Inequality, Elite Messaging and National Pride

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Despite the central role of nationalism as a modern political ideology, and despite a long scholarly tradition linking the development of nationalism to economics, the relationship between nationalism and inequality has only recently been addressed with substantial empirical rigor. This is surprising, given the central place of elite behavior in much of the canonical literature on nationalism (see Solt 2011, Marx 2003, Tilly 1994, Anderson 1991). It is doubly surprising given the substantial literature arguing for the importance of economic inequality to other types of political outcomes.[1]

A body of emerging research suggests that economic inequality may help explain both the persistence of nationalist politics and its variation across time and space. Data from multiple cross-national surveys indicate that people in unequal societies exhibit greater national pride compared with their counterparts in more egalitarian settings (see Shayo 2009, Solt 2011, Han 2013). Two prominent explanations have emerged for this finding: social identification theory, which focuses on nationalism's ability to confer social status, and diversionary theory, which focuses on elite behavior. Both theories likely have some merit, and may in fact be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually contradictory, but they have not yet been fully tested. In this paper, I investigate two crucial implications of diversionary theory.

First, I test whether and how nationalist rhetoric from political elites varies with a country's income distribution. Consistent with diversionary theory, I find evidence that elite rhetoric becomes more nationalist as societies become more unequal, and that this effect is not uniform across ideological lines, but is primarily used by right-leaning elites. I further find that the shape of the income distribution, in addition to its absolute level of inequality, is a crucial driver of this effect. Inequality in the upper end of the income spectrum appears to be the crucial factor in driving elite nationalist rhetoric. This is consistent with a diversionary account, in which elites use nationalist and chauvinist

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1. For some recent examples, see Iversen and Soskice (2006) and Lupu and Pontusson (2011) on inequality, party politics and redistribution; Boix (2003) and Acemoglu (2006) on inequality and democratic transitions; Gilens (2012) and Bartels (2008) on inequality and the quality of democracy; and McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) on inequality and political polarization. See also Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) for a review of wide-ranging research on the connections between inequality and social trust, deviancy, crime and public health.

rhetoric to generate solidarity within electoral coalitions threatened by inequality.

Second, I look for evidence that elite rhetoric actually matters for nationalism at the level of individual voters. Consistent with diversionary theory, I find that upper-level inequality is associated with greater amounts of self-reported national pride in a widely-used cross-national survey of Western European democracies. Also consistent with diversionary theory, I find elite rhetoric to be associated with greater reported national pride. Finally, I find that elite rhetoric and inequality are mutually reinforcing, providing strong support for the diversionary hypothesis, as well as limited support for social identity mechanisms.

Plan of the Paper

I proceed as follows: I briefly introduce relevant literature on inequality and electoral politics, paying particular attention to recent work emphasizing how the specific shape of a country's income distribution structures partisan politics and political outcomes. I next introduce a recent strand of literature connecting inequality with nationalist attitudes around the world. I then provide a test of my argument using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the World Values Survey, demonstrating that a) inequality structures elite political rhetoric in a manner consistent with diversionary theory, b) inequality and elite rhetoric have independent positive effects on overall levels of national pride felt by voters, and c) that elite rhetoric and inequality have a mutually reinforcing effect, providing limited support for social identity theory in addition to diversionary accounts.

The Politics of Inequality

A long-standing body of literature posits that distributive conflict forms the foundation of political competition in industrialized countries. This conflict largely defines the "left" and "right" poles of the political spectrum, and structures incentives for issue positioning along other axes. The model developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) remains a touchstone. These authors look to the disjuncture between equal voting rights and sharply unequal wealth to explain the parallel growth patterns of the franchise and the size of the state. Drawing on Downs (1957) they argue that parties will be pulled

toward the distributive preferences of the median income voter. The level of redistribution undertaken by the state should be a function of the distance between the median and mean income voters. Inequality thus structures patterns of voting and elite mobilization.

Iversen and Soskice (2006) make an essentially rationalist and individualist argument about electoral bargaining within a tripartite class structure. They posit that consensus-based political institutions facilitate coalitions between the middle and lower classes by locking in binding commitments not to take redistribution too far. Absent such institutions, middle class voters instead align with the upper classes. Hence, majoritarian countries redistribute less (see also Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). Lupu and Pontusson (2011) develop this framework further by incorporating more nuanced measures of inequality. They demonstrate that the specific shape of the income distribution matters, and that the distance between the high, middle and low points structure redistributive politics. As with the Iversen and Soskice account, the middle class is seen as the crucial component to any electoral equilibrium, but the specific structure of inequality conditions the extent to which middle class voters fear redistributive outcomes. Thus, the crucial variable is structural - the shape of the income distribution - rather than institutional.

This line of research is valuable, but the explanations it advances are hyper-rationalist in that they posit forward-looking voters making calculi about material self-interest. This leads to several potential blind spots. First, these models make no room for the influence or salience of other issues, including those (like nationalism) that are plausibly related to inequality. Second, they take no account of elites' capacity to influence the information environment and drive mass preferences.

In recent years, scholars of inequality and redistribution have suggested that cross-cutting social and ethnocultural cleavages may help explain how changing income distributions interact with political pressures for redistribution. In the American context, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) suggest that inequality polarizes politics across a range of other issues. As anti-redistributive elites seek to construct electorally-viable coalitions, they attempt to mobilize voters along axes of cultural and religious

protectionism. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) theorize that America's ethnocultural fault lines have undermined the social cohesion and broad solidarity necessary to legitimate a robust redistributive regime. Soroka et al. (2006) find that immigration, and the social conflict it engenders, undermines redistribution across the developed world.

I emphasize that, in this paper, I do not seek to explain redistributive outcomes as such. Rather, I apply theoretical and empirical insights from the literature on inequality and redistribution to examine patterns of nationalist mobilization. I call particular attention to two basic propositions: a) that the dispersion of material wealth plays a crucial role in structuring electoral politics; and b) that disaggregating inequality across a tripartite class structure deepens insight into both popular and elite incentives.

Nationalism

There are nearly as many definitions of "nation" and "nationalism" as there are researchers on the subject, and I am reluctant to add another to the list. Conceptually, Benedict Anderson's idea of the nation as "an imagined political community... imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991, 6) serves fine. For this paper, I focus on nationalism expressed as affirmative pride in membership in the national community. Obviously, nationalism is more complex than just pride; it is often caught up in inherently exclusionary and chauvinist "othering" discourses that posit explicit moral hierarchies of belonging (see Wright 2011, Reeskins and Wright 2013). The notion of "domain specific" national pride (eg. pride in a country's welfare state, technological achievements, or foreign policy) is likewise an important element of nationalism, but is also endogenous to a myriad of other political, social and historical realities. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, I define nationalism thusly:

Nationalism: A mode of political discourse and practice that privileges national loyalty and national culture without (necessarily) explicitly denigrating those outside the bounds of the dominant culture.

Since the 1980s, a wide literature has emerged on nationalism as a political phenomenon. Much

of the earliest work focused on nationalism as a dependent variable: it sought to explain nationalism's emergence as an ideology and salient popular identity, as well as its potency as a tool of mass mobilization. Historical sociologists like Gellner (1983), Anderson (1991) and Tilly (1994) examined nationalism as a product of economic and political modernity, brought on by some combination of elite manipulation and shifting material circumstances. Their work focuses on explaining how nationalism came to exist as a major organizing principle of modern political life.

Subsequent authors have often treated nationalism as an independent or intervening variable. The rise of "ethnic" or "nationalist" civil strive at the end of the Cold War led to a wide literature examining nationalism's role in secessionist conflict and civil war (see Horowitz 1985 and Brass 1991). Others have examined the crucial part nationalism played in the formation and maintenance of the state (see Suny 1993, Tilly 1994, Marx 1998, Wimmer 2002). Still others examined how individuals instrumentalize national identity to gain access to political goods (Laitin 1998).

Recent authors have begun to connect nationalism with more prosaic conflicts over issues of political economy. Of course the notion that nationalism plays into distributive politics isn't new. Carlton Hayes noted long ago (1926) that nationalism can have a soporific effect on class-based mobilization and demands for redistribution. This may work by dampening "divisive" class politics in favor of national solidarity, by sharpening ethnocultural fault lines between lower class constituencies, or some combination of the two.

Cross-nationally, Moses Shayo (2009) uses data from the International Social Survey Program to show that popular nationalism covaries strongly with inequality. People in more unequal societies give more nationalistic survey responses. The cross-national divide is especially acute among citizens at the lower end of the income distribution. That is, poorer individuals are the most nationalistic in general, and especially so in unequal societies. Shayo explains this finding with social identity theory. Drawing from social psychologists (Tajfel 1979, Abrams and Hogg 1988), he argues that people in more unequal societies identify with their nation in lieu of identifying with their social position (class),

because the latter identity is comparatively devalued. This leads, paradoxically, to poorer people in unequal societies being *less* likely to support redistribution, even as they would benefit most from it. Lindqvist and Östling (2009) advance a similar argument, positing that levels of nationalist identification and material redistribution can exist stably at multiple equilibria due to social identity dynamics. Kyung Joon Han (2013) has also finds in favor of social identification theory, but argues that Shayo misses the important role of immigration. Han's results indicate that inequality increases reported national pride in countries with high immigrant populations.

Frederick Solt (2011) also finds a relationship between nationalism and inequality in different survey data, though he disputes Shayo and Han's social identification accounts. Solt instead focuses on elites, arguing that in unequal societies, they rely more heavily on nationalism to generate solidarity among a materially-disparate population. This explanation is powerful, and important in that it acknowledges the role elites play in constructing national identity. However, Solt's argument is lacking in several important respects: a) Solt infers elite behavior from survey responses by the population at large. He presents no data indicating that elites actually engage in more intense nationalist rhetoric in more unequal societies; b) he provides no account of *how* elites go about generating greater national pride among the population; and c) he treats elites as monolithic, all with the same interest in maintaining social cohesion and forestalling redistribution. In democratic societies at least, this final assumption strays far from reality. Furthermore, neither Solt nor Shayo nor Han disaggregate inequality beyond single measures, making it difficult to determine what specific characteristics of a given income distribution lead to greater nationalism.

Some of the shortcomings of these studies may be unavoidable given their scope. Shayo and Solt, in particular, do not confine their analysis to developed democracies, and thus have data issues (the more refined data on inequality are generally only available for developed countries, and it is difficult to reliably measure elite diversionary tactics across regime type) as well as broader concerns about comparability (inequality tends to be substantially higher in the global south, and political

development more uneven). In this study, therefore, I examine the relationship between inequality and nationalism within the OECD, and Western Europe in particular. This narrows the scope of potential findings, but allows for a more nuanced look at how inequality affects political attitudes and behavior.

Theory and Hypotheses

Drawing on some of the above insights from literature on inequality, redistribution and nationalism, I theorize that material inequality should be a strong predictor of nationalist rhetoric by electoral elites in developed democracies. As income dispersion grows in the upper end of the income spectrum, anti-redistributive elites should increase the intensity of nationalist and chauvinist appeals in order to compensate for inequality's centrifugal effects. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: *Inequality in the upper end of the income spectrum should covary positively with nationalist rhetoric by elites, especially right-leaning elites.*

Examining elite rhetorical behavior may provide suggestive evidence for a diversionary account of nationalism and inequality, but it is unlikely to provide dispositive results. Nationalist appeals by elites may well fall on deaf ears. In order to more clearly investigate the relationship between inequality, elite rhetoric and nationalism, an examination of popular attitudes is necessary. Drawing on both social identity and diversionary accounts of inequality, I come to my second hypothesis:

H2a: *Inequality in the upper end of the income spectrum should covary positively with national pride on the part of citizens.*

If elite rhetoric has an independent effect, this should produce observable differences in public opinion in the presence of more or less nationalist political elites. Thus, my third and fourth hypothesis:

H2b: *Elite nationalist rhetoric should covary positively with national pride on the part of citizens.*

H2c: *The effect of elite rhetoric should be especially acute for citizens who pay close attention to politics.*

Finally, it is possible that individual level psychological (social identity) mechanisms may

condition citizens' receptiveness to nationalist rhetoric on the part of elites. If this is the case, one would expect elite rhetoric to have a greater effect on public nationalist attitudes in more unequal societies than in less unequal ones. The psychology of inequality, in other words, may act as an accelerant for the effect of elite rhetoric. Thus, my fifth hypothesis:

> **H2d:** *Inequality should increase the effect of elite nationalist rhetoric on politically-*
> *informed citizens.*

H1: Dependent Variable

Testing these hypotheses requires a valid cross-national measure of elite rhetoric that differentiates between different partisan elites. Solt specifically notes the difficulty of reliably measuring the nature and intensity of elite rhetoric across time and national context (2011, 824). Certainly, no reliable measure exists of the totality of rhetorical opportunities and mobilization strategies available to political elites. Confining my study to economically developed democracies does allow me to employ one of the few comprehensive resources available for this purpose: the Comparative Party Manifesto dataset (CMP) (Volkens et al 2012).

This dataset compiles expert quantitative content analysis of manifestos for political parties contesting free elections since 1945 in more than fifty countries. Coverage of OECD countries, most of which have had free elections for the entirety of the postwar period, is quite good. Country experts analyze party manifestos from each election, classifying sentences and sentence fragments as one of 52 categories across a range of economic and social issues.[2] Each party-election-category observation receives a score representing the percentage of total manifesto text dedicated to that category. So, for example, a score of 5.88 for variable 601 - "National Way of Life: Positive" - indicates that 5.88 percent of a manifesto is comprised of language supporting nationalism, patriotism, citizenship and established national ideas. In this way, the data serve as a rough measure of how heavily a political

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2. Some criticisms have been raised regarding the validity of CMP data, especially with regard to the coding process (see Mikhaylov et al. 2008). It remains, however, the most comprehensive and comparable assessment of party ideology available to researchers.

party prioritizes a given issue or mobilization strategy in a given year.

I use the "National Way of Life: Positive" variable to measure a party's rhetorical commitment to nationalism. The Manifesto Project uses this variable to label quasi-sentences that include "favorable mentions off the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals," including "support for established national ideas; general appeals to pride of citizenship; appeals to patriotism; appeals to nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion." (Volkens et al. 2012). For my first hypotheses, my dependent variable is each party-year score.

H1: Independent Variable

Inequality: Good time-series data on inequality is notoriously sparse, even for OECD countries, though it has improved in recent years. Given that my theory hinges on elite exploitation of nationalism to forestall redistributive pressures, I am primarily interested in pre-transfer income, as net inequality may be endogenous to the outcome variable. I rely on gross income ratios provided by the OECD. To measure the structure of inequality across the upper end of the income spectrum, I use the 90th:50th income percentile ratio. To measure it across the lower end, I use the 50th:10th percentile ratio. The data are distributed unevenly over time and across countries. Graph I shows the trend in mean pre-transfer inequality (90th:10th percentile ratio) from 1975 - 2010.

Controls

Migrant Stock: Much of the work on nationalism and chauvinism focuses on economic and cultural threat that native populations perceive from immigrant newcomers (McLaren 2003, Schneider 2008, Dancygier 2010). This explanation may be especially relevant in European countries, where national narratives do not emphasize the centrality of the immigrant experience. The precise way in which immigration conditions popular attitudes and elite discourse remains contested. Proponents of "contact," "group conflict" and "symbolic threat" theories continue to debate whether anti-immigrant backlashes are driven primarily by cultural or economic logics. For the purposes of this paper, I seek to demonstrate that inequality has an effect on nationalist and chauvinist discourse apart from that

provoked by immigration. I thus include a variable for the percentage of a country's population born abroad. I use United Nations data, reported at five year intervals (United Nations 2009). I fill in the gaps between reporting periods using linear interpolation.[3]

Unemployment: Scholars examining the economic context of populist-right emergence frequently use unemployment to operationalize economic dislocation and distress (Kitschelt 2007). Indeed, one might expect a rise in unemployment to trigger more intense nationalist mobilization by elites seeking office during hard times. I therefore include an annual measure of the unemployment rate provided by the OECD (2010) via Armingeon et al. (2012).

Effective Number of Legislative Parties: Elite mobilization strategy may be sensitive to the nature of competition within a particular party system. Elites in mainstream parties who must worry about competition from smaller parties at either end of the ideological spectrum in addition to their rivals in the center may face different incentives than those in systems where voters face fewer choices. I thus include a variable for the effective number of legislative parties at the seats level via Armingeon et al. (2012) in order to control for this possibility.

Models: Hypothesis 1

I test my first hypothesis using a set of party-election observations from the Comparative Manifesto dataset from 1975-2012. The coders of the Comparative Manifesto Project classify each of the parties they examine as belonging to one of nine party families (with residual categories for single-issue and coalition parties). These include Ecological, Communist, Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, Nationalist, Agrarian and Ethnic/Regional parties. I restrict my sample to parties of the center-left (Social Democratic and Liberal) and parties on the center-right

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3. Admittedly this data is not ideal in that it does not disaggregate migrant stock by country of origin. While this would be a theoretically-interesting variable to include, the most prominent available source of this information, the Global Migrant Origins Database (see Parsons et al. 2007), does not report data over time. Likewise, the data say nothing about the political rights of the foreign-born population. One might expect the percentage of the foreign-born population in the electorate to be most relevant to the tenor of elite rhetoric. Koopmans et al. (2012) have made important strides in estimating these values across time; however, many of the countries in my dataset are not covered by theirs, rendering estimation difficult. I use U.N. data as a next-best solution.

(Christian Democratic and Conservative). "Niche" parties that occupy the extreme ends of the political spectrum likely face different coalitional pressures than their catch-all counterparts in the political center. This produces a dataset of 469 party-election observations over 107 parties.

I run a pooled OLS regression, including an ideological dummy variable to test whether the outcome varies across the left-right spectrum as my hypothesis predicts. I include country and year dummies, as well as a one-election lag to control for previous partisan effects, as well as a variable indicating the time since the previous election. I then run separate regressions for center-left and center-right parties, conditional on the same set of covariates. I report the results of these regressions in Table 1.

Table 1: Contextual Effects on Elite Nationalist Rhetoric

Variable	Aggregate		Center-left		Center-right
Last Election Score	.140** (.059)		.138** (.059)		.012 (.088)
Time Since Last Election	.000 (.000)		.000 (.000)		-.000 (.000)
90:50 Income Ratio	8.265*** (2.639)		5.449** (2.300)		16.292*** (5.046)
50:10 Income Ratio	1.385 (2.350)		2.228 (2.348)		-.852 (4.163)
Unemployment	-.003 (.044)		.068* (.042)		-.051 (.083)
Migrant Stock	-.291 (.103)		-.276*** (.107)		-.247 (.160)
Effective Number of Legislative Parties	.194 (.154)		.154 (.135)		.320 (.285)
Center-Right Ideology	.633*** (.154)		--		--
Constant	-11.169*** (4.312)		-8.931** (4.105)		-39.271*** (10.945)
N	469 (107)		266 (60)		203 (47)
R^2	.473		.536		.603

- * = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<.01
- Center-left data includes liberal and social democratic parties. Center-right data includes conservative and christian democratic parties.
- Data is from 20 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States.
- Country and year dummies suppressed for clarity.

Interpretation

The results here provide support for a diversionary account of nationalism, in that they demonstrate that elites employ nationalist rhetorical tropes in response to rising inequality, and do so in a manner consistent with an effort to generate solidarity in response to redistributive pressures. Elites in general appear to employ nationalist rhetoric most intensely when inequality is high, especially in the upper end of the income spectrum. Consistent with diversionary theory, this effect appears to be most pronounced for electoral elites on the political right.

That said, these results are suggestive rather than dispositive. There is an obvious question of endogeneity: are elites anticipating potential redistributive pressures arising from inequality, or merely responding to its anticipated psychological effects? Further testing requires delving into the link between elite rhetoric and mass opinion.

H2: Dependent Variable

For my dependent variable, I turn to a widely-used measure of national pride from the European Values Survey. The survey question reads "how proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?" Interviewees respond on a four point scale, with the options of being "very proud," "quite proud," "not very proud," and "not at all proud." These data were recoded on a 0-3 scale such that higher numbers indicate a greater amount of national pride. In Western European countries in the fourth EVS wave, with the sample restricted to citizens whose father was born in the country in question, 6.16 percent report being "not at all proud," 8.91 percent report being "not very proud," 38.09 percent report being "quite proud," and 46.84 percent report being "very proud."

National pride is, of course, not the only measure of nationalism. Many surveys (notably the International Social Survey Program's three National Identity modules), but it is the only measure that is unlikely to be endogenous to country-specific factors (see Han 2013 for a longer discussion).

H2: Independent Variables

Inequality: I employ the same measures of the structure of income inequality from the OECD as I use in the models above.

Elite rhetoric: Measuring the impact of elite rhetoric on individual opinion is extremely difficult, and impossible to do perfectly with observational data. That said, following Zaller (1992), I use partisan preference as an indicator of the set of elites to which an individual respondent pays the most attention. The EVS includes a question asking which party the respondent would vote for were there an immediate election. I match this response with the party's CMP score for "National Way of Life: Positive." Thus, for each respondent in my sample, I can observe the level of nationalist discourse for

the party preferred by that respondent.

Attention to politics: Again following Zaller (1992), I theorize that, if elite rhetoric matters for respondent opinion, those who pay the most attention to politics should be most affected by that rhetoric. I use an EVS question about attention to politics in the media to operationalize this variable. For simplicity, I collapse the responses into a binary variable, labeling any respondent who reports following politics in the media either daily or several times per week as paying high amounts of attention to politics, and other respondents as paying low attention.

H2: Control Variables

Unemployment: I use the national unemployment rate as a proxy for national-level economic distress that may have an independent effect on popular nationalist attitudes. As with the previous model, I take this data from Armingeon et al. (2012).

Migrant Stock: To control for group contact or group threat theories of identity formation (see Han 2013, Hopkins 2011), I include the same variable as above for overall migrant stock in a country.

Sex: Following Han (2013) I include a variable indicating the respondent's gender, as this may plausibly be related to national pride through a variety of socialization mechanisms.

Age: I include an age variable (recoded into six categories), as previous studies (Han 2013) have shown that older people are reliably more nationalist than their younger counterparts, at least in recent years.

Education: I include a categorical variable for the level of education a respondent has completed. Education has consistently been shown to reduce levels of nationalism (Han 2013).

Income: Social identity theory places a great deal of importance on the income of individual citizens relative to the overall level of income inequality. I thus include a categorically-recoded, country-harmonized income variable to control for this possibility.

Political ideology: I include a measure of left-right self placement, as numerous studies have noted a connection between right wing ideology and national pride.

H2: Models

Following previous research on national pride (Han 2013), employ an ordered probit model. The dependent variable has only four ordered categories, making OLS (which assumes a dependent variable that can be treated as continuous) inappropriate. Collapsing the question into a binary response, meanwhile, would discard potentially significant variation. I run the model with country random effects in order to control for any potentially exogenous factors that vary across countries in my sample.

Because of issues with missing data and EVS survey coverage, I am only able to estimate the model on a sample of 12 Western European countries. The amount of respondents with complete data per country ranges from 249 at the low end to 875 at the high end. This gives me a total sample of 6,696 spread across 12 different countries.

Model 1 estimates the independent effects of each predictor variable without any interactions. I then run three further regressions testing for interaction effects that would support or undermine my stated hypotheses. I report interaction effects between attention to politics and elite rhetoric (H2c), and between elite rhetoric and inequality (H2d). Finally, I report the results of a three-way interaction between elite rhetoric, media attention and inequality. If elite rhetoric is a major driver of nationalist opinion, I would expect these three variables to be mutually reinforcing. Results of these models are reported in Table 2, with key predicted probabilities and marginal effects illustrated in the subsequent tables.

Table 2: Inequality, Elite Rhetoric and National Pride

| Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Elite Nationalist Rhetoric	.037***	-.375***	.051***	.026	.554
	(.012)	(.206)	(.012)	(.023)	(410)
90:50 Income Ratio	.335***	.367***	.885***	-.321***	.492***
	(.071)	(.087)	(.153)	(.083)	(.190)
50:10 Income Ratio	-.422***	-.458***	-1.296***	.460***	-.035
	(.114)	(.115)	(.129)	(.116)	(.115)
Unemployment	-.049***	-.095***	-.081***	.020***	-.049***
	(.006)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.006)
Migrant Stock	.099***	-.029***	.035***	-.030***	-.027***
	(.009)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
High to Politics in Media	.078**	.024	-.208	.002	.180
	(.037)	(.037)	(.289)	(.043)	(.357)
Sex	.005	.002	.001	.003	.000
	(.029)	(.029)	(.029)	(.029)	(.029)
Age	.028***	.030***	.029***	.028***	.030***
	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Education	-.098***	-.094***	-.096***	-.098***	-.093***
	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)	(.009)	(.009)
Income	.023	.024	.021	.023***	-.049***
	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)	(.006)
Left-Right Placement	.069***	.064***	.063***	.063***	.063***
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
90:50 × Rhetoric	---	.247**	---	---	-.291
		(.116)			(.230)
90:50 × Media Attention	---	---	.144	---	-.108
			(.160)		(.202)
Rhetoric × Media Attention	---	---	---	.045*	-.841*
				(.026)	(.459)
90:50 × Rhetoric × Media Attention	---	---	---	---	.495*
					(.256)
Constant (cut 1)	-2.414***	-2.701***	-3.209***	-2.083***	.407***
	(.200)	(.229)	(.312)	(.197)	(.365)
Constant (cut 2)	-1.852***	-2.142***	-2.650***	-1.522***	-.992***
	(.199)	(.228)	(.312)	(.196)	(.365)
Constant (cut 3)	-.475***	-.744***	-1.259***	-.123	.407
	(.197)	(.227)	(.311)	(.195)	(.365)
N (groups)	6696 (12)	6696 (12)	6696 (12)	6696 (12)	6696 (12)
Log Likelihood	-6503.729	-6416.366	-6441.333	-6418.654	-6416.246

- * = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<.01
- Sample restricted to citizens whose father was born in the surveyed country.

Inequality and National Pride

Model 1 illustrates the independent effects of inequality and elite rhetoric on levels of national pride. Inequality in the upper-levels of the income spectrum has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable, while inequality in the lower end takes the opposite sign (H2a). The nationalist rhetoric of the party respondents support is independently significant (H2b). Control variables education and age reduce and increase nationalist sentiment respectively, consistent with prior research (Han 2013, Shayo 2009).

Marginal Effects: Media Attention and Nationalist Rhetoric

Y-axis: Marginal Effects of Nationalist Rhetoric

X-axis: Attention Paid to Politics in the Media (Low to High)

The subsequent interaction models further point to the interconnected nature of inequality and elite discourse in structuring national pride. The positive and significant interaction in Model 4 indicates that, consistent with diversionary theory and (H2c), elite rhetoric has a greater effect on those who pay attention to politics. The positive and significant interaction in Model 2 further indicates that elite rhetoric correlates more strongly with national pride in societies that are more unequal. The three-way interaction in Model 5 points even more clearly to the importance of elite messaging, as the interaction effect of inequality and elite rhetoric is increased for those who pay closest attention to the media (H2d).

Marginal Effects: Inequality and Nationalist Rhetoric

(y-axis: Marginal Effects on Pr("Very Proud"); x-axis: 90:50 Income Ratio; values 1.4615, 1.891, 2.741)

Conclusion

The results presented here provide support for the diversionary theory of inequality and nationalism, suggesting that anti-redistributive elites work to increase the salience of national identity in the face of economic pressure that could undermine their electoral support. They further suggest that these efforts pay off, increasing the intensity of nationalism among supporting constituencies. Contradicting some other studies (Shayo 2009), income does not appear to affect nationalism apart from other contextual variables, at least in a causally-straightforward manner.

Admittedly, there are limits to this analysis. Though the importance of media attention to the effectiveness of elite messaging suggests a causal link, there remain potential endogeneity issues with the chosen variables. In addition, manifesto data is at best an approximate reflection of the rhetorical emphasis that groups of elites place on nationalism. More detailed analyses of a broader range of political communications are needed to provide further support for the diversionary hypothesis. That

said, this study suggests that researchers must look beyond rationalist/individualist explanations for the link between inequality and nationalism, and focus on the importance of politics as a driver of popular attitudes.

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