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## “European foreign policy has already ‘saved’ the foreign policies of small states. Now it is saving the foreign policies of the large ones too.”

“What will our European partners say – what is the opinion in Europe?”  
(Tonra 1997, 187)

For EU to save foreign policies of Member States<sup>1</sup> (MS) it means to promote their strategic interest, to give them a European scope through policy transfer to EU institutions. Else, salvage means Europeanization<sup>2</sup>. Considering that the foreign policies of small states are already ‘saved’<sup>3</sup>, this paper seeks to explore the pattern of large ones. By looking at the Europeanization in the context of national foreign policies, by describing ‘salvage’ cases of small and big states within the EU area, the research also argues why in the latter’s case European Foreign Policy (EFP) is ‘saving’ itself. Conclusions question on: EFP upgrade and on the challenges in Turkey and in the Western Balkans<sup>4</sup>. Lastly, two more issues for further research.

**Key words:** *EFP, national foreign policies, Europeanization, small states, large states, CFSP, ESDP*

### 1. Europeanization of national foreign policy

The end of the bipolar system and associated political developments made of Europeanization indispensable for EU member states to put into effect a common policy envisaged by the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and to consolidate the follow-up towards European Security Defence Policy (ESDP).

#### 1.1 *Apropos Europeanization*

Europeanization is a theoretical and political approach that explains: *a*) process of political penetration of the EU system of rules and norms into the different domestic strata and levels of member states; *b*) a process of identity-formation towards the European identity and *c*) the cost of the institutional impact of EU member on MS (Radaelli 2000). For Vink, Europeanizing signifies impacting domestic level from EU level<sup>5</sup>. In terms of development, Europeanization can be exported from the shipper (EU) to the addressees (member states) (Papadimitriou 2002).

Anastasakis defines Europeanization as “*a model building exercise-political system in the making that produces decisions and has an impact on domestic structures*” (Anastasakis 2005, p. 78). For other scholarships, Europeanization implies also an institutional and identity metamorphosis of the state (Hix & Goetz 2000). To further expand formally, Europeanization relies on the dimensions of: *scope and depth* (Keohane 1989a, p. 4).

**It is evident** that Europeanization of national foreign policies is a *modus vivendi and operandi* for the states as institutional and social entities. Exporting EU stimulus to the state-building process, policies and societies, the EU aims to unify itself as an international actor in global politics.

#### 1.2 *Europeanization and national foreign policy*

In the framework of CFSP, Europeanization is the EU impact on the state’s rational choices and decisions for a common European *identity and interest*. As a *comprehensive process*, Europeanization consists of **dimensions, facets, activity areas and instruments**. As a *cooperative process*<sup>6</sup>, it is about *intergovernmental arrangements*, “*sociological institutionalization*”<sup>7</sup> and *coping capacity with EU* as MS should pool their sovereignty to seek consensus. Both processes are closely interconnected to define and implement CFSP (Art.24, para 2 TEU).

Wong identifies three **Europeanization facets**: “*national adaptation*<sup>8</sup>, *national projection*<sup>9</sup>, *identity reconstruction*<sup>10</sup>” (Wong 2011, 157) corresponding to the **dimensions** of “*downloading, uploading and crossloading*” (Muller e Flers 2009, 12).<sup>11</sup>

In foreign policy matters, there is a continuous bargaining between national and European interests for what is of mutual benefit also leading to a shared vision with EU (Moravcsik 1993). The absorption capacity of MS for EFP, depends on the “goodness of fit” (Miskimmon 2007)<sup>12</sup> or coping capacity with EU requirements.

Applied to the CFSP/ESDP it means that MS participate in foreign-policy making using *economic, political, military and cultural instruments* (Kissack 2016) to participate in the **activity areas** of: trade relations and the development aid programme (*economic*), CFSP, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), enlargement, justice and home affairs, human rights, and democracy etc....(*political*), ESDP, peacekeeping etc.(*military*) and education (*cultural*).<sup>13</sup>

**Concluding**, Europeanization of national foreign policies is a comprehensive-cooperative process between EU and MS, implying a continuous policy dialogue between seekers and receivers, where decision-making and problem-solving issues are benefits that both sides enjoy.

Additionally, CFSP/ESDP institutionalization aims to bring EU closer to its goal of greater uniformity through an identifiable EU interest realized by facets of Europeanization.

## 2. EFP is a matter of costs and benefits: salvaging larger states

This section illustrates: (i) briefly, what signifies salvage for small states and (ii) in more detail, what signifies for larger states, as Germany, France and UK. The difference lies that in the second case, EFP is saving itself.

### 2.1 For harmony makes small states great....<sup>14</sup>

In the case of EU small states, size is of no concern. They are 20 out of 27<sup>15</sup>, all represented in the European Council<sup>16</sup>, with a vote in the Council<sup>17</sup> and often holding the rotating Council presidency (e.g. Malta, January 2017). Hence, the increasing international influence induces these states to prefer mainly as a salvage vehicle, *national projection*<sup>18</sup>, which is gainful to them because:

(i) Projection of policies, it is not adaptation to the Union policies. States upload their strategic interests to European structures. The institutional resources deriving from this upload, support these players exerting international influence.

(ii) Europeanization of national foreign policy brings benefits to the EU and to the MS. **For EU:** *Future survival of the union; political and security benefits; economic benefits* (Mayhew 1998). Whereas **for the small states:** *Participation in cooperative security arrangements, foreign policy decision making, and the conduct of an independent foreign policy.*

The following examples show that pro-active behaviour<sup>19</sup> of small states within the CFSP/ESDP framework exemplify EFP capacity in fostering national interests of MS.

In 2012, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov led a delegation of EU foreign ministers representing Lady Ashton on visits to Lebanon, Iraq and the South Caucasus. The delegation reflected on the EU as an undivided international actor where member states fully cooperate.<sup>20</sup>

Pastore (Pastore 2013) reflects on the “*Small State Start Strategy*” developed by the Baltic Countries and some other states from the Balkans and the Mediterranean, to pursue their foreign policies in the EU. Geographic vicinities bring in security and welfare implications, such as: Baltic countries vs. Russia and Belarus. By salvaging their foreign policies, strategic goals were fostered. E.g. In 2015, because of the events in Crimea and Ukraine, the Baltic Countries called for a support of NATO in the Eastern Front reflecting multifaceted response (NATO-EU) to the Russian threat.<sup>21</sup>

The influence of Belgium and Greece respectively towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Turkey, is another constructive case. Greece and Belgium have weak power but, under EFP their influence grew. For Belgium, DRC is an “old romance”- a former colony of King Leopold II. During the Council presidency in 2001, Belgium brought Africa to the focus of EFP by sending the first mission to the region and continuing its active commitment (Hoebeke, Carette e Vlassenroot 2007). Whereas, Greece has influenced in shaping EFP conduct towards Turkey. (Tsardanidis e Stavridis 2005) E.g. Turkey EU membership, depends on : *respect for minority rights and religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*<sup>22</sup>.

The Scorecard 2016, also highlighted the leading/cooperative role of small states in 12 EU foreign policy areas EU. (ECFR, 2016) e.g. the responses to France’s invocation of the 42.7 of mutual defence.

**Put it simply**, small states as opportunist policy-makers indicate EFP to promote their strategic interest.

### 2.2 Rescuing the Big Three or Shaping EU foreign policies?

Given the continuous maturity in EU and its MS in matters of foreign policy, the ‘Big Three’ conquer a central position in the formulation and implementing CFSP amongst three lobbies: Europeanist (France), Atlanticist (Britain) and Euro-Atlanticist (Germany). The question is whether EFP while rescuing the Big Three, in fact, is shaping itself.

#### 2.2.1 Crisis management by national projection.

The behaviour of a state in crisis management situations entwines strategic interests and political and military capacities to coordinate the responses. In the case of EU, the response to crisis management is a collective one, exercised on national level but coordinated in supranational level. France, UK and Germany were involved in crisis managements in FYROM (1990) and Afghanistan (2001).

Gross (2007) pinpoints that differences in national views shaped the conduct of CFSP/ESDP. E.g. in FYROM crisis, the first phase of the crisis response consisted in political negotiations, reflecting an overall agreed political conduct of EFP. In the second phase the launch of a NATO-EU led military operation showed that states differentiated in overall agreed 'hard' conduct of the EFP when it came to agree with NATO. In the case of Afghanistan, UK and Germany preferred NATO, while France though its initial reluctance adapted to allies' preferences.

France sees EFP as a mean to project national influence interests in forming a self-directed ESDP beside NATO. UK, while upholding a national profile considers EFP as a pragmatic choice. In Afghanistan, Germany used the EFP to strengthen national preferences. Although Berlin was not actively involved politically or military in the years after, it sought to be able and shape the emerging ESDP agenda (Gross 2007).

**As a result**, in crisis management situations the Big Three projected and adapted their strategic interests to EFP. On the other hand, they also influenced EFP conduct in responding to the crisis.

### 2.2.2 National adaptation, a German case

Smith (Smith 2000) puts in evidence four factors supporting national adaptation to EFP: (i) leadership socialisation, (ii) institutional and (iii) constitutional reformation, and (iv) support of public opinion. This is supported by Miskimmon (2007) in the case of Germany, where national foreign policy impacts EFP because of these factors' influence. E.g.: (i) negotiations to the signature of Maastricht Treaty- where the 'young' reunified Germany had to adapt to the EFP architecture. (ii) Amsterdam Treaty signature. Through institutional reformation, it was possible to mediate the demands from the Länder, even when incompatible with Germany's fundamental positions. (iii) The German Presidency of the European Council in 1999 during Balkan Wars<sup>23</sup>. (vi) EU support to UN troops in the Congo in 2006.<sup>24</sup>

### 2.2.3 EFP shaping itself?

Obviously, France, Germany and UK shaped the EFP and continue to do so. Many of the key elements of the foreign policy in the Lisbon Treaty depends on the basic parameters set by the Big Three (Lehne 2012). Also, Lehne sustains that there are some reasons behind that, such as: (i) *capability to conduct an independent foreign policy*. When France led the Council presidency in 2008, it engaged in negotiations with Russia with regard to the Georgian War. The Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement, intended to clarify a peace accord per which Russian troops would withdraw from the Georgian Black Sea port.<sup>25</sup>; (ii) *multilateral approach*. UK, France and Germany are part of important international and other supranational structures as UN Security Council (UK and France), G8, G20 and NATO.

(iii) The UK and France pushed for intergovernmental approach of EFP in IGC 2003<sup>26</sup>. To a large extent, the future of CFSP/ESDP now depends on whether Germany will assume greater leadership in this area, and whether France will speed up to a more integrated foreign policy, with Brexit next door.

## 3. Conclusions

Scorecard 2016 (ECFR 2016) shows that from 12 policy challenges for EU: Germany took leadership 8 times, and France 4. Together with Italy, they are also the top contributors in NATO troops in Afghanistan.

*For the future*, EFP must elaborate its added value. To address coming crises, Europe needs economy, politics and security strengthening: integration is the solution, not isolationism. Moreover, *Brexit* should serve as a lesson to more unite Europe under a new governmental structure, while keeping partnership with UK.

How capable will be EFP *to save Turkey's* foreign policy when: (i) the country might adhere at Shanghai Cooperation Organization<sup>27</sup>, (ii) Erdogan threatens of 'revenge' vs Netherlands<sup>28</sup> and (iii) Ankara is ready to offer to Moscow his 'Iagoan' services through Syria.<sup>29</sup>

The Parrondo paradox<sup>30</sup> of the *Western Balkans EU membership* is a never-ending journey towards the 'Promised Europe'. Prospects seem right and unaffected by Brexit<sup>31</sup> ...

*As this paper* focused only in EU vs small and big states to access the direct relationship of foreign policies, it would be interesting to see how an upgraded EFP will affect post- Bratislava process and foreign policies of the Visegrad countries with the Brexit next door.

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## Explanatory Notes

<sup>1</sup> As already accomplished processes of saving foreign policies on national level, the paper concentrates on EU member states, large and small

<sup>2</sup> See: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/europeanize>, accessed on 2.03.2017

<sup>3</sup> For study purposes as explained in the 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph, saved= Europeanised, thus our discussion focuses on the Europeanization of national foreign policies.

<sup>4</sup> as examples of non-EU large and small states

<sup>5</sup> Vink, M. (2002) What is Europeanization? and Other Questions on a New Research Agenda Paper for the Second YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation, University of Bocconi, Milan, 22-23 November 2002, online at: [http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/standinggroups/yen/paper\\_archive/2nd\\_yen\\_rm\\_papers/vink2002.pdf](http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/standinggroups/yen/paper_archive/2nd_yen_rm_papers/vink2002.pdf), accessed on 12.03.2017

<sup>6</sup> here Europeanization

<sup>7</sup> Sociological institutionalism suggests that Europeanisation is a socialisation learning process, resulting in the development of new identities (Borzel & Soyaltin, 2012),

<sup>8</sup> A top-down process, states adapt their foreign policy to the EU, by downloading the latter criteria and requirements

see Wong *ibid*, pg.151

<sup>9</sup> A bottom-up process, states seek to promote their national interest to the EU, by uploading them from national level to supranational level

see Wong *ibid*, pg.152

<sup>10</sup> EU exercises its normative power in shaping national identities conform EU identity, by interchanging norms, see Wong *ibid*, pg.157

<sup>11</sup> Table 1. Dimensions, mechanism and outcomes of the Europeanization of foreign policy, in: Muller, de Fleurs, see Bibliography

<sup>12</sup> Various authors use the goodness fit parameter to refer as the capacity, or capability of the state to cope with EU requirements, e.g. Miskimmon 2007, Mendez 2008, Mastenbroek 2006 etc...

<sup>13</sup> see [https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_en), accessed on 10.03.2017

<sup>14</sup> Sallust

<sup>15</sup> 27 without UK

<sup>16</sup> Article 22 TEU

<sup>17</sup> Article 16 TEU

<sup>18</sup> Wong *ibid*, pg. 152

<sup>19</sup> on their behavioural elements such as: *state as lobbyist, self-interested mediator, and norm entrepreneur.*, see Pastor *ibid*

<sup>20</sup> See: "Polish, Bulgarian and Swedish foreign ministers in Lebanon, Iraq", <http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/103670.Polish-Bulgarian-and-Swedish-foreign-ministers-in-Lebanon-Iraq>, accessed on 03.03.2017

<sup>21</sup> See: Russia Border Tensions, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/2cf60498-0e14-11e5-8ce9-00144feabdc0>, accessed on 0.03.2017

<sup>22</sup> See: <http://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/>, accessed on 12.03.2017

<sup>23</sup> See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/336150.stm>, accessed on 10.03.2017

<sup>24</sup> See: <https://www.ft.com/content/29202af0-b5cd-11da-9cbb-0000779e2340>, accessed on 14.03.2017

<sup>25</sup> See: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2706827/Georgia-crisis-Nicolas-Sarkozy-hails-breakthrough-in-talks-with-Russia.html>, accessed on 14.03.2017

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/france-germany-and-the-uk-in-the-convention-common-interests-or-pulling-in-different-directions/>, accessed on 16.03.2017

<sup>27</sup> See: <http://www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/turkey-russia-doing-syria/p38603> accessed on 05.03.2017

<sup>28</sup> See: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39270095>, accessed on 10.03.2017

<sup>29</sup> See: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raghida-dergham/erdogan-putin-ready-to-se\\_b\\_11384488.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raghida-dergham/erdogan-putin-ready-to-se_b_11384488.html), accessed on 11.03.2017

<sup>30</sup> A combination of not favorable elements constitutes a winning strategy. The Paradox is named after Juan Parrondo. It was created in 1996.

<sup>31</sup> See: <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/134198>, accessed on 12.03.2017

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