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What Kind of Role Should the European Union Play for Achieving Sustainable Peace in Georgia? : Improving the Effectiveness of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM).

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Abstract

During the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, a little war shook the world. On August 7, 2008, Georgia tried to forcefully incorporate South Ossetia into the Tbilisi Administrative Territory (TAT), which excludes breakaway regions i.e., Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as Russia was holding its Kavkaz 2008 military drill. Russia intervened in the armed conflict and invaded the TAT. For the first time since 1979, Russia's military crossed state borders to attack a sovereign state.

Based on the six-point agreement brokered by former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy, the armed conflict ceased and the European Union (EU) deployed the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) as an early warning apparatus to prevent the resurgence of armed conflict. Thus, it focuses on preventing possible future conflict. However, according to the information extracted from the interview with an anonymous EUMM officer in May, 2016,

Local Georgian people have acknowledged the fact that people cannot cross the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) of breakaway regions and this is no longer a temporary situation. Georgian people do not have access to the ABLs now, and the Russian and South Ossetian side have already stopped putting the new fences for demarcation of the ABLs. This is the new reality. In this respect, the situation on the ground is much more stable than before.

Therefore, this research discusses the EU's role in Georgia, with specific focus on improving the effectiveness of the EUMM. Now that the situation on the ground is relatively "stable", what kind of role should the EU play in Georgia for achieving sustainable peace? It argues that the EUMM should focus not only on early warning but also other conflict prevention activities e.g., post-conflict stabilization. Moreover, it provides implications that emphasize the importance of conflict transformation for addressing protracted conflicts via the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), which was established in tandem with the Geneva International Discussions.

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Chapter1: Introduction

To answer the research question: what kind of role should the European Union play for achieving sustainable peace in Georgia?, a related question must be taken into account: Why were the armed conflicts in Georgia not prevented, and why did early warning efforts by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) not function well in Georgia? The international community was confident to prevent reversion to armed conflict in Georgia before 2008, yet its preventive efforts failed. This puzzle has to be solved in order to answer the research question.

Georgia experienced several intrastate armed conflicts in the 1990s, and an armed conflict with interstate characteristics in 2008. On one hand, some argue that the 2008 war in Georgia was parallel to intrastate and interstate armed conflicts cf., ICRC (2012). On the other hand, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) concludes that the 2008 war in Georgia was not interstate, yet it was an ‘intra-state conflict with foreign military involvement’ (Stepanova 2008). That is, an armed conflict with Abkhazia that spilled over and/or escalated into large scale armed conflict *vis-a-vis* not only Abkhaz but also having incited Russia’s involvement (Ibid). As such, Georgia is a unique case to analyze for Peace and Conflict Studies since it went through complex and various forms of conflicts. For Area Studies, an analysis of conflicts in Georgia could provide us with some implications to devise procedures to analyze or map other conflicts in the former Soviet space, especially states with breakaway regions.

This research discusses the EU’s contribution to conflict prevention in Georgia, with specific focus on improving the effectiveness of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), as well as its role for confidence building to address the protracted conflicts in Georgia. To understand the structure of the armed conflicts in Georgia, this research overviews the background to the armed conflicts and provides a brief history of Georgia. To discuss these issues, this research examines protracted conflicts, conflict prevention, and conflict transformation within academic discourse, the principles and definitions of conflict prevention in the UN and EU, and the EU’s priorities and conflict prevention strategies. This research also discusses how to enhance the efficiency of the EUMM for conflict prevention, and it argues the importance of IPRM as the venue for achieving sustainable peace via conflict transformation.

Chapter 2: Literature Review on Protracted Conflicts and Conflict Prevention

2-1: Protracted Conflicts

Burton and Azar (1986) describes “deep-rooted conflicts” as resting on underlying needs

that could be intransigent and cannot be compromised. Azar (1990) pioneers the concept of “Protracted Social Conflicts” (PSCs) as “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.” Subsequently, a number of scholars including Ramsbotham (2005) restructure and further develop Azar’s theory of PSCs. For example, Rothman (1997) argues that identity is an analytic tool and focus of global peacemaking and continues to grow, although the analysis of identity groups has not replaced the nation-state as the dominant conceptual and organizing force for scholars of international politics. Fisher (2001) notes that in recent decades, the international community has been increasingly challenged by violent protracted conflicts between identity groups, defined in racial, religious, ethnic, ideological, or cultural terms. Moreover, Fisher (2001) asserts that when group identities, and the needs that underlie them, are threatened or frustrated, intractable conflict is almost inevitable.

Korostelina (2011) points out that the following question must be answered to develop the theory further: “do ethnic and national identities cause political conflict, or do they arise out of political conflict?” On one hand, approaches to the above question, which stress a strong biological basis for ethnocentrism i.e., shared genes, genetic similarity, and predisposition to ethnic nepotism, underestimate political and economic motivation (Ibid). On the other, approaches that emphasize the leading impact of economic and political interests over social identities, overestimate the role of the elite manipulation of the masses, and undervalue social movements and mobilization (Ibid). Rothman (1997) argues that “all identity conflicts contain interest conflicts; not all interest conflicts contain identity conflicts.” Furthermore, Kriesberg (2003) argues that people who share the same identity believe they share the same fate and interests, and think they experience similar deprivation and exacerbation caused by another group.

Nonetheless, social identities based on strong feelings of membership in a specific group e.g., ethnic, national, religious, and regional ones, have been in existence for a long time, yet have only occasionally resulted in conflict (Korostelina 2011). Thus, social identities *per se* do not arise as a result of conflict, although they might be reinforced and become more salient due to it, and should be understood neither as sources nor as consequences of conflict, but as a form of consciousness that entirely changes the dynamics and structures of conflict (Ibid). Therefore, social identities could be understood as a precipitating factor which changes the nature of conflict and makes conflict protracted and deep-rooted.

For example, Collier (2007) argues that post-conflict societies face a considerably

higher risk of reversion to armed conflict. According to Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, the typical developing country that has been at peace for a long period has about a 9% risk of descending into large-scale violence over the period of a decade (Collier et al. 2007). By contrast, based on an analysis of 66 post-conflict experiences, the risk of reversion facing the typical post-conflict society during its first decade of peace is at 40% (Collier et al. 2007). Collier et al (2007) estimate a hazard function of post-conflict risks, during the first decade, and find that economic recovery firmly contributes to risk reduction. The study by Miguel et al (2004) which, using rainfall shocks as an instrument for economic growth, showed that in Africa, the risk of civil war was alarmingly increased by low growth (Miguel et al. 2004). Now, the importance of economic growth for risk reduction in Africa is not in dispute (Collier 2007). According to them, if the conflict recovery policy in post conflict societies in Africa does not address the importance of economic growth, and if a certain degree of economic growth cannot be achieved, the country would be at risk of reversion to armed conflict.

However, certain scholars e.g., MacFarlane (2004), do not accept these causes because they believe these fail to tell the entire story. Whereas the combination of case studies and econometric analysis helps identify certain predisposing conditions, it does not support simple generalizations regarding the causes of all conflicts (Stewart 2000).

On February 25, 1921, the 11th Red Army of Russia entered the Democratic Republic of Georgia's capital city Tbilisi, and the war ended with the establishment of the Russian Occupational Regime (Carr 1950). Georgia's anti-Soviet movement became active at the end of the 1980s. However, the Soviet army violently subdued these protests (Goltz 2009). Thus, independence was preceded by devastating events, e.g., the killing of Georgian demonstrators by Soviet troops on April 9, 1981 (IIFMCG 2009). Protests to restore Georgia's independence began in 1989 (President of Georgia 2014), and in October 1990, Zviad Gamsakhurdia's "Roundtable/Free Georgia" coalition won 155 of the 250 seats in the Supreme Council, yet all 34 political parties, including the Communists, agreed on one point: complete independence (Goltz 2009).

Eventually, Georgia declared independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Collier argues that during the period of 1965-99, the risk of civil war had been systematically related to a few economic conditions, such as dependence upon primary commodity exports and low national income (Collier 2006). Conversely, objective measures of social grievance, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions, have had little systematic effect on risk (Ibid). However, it seems that the theory based on only material and rationalist approaches would not be fully applicable in the context of Georgia. In the case of Georgia, Abkhazia was a prosperous

region with a diversified economy based on semi-tropical agriculture and tourism, and that prosperity was shared by the Abkhaz minority that controlled the region's government (MacFarlane 2004). Thus, there was no obvious developmental dimension to the conflict, and similar conclusions are suggested by the dynamic of conflict in South Ossetia (Ibid). Therefore, although Collier identified one of the causes of armed conflict in the Sub-Saharan African context as economic development, material advancement does not seem adequate to analyze the whole picture of armed conflicts in Georgia.

Hence, this research deals with intangible objects as a precipitating cause of conflicts e.g., identity, as well as material structures. One of the principal causes of conflict in Georgia appears to have been the effort of minority political elites to maintain their positions in a period of considerable uncertainty, the failure of majority elites to effectively reassure their minority counterparts, and a long history of ethnically based distrust (Ibid). In fact, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was established in 1922 within the framework of Georgia, and delegations from South Ossetia twice demanded union with North Ossetia (Gahrton 2010). However, Stalin responded with oppression and executed all of the members of these delegations (Gahrton 2010). Additionally, Gamsakhurdia, a leader of the Georgian National Movement who was elected Georgia's first president, did much in terms of nationalism to alienate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and his rallying slogan was "Georgia for the Georgians" (Goltz 2009). The mistrust and sense of identity of Ossetians and Abkhaz people have been gradually constructed and/or reinforced by these events, although they co-existed as "Georgians" before these events. Consequently, Abkhazia and South Ossetia started to highlight the importance of independence, and fighting erupted between Georgian and separatist forces, first in South Ossetia (1991-1992) and then in Abkhazia (1992-1994). The armed conflicts ended when Georgia lost control of large parts of both regions (IIFMCG 2009).

2008 War

Gamsakhurdia was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, who returned to Georgia from Russia in 1992, and led the country until 2003 (President of Georgia 2014). In November 2003, the "Rose Revolution" erupted in Georgia, a type of revolution that the turbulent region had never experienced (BBC News 2005). Demonstrators demanded that Shevardnadze resign. Subsequently, Mikhail Saakashvili came into power without bloodshed (BBC News 2005). One of his manifestos as president was to reintegrate breakaway regions into the TAT (Smith 2009). Partly due to this Saakashvili administration initiative, armed conflict resurged in 2008 (IIFMCG 2009).

During the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, "a little war shook the world" occurred (Asmus 2010). On August 7, 2008, Georgia tried to forcefully incorporate the breakaway

region of South Ossetia into the TAT, which excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as Russia was holding its Kavkaz 2008 military drill (Illarionov 2009). Russia intervened in the armed conflict and invaded the TAT (King 2008). For the first time since 1979, Russia's military crossed state borders to attack a sovereign state (Cornell and Starr 2009).

The Russians seem to have played a role in the armed conflict, specifically in terms of preventing Georgia from becoming a NATO member. According to NATO's Bucharest Summit Declaration on April 3, 2008:

23. NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP² is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications (NATO 2008).

This declaration granted international recognition to Georgia as a candidate country and potential member of NATO, although it did not note when and how Georgia would become a member. After the declaration, Russia cautioned Georgia regarding its plans to join NATO. According to the Foreign Minister of Russia, Mr. Lavrov,

"We have stressed again that Georgia would not be able to achieve this by artificially pulling itself into NATO because this would lead to another stage of confrontation" (Kishkovsky 2008).

Thus, NATO enlargement seems to have become either/both a cause and/or a trigger factor of the 2008 war. The armed conflict ceased based on the six-point agreement brokered by the former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy, who was the EU chair at the time. The Embassy of France in Washington's website outlines the six points as follows:

- non-use of force
- definitive cessation of hostilities

² The Membership Action Plan.

- free access for humanitarian aid
- withdrawal of the Georgian military forces to their usual bases
- withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they held before hostilities began
- while waiting for an international body, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures
- initiation of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Embassy of France in the United States 2008).

Although the armed conflict ceased, two points of the six-point agreement have not been implemented by Russia: “free access for humanitarian aid” to South Ossetia and “the withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they held before hostilities began”. Under these circumstances, conflict prevention and conflict transformation in Georgia must be examined since the *status quo* is far from sustainable peace although the security situation is relatively “stable” on the ground.

2-2: Conflict Prevention

As a metaphor, Sandole (2010) categorizes interventions as follows:

1. *Preventive diplomacy* (violent conflict prevention): Take steps, based upon early warning, to prevent a house from “catching on fire” in the first place (proactive);
 2. *Peacekeeping* (conflict management): When the house is on fire, either because of the failure of violent conflict prevention efforts or through avoidance of their use, taking steps to prevent the fire from spreading (reactive);
- and
3. *Peacemaking*: When attempts to prevent the fire from spreading have failed, then attempt either:
 4. Coercive peacemaking (conflict settlement): Suppressing the fire (reactive); and/or
 5. *Noncoercive peacemaking* (conflict resolution): Dealing with the underlying causes and conditions of the fire (reactive) which establishes a basis for:
 - 6: *Peacebuilding* “writ small” (conflict transformation), or what John Burton calls conflict prevention: Working with the survivors of the fire on their long-term relationships so that, the next time they have a problem, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighborhood, or the larger commons in the process of dealing with it (reactive/ proactive).

Lund (2009) argues that conflict prevention could apply to a peaceful situation where

there are substantial physical indicators of rising hostilities. Conflict prevention measures, however, must be taken not only in the peaceful time but in post-conflict situation right after the cessation of the waging of armed conflicts and even during/after the post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, conflict prevention should be long-term efforts to avoid violent conflicts.

Compared to the huge costs of war, the costs of conflict prevention are drastically less (Lund 2009). According to Thayer, in an estimate of the Macedonian case, the actual cost of the UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP) was 225 million USD, or 0.02% of the estimated cost of 15 billion for a two year armed conflict (Thayer 1999). According to Henryk Sokalski, who led UNPREDEP for much of its existence during the years from 1995 to 1998:

We adopted a proactive approach to conflict prevention that we felt would be more effective than a reactive one. We also thought that dealing with the underlying causes of conflict was preferable to addressing their destructive postconflict outcomes. Many of the factors in Macedonia's crisis had very, very deep roots, addressing them would call for perseverance, astute methods and strategies, financial support, and educational programs (Sokalski, 2003, pp. 103– 4).

Thus, conflict prevention is not simply a high ideal, but a prudent option that could work if thoughtfully carried out (Miall 2007). As a valuable foundation for preventive efforts, Kriesberg (1998) argues that conflicts should be seen as passing through the stages of the underlying conditions which cause the conflict: the emergence stage, the stages of escalation and de-escalation, and the termination stage. He argues for development of an empirically grounded understanding of how people prevent destructive conflicts, so that relatively constructive conflicts may be waged instead (Ibid). Thus, he sees an important distinction between constructive conflicts from disruptive/violent ones, and to seek prevention and termination of potentially violent conflicts (Ibid). The aim of conflict prevention is not to avoid conflict altogether, but to avert armed conflicts (Ramsbotham et al 2012). According to Ramsbotham et al (2012), armed conflicts often result in lose-lose outcomes for all parties and the population at large, thus violence cannot be the best option to address or remedy injustice. Therefore, the importance of preventing violent/armed conflicts is indubitable.

Conflict Prevention in the United Nations (UN): Principles and Definitions

According to the Secretary-General's Report *A/47/277-S/24111* pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992 - well known as "An Agenda for Peace," preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and

peace-keeping by the former Secretary-General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

21. The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building - action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples (UN 1992).

Peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy efforts are important means by which to prevent the resurgence of armed conflict. Moreover, in terms of conflict prevention, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a declaration on September 9, 1999, "Global Effort Against Armed Conflict Needs Change from a Culture of Reaction to a Culture of Prevention" (UN 1999). In addition, according to identical letters A/55/305-S/2000/809 - known as the Brahimi Report - dated August 21, 2000 from the Secretary-General to the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council:

Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low-profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether (UN 2000).

Consequently, since 1992, the UN has emphasized conflict prevention rather than reaction or intervention. Conflict prevention could build a foundation for peace, and it can be a low-profile activity. Based on this characteristic, successful conflict prevention efforts need not be explicit, since many factors are involved and it is difficult to identify which efforts have contributed toward preventing armed conflict. Furthermore, when people enjoy prosperity and peace, it is almost impossible to identify when and how armed conflict is prevented until another crisis occurs. However, it is clearly identifiable when it fails. Thus, conflict prevention must encompass daily efforts, even if these are not evident to the public.

In the case of Georgia, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established in 1993 to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and Abkhaz authorities in Georgia (UNOMIG 2009). The mission ended in June 2009 resulting from a lack of consensus among Security Council members on mandate extension, namely due to Russia's objection (Freire and Simão 2013). Unfortunately, this constitutes an example of failed conflict prevention efforts by

the UN, as armed conflict resurged in Georgia on August 7, 2008. This also illustrates that armed conflicts engaged in by permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) are not always adequately addressed at the UNSC partly because of *realpolitik* among them³. This highlights the important role of the EU for conflict prevention and conflict transformation in Georgia, as there is less direct Russian intervention in the EU's missions than in the UN missions.

Conflict Prevention in the EU: Principles and Definitions

The EU has its own criteria and priorities guiding conflict prevention efforts. The “European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” by the European Peace-Building Liaison Office (EPLO) states:

The European Union is a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development. The process of enlargement will extend this community of peace and progress to a wider circle of European states (EPLO 2001).

Accordingly, EU countries portray themselves as successful examples of conflict prevention based on “soft” components such as democratic values, human rights, economic prosperity, and enlargement. Furthermore, the same programme paper elaborates the following:

In keeping with the primary role of the UN in conflict prevention, EU actions are going to be undertaken in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter (EPLO 2001).

Therefore, regarding conflict prevention, EU actions are aligned to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter although the EU also has its own agenda and priorities. As such, the EU will:

- set clear political priorities for preventive actions,
- improve its early warning, action and policy coherence,
- enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention, and
- build effective partnerships for prevention (EPLO 2001).

Hence, an early warning system is one of the primary agendas adopted by the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), which monitors the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (EUMM 2014). However, this research points out that early warning is necessary but insufficient for

³ Russia insists that it was not party to the armed conflict in 2008. However, in 2011, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed Russia's argument that there had been no dispute between Georgia and Russia regarding issues at the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

preventing armed conflicts in Georgia.

Early Warning - Necessary But Insufficient

There are two tasks for early warning: first, identification of the type of conflicts and location of the conflicts that could become violent; second, monitoring and assessing their progress with a view to assessing how close to violence they are (Ramsbotham et al 2012). Regarding the identification of location, this is not an issue in Georgia at the moment because it is clearly identified where preventive efforts are needed and should be conducted, although the EUMM has access to neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia. However, the monitoring and assessing progress are crucial for early warning in Georgia. Gurr (1993) identifies three factors that affect the tendency of a communal group to rebel: 1) collective incentives, 2) capacity for joint action, and 3) external opportunities. These factors must be taken into account, however, Ramsbotham et al (2012) argue another significantly important point: “Even when observers have issued ‘early warning’, it is by no means certain that they will be heard, or that there will be a response.” They point out the fact that governments and international organizations may be distracted by other crises as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, or are unwilling to change existing policies as in the case of Rwanda (Ibid).

In fact, the OSCE mission to Georgia and the UN Observer Mission in Georgia: UNOMIG issued early warning signals to policy makers at the UN Security Council and others, yet the armed conflict was not prevented because of these facts: 1) the complexity of the conflict (Stöber 2011); 2) these signals may not have been properly heard to prevent the 2008 armed conflict in Georgia (Lynch 2010), partly because of the above mentioned distraction and unwillingness of policy makers to change the preexisting policies; 3) the OSCE mission did not extend throughout the entire conflict zone, and did not include the area around the Roki Tunnel, the main access route to the North Caucasus (Lynch 2010). As discussed earlier, it also seems that UNSC was partially paralyzed in 2008 because of the fact that Russia is a party of that conflict in Georgia as well as a permanent member of UNSC, exercising Veto power. Also, concerning advocacy efforts, they tend to depend on media coverage of remote events and a distracted public that is touched by only highly emotive material, although advocacy efforts by international organizations (IOs), inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and governments arouse public support for preventive action (Lund 2009). Thus, they are prone to belated responses, not proactive ones (Ibid). Conflict prevention based on early warning was necessary but insufficient in Georgia, thus improving the effectiveness of the EUMM for post-conflict stabilization there is needed.

Chapter 3 : The EUMM and Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mission for Conflict Prevention

Concerning the EU's foreign and defense policies, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) replaces the former European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The Treaty of Lisbon introduced this name change by dedicating a new section in the founding treaties of this policy (EU 2010). The Treaty of Lisbon emphasizes the importance and specific nature of the CSDP, which still forms an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Before the Treaty of Lisbon was enacted, tasks that could be conducted under the CSDP framework included the following:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks and
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

The Treaty of Lisbon adds three new tasks to this list:

- joint disarmament operations
- military advice and assistance tasks
- tasks in post-conflict stabilisation (EU 2010).

Specifically, the last task added by the Treaty of Lisbon, namely post-conflict stabilization, is essential to enhance the EUMM's conflict prevention capabilities and effectiveness.

EUMM is the EU's unarmed civilian monitoring mission. Since deployment, it has patrolled day and night, specifically in the areas adjacent to ABLs of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (EUMM 2014). Headquartered in Tbilisi and with field offices in Gori, Mtskheta, and Zugdidi, the mission deploys approximately 200 monitors from various EU member states (EUMM 2014). Its mandate is valid throughout Georgia, however the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have denied it access to the territories under their control (EUMM 2014). The EUMM website outlines the mission's tasks as follows:

- to ensure that there is no return to hostilities
- to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- to build confidence among the conflict parties
- to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region (EUMM 2014).

The EUMM is also developing partnerships with the Government of Georgia as an effort toward conflict prevention (European External Action Service 2014). The

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the EUMM and the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs provides transparency and imposes restrictions on equipment used and activities performed by the Georgian police in the adjacent areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Furthermore, the MoU between the EUMM and Georgian Ministry of Defense limits the Georgian Armed Forces' positioning of troops and heavy equipment in areas adjacent to ABLs (European External Action Service 2014). This unilateral engagement by the Georgian government substantiates its commitment to the principle of not using force, as explained in the six-point agreement (European External Action Service 2014). The mission's extensive presence through hotlines ensures it has the capacity to gather accurate and timely information on the situation. Where appropriate, this information is disseminated to relevant assistance and response bodies (European External Action Service 2014). As such, the EUMM has sufficient capacity to monitor ABLs as an early warning initiative. Furthermore, the mission has the capacity to gather detailed information on security issues.

However, as discussed at the early warning section of the literature review, even if the EUMM plays an important role for early warning, it would be insufficient if the mission cannot access the possible conflict areas. In fact, EUMM can neither access Abkhazia nor South Ossetia although they attempt to overcome these constraints through a satellite system. Furthermore, the mission's mandate does not allow it to fund economic cooperation projects aimed at post-conflict stabilization. Thus, this research emphasizes the following points to strengthen the mission's capabilities and effectiveness for conflict prevention.

The "Grassroots Human Security Grant Projects (GGP)," a grant scheme initiated by the Embassy of Japan in Georgia, funds local and international NGOs, enabling them to implement projects to stabilize society such as renovating kindergartens for IDPs and clearing landmines (Embassy of Japan 2014). This should also be regarded as a form of conflict prevention, because it addresses grassroots issues. The grant amount for each project is approximately 100,000 USD, and the embassy adopts approximately 10 projects each year, totaling approximately 1 million USD per year (Embassy of Japan 2014). While this amount is relatively small, it could contribute toward strengthening and empowering the local population's capacity to return to normal life and building resilience against post-conflict challenges. However, the Embassy is not always adequately informed on grassroots issues, and sometimes has difficulties in finding reliable organizations to implement projects. Thus, the EUMM provides the embassy with information and recommendations for project implementation. One EUMM recommendation was a project to construct a social education center in Nikozi village in

the Gori district, which was implemented by the NGO “American Friends of Georgia” and funded by the Government of Japan (Embassy of Japan 2014). Another project implemented in close collaboration with the mission aimed at renovating a kindergarten in Khurcha village in the Zugdidi district.

In reality, the mission monitors areas along ABLs, and local people provide it with information on the challenges they experience. However, while the mission accurately acknowledges these challenges, its mandate makes it difficult to provide tangible support for the local people. Consequently, despite a good relationship between the mission and local people, both locals and monitors become frustrated by the numerous daily questions. Thus, this research argues that the mission strengthen relations with other donor embassies such as the Embassy of Japan by providing information pertaining to grassroots issues to stabilize society via economic cooperation projects. This should enable a win-win situation for EU-Japanese relations and a win-win-win situation for EU-Japan-Georgia relations. Another example of cooperation is the establishment of a poultry nursery in Dzevera village in the Gori district, which was co-funded by the Governments of Japan and Poland.

As many donor countries face the challenge of securing an adequate budget for economic cooperation projects, many will be keen to collaborate with other donors, although until recently, donor countries competed to fly their national flags at project sites. Additionally, most donor countries need accurate information on issues experienced by locals. The mission should utilize this opportunity to strengthen relations with other donors to implement projects and tangibly support the local population through information and collaboration. Furthermore, by providing other donors with the precise information required for project implementation, the EUMM could improve its reputation in local society, which could enhance the environment in which the mission seeks to gather more accurate information from local people. This could create the synergy required to improve the mission’s conflict prevention effectiveness through collaboration with other donors through co-conceptualizing projects and collecting more accurate information. Furthermore, collaboration efforts do not require that the mission’s mandate be modified, and the activity is aligned to EU foreign policy such as CSDP, since it can stabilize local society as a conflict prevention activity.

Chapter 4: Implications - Conflict Transformation by the EUMM

Rothman and Olson (2001) argue that not all conflicts could be regarded as negative interaction. However, there is almost a consensus that a human being should avoid violent/armed conflicts. Miall (1992) suggested the concept of “stable peace”, as the state

requiring reorientation of perceptions so that parties stop viewing each other as unremitting threats and enemies, thus moving beyond just ceasefire and formal cessation of warfare. This research uses the term “sustainable peace”, which requires stable peace plus flexibility and adaptation to the environment. Thus, sustainability is another key for achieving peace in this research.

Lederach (1995) views transformation as moving through stages in parties’ relationships, part of the dialectical process of human interaction. Also, he notes that transformation can occur in various directions; conflict can transform the parties for better and worse (Lederach 1995). Thus, this concept could best be used to analyze the situation in Georgia. Now that the negotiation among all stakeholders related to the conflict in Georgia has reached stalemate and near deadlock, transformation is urgently needed. Some might argue that positive transformation is needed, but one might ask: for whom would it be positive? Thus, conflict transformation must be the best terminology to describe and analyze that situation since it has the connotation of neutrality and impartiality.

In practice, multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, especially confidence-building and interest-coordination efforts are crucial for conflict transformation, addressing the protracted conflicts in Georgia. Consequently, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings which were established alongside the Geneva International Discussions, co-chaired by OSCE and EUMM are an important venue for transformation via confidence-building and interest-coordination.

Regarding confidence building, the IPRM holds regular meetings with security actors including the EUMM, UN, OSCE, Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia to resolve specific issues (European External Action Service 2014). This is an important platform for discussion and a much needed opportunity for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to enter the debate with other state, IO, and IGO actors.

The Geneva International Discussions, co-chaired by the EU, OSCE, and UN, were established based on the six-point agreement. Geneva discussions are divided into two working groups: security and humanitarian ones. Within this format, Russia, Georgia, the US, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been debating issues such as the non-use of force in the security working group. In the humanitarian working group of the format, the Georgian side has been attempting to bring the agenda of IDPs issues to the table. However, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sides are reluctant to discuss the issue, claiming that it has been already discussed at the UN General Assembly. Thus, although there have been only limited tangible fruits, the format is significant because it is the sole venue in which the breakaway regions can express their concerns in an

international setting.

The IPRM was established alongside the Geneva International Discussions. On the South Ossetian side, the IPRM meetings, co-chaired by the OSCE and the EU in the no-man's land of Ergneti, have been held on a regular basis for confidence-building among stakeholders. However, on the Abkhazian side, the mechanism had not been functioning until May 2016 since the *de facto* government of Abkhazia declared the EUMM representative *persona non grata* in 2012 (Civil.ge 2012, 2016). The stakeholders in the IPRM discuss the issues on the ground, such as airspace violations, a gentlemen's agreement regarding IDPs and local individuals with respect to freedom of movement at the ABLs between breakaway regions and the TAT, and "borderisation" by *de facto* authorities in breakaway regions and Russia using barbed wire and a surveillance system to demarcate the breakaway regions. At this venue, stakeholders coordinate their interests and express their concerns for confidence building, and the EUMM has accurate information on the ground and adequate capabilities to facilitate the meetings of IPRM.

As such, the EUMM also has sufficient capacity and a mandate to conduct capacity-building activities through the IPRM. Now that the security situation is relatively stable on the ground, not only stability for conflict prevention but also conflict transformation via confidence building must be taken into account for sustainable peace. Thus, local stabilization plus flexibility and sustainability are the keys for achieving peace in Georgia, and the EU should work as a provider of these key factors. Thus, capabilities of the EUMM should be enhanced for conflict prevention via post-conflict stabilization, and the EU should emphasize the importance of the EUMM as not only an arm of conflict prevention but conflict transformation through IPRM meetings.

Finally, this research proposes a necessary condition for achieving peace in Georgia. According to an anonymous OSCE officer in Vienna headquarters,

There were a number of splendid proposals from the OSCE and the UNOMIG sides prior to 2008 not only for conflict prevention but also conflict resolution.

However, the initiatives failed because they were not initiated by direct parties, but outsiders. The direct parties were not interested in the resolution.

Thus, local ownership should be recognized as an essential factor for achieving peace in Georgia. The transformation of the status and situation of the conflict and local ownership are also keys for achieving sustainable peace in Georgia.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

The EU and its EUMM can play a significant role in conflict prevention and conflict

transformation, because the EUMM is the only international monitoring mission in Georgia since the expiration of mandates for the UNOMIG and OSCE mission to Georgia. Thus, the EUMM should improve its stabilization capabilities for conflict prevention by collaborating with other donor countries, and the EU should further emphasize the importance of confidence-building measures, namely the IPRM, for conflict transformation. Now that the security situation on the ground is relatively “stable”, further stabilization and conflict transformation are needed to consolidate peace in Georgia. Furthermore, the EU’s role should be supportive of the self-help undertaken by the Georgian government and Georgian people since sustainable local ownership is also the key for long-term peace in Georgia.

Georgia signed the Association Agreement including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU in Brussels on June 27, 2014 (Civil.ge 2014). Thus, both Georgia’s aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration and the EU’s eastern partnership initiatives should reinforce mutual relations. On the basis of this rapprochement, the EU could play a more crucial role in achieving peace in Georgia.

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