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TITLE: Migratory Flows and Self-Governing Rights: A New Paradigm for the Post-Communist Eastern Europe

Author(s) name: Francesco Trupia

Affiliation: PhD Candidate Sofia University (Bulgaria); Research Fellow at Alpha Institute of Geopolitics and Intelligence (Italy)

Postal and Email addresses: Blv St. Kliment Ohridski, Block 8, ap.702, 1070 Sofia –Bulgaria, trupiaf@yahoo.it

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Migratory Flows and Self-Governing Rights: A New Paradigm for the Post-Communist Eastern Europe

Abstract

Migratory phenomena are currently challenging the sphere of human security and democracy in the post-Communist Eastern Europe, in turn affected since the collapse of Soviet Union and Yugoslavian regimes by the fear of proliferation of ethnic and religious violence and instability promoted by national minorities. Since the spring 2015, the wider areas constantly deal with the humanitarian migrants' crisis through their geographical corridors, exacerbating the public realm among locals and newcomers. Meanwhile, human rights abuses, political implications for EU candidate states, as well as selfish boundary policies and stubborn nationalisms, take already more and more place. Hence, what kind of scenario in terms of contribution to general securization of interstate-minority relations the migration will shaped? Migratory flows seem to be the new challenge for the region. Therefore, could such phenomenon negatively discourage the idea of self-governing rights and territorial autonomy to national minorities into the region?

Keywords: migrants, human security, self-governing rights, national minorities, post-communism, Eastern Europe

1. Introduction

Similar to the massive migratory flows that weakened the Eastern Europe due to the raises of ethno-transnationalism and counterinsurgencies while the Communist regimes collapsing, the refugees' crisis alongside the "Balkan corridor-s" and the wave of internally displaced peoples (IDP-s) are nowadays playing a relevant role over the wider region. Because of that, a wealth of historical campaigns of national minorities for the right of education, freedom of speech and self-governance seem to address other requests belonging culturally and politically to those newcomers, e.g. refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, who currently claim

political recognition and more legal protection within their new host-societies. After the demise of the exclusively state-centred notion of human security, the entire seems anew to challenge a large number of sovereign States still dealing with the internal attempts to avoid traumatic separatism, sub-regional escalations and migratory flows.

Despite minority cultural groups have been disadvantaged since more favourable conditions were provided by the majoritarian cultural system over former Communist Eastern Europe, this paper aims to outline a new paradigm between migratory phenomena and national minorities' state of affairs in order to introduce the proposal for the allocation of self-governing rights as form of reparation within public realms. I introduce therefore a parallelism between locals belonging to national minorities and newcomers as members of specific minority groups¹ who borrow their everyday life more in practise than in theory within new catchment spaces, e.g. "transnational social space". I intend the entire not merely an analogy, however a political, cultural and juridical phenomenon that political experts and liberal philosophers have already taken in consideration in order to work out and even prevent disorders. The paper, indeed, pays attention on the deep bondage between regional instability shaped *by movement* (T. Nail, 2016) and the national minorities' demands over rights of national minority language, political representation, and religion with specific claims for autonomy and self-determination (R. Stavenhagen, 1991), which challenge the idea of young Republics and States after the twenty-fifth anniversary of Velvet Revolution².

The theory elaborated here, will be further confronted with the reality by taking the Will Kymlicka's multiculturalism and his theory of minority rights, among other political and philosophical insights by Gutman, Segynbekova and Della Porta. In order to justify my theoretical approach on the parallelism between migrants and minority groups, the paper will try to identify the migratory flows as a challenging phenomenon above a region historically affected by fear of ethnic escalations alongside boundary scenarios. Unlike liberal models where ethno-cultural background and values have no importance due to only relevant accounts of civic idea for all individual members and citizens being entitled to equal rights and liberties, Kymlicka's proposal for self-governing rights can be employed to discuss the issues of democratization and *securization*

¹ Directly at the core of the matter, the Canadian philosopher includes immigrants into a specific minority groups together with National Minorities, Religious Groups, and Sui Generis Groups in his theory of Minority Rights.

² The Velvet Revolution, or Gentle Revolt, was a non-violent transition of power in Slovakia that overthrew the Communist leadership and symbolized the beginning of such transition all over the region.

across-borders. Moreover, rather addressing the role of ethnicity as a marginal phenomenon that will disappear as states modernize, I consider the Kymlicka' theory of minority rights of the most applicable and relevant management model for solving controversies and ethno-cultural diversities and also for reparation and preventive strategy for security issues.

Although an exception on many accounts, this paper refers the wider Eastern Europe as a heterogeneous space of the former Soviet and Yugoslavian countries that have not been different in dealing with human security and disloyal and internal minorities within contentious politics by poor protection of human rights. However, former Eastern Bloc countries compose an area of full democracies and authoritarianisms involved in the same internal process of enacting homogenization (Index Democracy, 2015) within public realms and democratic transitions. Most likely, a large number of former Soviet and Yugoslavian republics are either hybrid or authoritarian regimes due to a lack of high-quality electoral, representative institutions and procedural legitimacy, vulnerability to succession, false loyalty distorting the political information, low-information environments and invisible dissident, singling out challenges before they inflate requires detailed information about society, which is not only difficult to acquire but also usually illegal and expensive³.

The first part of the instant paper will try to briefly introduce the philosophical legacy of the Communist hostility against the concept of "minority" and the bond-place membership that can be employed to discuss why a current fear of escalation goes forward to threat security with waves of external migrations impinging processes of state-building from within. Hence, I come at the core of the *problematization* I try to overcome through self-governing rights upon a region showing an incapability to deal with migratory flows and disloyal minorities due to a "*Statis-States* dichotomy" that Communist regimes have been shaping until their political downfalls, and nowadays problematizes the assimilation of newcomers and minority groups inside the majoritarian cultural system. Further, in the second part, the core understanding of self-governing rights will be explained by introducing the new wave of "transnational social spaces" understood as new locums crossing national borders. This part will be partly based on empirical information from reports, articles, interviews to open sources and theoretical approach on

³ See more Robertson, Graeme B. (2011) *The Politics of Protests in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissident in Post-Communist Russia*. New York: Crambridge UP.

democracy theories, which will be implemented by normative texts such as constitutional texts and international covenants.

The last part of the paper will aim to point out the Kymlicka's theory of minority rights with a major of self-governing rights as strategy of security management and preventive policy for future turmoil. The paper, however, could be serve as an important framework and theoretical starting-point for future field analysis.

Hence, I raise the questions as follow: could the post-Communist States turn their pathological instability into a new socio-political pathway accommodating self-governing rights? According to the former Yugoslavian countries for sample, could such opportunity turns the Balkan repository of negative characteristics⁴ into a successful process of dealing with national and migrants minorities? Precisely, is a proposal of self-governing rights do they have to be assimilated to?

2. A Problematic Background

Whether former Communist States began to take political responsibility for maintaining order and regulating relations between national and minority groups, the historical downfall of the Communist legacy brought to definitely light the conclusion of one of the most important shared experience in humankind, in which different populations have been living within a "common realm" (P. Peachey, 1993). Over Soviet and Yugoslavian orbits, the hybrid, interethnic and intercultural self-identification of different human beings was never recognized however, on the contrary, it was reduced to one of the intersecting elements within a unique psychological model and epistemological configuration of hybrid subjectivity that it was considerable simplified on behalf of an "International Great proletariat". Under those circumstances, Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Serbians, Bosnians, Tatars, Gypsies and so forth – no matter from which ethnicity they belong to – were heavily forced to lean towards a rigid cultural and linguist model, politically Sovietied and linguistically Russified, without possibilities to find their self-realization (M. Tlostanova 2004, 194) in terms of cultural heritage, religion, secular kinship. The entire came to culturally represent a "theoretical axiom" within a "metaphysical totalities" which appeared exceedingly negative to suppress ethno-political identities in order to promote a crystallization of species-beings (B. Erdađi, 2014) replaced by

⁴ See M. Teodorova (1994) *The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention*, pp. 453-482, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 2.

an idea of human freedom understood in terms of Marxist moment on the way of Communism.

With the Communist systems collapsing, both as ideology as regime, the idea that former Soviet countries could independently cooperate within the boundaries of another sovereign State to defend citizens of the bordering State from grave and sustained human rights abuses from their own governments, seemed to be immediately wrong due to the waves of ethnic turmoil. Unlike the non-Communist Europe that faced the public sphere change due to the wave of newcomers, such as workers, women, and peasants (J. Habermas, 1990), with their interests far from a historical societal harmony (M. Vavřík, 2010), internal migrations have been taking place from within Soviet and Yugoslavian spaces due to availability of public transport, geographical proximity and geopolitical networks. As social scientists and anthropologists pointed out, both Soviet and Yugoslavian restrictions with regard external movement were justified, in time, due to security issues in order to keep a protective approach of the State in its role and compatriot defence in favour of their internal populations. Paradoxically, bond-place membership based on Marxist contribution on humanitarian relation with civil society has shown a negative political repression, which rendered any species-being invisible. In retrospect, long incubated grievances and situational factors led the formerly Soviet and Yugoslavian areas to large number of tumultuous secessions and internal turbulences that went forward to impinge the sphere of human security by threatening boundary policies after the downfall of Soviet and Yugoslavian systems. Overwhelming hostility towards the concept “minority” and to “external migrations” due to a *Statis* and *States* dichotomy (T. Nail, 2016) which removed risky threats of inner immigration in the European countries under the Socialism (A. Glavanakova 2016, p. 57), external migrations began to impinge the bound-place memberships shaping a side-by-side life over Soviet and Yugoslavian Republics. It followed that, a number of local irredentism, which began to try to gain political autonomy in alignment with their kin-cultural patterns since the downfall of Communist regimes, have taken into account the rise of external migrations through opened corridors. As time went by, an overwhelming fear for full-scale military escalations began to take place through cross-border movements and ethno-national minority groups showing to be secessionists rather much more irredentists and disloyal (W. Kymlicka, 2004). Throughout, former Communist States did not penetrated into their new society during the national-building phases in accordance with standard roles in terms of ethnic identification that were the basis of modern citizenship, more subtle mechanism for social control. It followed that in a couple of decades, and at least in some

measure, post-Communist peacekeeping operations surmounted rather than extended tribalism or ethnicity, with escalated turbulences that seemed immediately to be irredentist and disloyal alongside neighbouring kin-states. Majority cultural systems were inescapably privileged in the processes of nation-building, while at the same time national minority groups have been constantly left out – even though a large number of former Eastern Bloc, such as Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Lithuania, have shown a civil societies far from overwhelming majoritarian cultural systems.

3. A Conceptual Framework for Challenging Scenarios

Over last two years, Eastern Europe has experienced the fallout from the continuing crisis of the “Arab Springs” and most especially from the countries where there has been no regime change (C. Leviev-Sawyer 2015, p.149), such as Syria, or where political uprising brought the country to instability and insecurity, such as in Ukraine. It is therefore no surprise that inhabitants of former Communist states are nostalgic about the security of the previous period where prohibition of nomadism and liquidation of nomadic lifestyle have guaranteed a definitive program for internal *securization*.

First and foremost, it immediately appeared that the wider region was warned because the growth of migratory flows linked to the political instability of neighbouring countries, which would in turn increase a fear of escalation and turmoil. In the field of national boundary policy, the current refugee crisis has provided ample examples on the perception about how borderless movements began to unveil a historical unknowability of the Other (E. Bebgly and J.P. Burgess, 2009) due to ethno-nationalist agitations that made masses of people seriously vulnerable (P. Peachey 1993, p.30) after the collapse of Communist regimes. Meanwhile, a failure of Western foreign policies has outlined that the necessity to find out a strategy for advocating diversity has to be fulfilled in order to secure public spheres that multiplying waves of hundreds of thousands migrants and minority groups living under the line of poverty and marginalization may destabilize from within. This is why a public recognition of minority groups through a more allocation of self-governing rights seems comprehensively and widely to be a workable theory of solving and preventing escalations (N. Jourek, 1999, p.4) protecting the States from destabilizing impacts of internal dissident minorities or disloyal immigrant that do not follow and respect the majoritarian cultural system.

Although philosophical and political movements outside the Eastern Bloc have been developing such approach, Western institutions have paradoxically regretted and contested any implementation of self-governing rights due to their proven ineffective (W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski, 2000) which tends to generate more blindness and ruthless suppression of identities than equality (P. Peachey, 1993) in spite of its liberal approach. In addition to a not easy notion to grasp on theoretical ground, even an implementation in the field could remain generally foreign because neither self-governance nor self-governing rights nor political autonomy for disloyal migrants and ethno-minority groups seems to be *accessible*. Moreover, this challenging framework may come surely to provoke either a partial or full abandonment of the myth of homogeneous nation-states and its concept of national sovereignty, which demonstrated to be neither exclusive nor absolute (N. Caspersen, 2012). According to the migratory phenomena, too, the very concepts of borders, centres and margins have become fluid⁵ and destabilized just as existing nations and nation-states have been undergoing a rigorous reconsideration.

Last but not least, self-governing rights utterly fail to even raise the question whether the former Communist States would legitimate the alleged humanitarian concerns and a welcoming acceptance of the newcomers' driving forces (E. Bebgly and J.P. Burgess, 2009) within an impact on society, finance and domestic policy (C. Leviev-Sawyer 2015, p. 151). In fact, whether ethnic and religious identities were private matters for the individual during the Communist era (G. Shenk, 2006), a wealth of human relationships among newcomers and minority members who are born and grown into home societies (L. Sagynbekova, 2016) are currently following slightly alignments in terms of kinship, ethnicity, religious branch and so forth.

However, a Western approach over Eastern Europe does not seem to be able enough to resolve the current refugee crisis and the wealth of territorial rivalries. Because of that, the theory of multiculturalism may re-examine their real goals in order to fit an inclusive model through which the jeopardized Eastern Europe could deal successfully with communities and minority groups of different ethnic backgrounds, various linguistic affiliations and religious and ancestral branches. Hence, rather than addressing a lack of Western appreciation, the theory of self-governing rights comes as part of multicultural approach to account the heart of the matter by leading a workable strategy of problem-solving to the sphere of security and human rights. In light of ethnic rivalries over infusing

⁵ See more Zygmunt Bauman (2007) *Consuming Life*, Polity Press.

territories not simply to split by acts of drawing borders, which in turn are become the geographical corridor through which the *century of migrants* (T. Nail, 2016) takes currently place, it is very hypocrite the little interest of Western institutions that regrettably denied self-governing rights as either political policy or socio-cultural instrument. Most likely, such proposal could serve as core component for “re-joining Europe” (W. Kymlicka, 2004) to those post-Communist Countries aware of displaying their overall political maturity not only in terms of minority rights protection, as well as for those migrants and newcomers who, albeit their traditionally differences from national minorities, are members of specific minority in new host-States⁶. Despite being too “over-simplified” and “schematically structuralist”, a proposal for self-governing rights may allocate a strong dose of internationally provided surveillance and incentives in form of political reparation based on the idea of recognition, which shows its essentiality to fully function into a given society (W. Kymlicka 2001, p.22) where *transparency* is key above the meeting open places. The latter have therefore the main purpose to avoid disloyal entrenchment of crosscutting of ethnic particular groups (A. Glavanakova 2016, p.65) on social livelihoods and geographical terms. Over Eastern Europe indeed, while political theory have predominantly analysed the structures of politics, many physical structures have come to signify a political empowerment within an incredible capacity of influencing the behaviour of public spheres (Parkinson, J.R. 2012, p.71) not incidentally. At the same time, migratory phenomena began to pave the way toward new type of public-ness, in which asylums, refugee camps, “welcome centres” or fenced open camps, have shown an incredible capacity for signification in light of cultural exchanges between newcomers and members belonging to ethno-minority groups. Besides equality and inclusiveness where all are treated as free and equal peoples, refugees and asylum seekers began to physically and geographically pigeonhole new locums, namely “transnational social spaces”, due to their familiar kind-based bonds in private and public dimensions (T. Faist, 1998). Instead of leading to ghettoization, which is one of the most important concern of the wider Eastern Europe, “transnational social spaces” have tied up the causes of newcomers’ bonds with minority groups’ ones within their new host-States by way of language and even identity building. In practise, these new locums have led to the substitution of individual rights

⁶ See more D. Hys (2004) *A Critical Assessment of Will Kymlicka’s Theory of Minority Rights: Dilemmas of Liberal Multiculturalism*, Library and Archive Canada, Toronto.

protection and private “ethnic” rights to strictly follow and repeat collective rights.

In addition, migratory processes have externally led to multiplying exchange across borders and have internally affected society at large, in which identity emerges out of location and out of national topography. At present, *migranhood* opens up a complex of experience of acculturation through mutual binary of compromise, negotiation and assimilation. Because of that, the growth of public “transnational social spaces” has to be taken seriously into consideration as they are not merely abstract or rhetorical constructions.

By 2012, for instance, the resettlement about twenty-five Syrian-Armenians families receiving a plot of land in the region of de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, that is, an enclave occupied by Armenian armed forces⁷, brought to highlight how peoples coming from different States but belonging to same ethnicity can keep well-living together. Yet the role of Armenian-ness is interplaying over this “transnational social space” in spite the same region is a place of worsening scenarios due to the territorial rivalry with Azerbaijan. Syrian-Armenians who have previously fled Syria due to civil war, as well as members belonging to Yazidi and Assyrian minorities performing the Union of Freedom Fighter of Artsakh, borrow with local Armenians of Karabakh their everyday life because of their collective traumas (S. Ushakin, 1978) triggered by the Ottoman Genocide in 1915, which shapes a milestone for Armenian history. In turn, the herculean Armenian Minister of Diaspora attempts to raise the issue of assisting Syrian-Armenians refugees have increased an Armenian sense of tragedy (U. Denishiko, 2015) where a feeling of pain turned the collective trauma into a sense of charity towards migrants’ assurance. The current pro-Russian attitudes over Southern Ukraine, as well as in disputed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia or Transnistria in Moldavia, seem to point out the same scenario of borrowing socio-cultural lifeworld and political values. On the contrary, refugees cross-movement to Bulgaria from Turkey, a country understood rhetorically as a leading threat (J. Elster 1994), has improved a negative trends toward a Muslim-minority group, so-called “Pomak” or inappropriately “Muslim of Bulgaria”, and a higher historical allegiance of anti-Turkey. Due to the Pomaks’ stateless lifeworld across Macedonia and Southern Serbia (J. Elster, 1994) have historically made Nations very nervous (C. Delaney, 1994), while the peak of humanitarian crisis have increased the priority for regional boundary policies. Although three-fifth

⁷ However, the attempt to resettle asylum seekers and refugees from Syria had the political purpose to make ethnically stronger the enclave.

of Pomasks have shown a Christian affiliation with a strong Bulgarian-speaking attitude, borderless lifeworld and overwhelming misunderstanding in terms of religion affiliation have mistakenly blended together the minority groups' conditions with the Syrians and refugees movements. It followed that, human rights' abuses and mistreatments along the national Bulgarian-Turkish borders have provoked more backlashes and turmoil⁸ than the phenomenon *per se* created. The entire has anew confirmed a historical negative trend within the Bulgarian political landscape towards minority groups and Islamic heritage due to the Ottoman legacy. In Western Balkan, too, a broad of social, religious and cultural cleavages are currently linking to the borderless lifeworld of some minority groups, such as RAE community, the refugees migration through the Balkan corridors. Many citizens belonging to Albanian ethnicity have outflowed Kosovar districts of Mitrovica, Dranica, Shala, Drenese, Skenderaj and Vushtri by accounting themselves with the migrants' perilous journey in direction of the Schengen Area⁹. Alike the past, when minority cultures were faced with a set of mass migrations, modern and current diasporas show how migratory phenomena involve ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in new host-countries (A. Glavanakova, 2016). Therefore, the Balkan routes became an escaping alleyway for RAE communities' members¹⁰ challenging *by movement* (T. Nail, 2016) one of the worst Europe's pathological hotspots (C. Nordstrom, 2008) which seems nowadays to be a territorial segment of spatial mobility for locals and newcomers. With the raise of the numbers of asylum seekers, the combination between migratory flows from Middle East and Eastern Europe is perceived as a "potential threat to European stability"¹¹, making the minority issues in candidate countries one of the key deciding factors on readiness for membership. Caucasian and Balkan scenarios could serve to describe the linkage between migratory flows and minority groups' condition and how self-

⁸ "Tension in Bulgaria's Harmanli Refugee Camp Escalates" Novinite.com 24 November 2017, <http://www.novinite.com/articles/177634/Tension+in+Bulgaria's+Harmanli+Refugee+Camp+Escalates> (accessed on 27 November 2016)

⁹ "Poverty spurs mass migration from Kosovo" EurActiv.com, 16 February 2015 <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/poverty-spurs-mass-migration-from-kosovo/> (accessed on 15 May 2016)

¹⁰ RAE stands for "Romani, Albaniana, Egyptians" described by some as Gypsies.

¹¹ See more Vermeersch, Peter. (2004) Minority Policy in Central Europe: Exploring the Impact of EU's Enlargement Strategy". *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 3.2.

governing rights could openly open demonstrations among who govern (e.g., ruling authorities and agencies of States) and who are governed (Isin, Engin F. 2000, p.148), as well as how everyday life in society is negotiated into new structures of power. In retrospect, this new typology of external migratory flows are currently highlighting how borderline fragility can escalate and go dangerously forward to a growth of regional anxiety for human instability and security, which began to affect “irregular” and “illegal” migrations. Meanwhile, collective fear due to potential incursions of Islamist fundamentalism using the refugee waves as a rolling Trojan Horse (C. Leviev-Sawyer, 2015) or processes of radicalization from within, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Georgian Pankisi Gorge and Azerbaijan, have increased a sense of insecurity among locals even for low and regular contacts or visits between neighbouring countries.

In the case of Gevgelija Railway station, for sample, the Macedonian bear of losing the boundary control was previously shaped in the early 2015 April when an Albanian terrorist attack by an ethno-group of gunmen wearing KLA/UÇK insignia¹² against one of the police checkpoint along the Kosovar-Macedonian border. Due to the dubious Kumanvo clashes, where 18 people were killed, eight of whom were police officers, while 30 people were arrested with charges of terrorism¹³, the government’s official statements reported both events by saying that former rebel commanders from neighbouring Kosovo, which broke from Serbia in 1999 war and inspired an ethnic Albanian insurgency in Macedonia.

Because all of that, multicultural policy through a proposal for self-governing rights imply a mandatory public *consensus* to enhance a societal legacy and ethical understanding towards approvable and workable decisions in the eyes of the “core society”, as well as of both migrants and national sub-state groups. In order to ensure minority *rational argumentations*, they have to display a strength *orientation to the public good* based on common interests and sustainable demands for co-operating amicably. Speaking from the right to speech, for sample, *rational argumentations towards public good* do not work out

¹² “Kosovo Liberation Army-Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës” was an ethnic-Albanian paramilitary organization that sought the separation of Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the eventual creation of a State of “Greater Albania” including both the entire Kosovo and the Western Macedonia.

¹³ Tanjug. “Lack of EU and NATO Integration to Blame for Conflict” B92 11 May 2015. <http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2015&mm=05&dd=11&navid=94070> (accessed 10 October 2016).

marginalized groups' issues with high level of radicalization, such as the Roma people who sadly consider political campaigns the chance for support their "sellers of votes". Rational argumentation could as well serve as method to decrease the mounting *core society's* Islamophobia and its political rhetoric of "*send-them-back-to-where-they-come-from*" (C. Leviev-Sawyer 2015, p.150), which has absurdly spread out a phenomenon of "Islamophobia without Islam" in certain extents. Most likely, self-governing rights and their *integration* have to be seen through a mutual binary of both right, in the sense of securing minority groups and core society protection against discriminations or abuses or disloyal and illiberal attitudes, as well as a obligation of the majoritarian cultural system towards minority groups, and vice versa (W. Kymlicka, 1995). In public everyday life, liberal principles will therefore serve as condition under which self-governing rights will strategically moderate the political arena without using any type of censorship over political speeches, television serials, websites, novels, academic papers. As result, public *consensus* based on *rationality* and *public good* can decrease a wide range of disloyal minorities that across-borders and disputed territories are still pledging to conquer the swaths of their "State-within-another-State" (N. Caspersen, 2012), as well as migrants groups maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their country of origins – their motherlands – (A. Glavanakova, 2016) within host-States. In addition, the entire disempowers ethno-minorities' claims for exclusive public policies thanks to engagements into local forums (W. Kymlicka, 1999) able to decrease large-military escalations for political independence and discourage social riots, revolts, rebellions, and resistance against political and legal governments' authorities. It may finally promote a trust between national minority groups and immigrants and majoritarian cultural system would meaningfully and better transmit their messages due to a broad of social, political and cultural responsibility.

In Eastern Europe, such prospective does not seem to be much challenging due to growing concerns over the rise in numbers and in activism of many ethnic and national minorities, such as Albanians in Kosovo or RAE community in Macedonia among others, that have positively shown integrationist outlooks. In the context of *involuntary migrants* (e.g. internally displaced persons forced to flee their home countries) and *economic migrants* (e.g. "birds of passage"), their desire to become members of the larger societal structure should encourage a social and political integration to be used as win-win strategy in order to secure the public sphere. Here, even though newcomers do not possess societal culture to recreate a fully set of institutions and practises (W. Kymlicka 1995 p.62), their temporary resettlement closely to ethno-minority groups

brought to forge simultaneous multi-stranded relations (G. Schiller 1995) in attempting to avoid as much as possible a “cultural shock” and join one’s culture (W. Kymlicka, 2004) that span borders. Unfortunately, such settlement has already treated immigrants as second class because of socio-politically intersections they create within minority groups living already under the line of poverty and fully isolated.

At this point, the proposal for self-governing rights is twofold.

First, according to normative democracy theories with regards participatory-deliberative models (D. Della Porta 2014, p.49), under which minorities’ inclusivity, stable touches of different shapes and collective experience of peacekeeping are tied with liberal principles in order to guarantee internal stability in sovereign States. Second, liberal principles highlight an idea of Liberal States including freedom and tolerance, which in turn are key-factors for each constitutional democracy in seeking to establish the limits of government and give to its citizens the rights against it. Accordingly, minority issues over Eastern Europe come to protect traditional minority groups as well as migrants communities either from the impact of external pressures shaped by the majoritarian cultural system that easily they do not recognize as their own (e.g. economic or political decision of the larger society) or from misunderstandings and their fear of losing own-ness and belongingness.

However, such promotion of integration requires a public *inclusion* in order to promote public coordination between central governments and minority groups, which currently appear to be more and more sceptical about the future. On one side, for those European countries that have already signed the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and in the case of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and those former Yugoslavian countries that have signed the “Stabilization and Association Agreement” to plenty join European Union, self-governing rights may offer a further strategy for setting democratic and plural societies up. On the other side, self-governing rights may enhance Eastern Europe to deal with the arrival of mass-market consumers and newcomers and, in turn, it may put in contact the region with the never-seen-before number of solidarity seen in Africa, Asia and Latin America where rallies and protests have been organized on the ground of post-national identities and common classes. Rather than eliminating differences through decentralizations, devolutions, autonomies, territorial partitions (M. Walzer 1997, p.174) or continuing to promote a technocratic, controlling and structured policy of assimilation and integration, this *inclusion* reduces native loyalties (P. Peachey, 1993) in terms of “local ownership” through the instrument of self-governance. Meanwhile, inclusion compromises the arena of contributing to marginalized groups’ competitiveness on equal terms, and gradually

removing the barriers that prevent minority groups from political and social life of their locality or new host-States. Such opportunity will thus serve to democratically modify, concretize and make more practical the chances for dwellers and users (Isin, Engin F. 2000, p.12) – no matters migrants and minority groups members - to express their own-ness in democratic and liberal ways.

In may follow that, those isolationist national and immigrants groups will turn their behaviourism into an acceptable ground of political responsibility in line of sustainable values, while they can multiply at the same time their own services and raise your ideas on time and space instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (Lefebvre, Henri, 1991, p.34). Here, if what constitutes public spaces varies greatly between regions culturally determined by norms or taboos, post-Communist Eastern Europe needs to provide new social contexts within which individuals – no matter their belongingness to majority or minority cultural system -, have their freedom and opportunity to freely exercise their rights (A. Gutman 2003, p.41) in equal treatment.

In doing so, a revolutionary approach on the marginalized and unvoiced minorities could overtone the worsening state of affairs into a more positive one. Unlike the idea of “*We, the People*” (J. Elster, 1994) understood in accordance with the majoritarian cultural system after the collapse of Communist regimes and expressed through the rising of nationalist and racist idea and xenophobia, current migratory flows are shaping a new conception of “*We, the People*” (D. Della Porta 2014, p.9). The latter appears to be recently born due to national minorities’ voluntary awareness to express their borderless lifeworld and a triadic relationship between:

- 1) immigrants groups and institutions into host-States;
- 2) sending State from which migrants come from and host-States;
- 3) national and ethnic minorities close socially enough to migrants within the public realms (Faist, 1998) due to religious or cultural belongingness.

Therefore, self-governing rights enhance isolationist groups such as Crimean Tatars, who almost unfailingly denied approval for any cultural or political gathering and have had isolated assembly places far from urban centres due to their terrible history of deportation during the Soviet era. According to the *sovky* environment¹⁴, that is, a typical post-Soviet

¹⁴ Since the breakups in Southern Ukraine after Euromaidan, the term was recently used to address the dregs of toxic Soviet societies in the oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk affected by an overwhelming pro-Russian separatism.

outskirt with high levels of unemployment, non-educational system and political corruption, as well as to those *frozen rivalries*¹⁵ within Eastern Europe, the spectrum of self-governing rights may have a relevant impact on “States-within-a-State”¹⁶ (N. Caspersen, 2012) where non-dominant groups, such as RAE or migrants, suffer of being “traded-off”. Furthermore, a public recognition of transnational social spaces may tackle not only issues of disloyal and irredentist minority groups in allowing them to become members of certain public-ness and referring equally in comparison to those members of “core society”. In addition, even internally displaced persons (IDP-s) and families, in Ukrainian case for example, will be plenty conducted as agents into new public sphere by allowing them to be conducted by others for whom they hold to tenure and replacing their impossibility to return to their residencies due to many reasons concerning the ongoing conflict in Southern areas. Through refugee resettlements and improvements of their living conditions in all over the country, most of the great difficulties may be solved as soon as possible.

In juridical manner, self-governing rights seem apparently to lose their applicability due to huge gaps between legal framework and their usage in the field and, among others, the principal resistances come from a conflict between the State and the Entities. If the law is supposed to be a framework law, e.g. set the minimum standard elements that should also be comprise in the respective Entity laws, the same Entities are due to harmonize with it once adopted. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for sample, legitimates a combination among self-governing rights and international legacies in allowing national legislation to publicly recognize what was massively suppressed during totalitarian times in order to replace useless legislations and step forward to a more inclusive society. In fact, the ICCPR’ Article 27 guarantees that *States where ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language*. Although many Entity representatives objected to the fact that legal drafts contain only a provision for a State-level reparations fund, which make the national legislations losing their framework character, a

¹⁵ The Nagorno-Karabakh issues connect squarely the role of Armenian-ness with the new constitution (Article 19), which draws the national identity and its millenarian heritages with a comprehensive legal usage.

¹⁶ “States-within-a-State” include minority groups within other non-dominant minorities, such as RAE community.

legal inclusion of minority and migrants groups may generate agreements between a given State and its Entities Law and how funds would be financed and by whom. In Bulgaria, for sample, the Constitution declares ethnic parties illegals (Art. 11 – Section IV) and obliges minority groups’ members to “have the right” to learn the official language (Art. 34) understood as “obligation”, while at the same time the most important ethnic minority party, which is politically represented by the “Movement for Freedom and Rights” (MFR)¹⁷, is nowadays remaining marginalized. Over cross-border region of Kosovo and Serbia Montenegro, too, where the Serbian minority’s *securization* is still a concern due to the historical memory about Balkan War, current roundtables refer the old 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution. Involvement of Serbs, who neither trust Kosovar nor Montenegrin authorities, seems to be not impossible due to a lack of their recognition within either Kosovar or Montenegrin public spheres affected by the NIMBY¹⁸ syndrome and by stereotypes and a quite spread collective trauma related to the Balkan war.

By contrary, a wide range of democratic issues and the mono-ethnicity of the country do not impinge the Armenian political system to begin campaigning in order to guarantee enough public recognition to non-Armenian inhabitants belonging to minority groups - mostly Assyrians, Yazidis and Kurds - and include them within the public realm. Since 2005, even despite far from a multicultural approach used in academia, such decision has democratically combined waves of protests and constitutional reforms entrenching a more stable civic society and independent judiciary¹⁹. Surprisingly, even in Macedonia the last mass protests taking place in Skopje have tightly shown opposition against the VMRO-DPMNE²⁰ ruling party and the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski.

¹⁷ Symptomatically, after the collapse of the Bulgaria’s Communist regime, a court decision denied to the movement the right to adopt the first name, which was “Movement for Freedom and Rights of the Turks and Muslim in Bulgaria”. Moreover, only the immediate pressure of the Council of Europe and its unwillingness to push the Bulgarian Constitutional Court to admit the MFR to participate in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly of June 10, 1990.

¹⁸ NIMBY is an acronym for “*Not-In-My-Back-Yard*”, that is, a pejorative characterization of opposition by residents to a proposal for a new development because it is close to them or against local lifeworld.

¹⁹ See More Trupia, Francesco. *The Constitutional Reform and the Position of Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of Armenia*. In: *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, Vol. 2 No. 2, September 2016, pp. 20-28.

²⁰ Stands for Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (in Macedonian: Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за македонско

However, after social media mobilizations used hate speeches, the latter became major disturbances between mobs of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians²¹. It followed that, ethnic conflicts' reminiscent did not successfully combined ethnic inclusion among protesters, even though they advertised themselves as peaceful peoples. Moreover, mass protests did not legally binding an implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, which signed the official end of the ethnic turmoil, due to an important Macedonians' resentment.

All of these endorses the proposal for self-governing rights in accordance with liberal principles and public inclusion within former Communist States in order to settle views upon minority groups more negative now than it was in the early 1990s²², and, notably, tackle a common public opinion about migratory flows more and more negative since the downfall of old regimes.

It could not be surprising that legal cross-fertilization between international covenants and national constitutions could facilitate sovereign States' authorities to take peacefully control over border crossings. Moreover, according to the protection for the fate of individual human beings who recently became legitimate in light of the long-standing disputes, it could foster regional a pair States' cooperation over the wider region. The Macedonia' frightening implication to close the Gevgelija' railway along the Macedonian-Greek node during the peak of humanitarian crisis, the Bulgaria's and Ukraine's embarrassing necessities to send handfuls of military prominent to the borders Macedonia/Turkey and Southern Ukraine-Russia, the Azerbaijan's accuse against Armenian institutions of resettling Syrian refugees within the disputed territory, as well as the Albanian-majority town of Preševo standing squarely between the fragile triangle across Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia in light of the "Association of Serb Communes in Kosovo", are just few samples.

However, the *preference trans-formation* under which to develop rights' and ideas' interactions (D. Della Porta 2014, 49) implies necessarily a recognition within those transnational social space that appear the stages of new becoming.

национално единство), simplified as VMRO-DPMNE, and it is one of the two major Macedonian parties.

²¹ Dano, Victor. "Govor na omraza". *it.com.mk*. 14 February 2011. <http://it.com.mk/drushtvenata-omraza-i-incidentot-na-kale/> (accessed January 2016)

²² See more *Two Decades After the Wall's Fall. End of Communism Cheered but Now More Reservations* (November 2, 2009), The Pew Global Project Attitudes, pp. 49-55. Washington DC.

This recognition, therefore, does not problematize juridical aspects but it challenges the Eastern Europe's cultural sphere. The rising "transnational social spaces" (e.g., "welcome centre" or "refugee camps") have indeed philosophically a public-ness in themselves due to their externally existing things. Rather than conceptual or cognitive facts, their fact of being requires an occupation of a certain quantity of spaces where no distinction between private and public, very often in Muslim background for instance. This desire for recognition is not a good to consume, however an inter-subjective state of mind by which one human being acknowledges the worth or status of another human being or of that human beings' good, custom, and belief. This makes the struggle for recognition fundamentally different from struggles over economic exchanges, since the conflict is zero sum rather than positive sum (F. Fukuyama, 2012, p.41). Again, this recognition claims to transform philosophically a political, cultural and social desire into politics as first task, however it is precisely not an intellectual prostitution grafting its illusion of permanence onto any reality that happens to exist. Rather it is fundamentally different from the desire for material resources that in turn underlies an economic behavior. This makes the struggle for recognition fundamentally different from struggles over economic exchanges, since the conflict is zero sum rather than positive sum.

In the context of immigrant communities, this recognition precedes integration and inclusion (W. Kymlicka, 2001, p.22) within self-governing structures, because the desire to become full member of the larger societal structures pursue in turn immigrants to have recognized their own identity inside new host-societies, as well as in laws and institutions that are more accommodating their cultural differences.

4. Conclusion

Between 2014 and 2016, the trend of migratory flows has been clear, even asserting large numerous of ethical outlooks and competences to pass moral judgement on cultural and political ways of other people (E. Bebgly and P. Burgees, 2009). Whether West itself appears politically weak to proclaim its right and alternative policies to intervene within sovereign nations and dictate terms of solving settlements, levels of (in-)security enjoyed by citizens in the Eastern Europe are still not as high as those compared to the States of Western Europe in spite of latest terroristic attacks. Here, even considering the history of the wider Eastern Europe in light of integration policies for marginalized peoples – no matter who belongs to ethno-minority groups or marginalized living under the line of

poverty and social discrimination -, former Communist States have shown internal legislations on migration and citizenship, as well as a huge lack of policy of problem-solving unfortunately.

In other words, Eastern Europe has not generally been peacefully and plenty consolidated, and to that, an increasingly regional fear is re-taking relevantly place into each public realm, in turn affected historically by ethno-nationalism and internal counterinsurgencies that in combination with migratory flows and internal turmoil are increasing instability and insecurity among locals. In sum, the seemingly responsibility of Soviet-Communism after the World War II appears en vogue again, because a wealth of disloyal identities rolled down to the vulgar nationalism and struggle for recognition after decades while at the same time former Soviet and Yugoslavian populations avoided socio-cultural political identification or broke-up in ethnic rivalry.

By contrary, as I mentioned upon, while before the collapse of Communist systems the boundary controls were set up in order to decrease internal displacement threats (L. Sagynbekova, 2016) from external *movement*, migrations point nowadays out that it is worth noting that in many areas of Eastern Europe the demarcation lines between ethnicity, language and religion do not coincide with the majoritarian cultural systems. Hence, self-governing rights and multiculturalism as policy, whether official implemented and legally defined and culturally recognized, may involve advocating for mutual and peaceful coexistence according to a public recognition of transnational social spaces, which can be seen an extension of democratic aspiration and may come to resolve boundary policies between neighbouring States and human security issues within the public realms. Despite such recognition - traversing national borders not only in geographical but mainly in functional terms – is difficult to plenty achieve, the same idea of recognizing identities seems to be necessary in order to exercise significantly control over different groups in full security (M. Walzer, 1997), as well as essential in order function without false, distorted and reduced mode of being.

In conclusion, such challenging paradigm may partially resolve the cultural tragedy that the whole Eastern Europe currently feels in being considered to be West due to its virtues on political system and East due to its virtues on cultural history (M. Kundera 1984, p.1). Conversely, this paradigm may exacerbate a desperate preservation of Western identity as a natural and completed experiment, monolithic and normal area of standardized nation-states, which problematize further the cultural assimilation of immigrants and the key issue of examining the proposal for self-governing rights from a scratch in terms of effectiveness and particular protections for unvoiced migrants' and ethno-minority groups.

However, the most important issue that such approach outlines is an idea of democracy practicable in order to break down the Eastern European legacy understood as poorest area of European Continent and as land of bloody conflicts and unsolvable rivalries.

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