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Enlightenment reloaded

How to become better as individuals and humankind?

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Abstract:

Technologies are changing fast and they are changing not only our environment but also our mind. Our globalized and digitized world confronts us with challenging problems in historical new dimensions. They are asking for decisions daily: In private, job-related or political situations. And these decisions made by individuals have influence on the development of humankind in general. To control our possibilities and be not controlled by them, there is a need for orientation in our decisions. Our information increases, but at the same time the fundament of our judgements gets shaky. We need something robust, to rely on. Something which is truly human and therefore connects our individual purposes with a regulative idea giving direction for human development. Maybe the causality of freedom Kant as a proponent of the Enlightenment developed, can help us in our educational efforts even today. This paper discusses therefore first how the look at the 18th century especially into the philosophy of Kant can give orientation for our 21st century problems, second what Kant's concept of freedom is about and why it is connected to morality and third how we can today try to promote Enlightenment and consequently moral progress as individuals and humankind.

Immanuel Kant, Freedom, Morality, Enlightenment, Education

Looking backward, moving forward: Our connection to the 18th century

There are many ways to argue for the importance of knowing our past for understanding our presence and thereby to plan our future. For instance, when you think about human beings using special techniques to improve the way of living, these were developed over centuries and refined from the cultivation of the rural environment to the digitized sphere where you can fill up your refrigerator by clicking on a technical device. These main technological or artificial improvements came not out of the time-independent imagination of one single person, but could only be achieved by building up on efforts of the knowledge, trials and ideas of the preceding generations. Also a precise analysis of our thinking, which is inseparably connected to language, shows humans situated in their history and strongly dependent on each other, as well to the previous, as the current and the following.

Since it is always an enriching experience for different reasons to take a look at our history, this paper focuses upon our connection to the 18th century, namely the peak period of the Enlightenment in Prussia. A strong reason for that can be seen in the description of the first paragraph, which draws attention to the connectivity of generations, the influence of the collaboration of individuals, their dialogue over centuries, the formability of humans and the relevance of education. Enlightenment as a differently dated epoch between 1650 and 1800 represents a complete revolution in culture in all areas of life and, as an ongoing process of rationalization of society, politics, religion and science, goes far beyond questions of history and education. As a social phenomenon, it marks the beginning of modernity. But the core of this project lies in the insight into the formability of humans and the associated relevance of education for the progress of both individuals and mankind in general. Indeed, the Enlightenment in the self-perception of its protagonists was a major educational project (see Funke 1963; Munzel 2012). Based on this basic assumption, scientific disciplines such as anthropology or pedagogy were established in the 18th century.

Education was interpreted controversially within the Enlightenment and also in the discussions that followed it (cf. Tenorth 2008: 80). On the one hand, the conscious attempt to shape people for society reveals a compulsion to subordinate the individual to the goals of the general public and thus ultimately to rob him of his individual possibilities. In this respect, enlightenment-education appears as an alienation from one's own nature, as the sole rule of an imposed concept of reason. On the other hand, the controlled organization of education opens up the hope of leading to an enlightened human race by promoting progress and improving education. Here the advantages of humanity appear, which a sensible coexistence also brings to the individual. In these incompatible evaluations, one can find the own contradictions of the epoch, the "conflict between freedom and coercion, between individual and society, between adaptation and maturity, between utilitarianism, that is, the sacrifice of the subject for the economic and social purpose, and education of individuals to humanity" (Tenorth 2008: 81). These topics are presented and discussed by the intellectuals and educators of the 18th century, set for the modern age and remain controversial. Accordingly, the vocabulary of reflections on education today often relies on key terms that were developed here: "Criticism, enlightenment, maturity, emancipation, tolerance, progress." (Ibid.) There is no denying of the outstanding pedagogical impact of the 18th century on our modern understanding of education.

The conflicts between coercion and freedom, societal and personal needs, the essential dynamics of human cultural output and the need for established rules and laws once again pose the question of education and the associated, hoped progress for the better. In our days this happens in a similar presence and urgency to that of Immanuel Kant and his contemporaries in the second half of the 18th century. As evidenced by databases, the term 'enlightenment' has two high

phases in German-speaking countries, the first phase falls in the second half of the 18th century and the second phase begins in the middle of the 20th century and continues to this day (see Hafner 2018). In response to the often proclaimed crisis of democracy, Michael Hampe describes in *Die Dritte Aufklärung* [= *The Third Enlightenment*] (2018) that after the Socratic enlightenment of antiquity and the scientific enlightenment between 1500 and 1800, the third enlightenment has been going on since then, which is about: to raise the collective awareness of humanity in order to make it the subject of its own history. Steven Pinker, who classifies himself as a possibilist, writes with *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress* (2018) a plea for a scientifically founded trust in human possibilities in modern times against the distortions of negativity of public voices.

The reasons for the demand for a new enlightenment can be found in the current political and social situation, which reinforces questions about common values for dialogue and democracy. However, today's discussions are less self-evident about the basic capacity of our reason and the associated opportunities for moral progress. Even the basal question about the actual vocation of man rarely comes before the public. This maybe based in our experiences with the historical outcome of the optimistic Enlightenment of the 18th century. Given the triumph of fascism and monopoly capitalism as new forms of rule, Horkheimer and Adorno subjected the Enlightenment-concept of reason to a radical critique. We know now definitely that Enlightenment alone is not a sufficient criterion for the moral development of people or the realisation of humanism. Only because you know something, that doesn't mean that you are going to change your behaviour according to that knowledge, incidentally this is also broadly discussed in the 18th century. But it seems to keep being a necessary criterion of the improvement for both making judgements and changing your course of action. If you simply don't have information of or insight into the consequences of your actions, you won't question yourself or start to reflect upon a better alternative.

But the information alone is also not sufficient for making a judgement or an important decision. We need to rely on a special faculty to process and evaluate information to draw useful conclusions for our actions. We need to think and activate our own reason to find orientation in our complex world. It's a crucial aspect, as Kant puts it, that our reason is interested in questions, she is not capable of giving an answer to. Richard Velkley (2012: 70) noted that philosophy is currently turning to microscopic cultural and historical research because it has tired of the big questions about meaning and purpose. However, for misogyny and rejection of science, the basic avoidance of the big and most important questions is more crucial than the positioning within polarizing political attitudes, and the past enlightenment is instructive on this point in particular:

"Many aspects of the present situation indicate that the problems of the first crisis of the Enlightenment are still with us, even if this fact is not widely recognized. The German Enlightenment's insights as well as its oversights and errors can instruct us, for there are few other periods in Western history in which the question 'What is human reason?' has been investigated so deeply. [...] In a return to genuine thinking we must begin with the recognition that in our lack of answers we are still faced with the fundamental perplexities." (Velkley 2012: 70)

Kant's famous definition of Enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage" given in his essay of 1784 is still used. And when we share with Kant (AA VIII: 39) what he calls "expanding knowledge, cleaning up mistakes and continuing to advance in the enlightenment", an adequate way of dealing with the fundamental perplexity of human existence is required: "*Dare to know!* (*Sapere aude.*) 'Have the courage to use your own understanding,' is therefore the motto of the enlightenment." (AA VIII: 35)

But is it really advised to ask Kant, when we want to get orientation in a world which is radical different to the Prussian state of the 18th century? For example, virtual reality has become part of everyday life and a differentiation between the analog and digital world is no longer a matter of course for adolescents in today's technical information and communication structures. Cyber bullying, fake news, shit storms and social bots present people with unprecedented everyday situations that require decisions in a professional or private context. This is totally different from the questions of Kant and his contemporaries, who were traveling in horse-drawn carriages, writing letters with fountain pens and living in a monarchy without political participation. So let's investigate why Kant's Philosophy is an advantage even for today especially for considerations about reason, enlightenment and education.

The copernical revolution: Why Kant's Philosophy is still applicable today

With his philosophical works and as an academic teacher Kant both actively participated in and also critically engaged with the ongoing educational enterprise of his time. He is well known for the beginning of what we call the modern thinking, which is often expressed as copernican revolution. This expression is based on a comparison by Kant himself. In his main work, the *Critique of pure reason*, he describes his new approach in metaphysics referring to what Copernicus did about 240 years ago. The publication of Copernicus model of the universe outlined in his book *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* in 1543 was a major event in the history of science and triggering the so-called Copernican Revolution in astronomy. As Kant puts it:

"When he [=Copernicus] found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest." (AA III, preface to the second edition: XXIX)

Until that, astronomers placed the earth as center of the universe. And by doing so, the problem arised that you cannot

explain the changing positions of the stars. So Copernicus tried to work with the hypothesis that there is no center of all heavenly circles and thereby he discovered another centre: the sun. What appears to us as motion of the sun, arises not from its motion, but from the motion of the earth and our sphere, with which we revolve about the sun like any other planet. The Copernican revolution in physics initiated the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric model of the universe.

Metaphysics, the science which is interested in the first principles of the world from a philosophical point of view, has similar difficulties. When you want metaphysics to be more than mere speculation which has no relation to reality, more than a fun game of ideas and words, you have to refer to empirical insights. Their benefit is obvious: they can be observed, like the moving stars from Copernicus. You can make experiments and double check. But when you are a Metaphysician you want more than just a collection of random observations, because the observation itself is not a proper explanation. You want to create a reliable science, you want to find principles which are necessary and eternal. The benefit of necessary and eternal knowledge is also clear: you don't need to observe a special situation first to make sure you are right. For example, if you know the force of gravity, you don't need to throw the bottle off the table, to see what will happen. Explanation and prediction show why scientific knowledge is a useful achievement of humanity. But how can you find necessary principles in contingent objects? The behaviour and choices of humans are maybe not as constant as the movement of stars. We can think about totalitarian regimes killing humans and republican regimes trying to fix civil rights or mothers who kiss their children and mothers who abuse them or people making war and people taking care for each other.

The Astronomer and the Metaphysician have a similar problem or goal: finding universal rules in a moving and changing structure. But the first one has to solve that while looking at the world as a part of the solar system, the second one while looking at the world in a general way from a human perspective, so Kant takes Copernicus as a paradigm for his philosophical attempt:

"Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us." (AA III, preface to the second edition: XXIX)

To make metaphysics a true story of success like astronomy Kant suggests the philosopher has to change his point of view. We don't have to look at the objects, we have to analyse the observer of the objects, who remains basically the same in the course of time. When we find out how human experience works in general, we also get to know the principles of all objects independent of their individual, empirical observation, because objects are for us nothing else than how we experience them. And the Critique is exactly this attempt. Kant's metaphysical concept is concerned with the condition of possibility of knowledge itself. His transcendental philosophy analyzes how we can possibly know objects before we experience them by looking at the subject. That is one of the reasons why Kant is often seen as the beginning of the modern thinking. In his philosophy the center is not god, not nature, not any invisible, obscure essence but the individual thinker, the I who not only receives the world but creates it.

The high abstract level of the transcendental philosophy makes it a useful tool for measuring the performance of our cognition. Even in our current contexts, Kant's epistemology can help us to enlighten ourselves about our reason, because it reminds us on the fact and the associated responsibility, that science is never purely objective but always an interplay of things themselves and our cognitive activity. And here you have also evidence why the Kantian Philosophy could be a rich resource to handle with Enlightenment-related pedagogical issues. In his thinking the "I" is in the center of all knowledge and Pedagogy is the science of education which has to deal with individuals as subjects and not as objects. But if we want to learn more about what can give us orientation in our today's decisions and how we can get better through Enlightenment as an ongoing process over generations, we need to take a look at Kant's moral philosophy and its connection to and influence on education.

How to be moral? The concept of freedom and its effect on pedagogy

Having started the investigation of Kant's educational thoughts throughout his works it was apparent that even though this is not his main issue, educational aspects pervade his writings continuously. They are found in the pre-critical and the critical, in the theoretical and the practical, in the academic and more popular writings as also in his letters. What is quite well known when it comes to Kant and Pedagogy is his four-stage-program mentioned in the published text from his student Theodor Rink, showing the educational process according to four different steps, namely discipline, cultivation, civilization and moralization (AA IX: 449f.). This text raised controversial views concerning its authenticity (see Weiskopf 1970, Stark 2000). But you have a similar view in Kant's anthropology. When it's about the character of the species, he divides education according to the three human predispositions and follows therefore: "Man is determined by his reason to be in a society with people and to cultivate, civilize and moralize in it through art and science [...]" (AA VII: 324f.). There is no doubt for him, that man has to be educated for the good, but this education is a self-imposed task. Man has to be "rather active, in the struggle against the obstacles which depend on the rawness of his nature to make himself worthy of mankind" (ibid.). Education is connected to morality as the goal of that process and as its justifying and guiding principle. As Felicitas Munzel (2012: 182f.) puts it:

“In Kant's idea of education, *Bestimmung* [= vocation] directs the activities of discipline, cultivation, civilization, and moralization (the four stage program in which all human aptitudes are to be made fit for the realization of reason's principles) toward a dynamic, organic unity ordered to the final purpose, the summum bonum.”

Likewise to his copernican revolution in epistemology, Kant gives moral philosophy a new foundation by replacing the traditional goal of happiness by pure morality. To understand what he means with pure morality and the summum bonum, you need to know about the two different causalities Kant's philosophy offers. In the causality of nature, you are always in a chain of cause and effect. Here you can describe even people as objects, as more or less passive part in a sphere of coercion. Our lives are structured by this causality. Not only in terms of physical laws of nature, but also by the relevance of cause and effect in the social and positive-structured community. To give a few examples: The judge makes a decision by examining all externally observable factors and their interplay. Science attempts to falsify certain presuppositions through repeatable experiments in order to approach an objective standard. The achievement of a student in school is always referring on content of the curriculum and therefore an effect of received instruction. All of this is structured by the causality of nature. Apart from that, Kant introduces another causality, namely the causality of freedom. Here you are not forced by an outer chain of cause and effect, here you are the start and the origin of an action. You are not a means to an end but a purpose in itself [= Zweck an sich]. You can only be sure, that you are the origin of the action, that you are truly free, when there is no other rule you are following than your own reason. Only reason is capable to set out purposes autonomous, because she is not bounded to changing experiences like desires or customs for instance. It is also in the term auto [= self] and nomos [= law]. And because reason can set purposes independent of contingent factors, she can not only see what is given in our world, but what should be ideal and according to that she can formulate regulative ideas to guide actions in practice. As Kant showed us with the categorical imperative, acting freely is not the same like acting without a law, but acting according to the law of reason. Setting purposes in the causality of freedom is also structured by a principle then, which is formulated in the famous version: „Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.“ (AA IV: 421) Only if you can guarantee that you made your choice on maxims which are justifiable for everybody, you can realise your moral predisposition. This is possible, because human beings have practical reason, they can realise actions driven by rational choice. Only when there is no other external power determining your decision, you can be sure to act freely and in the real sense autonomously. The benefits of the Kantian concept are, that it formulates an abstract principle which allows us to talk and think about morality as the character of our species and our guiding vocation and also gives us via the generalization-approach a subjective orientation for our decisions. But also the disadvantage of that concept is striking: Since you are the only person who will know, if you made a moral choice according to the moral law of your reason an objective observation of morality is not possible and because it is initiated through an inner activity it cannot be taught directly. When you see somebody gives money to a beggar, there is no chance for you to judge this behaviour as moral or not, because you don't know the motivating force of the other person. He could follow a universal maxim, or he made a smart decision according to his understanding or his action was driven by appetite and desire. For the objective evaluation of human behaviour Kant introduces the positive law. In the legal sphere you can be punished for violating the law. But how can morality as inner and idealistic concept help to make our reality, our living together better? Why is it central to become moral and not just simply legal? As looking at the I and his freedom to set its purposes autonomously, this is not leading to an atomistic and egoistic setting of purposes. Like the creating part of the I in our understanding is bound to the nature it is referring to, the free and autonomous I is connected to all the other Is as purposes in themselves. Through this causality the moral sphere is constituted. By setting purposes according to your reason, to an universal standard, the chain of cause and effect in nature is supplemented by moral worth, moral character and a moral way of thinking. Therefore you are and humanity is more than a mere mechanism. Through morality and its effect on our acting, culture can be designed in accordance to rational purposes. And as our reason is developed over generations also our practice could become better, when we act according to our regulative ideas of reason. Another formulation of the categorical imperative shows the connection of the individual human being and humanity as species: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end." (AA IV: 429) Here Kant is not negating the effect of natural causality, but he is supplementing the natural sphere by morality. Humans as ends in themselves are not establishing a second world in the sense of separation from nature. Freedom simply creates another point of view in the same world where causality of nature takes place. We can be means for ends for example as tax payers for the state, as workers in a subarea of a project or as successful students for the reputation of a teacher. But if we leave it at that, we do not use our ability of practical reason to create our own purposes, to take responsibility and to shape humanity. Therefore we need to reason about ourselves as tax payers, as workers, as students. We need to ask on which rules we are judging, why we are doing what we do. In this reasoning-process we are always connected to each other as reasoned and reasoning beings. As long as we don't learn to think for ourselves, we choose to stay in our self-inflicted immaturity: Enlightenment is hindered, neither for individuals nor for humanity moral progress is possible. The concept of freedom Kant is introducing with his moral philosophy has a double function for the educational process:

"The freedom to be achieved by the mind is both negative and positive: the freeing of judgment *from* prejudice (the tyranny of unexamined opinion), from the domination of the principle of self-interest, from thoughtlessness, and the freeing of judgment *for* the morally good order and form of judging (moral character) – that is, for the realization of reason's ideas and principles, for thoughtful reflection." (Munzel 2012: 180)

So indeed, Kant's conception of morality is idealistic, but with a strong effect on practice. And since Kant was not only a theoretic thinker but also a public intellectual and teacher, he inspired many of his contemporaries also in the new developing discipline of pedagogy. Christiane Ruberg shows in her analysis *Wie ist Erziehung möglich? Moralerziehung bei den frühen pädagogischen Kantianern* (2002) that the so called circle of early educational Kantians goes far beyond the well known August Hermann Niemeyer and Friedrich Heinrich Christian Schwarz. The concept of autonomy and freedom confronted pedagogy with a struggling question: How can you educate someone to freedom? As Ruberg (2002: 224) puts it, education in a Kantian sense cannot be more than a preparation of moral self-activity. So the last part of this analysis wants to discuss, whether Kant gives us any applicable advice on how Enlightenment and moral education can succeed.

Asking Kant how to promote Enlightenment also today

In keeping with the outstanding importance of freedom for his concept of morality, Kant identifies freedom as requirement for the Enlightenment. As a slowly, over generations proceeding "reform of modes of thought", Enlightenment "requires nothing but *freedom*--and the most innocent of all that may be called 'freedom': freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters." (AA VIII: 36) As you can see also in this essay, he don't speak out for unlimited, individual freedom, but rather shows a precise restriction of freedom that is even conducive to education. It may seem paradoxical, he says, but a degree of less civil freedom is advantageous for the expansion of the freedom of the mind. As Kant outlines here, people within society have the opportunity to assume two different functions. On the one hand, they are classified as a "part of the machine" in a community that, in order to be preserved, is bound by certain rules and statutes (ibid. : 37). Here you can think about the chain of cause and effect in nature and the legal sphere with the punishments according to positive law as described in the previous chapter. The freedom that is important for the development of the Enlightenment is not prevented by the externally defined requirements of people in their respective offices and professions and does not mean that you always and only should act at your own discretion. On the other hand, people need to be free in the quality of a scholar as a "member of a whole common being", "the global civil society", in front of an audience, to use their reason without the direction of another (AA VIII: 37). Then they address themselves in the role of the scholar, not in a concrete, private situation to a mere small circle, but speak "through writings to the actual audience, namely the world" (ibid. 38). It seems easier to assume the role of the scholar when freedom as a citizen is restricted in private situations and if there are rules and positive law regulating the community. As described above, it is important for a rationally justifiable action to check whether it is based on a generalizable maxim. For doing so, we can conclude, you need time and rest, you need to collect and review all informations and see which action would be the best one if you connect them to the law of reason. And if this reasoning and its outcome should really be about the best in a general human perspective, it must be practiced publicly and be achieved by community. "It is more nearly possible, however, for the public to enlighten itself; indeed, if it is only given freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable" (AA VIII: 36). The means of promotion and the goal of the Enlightenment are thus bound to a certain concept of freedom, that of publicly communicating what is reasonably conceived and presented to an audience in the role of a scholar. A freedom that essentially connects every single person in the community with others as mankind.

With the reference to the role of the scholar, Kant gives a hint to a further connection of the Enlightenment project: the education of humans. In this essay, Kant does not explicitly speak of the fact that, in order to use one's reason freely and publicly as a scholar, one must first receive an education. However, his examples implicitly refer to them, which are intended to illustrate how individuals become mature. He compares self-thinking with learning to walk and the behavior of the guardians with the "Gängelwagen", a contemporary baby walker (cf. Ibid. : 35). Analogous to how children do not actually learn to walk with such a tool, but learn to be guided, guardians make independent thinking appear as a danger without being able to fall painfully. Thinking through predetermined patterns, which are maintained through fear, laziness and comfort, the actual immaturity of the individual, becomes "almost to nature" for the person concerned (ibid. : 36). Imitating given things, assuming helpful supports for the accomplishment of everyday tasks, is much easier than getting out of this immaturity by working on the mind on one's own. For these reasons, according to Kant, only a few manage to walk safely in their own thinking. The question arises whether, in addition to the outlined and oppressive effects of the guardians, there could also be beneficial behavior. A teacher who offers the child space and the opportunity to gradually straighten himself up in order to learn optimally, to take his own steps. Someone who doesn't stir up fear of the stressful business of self-thinking, but encourages them to use their own minds.

If you asked Kant, who would be the perfect educator, you might be surprised. In a very cautious way, he attributes this task to nature. In terms of humanity's progress, it is more about what nature does "in and with us" than what we do with our educational methods (AA VIII: 310). Only because nature has acquitted us of her guidance through instincts, it is our task to develop humanity. But Kant knows somebody, who can transform the theoretical wisdom of nature into practice. It is the teacher of wisdom:

"For a teacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not come so far to guide himself,

much less to guide others, with certain expectation of attaining so high an end: it would mean a master in the knowledge of wisdom, which implies more than a modest man would claim for himself. Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an ideal, which objectively is presented complete in reason alone, while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of his unceasing endeavours; and no one would be justified in professing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in his own person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good) [...]." (V: 108)

The task of the teacher of wisdom is to know the natural limits and thereby to regulate our cultural progress. For Kant there is just one teacher in the ideal: the philosopher. You can not meet him in our reality, but you can see his idea of legislation in every human reason. This is why Kant claims even in his famous first Critique, that you cannot learn philosophy, but you need to learn to philosophize:

"One can only learn to philosophize, i. e. to practice the talent of reason in adhering to its general principles on certain existing attempts, but always with the right of reason to examine and confirm or reject them themselves in their sources." (AA III: 542)

This takes training and courage. Performing his critical lifestyle, Kant gives us an applied example not only of *how* man *can* live with himself as a paradox but also he acknowledges the wisdom of nature and shows *how* we *should* live. By the art of the teacher of wisdom, theory of nature's wisdom is transformed into human practice and therefore an example of freedom is given.

I think that in our time it is even more obvious how contingent experiences are. Technologies are changing fast and they are changing our mind. Kant knew that it is part of our reason, that she always wants to blow up boundaries and he gave us an instrument to position ourselves in the flood of countless possibilities. In order to create an alternative to a belief in authority, he introduces the autonomous scale which is part of every intelligible human being, which lies in our reason and connects us to all other reason-capable beings. With regard to our freedom we can proof if we and our species is dependent from purposes that are not created by ourselves and therefore not primarily designed for the human being as purpose in itself. And we can start to set our purposes in a different way and therefore be an example for the following generations. Instead of creating passive objects as means to an end, we need to focus on our rational capacity of freedom to set our purposes autonomously. As a teacher of wisdom you know that you are fallible, but with a cultivated reason you learned to trust your judgements and you can encourage others to do so: By using one's own reason publicly in all respects and by re-asking all the big questions again.

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