. Massive displacements over the course of World War II have left their mark on this population. This is particularly noticeable in Galicia and Volhynia, where intense fighting between the Red Army and Nazi Germany's Wehrmacht in 1944 forced relocations of whole villages. As a result, whereas 84% of respondents in Podolia had been born in the survey village, this number is 72% for Galicia and 66% for Volhynia. These percentages are sufficiently high for effective identity transmission; a 50% threshold can be usefully applied as a rule of thumb. More importantly, when I add up the responses for those born in the survey village and the oblast where the village is located, I get population stability levels of 89% for Galicia, 92% for Volhynia, and 98% for Podolia. It is therefore not necessary to worry about migratory inflows or other types of population mixing in the 20th century. I also asked respondents about their historical roots, and it was gratifying to see that over 50% in all three regions

were able to trace their roots back in the survey village to the early 19th century (100 years back from their birth).

VI. Results

(i) Dependent variables: Differences in political attitudes and behaviors

Before I discuss the evidence on identity transmission proper, it is first important to establish that identity persistence has in fact taken place in the imperial borderlands. To make this point I present evidence on contemporary differences in political attitudes and behaviors across the three historical regions in Table 4. Just as in the preceding table, in the rightmost three columns I show pairwise differences of means for the three regions. I demonstrate that the populations of Podolia, Galicia, and Volhynia hold widely different foreign policy preferences when it comes to attitudes toward Russia, assess the recent Soviet past in very different ways, and vote differently. There are therefore three distinct dependent variables in this project; all three are directly linked to differences in historical 'treatments,' which created radically different political notions of what it means to be a Ukrainian today. It might be tempting to dismiss the evidence from any single survey question as an irregularity. Therefore, I draw on evidence from eight distinct questions by way of demonstrating that these findings are robust: four questions about attitudes toward Russia, three about the Soviet past, and one on voting behavior. Notably, differences across regions are statistically significant for every question with an occasional exception of the residents of Galicia and Volhynia answering in similar ways.

[TABLE 4]

Some of the biggest differences between the three populations have to do with attitudes toward Russia and reflect disagreements over Ukraine's relative cultural and political distance from Russia today and a lack of consensus over what bilateral relations should look like in the future. Seventy three percent of respondents in the region of Podolia, historically under the tutelage of the Russian Empire, believe that Ukraine's culture is most similar to Russian culture. By contrast, only 5% of the residents of Galicia, historically under Austrian control, agree that Ukrainian culture is similar to Russia. The region of Volhynia, under Russian control in the 19th century but administered by Poland in the interwar period, falls between Podolia and Galicia at 26%. Results are similar in the harder domains of defense policy and politics: whereas 75% of Podolians believe that Russia is Ukraine's ally, this view is shared only by 8% of Galicians and 12% of Volhynians. Importantly, these differences in opinion are not mere historical curiosities. The question of Ukraine's foreign policy orientation—whether Ukraine reestablishes closer relations with other former Soviet republics or moves toward membership in the European Union—has been the single most important issue in every election over the past decade. When asked how they feel about Ukraine joining the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, 63% of Podolians say that they support this initiative, against only 3% of Galicians and 10% of Volhynians. Looking to a more distant future beyond the policy concerns of the day, 48% of the residents of historical Podolia want Ukraine to be like Russia or Belarus in 30 years' time versus only 2% of Galicians and 6% of Volhynians.

Attitudes toward the Soviet period are also filtered through the prism of the respondents' distinct perceptions of Russia's role in Ukraine's history. Notably, over 50% of interviewees in all three regions agree that Soviet authorities improved village life by bringing modernity to the countryside. Yet, despite that, there is still a gap of 21 percentage points between Galicia and Podolia on this issue, with Podolians being more likely to praise Soviet authorities. Differences between the three regions are even more pronounced when it comes to assessment of specific historical events. Whereas 73% of the residents of Podolia and 56% of Volhynians say that they welcomed Soviet authorities as liberators as World War II was coming to a close in 1944, only 26% of Galician respondents say that Soviet authorities were welcomed. This difference is due to the fact that most Galician Ukrainians perceived Soviet soldiers as occupiers, who were there to suppress independent Ukrainain statehood, not as liberators. Likewise, whereas 80% of Podolians recognized Red Army soldiers as their brethren, same as young men in local communities, only 32% of Galicians perceived them as such.[8] These divergent interpretations of historical events also demonstrate that differences in attitudes toward the USSR and Russia precede the post-war solidification of Soviet authority. This implies that differences in political identities between Galicia, Volhynia, and Podolia pre-date World War II and are rooted in a deeper past.

The question of how best to manage relations with Russia and broader foreign policy concerns are situated at the heart of Ukrainian politics. As all political parties

[8] This is a difficult question to interpret because, factually, there were more Podolian Ukrainians in the Red Army than Galician or Volhynian Ukrainians. Podolian men were recruited into the Army throughout the interwar period, whereas Galician and Volhynian Ukrainians first began to join the Army in 1939 when the Soviet Union requisitioned these regions from Poland. Nevertheless, the Red Army was certainly not majority ethnically Ukrainian, and therefore the Podolia coefficient of 80% reflects more than just the fact that there were some residents of Podolia in the Army.

take clear positions on these issues it is to be expected that basic differences among voters on attitudes toward Russia should also carry over into differences in voting behavior. At the same time, party platforms are multi-dimensional and in the Ukrainian context involve economic and especially personalistic issues, which means that differences in voting behavior between the three historical regions are more muted than differences in political attitudes. The key dependent variable on voting that I use is the percentage of the vote cast for the ultranationalist Svoboda party in the October 2012 parliamentary election, the most recent general election preceding the survey. The Svoboda party has been around for almost the whole of the post-Soviet period, but in 2012 it secured 10.44% of the national vote and for the first time surmounted the 5% threshold for entry into parliament. The reason that electoral support for Svoboda is particularly interesting is because foreign policy is at the very core of its party program, and Svoboda takes the most uncompromising and unambiguous anti-Russian positions. For instance, in its manifesto, Svoboda calls for nuclear rearmament, so that Ukraine is able to effectively balance against Russia. The three regions also differ in terms of percentages of votes cast for all the other major parties with the exception of Udar (a new party created in the run up to the 2012 election); complete results are reported in Appendix A. Notably, the residents of Podolia are considerably more likely to vote for the ruling Party of Regions and for the reformed Communist Party than their neighbors from Galicia and Volhynia.

Are regional differences robust to inclusion of controls introduced in the previous section? To test for the robustness of regional dummy variables I ran probit regressions for all eight dependent variables and included in these regressions all the controls described in Table 3. Probit was chosen because dependent variables are

binary. The region of Galicia serves as the baseline category. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 5. The first thing to note is that the Podolia dummy is large, signed in the right direction, and statistically significant across all eight questions. In the difference of means comparisons in Table 4, Volhynia was found to be different from Galicia in six of eight questions. Volhynia remains statistically different from the baseline in the same six questions in probit regressions, and signs for Volhynia coefficients are all in the right direction. Running the necessary transformations I found that the size of regional differences in probit analyses is within 2-4 percentage points of the differences reported in the comparison of means table. In other words, regional differences appear to be largely undiminished by demographic covariates.[9]

[TABLE 5]

All in all, the magnitude of differences between formerly Austrian Galicia and formerly Russian Podolia is striking. It runs in the range of 30 to 70 percentage points for seven out of eight questions for individuals who reside within the maximum distance of 30 miles from one another. This is a very substantial difference for communities that have lived in an identical institutional and material environment since 1939. The region of Volhynia, under Russian imperial control throughout the 19th century and then under Polish tutelage in the interwar period, falls between the ideal cases of Galicia and Podolia on all the dependent variables.

[9] Some demographic controls do have analytical significance. Though why and how they matter is orthogonal to this paper's focus on historical legacies, it is worth touching on a few of the more interesting results. Women come across as consistently more pro-Russian, pro-Soviet, and anti-ultranationalist than men. Respondents with higher income appear to be more pro-Russian, pro-Soviet, and anti-nationalist. In this broad analysis without region-specific interaction effects, Greek Catholicism does not have a consistent impact on policy preferences or voter behavior. In other words, Greek Catholicism does not appear to be a crucible of political loyalty that preserved anti-Russian attitudes the way the Catholic church did in Hungary in Wittenberg's (2006) account.

(ii) Independent variables: Potential mechanisms

In the theory section, I hypothesized that the family, school, the church, and local authority figures facilitate persistence of political identities in different ways. Here is how I operationalized these variables. I measured the influence of the family in a series of questions about parental political attitudes and behaviors. I asked survey respondents to recall whether their parents were positively predisposed toward the Soviet regime, whether they discussed issues relating to Ukrainian nationalism in the family circle, and whether they were patriotic. In most studies on intergenerational persistence of political, economic, and religious attitudes (e.g. Jennings and Niemi 1968, Dohmen 2012, Bengtson et al. 2009), both parents and offspring are asked the same questions separately in order to obtain an objective measure of attitude transmission. This is something that I was not able to do in this instance because of financial constraints and, more immediately, because respondents' parents were long deceased. What I capture in this study is persistence between perceived parental attitudes and actual offspring attitudes. An influential paper by Acock and Bengtson (1980) suggests that the fit between perceived parental attitudes and actual offspring attitudes is generally much stronger than that between actual attitudes on both sides of the generational divide.

In addition to gathering respondents' subjective perceptions of their parents' political views, I also asked who was an authority figure for them in their formative years. This is more of an objective question, and almost all respondents named either relatives, almost always meaning parents, or teachers. This question about childhood authority figures provides a highly effective test of the relative power of family versus

school in the transmission process. To get at the relative influence of the church in the transmission process, I asked respondents whether they attended religious services more than a few times a month during the Soviet period. That level of attendance would have been considered high under Soviet rule when state authorities discouraged all open expressions of religiosity. I considered several alternative measures of the persistence of local elites. In the survey, I asked about geographic origins of various village officials from the village head to the school principal. I also collected data on whether respondents considered these officials to be faithful to the regime, anti-religious, or opposed to Ukrainian nationalism. The problem with this line of questioning was that many interviewees could not recall factual information about specific individuals. Officials whom respondents remembered with some consistency were heads of the village collective farm (kolkhoz); this is unsurprising given that collective farm heads were the most powerful representatives of the Soviet state in rural areas. Therefore, I use the question about the geographic origin of the longest serving collective farm head (average time in post in survey villages was a little over 20 years) as a proxy measure for persistence of local elites from the pre-Soviet into the Soviet period.

[TABLE 6]

The mechanism variables are described in Table 6, where I report regional means in columns 2-5 and differences of means for each region pairing in the three rightmost columns. Identity transmission mechanisms appear to operate at different frequencies in the three regions, as evidenced by the fact that almost all regional pairwise comparisons are statistically significant. Notably, parents in the historically

Austrian region of Galicia were considerably less pro-Soviet (22%) and more subject to emulation (67%) than parents in the historically Russian region of Podolia, where 68% of parents were pro-Soviet and only 29% were emulated. In Podolia, teachers were named as authority figures much more frequently (49%) than family members (29%); the difference of means between the two categories is statistically significant at t=3.72. Under the Soviet system, teachers were the primary carriers of state ideology, and therefore it is not surprising that individuals who named teachers as primary authority figures grew up to be supportive of the Soviet system and of Russia. Volhynia, once again, falls between the ideal cases of Podolia and Galicia. Volhynian respondents emulated teachers more than their Galician neighbors, but, unlike in Podolia, Volhynian children were still more likely to hold up parents rather than teachers as examples (t=9.82).

The church might also have some role to play in preserving anti-Russian attitudes: respondents in Galicia and Volhynia were much more likely to frequently attend church services under the Soviets than their neighbors in Podolia. Variables measuring parental propensity to discuss nationalism and parents' patriotism levels also deserve attention. At first glance, parents appear to have been quite patriotic in all three regions: 41% of Podolian mothers were perceived to be patriotic by their offspring, 54% of mothers in Volhynia, and 62% of mothers in Galicia. However, in a series of questions that I do not report here in the interest of space, it is clear that patriotism meant completely different things in the three regions. In Podolia, patriotism was associated predominantly with support for collective farms and Soviet authorities. By contrast, in Galicia and Volhynia patriotism was primarily about private religiosity and organized celebration of religious festivals.

(iii) Econometric analyses

In this section, I put all of the data elements together in probit regressions with region fixed effects where I analyze the relationship between mechanism and control variables and the eight dependent variables. Probit was chosen because dependent variables are binary; I used region fixed effects because preceding analyses suggest that identity transmission mechanisms operate in different ways across the three regions. The historically Austrian region of Galicia is the baseline category, which means that variables where mechanisms are interacted with regional dummies capture differences between each of the other two regions and Galicia. All regressions include all of the mechanism variables described in Table 6 and a selection of control variables from Table 3. For reasons of multicollinearity and space I had to exclude markers of ethnic and linguistic self-determination, employment variables, the measure of the depth of family roots and the age variable. In Table 7, I present a selection of the most interesting results focusing on regional dummy variables and mechanism variables—parental attitudes, relative vs. teacher as authority figures, church attendance during the Soviet period, and local roots of the collective farm head—that directly speak to hypotheses advanced in the theory section.[10]

[TABLE 7]

Coefficients from probit regressions are difficult to interpret without additional transformations, and for ease of substantive interpretation I present marginal effects' plots later in the section. However, in this instance, variables' significance levels and their signs are highly informative. The mechanism variables

[10] Full regression results are available on request.

capture inter-regional variation on dependent variables considerably better than control variables did on their own. In Table 5, where I regressed dependent variables against regional dummies and all of the control variables, regional dummies retained their significance throughout and remained large. In Table 7, in regressions that include mechanism variables in addition to controls, regional dummies lost their significance altogether in 63% of the cases and were much smaller whenever they retained statistical significance. This suggests that variation in identity transmission by families, schools, churches, and local elites does, in fact, successfully account for much contemporary inter-regional variation in political attitudes and behaviors.

The strongest finding on mechanisms is that parental attitudes are a good predictor of respondents' attitudes and behavior. Respondents whose parents were pro-Soviet are themselves more likely to hold positive attitudes toward Russia and less likely to vote for ultranationalists, as evidenced by the fact that coefficients for the *parents pro-Soviet* variable are consistently positive throughout (with the exception of the voting question where the expected sign is negative). Notably, the effect of pro-Russian parental attitudes is greater in historically Russian Podolia, and occasionally in Volhynia, than in Galicia. This can be seen clearly in Figure 2, where I present marginal effects plots for three representative questions: Russia's security position in relation to Ukraine, attitudes toward Ukraine's membership in the Customs Union, and the propensity to vote ultranationalist. With all the other variables set to their mean, as a resident of Galicia switches from anti-Soviet to pro-Soviet parents, her likelihood of considering Russia to be Ukraine's ally remains fixed at 5%. In the same context, the probability of thinking of Russia as ally goes up by 11 percentage points among respondents from Volhynia and by 43 percentage points

among Podolian Ukrainians. This suggests that pro-Russian attitudes had a higher likelihood of persisting in areas formerly controlled by the Russian empire. Interestingly, parental attitudes do not fare well in accounting for inter-regional differences in historical assessment of the Soviet past (columns 5-7). In these questions, only the baseline is statistically significant.

[FIGURE 2]

In two of the questions—about Russia's security status in relation to Ukraine and the effect of Soviet rule on the village—the *teacher as childhood authority figure* variable captures a substantial amount of differences between the three regions. Notably, in both instances, signs change direction as we move from Galicia on the one hand to Podolia and Volhynia on the other. In Galicia, as the likelihood of holding up a teacher as an authority figure increases, the probability of expressing pro-Russian attitudes decreases; the opposite is true in Podolia and Volhynia, where those who followed their teacher's example are more likely to be pro-Russian. This is illustrated visually in Figure 2.

On the question whether Russia and Ukraine are allies, the probability that respondents from Galicia would think of Russia as an ally decreases by five percentage points when the teacher variable is activated. Among respondents from Podolia, it instead increases by 28 percentage points; it also increases by 6 percentage points among Volhynian Ukrainians. This difference in the direction of the mechanism's effectiveness is evidence of important differences in the quality of local elites. Of 83 teachers in the sample, the majority are from the same village or county

(oblast) as the school where they taught: 100% of teachers in Podolia are local, 66% in Galicia, and 56% in Volhynia. However, there is a great deal of variation in their levels of ideological commitment to the Soviet system. Sixty-one percent of teachers in the former Austrian region of Galicia said that they made minimal or no effort in teaching required school courses on Communist ideology; this figure was 41% for Volhynia and only 21% for Podolia. In other words, teachers in Galicia, most of whom were local, made a considerably lesser effort in publicizing the ideological line than teachers in former Russian areas. A more direct measure of local elite persistence—geographic origin of the longest-serving head of the collective farm—turned out to be a disappointment. That variable was consistently not statistically significant, and I did not include its regional interaction effects in the final model.

[FIGURE 3]

Interaction terms combining regional dummies with the variable measuring respondents' propensity to treat relatives as example figures are also frequently statistically significant and therefore are helpful in understanding the causes behind the variation on dependent variables. Interestingly, in Podolia, those 29% of respondents who said that they imitated relatives rather than a teacher or some other figure are 27 percentage points less likely to think of Russia as Ukraine's ally than other residents of their region. This can be gleaned from the marginal effects plot in Figure 3. The church appears to play the same role as family in Podolia as a refuge from the influence of state institutions. As I show in the second row of Figure 3, those 17% of respondents in Podolia who reported attending church services frequently are

less likely to consider Russia as an ally by 26 percentage points; 56% of this group also named parents rather than teachers as examples.

VII. Discussion

(i) Differences in political identities:

Differences between the three regions on the dependent variables—foreign policy preferences, assessment of the recent past, and voting behavior—are fully consistent with the historical legacies account. Galicia, where political identities were shaped under Austrian influence in the 19th and early 20th centuries, is considerably more pro-Russian than either Podolia or Volhynia, which were both part of the Russian empire. However, how does this argument fare against alternative hypotheses? It might be argued that differences in political identities between Galicia, Volhynia, and Podolia were engendered entirely during the interwar and early Soviet periods, and therefore that imperial rule made no difference. For this explanation to be valid outcomes in Galicia and Volhynia should be identical: both regions were subject to Polish control between 1920 and 1939 and both experienced mass deportations, arrests, and forced collectivization under early Soviet control.[11] Yet, Volhynia today is considerably more pro-Russian than Galicia, and the generation of respondents' parents was also more pro-Russian historically. This strongly suggests that factors that have caused differences in political identities must predate Soviet rule.

[11] It bears highlighting that Podolia experienced its own share of tragedies associated with early Soviet rule: a major famine of 1932-33 is estimated to have taken 3-5 million lives in Soviet Ukraine (Snyder 2010, Magosci 1996), and Podolia also went through the forced collectivization campaigns of 1929-33 and the Great Purge of 1936-38.

(ii) Transmission mechanisms behind identity persistence

I now turn to the five hypotheses on the mechanisms by which political identities persist. Hypothesis 1 regarding the crucial role of parents in identity transmission is largely confirmed, albeit with an important caveat. It is clear from the data that parents play a vital role in the preservation and transmission of independentist Ukrainian, and therefore by definition anti-Russian, political identities in the formerly Austrian region of Galicia. However, it seems likely that families are effective only when embedded in supportive communal networks. For instance, parents who attempt to project pro-Russian attitudes onto their offspring in Galicia are almost entirely unsuccessful. By contrast, in Podolia, most parents transmit state-sanctioned pro-Russian attitudes. At the same time, for a small number of Podolian respondents, family appears to be a place of refuge where anti-systemic views can be nurtured. How such views are able to survive the onslaught of state institutions and majority opinion is hinted at when we consider family and religion variables together. It seems that Orthodox churches offer small alternative communities to those Podolian Ukrainian who resist dominant state ideology. It bears highlighting that such resistance is marginal; even the most anti-systemic Podolian respondent is still much more pro-Russian than an average resident of Galicia. In Galicia, where local institutions were captured by communal elites, there was seemingly little space for the nurturing of a minority pro-Russian identity. All in all, families are instrumental to persistence of anti-establishment identities, as long as families remain embedded within social networks that propagate similar views. Without the support of at least a small like-minded community, as that provided by churches in Podolia, the family's influence becomes overwhelmed by other institutions. This caveat is an important rejoinder to classical political socialization accounts.

Hypothesis 2 concerning the importance of schools to the transmission of pro-establishment political identities is partially confirmed. Schools operate as expected in the region of Podolia: there, those respondents who said that teachers were examples for emulation were much more likely to hold pro-Russian and pro-Soviet attitudes. However, in Galicia, schools either nurtured anti-Russian attitudes or had no effect at all. This suggests an important revision to the schooling hypothesis: schools successfully transmit pro-establishment identities as long as teachers subscribe to dominant state ideology. Teachers in Galicia did not conform to the latter requirement because they were mostly a product of the local environment where independentist Ukrainian attitudes were dominant long before the arrival of Soviet schooling.

I already touched on hypothesis 3 regarding the role of churches in identity persistence. Churches can, in principle, provide an alternative community for the preservation of minority views, as they seem to have done in Podolia. This finding is consistent with Wittenberg's (2006) research on persistence of conservative voter base in communist Hungary. What I was not able to assess is the importance of private religiosity. This is something that was particularly important in Galicia where the dominant Greek Catholic church was outlawed between 1946 and 1989. In this project, private religiosity is subsumed under the broad label of the family, although it might be useful to disentangle the two in future research. Hypothesis 4 regarding the importance of community persistence for persistence of political identities remains largely untested. This hypothesis cannot be falsified here, because I do not have any instances of community dissolution. However, there is broad support in the data for the argument that families are ineffective at identity transmission if they are not

embedded within a larger social network that shares similar views. Finally, there is weak support for hypothesis 5, which posits that persistence of anti-establishment identities is only possible when local elites persist. The results confirm that teachers in Galicia, majority of whom were locally rooted, were able to suppress the dissemination of pro-establishment attitudes via state schools. It is not clear, though, that Galician communities would not have successfully overcome school influence even if teachers had not been local. I struggled to identify who local elites were—heads of village collective farms appear to be a bad proxy for that group, as *kolkhoz* heads have no discernible effect on political identities. This hypothesis requires further testing, especially because community-level elites receive little attention in the existing literature on political socialization.

VIII. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that identity-forming formal institutions leave lasting cultural legacies after giving rise to political identities and disappearing. I illustrated the argument with evidence from a natural experiment of history that divided a homogenous population of ethnic Ukrainians between Austrian and Russian empires in the late 18th century before reuniting them once again in the 20th. Marshaling evidence from a survey of 800 individuals over the age of 70 who reside within 15 miles of the defunct imperial border I have also sought to test a theory of identity transmission. Evidence suggests that families play an extremely important role in identity transmission. Historical political identities remain dominant in such families even in the face of a hostile formal institutional environment or major changes in material circumstances as long as these families remain embedded within social

networks that share the same identity. By contrast, in families where the parental political identity is consistent with the state program or where parents do not hold strong political views, state institutions, and especially schools, become dominant in the process of identity transmission. I have also shown how state institutions, like schools, can be rendered ineffective by local elites who do not support state-promoted ideology. Churches, too, can undermine the state's efforts at identity construction and transmission by providing a small haven for alternative social networks.

This argument has several limitations. First, I could not fully test the hypotheses about the importance of community and elite persistence to the process of successful identity transmission, because I did not have sufficient variation on these independent variables in the context of western Ukraine. Second, while this study meets many standards of internal validity, it is weak on external validity: to demonstrate that similar processes to ones described here happen elsewhere the theory of identity formation and persistence would have to be tested outside of the Ukrainian context. Third, identity persistence is best studied against evidence from several generations of respondents, and this is something that I was not able to do in this project due to substantive and logistical limitations. A lot more additional work is to be done before we can pinpoint with certainty most of the mechanisms behind identity transmission, many of which appear to be interactive. Yet I hope that this paper inspires at least some interest in this issue and in the broader research agenda.

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Figures and Tables:

TABLE 1:
HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF THE REGIONS UNDER STUDY

	Before 1772	*1772-1918*	*1918-1939*	*1939-present*
GALICIA	Poland	AUSTRIAN EMPIRE	Poland‡	Ukraine
PODOLIA	Poland	RUSSIAN EMPIRE†	Soviet Ukraine‡‡	Ukraine
VOLHYNIA	Poland	RUSSIAN EMPIRE†	Poland‡	Ukraine

† Russian Empire acquired Volhynia and Podolia in 1795.
‡ Poland established complete control over Galicia and Volhynia in July 1919.
‡‡ Soviet authorities established complete control over Podolia in July 1920.

TABLE 2:
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GALICIA, VOLHYNIA, AND PODOLIA

<table>
<tr><th></th><th>Imperial Period, 1772-1918</th><th>Interwar Period, 1918-1939</th><th>Soviet and Post-Soviet Periods, 1939-present</th></tr>
<tr><td>Galicia</td><td>Austrian Empire:
• Greek and Roman Catholic churches equated in rights (1781)
• First book in Ukrainian vernacular published (1837)
• First Ukrainian political party founded (1848)
• First periodicals in Ukrainian vernacular published (1848)
• All national communities granted language rights (1867)
• Ukrainian educational society (Prosvita) set up (1868)
• Use of Ukrainian vernacular explicitly permitted in schools (1893).</td><td>Poland:
• Independent Western Ukrainian republic declared; quashed by Poland (1918-1919)
• Ukrainian political organizations boycott Polish general elections (1922)
• Ukrainian militant organizations use terror tactics against Polish officials and the state responds with violent suppression (1929-1930)
• Attempts to foster a pro-Polish autonomous Ukrainian national and political community (identical to ones in Volhynia) fail (1926-1939).</td><td rowspan="3">Soviet Union:
• Greek Catholic Church banned (1946) and revived (1990)
• An armed conflict between Ukrainian nationalists and Soviet troops in Galicia and Volhynia (1944-c.1950) but not Podolia
• Deportations of wealthy peasants and suspected nationalists (1944-c.1950)
• Robust efforts to Sovietize the population via schools and collective farms across all three regions (1944-1991).</td></tr>
<tr><td>Volhynia</td><td rowspan="2">Russian Empire:
• Greek Catholic Church banned (1839)
• Publications in Ukrainian vernacular banned (1863)
• Use of Ukrainian vernacular explicitly prohibited in schools (1875)
• First Ukrainian political party founded (1905).</td><td>Poland:
• Volhynia Experiment: creation of an autonomous Ukrainian national community friendly to Poland and the West via state schools and Orthodox churches (1926-1939)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Podolia</td><td>Soviet Ukraine:
• Policy of korennizatsiia, forced awakening of an autonomous Ukrainian national community (1920 onward)
• Forced literacy campaigns (1919-1939)</td></tr>
</table>

Sources: Magosci (1996), Wandycz (1974), Himka (1988), Thaden (1984), Snyder (2005), Martin (2001).

FIGURE 1: THEORY OF IDENTITY FORMATION AND PERSISTENCE



MAP 1: THE SURVEY AREA; IMPERIAL BORDER MARKED OUT WITHIN MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES.



Legend:
Segments 1-13 (odd): Galicia Segments 2-10 (even): Volhynia Segments 12 & 14: Podolia

TABLE 3:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Means by region:			*Differences of means between regions:*		
	Galicia	Volhynia	Podolia	Galicia vs. Podolia	Galicia vs. Volhynia	Podolia vs. Volhynia
Age (yrs.)	79.4 (5.37)	78.7 (5.50)	77.8 (5.61)	2.99***	1.56*	-1.50*
Female (%)	0.68 (0.47)	0.70 (0.46)	0.67 (0.48)	0.45	-0.53	-0.84
Education (yrs.)	7.01 (3.43)	7.21 (4.01)	8.17 (3.39)	-3.63***	-0.68	2.51***
Income and Pre-Retirement Occupation:						
Income (on a 10-point scale where 1 is lowest)	3.93 (1.84)	3.75 (1.42)	4.45 (1.30)	-3.24***	1.29	4.94***
Agricultural worker (%)	0.73 (0.44)	0.67 (0.47)	0.74 (0.44)	-0.24	1.65*	1.51*
Teacher (%)	0.10 (0.29)	0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.32)	-0.72	-0.83	0.00
Ethnicity and Language:						
Self-identified as ethnic Ukrainians (%)	0.99 (0.12)	1.00 (0.06)	1.00 (0.00)	-1.05	-1.23	0.00
Only Ukranian spoken at home (%)	0.99 (0.09)	0.97 (0.17)	0.98 (0.14)	1.00	1.96**	0.62
Religion:						
Orthodox (%)	0.35 (0.48)	0.96 (0.19)	0.86 (0.35)	-12.18***	-19.07***	-3.72***
Greek Catholic (%)	0.63 (0.48)	0.00 (0.00)	0.04 (0.21)	14.94***	20.62***	3.00***
Population stability:						
Born in the survey village (%)	0.72 (0.45)	0.66 (0.48)	0.84 (0.37)	-2.99***	1.61*	4.02***
Born in the same oblast as survey village (%)	0.17 (0.38)	0.26 (0.44)	0.14 (0.35)	0.86	-2.76***	-2.90***
Family roots in birth village over 100yrs (%)	0.57 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.89 (0.31)	-7.47***	1.43	8.29***
N	*403*	*250*	*160*	*563*	*653*	*410*

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$; standard deviation reported in bracket

TABLE 4: DEPENDENT VARIABLES:
POLICY PREFERENCES, ATTITUDES TOWARDS RECENT PAST, AND VOTER BEHAVIOR

	Means by region:			*Differences of means between regions:*		
	Galicia	Volhynia	Podolia	Galicia vs. Podolia	Galicia vs. Volhynia	Podolia vs. Volhynia
Foreign Policy:						
Russia is Ukraine's ally (Q93)	0.08	0.12	0.75	-21.86***	-1.70*	16.71***
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.44)			
Ukraine's culture is most similar to Russia (Q90)	0.05	0.26	0.73	-24.30***	-8.08***	10.55***
	(0.22)	(0.44)	(0.44)			
Want Ukraine to be like Russia or Belarus in 30yrs (Q89)	0.02	0.06	0.48	-17.18***	-2.81***	11.37***
	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.50)			
Ukraine should join the Customs Union (Q91)	0.03	0.10	0.63	-21.74***	-3.86***	13.57***
	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.49)			
Attitudes toward the Soviet past:						
Soviet soldiers fighting against Nazis were "our boys" (Q8)	0.32	0.34	0.80	-11.38***	-0.52	10.09***
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.40)			
Soviet authorities were welcomed in 1944 (Q1)	0.26	0.56	0.73	-11.35***	-8.02***	3.49***
	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.45)			
Changes during Soviet period improved the life of the village (Q79)	0.59	0.52	0.80	-4.68***	1.45	5.52***
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.40)			
Voter behavior (2012 parliamentary election):						
Voted for ultra nationalist Svoboda	0.56	0.26	0.18	8.04***	7.10***	-1.73*
	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.38)			
N	403	250	160	563	653	410

* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; standard deviations reported in brackets

TABLE 5: TESTING ROBUSTNESS OF REGIONAL EFFECTS TO CONTROL VARIABLES (PROBIT)

	Russia is ally	Ukr. & Rus. cultures alike	Future like Russia	Join Customs Union	Red Army "our boys"	Soviets welcomed in '44	Soviets good for village	Voted for Svoboda
Podolia	1.98***	2.33***	2.20***	2.32***	1.05***	1.41***	0.46*	-0.99***
	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Volhynia	0.13	0.96***	0.60**	0.57**	-0.22	1.09***	-0.49*	-0.63***
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.22)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	0.35**	0.23*	0.24	0.15	-0.08	0.21**	0.18*	-0.33***
	(0.02)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education (yrs)	-0.12	-0.00	0.01	0.04*	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income (10-point scale)	0.16***	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.08*	0.09***	-0.09**	-0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Farmer	0.03	-0.14	0.15	-0.04	0.06	0.04	-0.14	-0.03
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Teacher	0.17	-0.18	-0.32	0.13	0.14	0.21	0.05	0.28
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.24)
Ethnic Ukrainian	-0.33	-0.70*	--	-1.36**	0.08	0.22	-0.26	0.82
	(0.49)	(0.48)		(0.64)	(0.46)	(0.58)	(0.52)	(0.66)
Communicate in Ukrainian	-0.31	-1.13***	--	0.71	-0.03	-0.19	-0.28	0.95*
	(0.51)	(0.43)		(0.80)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.56)
Eastern Orthodox	0.08	0.02	1.02***	0.45	-0.01	0.28	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Greek Catholic	-0.11	-0.06	0.95**	0.23	-0.62*	0.46*	-0.55*	0.18
	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Born in survey village	-0.26	0.18	-0.15	-0.07	-0.38*	-0.38*	-0.05	0.21
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.26)
Born in survey oblast	-0.16	0.23	0.05	0.07	-0.36*	-0.59***	-0.31	0.38
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.26)
Family roots over 100yrs	0.11	-0.35*	0.03	-0.29	-0.24	0.16	-0.25*	0.22*
	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Constant	-2.28 *	-0.54	-3.97***	-1.24	1.42	-1.36	2.78**	-1.75
	(1.27)	(1.29)	(1.34)	(1.65)	(1.19)	(1.31)	(1.14)	(1.34)
N	761	762	740	758	762	761	701	669

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$; clustered standard errors by village

TABLE 6:
INDEPENDENT/MECHANISM VARIABLES: FAMILY, SCHOOL, CHURCH, LOCAL AUTHORITIES

	Means by region:			*Differences of means between regions:*		
	Galicia	Volhynia	Podolia	Galicia vs. Podolia	Galicia vs. Volhynia	Podolia vs. Volhynia
Family:						
Parents liked the Soviet regime (Q50)	0.22	0.44	0.68	-11.49***	-6.10***	4.85***
	(0.41)	(0.50)	(0.47)			
Parents never spoke about Ukrainian nationalism (Q55)	0.31	0.71	0.38	-1.60*	-10.77***	-6.90***
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.49)			
Mother was a patriot (Q51)	0.62	0.54	0.41	4.58***	2.01**	-2.58***
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.49)			
Father was a patriot (Q53)	0.59	0.44	0.38	4.58***	3.76***	-1.19
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.49)			
A relative was the example to emulate in childhood (Q64)	0.67	0.56	0.29	8.70***	2.84***	-5.50***
	(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.46)			
School:						
A teacher was the example to emulate in childhood (Q64)	0.10	0.17	0.49	-11.34***	-2.61***	7.34***
	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.50)			
Church:						
Went to church several times a month under Soviets (Q67)	0.69	0.65	0.17	12.68***	1.06	-10.69***
	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.38)			
Local authorities:						
Collective farm head was a local (Q36)	0.68	0.60	0.93	-6.35***	2.07**	7.83***
	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.26)			
N	403	250	160	563	653	410

Standard deviations reported after coefficients; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE 7:
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MECHANISMS AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
(PROBIT; REGION FIXED EFFECTS; PARTIAL MODEL REPORTED)

	Russia is ally	Ukr. & Rus. cultures alike	Future like Russia	Join Customs Union	Red Army "our boys"	Soviets welcomed in '44	Soviets good for village	Voted for Svoboda
Constant	-1.31***	-0.91*	-1.24*	-2.08***	-0.13	-2.08***	0.33	0.21
	(0.45)	(050)	(0.84)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.34)
Volhynia	-1.04*	-0.90	-1.07	-0.17	-0.47	1.21**	-1.25**	0.05
	(0.61)	(0.79)	(0.97)	(0.68)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.60)	(0.44)
Podolia	0.35	0.96	0.84	1.33***	-0.34	0.64	-1.00*	-0.41
	(0.46)	(0.68)	(0.81)	(0.46)	(0.55)	(0.60)	(0.66)	(0.45)
Parents pro-Soviet	0.30	0.22	0.18	0.20	0.49**	0.79***	0.71***	-0.27*
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.17)
Parents pro-Soviet*Volhynia	0.26	0.64*	0.36	0.51	0.26	-0.05	0.20	-0.50*
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.27)
Parents pro-Soviet*Podolia	0.90**	0.21	0.76**	0.84**	-0.05	0.22	0.42	-0.07
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.27)
Relative as authority figure	-0.00	-0.54***	-0.24	0.24	0.10	-0.26*	0.09	0.30*
	(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.60)	(0.18)
Relative as authority*Volhynia	0.55	0.63*	0.74*	-0.26	0.32	0.53**	0.20	0.07
	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Relative as authority*Podolia	-0.71*	0.20	-0.37	-0.67*	0.05	-0.26	0.46	0.12
	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.48)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.34)
Teacher as authority	-0.48*	-0.41	0.07	0.19	-0.21	-0.23	-0.65***	0.08
	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Teacher as authority*Volhynia	0.85*	0.42	-0.10	-0.47	0.13	0.25	0.49*	-0.26
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.71)	(0.68)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Teacher as authority*Podolia	1.18***	0.32	-0.25	0.31	0.22	-0.17	0.80*	-0.07
	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Churchgoer	-0.18	-0.35*	-0.41	-0.37*	-0.34**	-0.08	-0.00	0.25*
	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Churchgoer*Volhynia	0.21	0.37	0.61	0.42	0.20	-0.09	-0.13	-0.27
	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.25)
Churchgoer*Podolia	-0.53*	-0.05	-0.20	-0.41	0.32**	0.18	-0.71**	0.16
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.61)	(0.50)	(0.17)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.45)
Farm head local	0.11	-0.01	0.05	-0.04	0.26*	0.28**	0.15	-0.01
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.14)
N	773	774	769	771	773	772	709	675

* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01; standard errors clustered by village.

FIGURE 2: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF SELECT MECHANISMS (PART 1)

2.1. Parents liking the Soviet system (variable name: parents pro-Soviet):



2.2. Teacher as authority figure (teacher as authority):



FIGURE 3: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF SELECT MECHANISMS (PART 2)

3.1. Relatives as authority figures (variable name: relative as authority)*:*



3.2. Frequent church attendance (churchgoer)*:*



APPENDIX A:
VOTER BEHAVIOR (2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION)

	Means by region:			*Differences of means between regions:*		
	Galicia	Volhynia	Podolia	Galicia vs. Podolia	Galicia vs. Volhynia	Podolia vs. Volhynia
Voted for ultra nationalist Svoboda	0.56 (0.50)	0.26 (0.44)	0.18 (0.38)	8.04***	7.10***	-1.73*
Voted for Udar	0.05 (0.22)	0.07 (0.25)	0.07 (0.26)	-0.86	-0.98	0.00
Voted for Batkyvshchyna	0.36 (0.48)	0.58 (0.50)	0.40 (0.49)	-0.83	-5.13***	-3.26***
Voted for Party of Regions	0.01 (0.10)	0.06 (0.24)	0.21 (0.41)	-8.69***	-3.48***	4.21***
Voted for Communists	0.00 (0.05)	0.02 (0.14)	0.11 (0.31)	-6.58***	-2.46***	3.60***
N	403	250	160	563	653	410

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$; standard deviations reported in brackets