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## **Explaining the Stages for Subnational Mobilization across the European Union Arena: The EU Activities of Turkish Cities**

Ali Onur Özçelik

Assistant Professor

Eskişehir Osmangazi University, Faculty of Economics And Administrative Sciences,  
International Relations Department (Eskişehir/Turkey)  
alionur.ozcelik@gmail.com

### **Abstract**

European Union activities at subnational level have been analyzed under the heading of subnational mobilisation. Such a definition refers to the growing engagement of subnational governmental actors with the institutions and process of EU policymaking. Yet, the subnational mobilisation literature generally tends to focus on the activities beyond the national context, particularly the activities of subnational administrations in Brussels through their established liaison offices, in order to demonstrate subnational mobilisation. This paper does not restrict itself to the liaison offices in Brussels to reveal whether there is subnational mobilisation or not. It conversely includes other EU-related activities, which may support the mobilisation of SNAs (e.g. applying EU fund programs, changes in organizational arrangements, transnational activities and vertical channels). Drawing insights from Peter John's (2001) 'Ladder Model for Europeanization of Governance', the four stages for subnational mobilisation are proposed. According to this, what happens in an SNA between the input of an EU stimulus and an output that encourages mobilisation may be described in four stages: growing awareness at local level; changes in organizational arrangements; engagement with transnational activities with their equivalent in the EU; and conducting EU level activities through vertical mobilization. Taking into account these stages, this paper will evaluate three case cities of Turkey (İzmir, Samsun and Diyarbakır) in order to capture the degree of Europeanization on different Turkish cities.

**Key Words:** Europeanization, Multi-Level Governance, Subnational Mobilization, Subnational Administrations in Turkey

## INTRODUCTION

Subnational mobilisation within a broader political game across Europe has become a centre of attention for several scholars from different disciplines<sup>1</sup> in order to provide insights into the content and scope of subnational activities and the functions of subnational mobilisation in the EU arena. Throughout the integration process, new opportunities have been created for interest formulations of subnational administrations (SNAs, hereafter) in EU politics. In particular, the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and the principle of partnership marked a decisive step in the development of lobbying in Brussels by a number of SNAs. The 1990s therefore witnessed the multiplication of access points for the activities of SNAs in Brussels, ranging from information gathering to influencing the EU policy-making process. This paper cannot take stock of the totality of subnational activities in Brussels. Rather it can propose the stages of subnational mobilization across the EU arena.

Scholars generally analyze six channels for SNAs to access European politics except for the national one (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Jeffrey, 1997; 2000; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Tatham, 2008). These 'extra-state'<sup>2</sup> channels encompass the Council of Ministers, the Commission (especially via DG Regio and DG Enlargement), the European Parliament, the Committee of Regions (the CoR), interregional organizations and liaison offices. It is important to note here that SNAs from member (and candidate) states do not benefit equally from these channels due to the differences in institutional arrangements, legal structures, administrative framework and traditions in their domestic settings. Furthermore, there is an uneven pattern of subnational mobilization within the same country.

The variation in the level of mobilisation among regions and cities in member states and a substantial divergence in their agendas for the EU politics have in fact become a centre of attention for a number of scholars. Those scholars have listed a multitude of factors which mainly constrain or enable SNAs to pursue their activities on the EU level. The majority of studies have sought to explain the factors that motivate SNAs to establish their liaison offices in Brussels<sup>3</sup>. To analyze what causes this uneven pattern of mobilisation across the European arena and within the member states,

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<sup>1</sup> Scholarly endeavours and their concepts to describe this novel type of territorial politics in the EU vary considerably. As such, the 1990s have been the era of a 'Europe of the regions' (Mazey & Mitchell, 1993; Loughlin 1996), 'a Europe with the regions' (Hooghe, 1995, Marks *et al.*, 1995; Hooghe & Marks, 2001), 'a Europe with certain regions' (Hooghe, 1996; Marks *et al.*, 1996; Le Galès & Lequesne, 1998), 'a Europe through regions' (Kukawka, 2001 cited in Tatham, 2008), the emergence of 'a third level' in European decision making (Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Bullmann, 1997) and the evolution of a system of MLG in the EU (Marks, 1993). A burgeoning literature (Hooghe 1995; 1996; Jeffrey, 1997; 2000; Keating, 1998; Le Galès & Lequesne, 1998) has emerged around what have been termed subnational mobilisation (Hooghe, 1995), paradiplomacy (Keating & Aldecoa, 1999), territorial representations (Moore, 2008; 2011) and the foreign activities of subnational actors (Blatter *et al.*, 2008; 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey (1997a; 2000) mentions about two broad types of access channels: 'intra-state channels', with indirect SNA access to the EU policy process conducted through the institutions of the member state; and 'extra-state channels', with direct SNA access to European institutions.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, see Marks, *et al.*, 1996; 2002; Jeffrey, 2000; Husseyune & Jans, 2008; Tatham, 2008; 2010; Moore, 2011.

various factors constraining or enabling SNAs to pursue their activities on the EU level have been listed. Scholars have generally pinpointed the domestic context as the key source of variation and highlighted the importance of the national and subnational conditions as the main explanatory variable which underpins subnational mobilisation towards the European arena. The domestic—national and subnational—context of a given SNA largely depends on their engagement with the EU institutions. For instance, Blatter *et al.* (2009: 192) concluded that a large budget in combination with strong regional competencies in foreign relations is the main pathway toward a strongly staffed regional office in Brussels in order to influence EU decision-making. However, Bomberg and Peterson (1998: 232) argue the strong constitutional and legal position at home can be a critical source for SNAs, but it does not guarantee access or influence in Brussels and Strasbourg. In sum, subnational mobilisation and the effective participation of regions in the EU policy network have become various and depend on the idiosyncrasies of national and subnational factors.

Based on the most different system design, this work borrowed the techniques from the case study method in order to determine the sample case cities. To begin with, cities constitute a fairly general category of urban space, relatively original forms of compromise, and aggregation of interests and culture, bringing together local social groups, associations, organized interests, private firms and urban governments (Le Galès, 2002: 262). However, the paper focuses on particular institutions within the city boundary, which are defined as municipalities and regional development agencies (RDAs). Consistent with this and as a practical solution for choosing the case cities, the host cities of NUTS<sup>4</sup> II regions were selected because in that level both RDAs and municipalities operate. There are 26 RDAs corresponding to each NUTS II level. Apart from the three largest cities (e.g. Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) that are located in a mono-centric region, the rest of the RDAs consist of polycentric regions ranging from two to six cities<sup>5</sup>. Izmir, as one of the sample cities, represents the mono-centric region. The rest of the sample cities are in the polycentric regions.


The difficulty is to establish a comparative framework among sample cities in order to evaluate similarities and contrasts. Drawing out from these potential differences and similarities, one may generate further information regarding the subnational mobilisation efforts of SNAs from selected cities. In order to come closer to the ideal of the most different system design, the sample cities with different fundamental structural characteristics were chosen depending on socio-economic

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<sup>4</sup> NUTS is the abbreviation of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. It is a geo-code standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. The standard is developed and regulated by the European Union, and thus only covers the member states of the EU in detail. The NUTS is instrumental in European Union's Structural Fund delivery mechanisms.

<sup>5</sup> The concepts of mono-centric and polycentric were borrowed from Herrschel and Newman (2002). Mono-centric regions suggest a greater emphasis on the local dimension through the influence of the dominant core city. Polycentric regions, by contrast, suggest more of a regional emphasis, because of the rivalry between the smaller cities across the region.

development ranking, geographical location and their eligibility for EU fund programmes. More importantly, the potential intermediating factors at the subnational level, regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationship and existing territorial networks mainly determined the selection of case cities. These case cities are İzmir, Diyarbakır and Samsun (See the Map 1).



Source: (Dinçer *et al.*, 2003)

In the remainder of this paper, the different stages for subnational mobilisation towards the EU arena will be presented and the uneven pattern of subnational mobilisation within and across the member (and candidate) states will be explained. This overall framework will be implemented to three case cities of Turkey.


**FOUR STAGES OF SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION**

The early writing on subnational mobilisation mainly focused on the mushrooming of liaison offices created by SNAs in Brussels during the mid-1980s. Establishing an office, the clearest indication of subnational mobilisation, is just one way of demonstrating the euro-engagement of SNAs. The paper argues that there are several stages in their engagement with the EU’s multi-level polity. In explaining the Europeanization of subnational governance, John (2000) describes Europeanization as ‘a collection of processes which progress from greater awareness of European legislation, growing willingness to search for European finance, networking with other European local authorities and experts, direct lobbying of Brussels institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on subnational policy making’. From this definition, one may see that the process of Europeanization necessitates some steps for subnational mobilisation. It starts from growing awareness of EU matters to actively involving with the EU politics by engaging with different EU access points and shaping EU politics.

The paper finds the ladder model for Europeanization of governance of Peter John (2001: 72) reasonably convenient. According to this model, John suggests that Europeanization is a stepped set of activities with subnational authorities gradually ascending a ladder. He divides the steps into stages that reflect the degree of choice local bodies have over their activities. The more action the SNAs undertake, the greater the interplay with European ideas and practices and the higher they ascend the ladder (Figure 1). Some of these activities, such as responding to regulations, are compulsory and so are minimal in character (steps A-C); others are associated with the search for European funding, reflecting the financially oriented subnational authority (steps A-E). The next stage of networking (steps A-G), although closely associated with obtaining finance, can involve more exchanges of ideas. However, it is only when SNAs start to incorporate European ideas into their policies that they reach the final, fully Europeanized stage (steps A-I) (Ibid).

Whereas the lowest steps (i.e., minimal and financially orientated) of the ladder mean the absorption of Europeanization in a top-down manner, the next two steps are usually followed by bottom-up and horizontal activities. The highest level of subnational Europeanization is marked by the incorporation of European ideas and practices into the core of the local policy agenda. In sum, the more action an SNA takes, the greater the interaction with European ideas and practices and the higher they stand on the so-called 'ladder metaphor'.

**Figure 1** Ladder Model for Europeanization of Governance



**Source:**

John (2001:72)

The ladder for Europeanization of governance is a valuable metaphor. Yet it needs to contain some more insights in order to adapt for the state of Turkish SNAs. Initially, the metaphor should be time-sensitive. This is because the movement of SNAs on the ladder is not always progressive but at times may be regressive depending on developments at the national and supranational level. For instance, given the current affairs of Turkish-EU relations, while some SNAs have stepped back from their earlier position, some others have moved onto further steps. Secondly, SNAs do not always follow a particular pattern to move on the ladder. Sometimes they skip over the steps. SNAs may start with stage A but then skip a few steps and go to stage D. Furthermore, some SNAs may also move sideways. This may be considered a spill-over effect. As a concrete example, SNAs may recruit staff and create an EU unit but then staff in that unit may engage with other international or national projects if they perceive decreasing EU attractiveness or if they think it is not strategic to allocate time only for the EU matters. Finally, not all SNAs are strategically driven. They may become a member of certain interregional organizations or create EU units inside their respective organization as a consequence of imitating the movements of other SNAs.

Consistent with the above discussion, the argument here is that what happens in an SNA between the input of an EU stimulus and an output that encourages mobilisation may be described in four stages: growing awareness at subnational level; adaptation in organizational settings; engagement with transnational activities and their equivalent in the EU; and conducting EU level activities through vertical mobilisation. These stages are time-sensitive and there is a possibility of spill-over within each stage.

***Growing awareness at subnational level:*** By this stage, SNAs have become aware of EU opportunities. They have sought to access EU funds and be involved in the EU projects. The main motivation is to obtain the EU's financial incentives. Even though their organizational setting was not ready and the capacity of human sources inadequate, some SNAs used their existing staff (who at least could speak English) and/or worked with consultation firms which mainly specialized on the EU's projects.

***Change in organizational arrangements:*** Several SNAs realized that fund opportunities have been increasing and their EU activities have been widening. Accordingly, those SNAs have started to create an EU unit and recruit staff or a group of experts for their respective organizations. As a result, with the encouragement of some visionary leaders and/or learning from other institutions, EU activities have become institutionalized, causing a change in organizational setting of SNAs.

***Transnational Activities:*** Apart from receiving EU monies, some SNAs have engaged with the transnational links through sister cities, twinning links and networking arrangements in order to involve in joint-projects and transfer innovative local practice. Their networking with the European counterparts led them to learn best practices and teach them how to exploit the EU opportunities.

***Vertical Mobilisation:*** This is a stage where SNAs perceive their role in the wider EU politics and act accordingly. To reach this level, a strong organizational capacity and a proactive leadership are essential pushing factors to exploit the opportunities within the EU multi-level polity. Some Turkish SNAs have already started to participate in interregional networks or established liaison offices in Brussels. Some others have even interacted with the EU institutions. The crucial point here is that vertical mobilisation should be bottom-up, particularly in the absence of a clear pulling effect from the EU.

Overall, the idea behind the ladder metaphor or four stages of subnational mobilisation is that SNAs are on different levels of a continuum, suggesting uneven patterns of subnational mobilisation among Turkish SNAs. The remainder of the section builds on this in order to show divergences among Turkish cities.



**EURO-ENGAGEMENT OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS: SOME CASE STUDY EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY**

By reflecting on in-depth case study findings based on three sample cities of Turkey, Izmir, Samsun and Diyarbakır (for the criterion of the case selection see above), this section draws insights from John’s ladder metaphor and adapts it to the situations for Turkish SNAs. As argued, four stages of SNA engagement with the EU multi-level modality are determined as growing awareness; organizational arrangements; transnational activities through horizontal channels; and vertical mobilisation. While the first two stages refer to the absorption of Europeanization in a top-down manner, the last two stages are usually followed by bottom-up and horizontal activities. SNAs in three cities have acknowledged the opportunities of the EU and climbed up on the ladder. Yet the crux here is that the different characteristics of subnational settings determine the ultimate outcome and their speed on ascending the ladder. The next section therefore presents the contrasts and similarities for each SNA from the selected case cities.

**Growing Awareness**

The initial attachment with the process of Europeanization started with the EU-funded projects. These projects are usually seen as a way to bring the concept of the EU from being something abstract at the supranational level to the subnational level. Being in eligible areas for the pre-accession fund programs since 2004, SNAs from Diyarbakır and Samsun are in a better position to profit from EU opportunities. Izmir has not been included in any EU development programs. Yet, for non-eligible SNAs, new fund opportunities have arisen from a variety of community programs such as civil society dialogue, cross-border cooperation, Youth, Leonardo and Grundwigo. Izmir, like other non-eligible cities, can participate in those community programs. Considering all the available fund programs since 2003<sup>6</sup>, Table 1 illustrates the number of projects implemented in the selected cities.

**Table 1** Number of EU Projects Implemented in the Selected Cities since 2003

| Cities     | National Ranking (out of 81) | Number of Contracts | Grant Amount (Euro) |
|------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Samsun     | 6.                           | 132                 | 15.112.041          |
| Diyarbakır | 19.                          | 51                  | 8.672.326           |
| Izmir      | 25.                          | 44                  | 4.469.407           |

Source: (www.mfib.gov.tr, 21 August 2013)

The actual influence of EU funds is to promote partnership across different stakeholders. This is also clear evidence for growing awareness about EU logic. Instead of treating the EU as a pot of money,

<sup>6</sup> The Central Finance Contract Units as a main contractor for the EU funds in Turkey were established in 2003. Therefore, the available data starts from that time.

the Commission aims to foster cooperation and partnership among SNAs within and beyond their national settings. SNAs from Izmir and Samsun became more aware of cooperation and partnership before the implementation of EU funds as a consequence of their experience deriving from the pre-existing territorial networks. The EU projects have strengthened those existing partnerships in both cities. However, in examining closely the quality of partnership and cooperation among local actors for the EU projects in the selected cities, a rather different picture emerges.

A number of informants in Izmir highlighted that the main difficulty is the inter-organizational dispute marked by the interest maximization of each organization participating in a project. This may be considered an organizational chauvinism. If the institutions seeking partnership are relatively equal and/or smaller, it is easier for them to work together. Otherwise, organizational chauvinism does not allow the larger institutions to participate in the collaborative efforts unless there is a grand project for the city. An interview participant in Izmir reported that: 'if the local institutions are large, they do not seem pleased to collaborate with each other. Leaders in those organizations think that they are the most important person in the city'<sup>7</sup>. The partisan consideration also exacerbates the establishment of strong partnership among local stakeholders in Izmir.

Samsun seems to be more organized when it comes to benefitting from EU projects. Local organizations in the city are relatively smaller in size and fewer in number, facilitating the collective action for a single EU project. After the creation of the R&D unit under the Samsun Governorship in 2004, it has become a hub for EU projects. An informant from Samsun explained the importance of this unit as follows:

'[...] we created this unit and called it a project kitchen. When we see project calls, we produce as many projects as possible, sometimes more than ten. Then we start looking for partners in the city, if necessary, in other EU countries. [...] at the end of day, all these processes make us integrate with each other [...]'<sup>8</sup>.

The creation of partnerships around the EU funds in Samsun seems to be ad hoc rather than a structured or institutionalized form of partnership. The favourable condition for the durable and institutionalized partnership may be provided by lack of visible cleavages among local leaders. Samsun has more favourable conditions for the structured or institutionalized form of partnership as the political orientations for the actor are more compatible. Because of an undeclared cleavage among local leaders (particularly elected and paid officials) and the number of larger organizations, it may be difficult to construct a sustainable partnership in Izmir. For Diyarbakır, the partnership issues

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<sup>7</sup> Interview with Ahmet Önal, Konak District Governor, EU and Foreign Relations Coordinator, İzmir Governorship, İzmir, (09.12.2011).

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Aslan Karanfil, Secretary General, Samsun Special Provincial Administration, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

are new practices, which have been introduced by the European projects. However, the main problem is to find a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue as it makes other local and civic issues (including the EU activities) become side-lined.

Next to projects, a number of different sources may raise awareness of EU matters at subnational level. In this respect, SNAs of Izmir are in a better position than those of Samsun and Diyarbakir. There are nine universities (private and state) in Izmir; four of which have either EU specialist departments or information centres or documentation centres<sup>9</sup>. These universities not only provide an informational (empirical and theoretical) contribution to the city, they also provide human resources and intellectual capital. For instance, several international conferences have been held by those universities in the city since 1999. The majority of them were related to EU-specific issues<sup>10</sup>. On the other hand, neither Samsun nor Diyarbakir has enough support from their local universities in terms of an empirical and theoretical basis for EU matters.

The common point for each case city is that chambers of trade and industry or business organizations are the earliest subnational organizations to become contact points for EU politics<sup>11</sup>. This is because Turkey signed the Custom Union Agreement with the EU in 1995. Since then, business organizations have been involved in the Europeanization process and disseminated EU information to the subnational level much earlier than any other public or private organization. By the intensified relations with the EU in the mid 2000s, the learning process among subnational actors gradually intensified, which brought about the creation of several EU units under different organizational frameworks.

Having several EU units under different organizations does not suggest a successful integration of a given city with the Europeanization process. It may cause a fragmented EU function of the city if there is no sufficient communication among organizations. In fact, insufficient and irregular coordination are correspondingly considered one of the major shortcomings in the creation of a partnership. For instance, because of the insufficient coordination, a number of stakeholders undertake similar projects or organize identical visits to the EU arena by spending their money on and assigning their personnel to the preparation of necessary plans. Such duplication has resulted in wasting both money and staff hours of their personnel. In order to arrange and coordinate different

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<sup>9</sup> Three universities (Dokuz Eylül, Yaşar and Izmir Economy) have EU Research and Implementation Centres. Two out of 14 EU Documentation Centres created by the EU Delegation in Turkey are in Izmir (Ege and Dokuz Eylül Universities). Two universities (Dokuz Eylül and Izmir Economy) have a master program for EU Studies.

<sup>10</sup> In one of the recent conferences held by Yaşar University in 2011, Thomas Diez and some other European scholars were invited to give a speech. The conference was on Turkey's Accession to the European Union in post-Lisbon Period: Challenges and Expectations.

<sup>11</sup> Izmir EU Information Centre under Aegean Industrialist and Businessmen Association (since 1996); Samsun EU Information Centre under Samsun Chamber of Trade and Industry (since 1997); and Diyarbakir EU Information Centre under Diyarbakir Chamber of Trade and Industry (since 1998).

EU activities, EU Coordination Offices were created by the Ministry of Interior Circular under the governorship of each city in 2010. Apart from the EU Coordination Offices, there is no institutionalized partnership specifically designed for EU matters. Next to the institutionalized form of partnership, one should also discuss whether the organizational capacity of an SNA in the selected cities is adequate to conduct EU activities in Brussels or not.

### Organizational Arrangements

SNAs from Izmir have a big lead in finding necessary human resources and intellectual capital for the EU matters. First of all, it is one of the most developed cities with a high ranking level in quality of life. This makes the city a centre of attraction for qualified human resources. Secondly, it harbours several public and private universities and some of these universities have a specific department for EU politics<sup>12</sup>. Finally, the financial capacity of the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality is more prosperous than those of Diyarbakır and Samsun (discussed below). This provides more scope to appoint extra employees. Table 2 evidently illustrates the amount of workforce and the educational background of employees for each organization. Several staff working in SNAs in Izmir hold master or above degrees.

**Table 2** Educational Background of Personnel in the Selected SNAs (2012)<sup>13</sup>

|                         | Number of Civil<br>Servant | Foundation<br>Degree | Bachelor<br>Degree | Master        | PhD           |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Izmir MM                | 2218                       | 451                  | 759                | 80            | Not specified |
| Samsun MM               | 223                        | 48                   | 91                 | None          | None          |
| Diyarbakır MM           | 333                        | 80                   | 76                 | None          | None          |
| Izmir RDA               | 43                         | None                 | 12                 | 21            | 10            |
| Middle Black Sea<br>RDA | 40                         | 1                    | 27                 | 11            | 1             |
| Karacadağ RDA           | 35                         | Not specified        | 34                 | Not specified | 1             |

MM= Metropolitan Municipality; RDA= Regional Development Agency

Izmir Metropolitan Municipality has a special EU office, with several experts dealing with EU matters. They have different language skills (e.g. English, French, German and Italian)<sup>14</sup>. Such language ability helps the given organization widen its transnational links with different SNAs in Europe. As for Samsun and Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipalities, both are understaffed regarding EU politics. Yet, in 2004, the Samsun Governorship took a bottom-up initiative to create an R&D unit, which brought about several qualified EU experts. They were usually selected because of their language abilities.

<sup>12</sup> Two informants for this research are currently enrolled in a PhD programme in EU politics.

<sup>13</sup> This table was prepared based on each institution's 2012 Activity Report. Only white collars and permanent staff were included. Blue collars and temporary staff were excluded.

<sup>14</sup> Başak Somuncu, EU Expert, İzmir Metropolitan Municipality, İzmir, (08.12.2011).

Those experts were only trained and educated in EU projects and therefore had limited knowledge about general EU politics. Such a smattering of EU knowledge may not be sufficient for these organizations to mobilize across the EU arena in terms of joining transnational links or participating in interregional organizations in Brussels.

As for the organizational level, Samsun and Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipalities have project offices under the international relations departments rather than a specific EU unit. The obvious reason is that the assignment of particular EU issues to the existing employees in the respective organizations is common practice because of the low level of the EU membership credibility. Experts working in these offices (in Diyarbakır and Samsun) shared the same idea that EU issues have become side-lined with other issues and thus there is no point in allocating an expert for EU matters. However, if the organization has already appointed EU experts and created project offices, personnel working in those offices have become engaged with several national or international projects (i.e. JIKA, Development Agency, and the like)<sup>15</sup>. An informant from Samsun, for instance, expressed that: 'we learnt the project culture from the EU but now are using it for other national and international projects. [...] our RDA [Middle Black Sea] goes for project calls every three months and their project criteria are similar with the EU logics, why should we only depend on the EU funds?'<sup>16</sup>. This shows that there is a spillover effect. The organization started with recruiting experts for EU projects, but then those experts had to establish their position by being involved in different projects because of the low credibility of the accession process and insufficient EU funds.

With regard to the situation for RDAs in the three cities, the number of staff is less but the educational background of staff is generally higher than municipalities. Although there is a direct relation with the creation of RDAs in Turkey and the process of Europeanization, none of the RDAs in the selected cities have a specific EU office. There are contact persons for EU affairs, particularly for the relationship with European Association of Regional Development Agencies (EURADA). Officials and experts in the selected RDAs have good knowledge of administering EU funds because the fund management system of the RDAs is identical with that of the EU. This makes experts in RDAs learn rapidly about the logic of EU fund management and thus they easily adapt themselves to EU standards.

On the whole, most of the staff working in those SNAs as EU experts or responsible for EU matters are usually young and they come from a different institutional background because of their language skills. The grant procurement side has become more specialized. Yet most of the personnel are not adequate in understanding the complexity of EU politics and they are not able to do more policy-

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<sup>15</sup> İnan İzci, EU Coordinator, Municipality of Sarıyer, İstanbul, (15.12.2011).

<sup>16</sup> Eyüp Elmas, R&D Coordinator, Samsun Special Provincial Administration, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

oriented work. For instance, there is no expert with experience in all EU institutions. One may argue that Izmir Metropolitan Municipality and Izmir Development Agency (because of the abundance of qualified human resources in the city) as well as the Middle Black Sea Development Agency (because of transferring staff from the Yeşilirmak Union) are ahead of other selected SNAs in terms of having the necessary expertise level for EU politics; however, to move from a simply project-oriented approach to a more Europeanized stage requires skilful experts, who know about the EU institutions and have experience in Brussels. This is a common point shared by informants in Brussels.

The financial strength of a given organization is another component to conduct international activities in the EU arena. Therefore, the question is whether those SNAs have sufficient financial resources to conduct horizontal and vertical mobilisation across the EU arena. The short answer is affirmative. Although the financial strength of Turkish SNAs is comparatively lower than their counterparts, particularly in the EU-15 countries, Table 3 reveals that the financial capacity of each organization (except for Samsun and Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipalities) is sufficient enough to conduct a number of horizontal and vertical activities in the EU arena and even establish a liaison office in Brussels.

**Table 3<sup>17</sup>** 2012 Income and Expense Account for the Selected SNAs (*million €*)

|   | <b>Income</b> | <b>Expense</b> | <b>Net</b> |
|---|---------------|----------------|------------|
| Izmir Metropolitan Municipality         | 801           | 699            | 102        |
| <b>Samsun Metropolitan Municipality</b> | <b>73</b>     | <b>81</b>      | <b>-8</b>  |
| Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality    | 68            | 77             | -9         |
| <b>Izmir RDA</b>                        | <b>26</b>     | <b>8</b>       | <b>18</b>  |
| Middle Black Sea RDA                    | 19            | 11             | 8          |
| <b>Karacadağ RDA</b>                    | <b>30</b>     | <b>14</b>      | <b>16</b>  |

1 € = 2.738 Turkish Lira (the last 6 digits were rounded)

Financial and human resources are important dimensions for the organizational capacity but a particular emphasis should be placed on the role of leadership. Given that the attractiveness of the EU had faded away by the low EU membership prospect, EU activities require a political leadership and direction in order to support the bottom-up initiative. During the initial years of the EU-accession process, local leaders, except for some mayors from the southeast part of Turkey because of the Kurdish issue, were not included in any part of the EU accession process. The then Metropolitan Mayor of Diyarbakır, Osman Baydemir, seemed to be involved in EU matters more than his counterparts in Turkey during this period<sup>18</sup>. As argued, Diyarbakır is the central city for the Kurdish

<sup>17</sup> The table was prepared by deriving data from each organisation's 2012 income and expense account.

<sup>18</sup> As a concrete example of his political involvement activity in the EU, Mayor Baydemir has been a supporter of the EU Turkey Civic Commission which favours Turkish membership in the European Union since 2004. The Commission wishes to contribute to a democratic, peaceful and lasting solution of the Kurdish problem. An article written by

issue, which made the Metropolitan Mayor interact with a number of European officials, parliaments, media members and local leaders.

The intensified relations with the EU during the mid-2000s, a number of local leaders wished to be involved in EU activities by making several organizational arrangements. Many mayors associated with the incumbent government party had a more pro-EU outlook than other mainstream political parties during this period. By the decline in the EU relations, although some of the local leaders from the government party side reverted back to a more sceptical or passive position, others remained reactive or proactive on EU activities. For instance, the Mayor of Samsun, Yusuf Ziya Yılmaz, did not distance himself from the EU matters and had been actively participating in the wider European politics. He was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (in Council of Europe) between 2004 and 2008. He has been vigorously involved in the CPMR-Black Sea Region initiatives supported by the EU cross-regional programs under neighbouring countries. The most recent activity of Mayor Yılmaz was to organize the kick off meeting for Black Sea Basin Buildings Energy Efficiency Plan in Samsun in August 2013. This is a joint operational programme funded by the EU Commission<sup>19</sup>.

During the period of the low EU credibility, the municipalities from the opposition parties have engaged with EU politics more than their counterparts from other mainstream political parties. The creation of a Republican People's Party (CHP, Turkish acronym) office in Brussels in 2009 and the active involvement of Union of Social Democrat Municipalities in EU politics have consistently stimulated the municipalities in Izmir to engage with the EU institutions. The Mayor of Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Aziz Kocaoğlu, had a chance to meet several EU politicians (particularly the members of Party of European Socialist) as well as the DG Regio Commissioner. The active involvement of Mayor Kocaoğlu in EU politics not only stems from a partisan inducement but also from his strong leadership<sup>20</sup>.

The leadership in the selected RDAs requires more explanation. RDAs are run by the Executive Committee in which the Governor(s) is/are chairing the committee. The General Secretaries of RDAs have managing roles and thus their visions are correspondingly relevant for the EU activities of a

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Mayor Baydemir about the Turkish-EU relations with specific reference to the Kurdish issue was published on the website of the aforesaid organization. His article is titled 'Turkey's Integration to EU and Solution of Kurdish Problem' and can be found in the following link <http://www.eutcc.org/articles/8/20/document213.ehtml> (accessed on 27th August 2013).

<sup>19</sup> For more information see <http://r2e2.am/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/press-release-en-for-kick-off-meeting.pdf> (accessed on 27th August 2013).

<sup>20</sup> The work of Mayor Kocaoğlu seems to be having a valuable effect on the city and its inhabitants. The US-based Brookings Institution placed Izmir 4th in its 2011 edition of Economic Performance Rankings. This is a global assessment of metropolitan areas. It is the highest ever ranking of the city. In December 2012, the London-based organization (City Mayor Foundations) selected Mayor Kocaoğlu as the Mayor of the Month, making him the first Mayor from Turkey to gain this award. This information was gained from Izmir Metropolitan Municipality 2012 Activity Report.

given RDA. General Secretaries in selected RDAs are highly educated and have around ten to fifteen years' experience in public or private sectors. Two of them (Izmir and Karacadağ) have obtained PhD degrees in social science and the other one (Middle Black Sea) had a master's degree in agricultural economics. Each of them speaks fluent English and has educational experience in the UK.

General Secretaries of RDAs in Izmir and Samsun seem to have more advantage due to the pre-existing territorial network in their respective regions. Furthermore, the General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency has a supportive educational background in terms of being involved in EU politics. After the completion of his PhD in Economics, he conducted his studies on EU regional policies and structural funds, regional development and the Turkish accession process to the EU<sup>21</sup>. Such an academic background offers him a great advantage when it comes to conducting the activities related to the structural funds and EU regional policy. It is also important to emphasize here that the General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency and that of Middle Black Sea have become members in the Executive Committee of EURADA for the term 2012-2014. The relative weight of pre-existing territorial networks in both regions accompanied by the proactive leadership has led both RDAs to become active players in the EU multi-level polity.

Generally speaking, the first two stages (i.e., growing awareness and organizational changes) are mostly shaped by the top-down effect of Europeanization, particularly with the logic of EU projects. In order to exploit the new opportunities, SNAs in the three cities have embarked upon adjusting their organizational framework by recruiting staff and/or creating a unit to deal with the EU projects. The more those SNAs are involved in the projects, the more they learn about the EU project culture. However, the next two stages (i.e., transnational activities and vertical mobilisation) necessitate different mechanisms including horizontal and bottom-up Europeanization.

### **Transnational Activities**

Transnational links and networking in the EU arena are the ways in which SNAs start to move from a top-down understanding of Europeanization (i.e., responding to the EU fund calls and change in organizational arrangements) to a more Europeanization stage in terms of a normative and ideational phase (i.e., learning best practices, networking and information sharing). This stage is usually essential for horizontal Europeanization. Turkish SNAs are generally reactive in order to exploit EU opportunities. They usually apply for EU funds or create networks with other organizations in their respective cities. Once they become involved in EU projects and grasp the value of

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<sup>21</sup> For more information about the General Secretary of Izmir RDA, Dr. Ergüder Can, see the following link: <http://www.izka.org.tr/en/kurumsal/organizasyon-yapisi/genel-sekreterlik/genel-sekreter/> (accessed on 28<sup>th</sup> August, 2013).



networking with their counterparts in the EU, they may start to conduct transnational activities through horizontal links, such as sister cities, twinning links or reciprocal visits. Interview participants in each city commonly pointed to the importance of networking and sharing best practices or information with their counterparts in the EU arena. Whereas this is clear for Izmir and Samsun, there is no evidence for Diyarbakır. The obvious reason is that SNAs from Samsun and Izmir have more favourable conditions in terms of organizational capacity and subnational context than those of Diyarbakır. Such advantages have facilitated their transnational activities through horizontal channels.

EU matters in Diyarbakır are neither side-lined by other issues nor mainstreamed in the city, except for the EU projects. There are no remarkable transnational links between SNAs from Diyarbakır and their counterparts in the EU arena. Some developments, the creation of Karacadağ Development Agency in 2010 and the AKP's recent Kurdish initiative in 2012 may affect the behaviour of SNAs and lead them back into EU matters. Accordingly, developments on this front should remain to be seen. It is also worth emphasizing that the city is more engaged with the Middle-East region in general and North Iraq in particular because of its geographical position<sup>22</sup>. Subnational interest towards Turkey's south borders has also been encouraged by Ankara's activist foreign policy in that region. Furthermore, with the impetus of the Turkey-Syria Interregional Cooperation Program between 2010 and 2012, the Karacadağ Development Agency has canalized its human and financial resources to exploit the benefits from these regions<sup>23</sup>. One should note that the potential benefits from the Middle East context have economic and cultural dimensions<sup>24</sup>. For learning best practices regarding city regeneration or several urban-specific issues, interview participants in the city commonly acknowledged the prominence of European values, norms and practices.

As regards the situations for SNAs from Samsun and Izmir, they have been involved in several transnational links with their counterparts in the EU. The pre-existing networks in these cities, particularly for Izmir have provided a fertile ground for embarking on horizontal links with European counterparts. Furthermore, local and regional leaders in these cities (Metropolitan Mayors and General Secretaries of RDAs) have been active in some EU-wide organizations (e.g., CPMR and EURADA). The personal relations of those leaders with their European counterparts have promoted the image of their respective cities. Horizontal links with the European counterparts along with the

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<sup>22</sup> Abbas Büyüктаş, Expert, Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Diyarbakır, (29.11.2011).

<sup>23</sup> For the implementation guideline for Turkish-Syria Interregional Cooperation Program, see the following link [http://www.karacadag.org.tr/ContentDownload/Program\\_Implementation\\_Guidelines\\_09\\_November\\_2010.pdf](http://www.karacadag.org.tr/ContentDownload/Program_Implementation_Guidelines_09_November_2010.pdf) (accessed 31st August 2013).

<sup>24</sup> Interview with Dr. İlhan Karakoyun, Secretary General, Karacadağ Development Agency, Diyarbakır, (29.03.2011) (28.11.2011).

number of international seminars and conferences held in Samsun and in Izmir have also increased the learning process about Europeanization.

In the absence of gaining structural funds directly from Brussels, the horizontal links have become initiators for subnational mobilisation and mode of normative changes in terms of learning best practices. The growing transnational activities of Samsun in the EU arena after 2005 substantiate the important results for this learning process. The President of Samsun Provincial Assembly expressed that:

'[...] we had many European friends [implying project partners], we still keep in touch with them [...] sometimes they visit us, sometimes we visit them. Thanks to these mutual interactions, we always update each other on the developments in the EU. We always want to learn new things and good practices. Our networks in Europe helped us a lot for these purposes'<sup>25</sup>.

Joining in interregional organizations also seemed to be a product of the EU projects and transnational links with the European counterparts, particularly for the case of Samsun. An interview participant reported that:

'[...] when we see flags or logos during our joint projects with partners from Europe, we asked what these flags or logos are [...] when we learnt that it represents an organization in Brussels, we got its details [internet addresses or phone numbers] [...] after searching on the internet, if our organizational situation is available, we consider to be a member of that organization'<sup>26</sup>.

Above all, Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies' connections with EURADA and their active involvement have correspondingly accelerated the transnational activities in Samsun and in Izmir. An event held in Samsun may be a good example of the transnational links with a number of European counterparts. In 2012, the Middle Black Sea Development Agency organized a EURADA event titled AGORADA 2012. This event was about the adoption of a regional innovation strategy. Several local and regional actors from different EU states participated in this event. This was a real success for Samsun to adjust the organizational logic for the sake of the utilization of EU funds in the context of top-down understanding, to involve in transnational links and learn best-practices in the context of horizontal Europeanization.

Although Izmir has a similar trajectory with Samsun regarding the involvement of EU politics, the international and European level experiences of SNAs in Izmir have their roots in history that

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<sup>25</sup> Mehmet Yiğit, Deputy Governor, Diyarbakır Governorship, Diyarbakır, (28.11.2011).

<sup>26</sup> Cevdet Karaca, Coordinator in EU and External Relation Coordination Centre, Coordinator, Samsun Governorship, Samsun, (01.11.2011).

coincides with the pre-Helsinki period. Starting from the EGEV/EBKA (Aegean Economic Development Association) experiences, Izmir has established various partnerships with Italian, British, French and Spanish local and regional authorities to establish a region-wide platform which integrates public private and third sectors to each other (Temizocak, 2006). Izmir Development Agency has largely inherited the experiences of EGEV and its networking in the EU but it has developed ardently its networking with European counterparts. Although it is a qualitative evaluation, the reputation of Izmir for Europeans is much higher than many Anatolian cities. This provides a fertile ground for organizing various international events in the city. Besides, visits from a number of EU countries as well as from EU levels in Izmir have also been arranged by other institutions such as universities, NGOs and local administrations<sup>27</sup>. Accordingly, Izmir has more advantages to diversify its transnational links than other cities in Turkey.

Summing up, there is a clear shift towards a bottom-up Europeanization, though the pace of such a shift varies from organization to organization and region to region. Izmir and Samsun, because of their experiences from pre-existing territorial networks and relatively stronger organizational capacity and leadership, seem to be forerunners for embarking on transnational links. The continuation of the third stage suggests a vertical mobilisation, which should also be bottom-up in terms of organizational capacity.

### **Vertical Mobilisation**

This is the stage when SNAs should perceive their role in the wider EU politics and act accordingly. To reach this level, a strong organizational capacity and a proactive leadership are essential push factors to exploit the opportunities within the EU multi-level polity. Particularly, when there is no strong pulls effect (e.g. membership prospect or financial incentives), voluntary mechanisms (i.e. bottom-up or learning) should initiate the behaviour of SNAs to mobilize across the EU arena. If there is a sufficient subnational context, (e.g. pre-existing territorial network) the shift towards the multi-level modality may be easier and faster. If SNAs cannot organize locally and do not seek to act internationally, or if their subnational context and organizational capacity does not permit them to mobilize across the EU arena, it may be difficult to mobilize across the EU arena.

The paper argues that SNAs from Diyarbakır have not reached the full Europeanization stage as there is no evidence to suggest a vertical mobilisation. Moreover, the regional distinctiveness of the city

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<sup>27</sup> For instance, the Commissioner responsible for the DG Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, visited Izmir in 2004. This visit was arranged by one Business Association (ESIAD) in Izmir. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=verheugen-opens-key-visit-to-turkey-2004-09-06> (accessed on 29<sup>th</sup> August, 2013).

has obstructed any mobilisation from Diyarbakir to the EU level or vice versa. Although the Metropolitan Municipality of Diyarbakir has hosted a number of European Parliaments and EU officials in the city since 1999, they have no institutional channel to articulate their functional interests in Brussels. There is a Kurdish-Friendship group in the EU Parliament but it is largely confined to party-political considerations, whereby Kurdish politicians from BDP can discuss minority rights or some other democratic rights. These are national level issues and not related to any specific city or region. Once it accomplishes its institutionalization process, Karacadağ Development Agency may articulate the functional interests of Diyarbakir in the EU arena and embark on vertical mobilisation. It is a member of the EURADA, but currently is not active enough to benefit from it.

Unlike Diyarbakir, SNAs from Izmir and Samsun, with their broad European networks, strong organizational capacity and favourable subnational context, seem to have more confidence in their ability to engage with the EU multi-level polity. In principle each individual SNA, either municipality or regional development agency, from both cities can make use of EU opportunities in Brussels; but in practice it is difficult for a single organization to lobby successfully at the European level. This leads to a collective action under the umbrella organization to establish a liaison office or to participate independently in interregional organizations. For the former case, there is no clear evidence apart from the failed House of Izmir initiative in Brussels. If there is a membership prospect and a possibility to draw EU funds directly from Brussels, SNAs from Samsun and Izmir may pursue creating an office in Brussels. Under the current conditions, it seems neither rational nor realistic to establish an office in Brussels. Accordingly, SNAs from both cities have so far chosen the latter strategy and they have participated in a number of European-wide interregional organizations. Table 5 illustrates these interregional organizations in which local and regional actors from Samsun and Izmir are members.

**Table 4** Membership to some European-wide Interregional Organizations<sup>28</sup>

| <b>Name of the Organization</b>                | <b>Name of the Interregional Organizations</b>                     | <b>Membership Date</b> |
|--|--|------------------------|
| Izmir Metropolitan Municipality                | BALCINET (The Balkan Cities Network)                               | 2000                   |
|  | MEDCITES (Mediterranean Cities Union)                              | 2005                   |
|  | Eurocities   | 2008                   |
|  | Cities for Mobility  | 2009                   |
| Izmir Regional Development Agencies            | European Associations of Zoos and Aquaria                          | 2010                   |
|  | EURADA (European Association of Regional Development Agencies)     | 2007                   |
|  | The Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies    | 2009                   |
|  | TCI Network (Network for Competitiveness, Clusters and Innovation) | 2011                   |
| Samsun Special Provincial Administrations      | The European Cluster Alliance                                      | N/A                    |
|  | CPMR (Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe )        | 2008                   |
| Middle Black Sea Development Agency            | AER (The Assembly of European Regions)                             | 2010                   |
|  | EURADA (European Association of Regional Development Agencies)     | 2009                   |
| Yeşilirmak Basin Development (Based in Amasya) | EURADA (European Association of Regional Development Agencies)     | 2007                   |

As seen from Table 4, membership of those interregional organizations has taken place during the period of low EU credibility. This emphasizes that more complex interactions including bottom-up and horizontal mechanisms are at work. Their participation in those interregional organizations show that SNAs from Izmir and Samsun take a proactive view on EU matters. This does not suggest that they are pro-European. Rather, it shows that the EU membership is not an ultimate goal but is considered as a standard that their respective organization should reach. Therefore, in the absence of adaptational pressure, one may put a greater emphasis on voluntary adaptation through policy transfer, learning and lesson-drawing.

Not all SNAs within those interregional organizations are active. While the Metropolitan Mayor of Izmir used his personal and party political links to engage with the EU institutions, RDAs from Izmir and Samsun established an institutional channel through their link with the EURADA. General

<sup>28</sup> Data derived from each organization's official website. Only European-wide interregional organizations were included. In fact, Izmir Metropolitan Municipalities and Development Agencies are also members of some global scale interregional organizations, such as World Union of Wholesales Market, UCLG-MEWA and International Network for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises.

Secretaries of both RDAs were elected as members of the EURADA Executive Committee for two years, 2012-2014. The General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency was also elected (in 2012) as Vice-President of the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies for the period of 2013-2015. Metropolitan Municipality Mayors of Izmir and Samsun are also actively engaged in some interregional organizations but they have no administrative or executive roles for the time being.

The General Secretary of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency commented on his membership in the EURADA Executive Committee and provided insights into some SNA activities in the European multi-level system. He explained that:

‘[...] by participating in board meetings and working groups in EURADA, we represent our country. Also, we want to catch the trend of European local and regional agendas, [...] if there is a possibility, we also want to participate in lobbying activities [...] we want to be heard by our counterparts, we do not only want to learn best practices but also share what we know [...]’<sup>29</sup> .

The above passage is important for several reasons. First, SNAs see themselves as a representative of the country outside the national setting. This is clear evidence of path dependency stemming from the unitary state culture. In other words, SNAs usually cooperate with their national government and behave as representatives of their country. Secondly, it shows that some SNAs have already realized the importance of lobbying in Brussels. Finally, there is a normative dimension in terms of transferring knowledge and best practices.

As for the relations with the EU institutions (the Commission, the EU Parliament and the CoR), it seems that only SNAs from Izmir have engaged with the formal EU institutions. Mayor Kocaoğlu’s visit to the DG Regio Commissioner, Pawel Samecki, in 2009, is a good example for relations with the EU institutions. Izmir Metropolitan Municipality and Development Agency has also participated in CoR activities. In 2010, a seminar was organised in Izmir by the CoR Working Group on relations with Turkey with the support of the Izmir Development Agency and the Innovative Technology Centre Europa (ITC-Europa). Apart from these examples, there is no reliable data available to show the extent to which SNAs from the selected cities have engaged with the formal EU institutions.

Considering all the stages, it is clear that SNAs are on different levels of the four stages. While Diyarbakır started to move towards the third stage, SNAs from Izmir and Samsun has sought to establish their places in the final stage. Yet there is a spillover phase. Rather than considering being Europeanized, they prefer to become more internationalized. One may claim that what they learn

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<sup>29</sup> Interview with Mevlüt Özen, Secretary General, Middle Black Sea Development Agency, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

from their European links makes them become an international actor. This is also closely related to Turkish-EU relations and the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy. For instance, instead of establishing an office in Brussels, SNAs from Samsun have discussed establishing an office in Russia<sup>30</sup>. Good relations between two countries have led SNAs to become more strategic in their mobilisation. The European dimension is always on the agenda in terms of learning best practices, networking or joining in the projects, but economically and strategically the idea of having an office in Russia seems more attractive. In this respect, geography is a factor but it changes the direction of mobilisation if there are economic purposes in mind. For each case, it seems difficult to refer to a fully Europeanized stage as argued by Peter John. This is largely because of Turkey's current relation with the EU and the low EU membership credibility. There are efforts for shifting towards the multi-level modality but because of the decreasing importance of the EU, SNAs have a 'wait and see' strategy.

Table 5 summarizes the four stages of subnational mobilisation for each case city and selected SNAs within these cities. It is clearly seen from Table 6 that SNAs do not usually follow any specific patterns when they engage with the Europeanization process. For instance, without having an EU unit, they may join in transnational links. In other words, it is not always progressive but may be erratic movement.

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<sup>30</sup> Interviews with Mevlüt Özen, Secretary General, Middle Black Sea Development Agency, Samsun, (21.11.2011), Aslan Karanfil, Secretary General, Samsun Special Provincial Administration, Samsun, (21.11.2011) and Mustafa Karakurt, Chairman (elected), Samsun Provincial Assembly, Samsun, (22.11.2011).

**Table 5** Summary of Four Stages of Subnational Mobilisation  
(*the darker the colour, the higher the stage*)

| EU Activities   | Izmir<br>MM | Izmir<br>RDA | Samsun<br>MM | Middle<br>Black<br>Sea RDA | Diyarbakir<br>MM | Karacadağ<br>RDA |
|---|-------------|--------------|--------------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Benefitting from the EU fund programs   | Yes         | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | Yes              | Yes              |
| Networking with other local organizations   | Yes         | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | Yes              | Yes              |
| Special EU Units in the Organization  | Yes         | No           | No           | No                         | No               | No               |
| EU Officials (Exclusively)  | Yes         | No           | Yes          | No                         | No               | No               |
| EU Officials (Not Exclusively)  | No          | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | Yes              | Yes              |
| Training staff for the EU Funds   | Yes         | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | Yes              | Yes              |
| Circulation of EU Directives or Regulations in the Organization                     | Yes         | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | Yes              | Yes              |
| Sister Cities   | Yes         | No           | Yes          | No                         | No               | No               |
| Joint Projects with partners from the EU states                                     | Yes         | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | N/A              | N/A              |
| Organizing international conferences/seminars in the city regarding the EU politics | Yes         | Yes          | Yes          | Yes                        | No               | No               |
| Being members of Brussels-based interregional organizations                         | Yes         | Yes          | No           | Yes                        | No               | Yes              |
| Active roles in interregional organizations   | No          | Yes          | No           | Yes                        | No               | No               |
| Liaison Offices   | No          | No           | No           | No                         | No               | No               |
| Participating in the CoR Activities (e.g. working group)                            | Yes         | Yes          | No           | No                         | No               | No               |
| Visits to the EU institutions (EU Parliament and the Commission)                    | Yes         | N/A          | N/A          | N/A                        | N/A              | N/A              |
| Attempts to Influence EU Institutions   | N/A         | N/A          | N/A          | N/A                        | N/A              | N/A              |

(MM= Metropolitan Municipality, RDA= Regional Development Agency)



## CONCLUSION

The form of subnational mobilisation and the channels where SNAs are able to contact the EU institutions and their activities in Brussels have been outlined. As a result of the developments in the integration process, the multiplication of access points and the ongoing enlargement process, a large number of SNAs both from member and candidate states have sought to engage with the multi-level polity and to affect the EU-decision making process on their behalf. All of the channels illustrated above suggest that engagement with the supranational institutions and networks has gone hand in hand with SNAs' integration with the Europeanization process.

What has been revealed that SNAs are not equally mobilized and there is a variation in their engagement with the EU institutions. Focusing on different subnational contexts in a single state is one of the key methodological strategies to examine variations among SNAs. More importantly, as Jeffrey (2000) suggested, one needs to consider the 'bottom-up drive' for examining the intra-state factors that may explain subnational mobilisation, but the latter has received little attention from scholars. Taking the bottom-up perspective, the paper has focused on regional development agencies and metropolitan municipalities from three different subnational contexts, Samsun, Diyarbakır and İzmir. The choice of comparing SNAs from the selected cities enables us to explore the uneven effects of the Europeanization process in different subnational contexts, and to examine why some SNAs have used the EU to advance their functional territorial interest, whilst others have not.

The paper has outlined the four stages of subnational mobilisation for each case SNA within three selected cities, in terms of growing awareness and organizational arrangements, albeit to varying degrees, taking place in each SNA. It was also seen that those SNAs have certain access points to the horizontal and vertical channels in the EU multi-level system. This implies that the new opportunity structures have offered possibilities for SNAs to engage with the EU multi-level polity. Yet it also involves the caveat that there is a large variation in the substance, content and timing of their mobilisation across the EU arena. Accordingly, the evidence presented here suggests a pattern of variation in subnational engagement with EU politics, rather than any neat conclusion in terms of homogeneous Europeanization of SNAs. Accordingly, the differential impact of Europeanization is apparent from the evaluation of case study SNAs from the selected cities.

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