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Serbian Orthodox Church and the Challenge of Modernity, 1900-1945

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Abstract:

The single characteristic most commonly associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church is its affinity for nationalism. The conventional understanding is that the two are intimately linked and inseparable. This link is normally presented as given and existent “since times immemorial” i.e. since the conversion to Christianity. However, this ‘link’ is to a great extent a creation of the late 19th c., and was contested already at the time. Once placed in the framework of ‘an encounter with modernity’ the relationship between the Serbian Church and secular nationalism(s) acquire new logic and dynamism.

I argue that the Serbian (and later interwar Yugoslav) as well as broader European political context was of great significance for the development of the Serbian Orthodox political project, which indeed in the shape that it took by the late 1930s was closely linked to nationalism. The political project of the Church, was essentially, defined by its reaction to challenges posed by political modernity: the creation of multinational and multi-religious Yugoslav state, ideology of Yugoslavism, fear of secularization, liberalism and capitalism, the rise of communism and fascism. The political sympathies of the Church were not static: while in 1918 the Church embraced and supported the new multinational Yugoslav state, in March 1941 the Patriarch and some important hierarchs supported the coup which eventually led to the dissolution of the state. In its attempt to cope with modernity the Serbian Church relied on a variety of resources, some of them of specific Orthodox theological nature, other of secular and non-native origins. By engaging with modernity, the Serbian Church often unconsciously and almost always unwillingly became part of it. Even the most anti-modernist, anti-democratic and anti-Western views of the Serbian Orthodox clerics are an inherent part of European twentieth century modernity.

Keywords: modernity, East Orthodox Christianity, secularization, nationalism, Yugoslavia

The classic understanding of the relationship between the Serbian nation and the Serbian Orthodox Church (both in the sense of an institution and a religious community) is that the two are intimately linked and inseparable. An established scholar claimed that “the Serbian Orthodox Church was a cultural and quasi-political institution, which embodied and expressed the ethos of the Serbian people to such a degree that nationality and religion fused into a distinct ‘Serbian faith’. This role of the Serbian church had little to do with religion either as theology or as a set of personal beliefs and convictions.”ⁱ Similar claims travel from one text to another. This opinion calls for a re-consideration if only for the reason of its too readily acceptance.

Some Theoretical Remarks

If there is any way to briefly describe the state of the art in the field of church and religious history in South Eastern Europe, it most likely would go along the following lines: everybody agrees on the fact that since times immemorial and up to 1945 religion in general and Orthodox churches in particular were very important for national cultures and communities; nobody agrees on anything when later periods are in question. The unproblematic way church and religious history is narrated and incorporated into national histories prior to the WWI throughout the region is striking. With the sole exception of Greece, where from early on the question of the uneasy relationship between Christianity and Classical Hellenic heritage was under scrutiny. Paschalis Kitromilides has argued that the association of Orthodoxy with nationalism was the product of the nineteenth century nationalism, and in fact contradicts the universal nature of Christianity.ⁱⁱ However, in the rest of the region most researches seem to be blissfully ignorant of any serious discussions on the pre-communist time.

The persistence of the secularization thesis among the students of history is an important factor in this regard. While in the field of sociology of Religion the secularization theory is increasingly criticized and challenged by alternative approaches, many historians tend to think of religion as an obstacle on the way to a more modernized society. Most recently Brian Porter-Szucs set a new agenda for research in the history of East European Christianity and modernity. This new history should “avoid entirely the misleading question of whether the region does or does not fit some imagined normative pattern of secularization. Instead, our histories should explain the choices made and the constraints faced by Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and others as they simultaneously constructed and responded to their own particular versions of modernity”.ⁱⁱⁱ If in the mid-1990s general view among scholars of nationalism was that religion is “a social force available for nationalist manipulation”^{iv}, a decade later one can register more profound and serious interest in religion and its interaction with the forces of nationalism. This is primarily due to the rethinking of the secularization paradigm and the realization of the need to pay closer attention to religion as an inherent part of modernity in general, and European political modernity in particular.^v

It is clear today that the secularization narrative should be taken seriously, among other reasons precisely because it proved to be so persuasive. It should serve not as a heuristic tool, but rather as source material, analysis of which can help us understand the complex relationship between (institutionalized) religion and nationalism (or the political sphere in general for that matter). As Mark Edward Ruff pointed out, “[N]arratives of secularization and religious decline often served as a way to create religious identity, defining it against a hostile outside world [...] The fact that secularization was so widely used as a concept in the past, means that it cannot simply be suddenly brushed aside. Historians must examine precisely why for nearly two centuries so many churchmen believed it to be critical to elevate religious decline to a master narrative and how they shaped their own discourses and program for renewal around this phenomenon”.^{vi}

The Serbian Church and Serbian Nationalism of the 19th c.

With the rise of modern nationalism in the 19th c. religious Orthodox identification gave place to a new secular identity, which was strongly influenced by European liberalism. Church hierarchs and affiliated intellectuals, in an attempt to secure their own position, strengthened and promoted the notion of the *national church* as the savior of the nation, which increased the symbolic value of religion and the church institutions within the framework of an independent national state. By the turn of the 19th century, the nationally oriented historical narrative was already a fixed one and had a number of significant features. The most important of them was the contribution of the Church to the defense of and being an inspiration to the Serbian national identity. The overwhelming majority of the clergy who ever happened to write on this issue underlined the role the Church had had during the fight for liberation, as well as the fact that the Serbian Church has always been national [narodna]. Such a position of the Church led inevitably to the construction of a specific national canon, as the rhetoric of the Church argument most of the time involved national history, national development, freedom of the Serbian people, etc. The references to the times when “[T]here was no ruler, no government, no nobility, but the priests, God’s saints were with the people...”^{vii} were very common. As a next step in the narrative, a conclusion was drawn that “[I]t is the indisputable truth that Serbian Orthodox priest as a *national* priest has always been a true friend of his nation”.^{viii}

This view was accepted among secular and church intellectuals alike. Curiously, this narrative continues to operate today as a coherent account without evident internal contradictions. Given the high level of politicization of history in the region, such an agreement of the public and professional research community is exceptional. Although not often challenged, the claim that the Orthodox Church had always supported the cause of national liberation is problematic, especially when the matter concerns the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire.^{ix} However obvious and natural it may seem today that the Serbian Orthodox Church supported and promoted the national cause, invented and re-invented itself *via* claiming an important place in the national narrative, one has to remember that the turn of the century up to WWI was the period of fluctuation, in which other, however marginal in retrospective, opinions were articulated as well. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Serbian clergy had reached a level of training and education that allowed it to keep track of intellectual and political developments in religious sphere outside the country. New trends in social, political, and religious thought made it to the Serbian Orthodox milieu, but were not necessarily picked up by a lot of people.

The Challenges of Yugoslavia

The creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929) had profound effect on the Serbian Church. It suddenly had to operate in a new multinational and religiously heterogeneous state, lacking the legal status of the state church. Given the complexity of the new political situation and a degree of the initial post-war chaos, it is not very surprising that up until the mid-1920s the Serbian Church was not very actively involved in the national politics. The aims of the Church more or less coincided with those of the newly born state, or at least this is what both parties believed at the time.

For the Serbian Orthodox Church, foundation of the new multinational state signified the possibility of an unification of the Serbian lands in one entity - Belgrade Patriarchate. The Patriarchate was established (some contemporaries preferred the term “*re-establishment*” referring to the old Patriarchate of Peć) in September 1920. Despite the fact that the unification of the Church was a long-awaited event, it did not run entirely smoothly. As a sign of protest, the Montenegrin clergy abandoned their official duties at the end of 1920, the situation was so grave that the Minister of Faith had to ask local bishops to intervene and promised to improve the lot of the parish clergy.^x Generally speaking, the problems surrounding the unification process were caused by the imposed centralization of the Church structures. Curiously, there is a similarity between the discussions within the Church and the general political debates in interwar Yugoslavia. In both cases unity, centralization, and federalization were the key points.

Not yet the central issue for the Church, the multi-confessional and multi-national character of the Kingdom was formally noticed and acknowledged by the clergy. However, the leitmotif of the Church discourse in the first half of the 1920s had almost nothing to do with the new state *per se*. It was an old and familiar refrain of ‘liberation and unification’ *of all Serbs*. One could argue that this choice of rhetoric speaks volumes about the political position of the Church. By consciously overlooking multinational character of the Kingdom and keeping its traditional national narrative, the Serbian Church underlined the Serbian component in the new state. For instance, the slogan ‘liberation and unification’ was in contradiction with the obvious heterogeneity of the war experience of soldiers on the one hand, and elevated one type of experience, that of the victorious party, to the normative level, while many war veterans were

ambivalent about their identity as ex-soldiers and felt uneasy regarding the official attitude.^{xi} Thus, the Church's embracement of the official rhetoric contributed to the creation of the image of the Church as a *Serbian national* institution.

"Enchanting centuries-long dreams have turned into glorious and majestic reality. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes resurrects, and within it resurrects the United Serbian Orthodox Church", read the editorial of the first issue of the renewed official periodical of the Serbian Church.^{xii} The state and the Church were in complete mutual understanding and were drawing on each other's authority and symbolic capital. Retrospectively, this light-headed attitude of the state officials might seem somewhat careless, especially given the suspicion towards religion articulated by some proponents of Yugoslavism already decades earlier. At all events, the link between the Serbian nation and the Orthodox Church has not been broken by the creation of Yugoslavia.

Responses to Modernity

The decade from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s was the time of debates within the Church. The radical change in the political context that came with the introduction of the Royal Dictatorship in 1929 occurred while the Serbian Orthodox clergy were in the process of setting an agenda for themselves. The dilemma can be roughly reduced to the juxtaposition of social vs. national mission of the Church. The new system of governance meant that suddenly the churches and religious symbols became even more laden with political significance, as they constituted one of the few ways to assert national identity, different from the integral Yugoslav one. Some of the Church leaders saw an opportunity to win people over by appealing to their national feelings. In the circumstances of a vacuum of national rhetoric, this strategy was very effective. Moreover, it felt familiar to the Church to emphasize the national aspect of East Orthodox Christianity. This combination of factors led to a gradual marginalization and rejection of those streams within the Church that did not accentuate the national dimension. The original idea of evangelical and social work of the grass-root evangelical movement *bogomoljci* was increasingly more often replaced by national and nationalist rhetoric of Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirović. The initiatives of the ecumenical dialogue transformed into regional cooperation of the Orthodox churches against secularism, liberalism and communism. Weak attempts to include the values of the political left did not develop into anything significant.

It is essential to keep in mind that the turn to the national was mainly caused by the necessity to find a new place for the Church in the modern world, which did not appear to be very friendly towards religion and Church interests. East Orthodox theological and philosophical tradition normally is not read and understood in the framework of the discussion of modernity, it is rather taken to represent a conservative, traditionalist, and generally anti-modern position. I argue instead, that it was precisely the critique of modernity offered by the Serbian Orthodox thinkers that makes their tradition modern. As it was correctly observed by Kristina Stöckl, "being modern means taking a stand on these [related to modernity] issues, but what exactly the stand will be is always a subject to a concrete societal and historical elaboration".^{xiii}

The first step in clarifying the position of the Church in relation to the hostile world was to identify the enemies, be they real or imagined, people, movements or historical processes. Major perils that could possibly harm the Church were seen in the following way: "Orthodox Christianity finds itself today between the hammer and the anvil: between atheism, godlessness, materialistic direction in thought and life on the one hand, and propaganda of various Christian churches and sects on the other".^{xiv} In the minds and writings of the Serbian Orthodox clerics these two threats often appeared as a single whole and were intrinsically linked to each other. In fact, not only the two were obviously separate, but the Yugoslav Catholics (who were almost always perceived by the Orthodox circles as rivals and often as enemies) were facing very similar problems. In a manner similar to the Russian theologians after 1917, the Serbian religious thinkers connected modernity to the 'West', and their critique of modernity primarily took the form of criticism of the West, and within Yugoslavia of the Catholic areas, historically associated with the Habsburg monarchy and "Europe". Secularization tendencies and religious competition were closely linked to and inscribed into the context created by the Yugoslav state. Thus, the state (i.e. the government) was simultaneously an actor who could (and did) promote secularization, and at the same time provided a framework for the inter-religious cooperation, the primary aim of which was to counter the negative sides of advancing modernity. Very often though, the latter was seen by the Serbian clergy as a competition and rivalry, not a dialogue.

In a way similar to that suggested by Russian émigré theologian Sergey Bulgakov, some of the Serbian clerics proposed that the Church ought to take a more active role in the world, in order to counterbalance the negative effect of secularization and general modernization of life. Such active engagement was possible only after the modernization of the Church itself. In the Russian theological circles this attitude was opposed by another stream, known as 'Neo-Patristic', which argued for the re-examination and re-assertion of the Byzantine theological tradition. Some prominent representatives of this stream settled in Serbian Sremski Karlovci and eventually became intellectually influential.^{xv}

The Serbian Church thought of creating an 'Orthodox public' as its primary task. This public would have an Orthodox worldview and be immune to materialism, atheism, socialism, Marxism, and communism. This new public, composed of elite and common folk, would also defend positions of the Serbian Church in the ongoing struggle with its rivals and lobby the Church interests as their own. That was no easy goal, but the stakes in this game were high. For the clergy was thinking and talking in grand and universal terms of survival of the nation and the humankind. Large-scale war required appropriate means of defense and offensive.

One can distinguish two dimensions to which the Church critique applied, institutional and philosophical. Both were political, but the arguments had different logic. In the eyes of the Orthodox clergy, secularization was dangerous for the Church as a policy which created less favorable conditions for religious institutions; and as a way of thinking which eventually could lead to the secularization of society, and consequently diminish the authority of the Church. While in reality these two policy types were connected, they could also exist separately from each other. That is to say, that not all policies directed at the limitation of public visibility of the churches had in mind complete secularization of society. When the drive towards secularization came from philosophical and non-context bound background, it came as a part of a more general strive towards modernization. The latter, in its mild variant, included secularization in the sense of limiting public presence of religious institutions and confining religious life exclusively to the private sphere. The more radical version suggested the complete elimination of religion. Policies with this kind of background did not differentiate between religions and religious institutions, and were not directed against one particular confession; their aim was global, not local. There were also local, context bound secularization policies, when limitation of public presence of religions was not meant as absolute, but relative. This secularization attitude grew out of fear that religious differences might damage the state unity of the multinational Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In this case, the proponents of integral Yugoslavism were the most enthusiastic supporters of the idea to eliminate religion from public sphere. Paradoxically, the idea that secularization will strengthen the Yugoslav national unity was possible only if one acknowledges that nationalisms of the constitutive nations had a strong religious character. Yugoslav nationalism, in its turn, was supposed to be as much supra-religious as it was supra-national. The ambiguity and problematic nature of such an intellectual and political construction was obvious to many contemporaries. The representatives of the Serbian Church provided answers to the institutional challenge, as though it was ontological. Should one look at the situation in its mirror-reflection, it would become apparent that while the clergy was largely unable to contribute to the dialogue about institutions and religious balance in the country, the state officials were equally unable to see the problem from a non-secularist perspective. The catastrophic consequences (for the government) of this incapability became apparent during the Concordat crisis of 1937.

A suggestion was brought up in the Parliament in 1933 by Dr. Nikola Kešeljević, a member of the Yugoslav National Party which promoted integral Yugoslavism. Kešeljević suggested complete separation of Church and state in Yugoslavia, as a step necessary to limit the scale of the Churches' public activities. This legal project aimed at radical restriction of the social activities of the Church and the restriction of its cultural influence. All hospitals, schools and other social institutions that belonged to any religious institutions should be passed to the state; civil marriage was to become mandatory, the priests should be regarded as "ordinary persons", etc.^{xvi} The project, on the one hand, represented an anti-clerical way of thinking, which sought a more profound secularization of society as a part of the modernization process. On the other hand, Kešeljević's party affiliation suggests that he supported the ideology of integral Yugoslavism, hence his interest to limit the public visibility of the churches. The limitations that Kešeljević suggested were much more restrictive even in comparison to the initial policies of the dictatorship period. Kešeljević obviously was the proponent of profound and complete secularization, but his proposal was also a reaction to the growth of public visibility of religion and strengthening of political position of Yugoslav religious institutions. Here, the ambivalent character of the state policies towards religious communities becomes apparent: despite their best intentions, the King and his government failed to cut religion out of public sphere. Even more so, under the conditions of restricted political life, religion came to the forefront of the political debate and was increasingly used as a national symbol. Whatever their philosophical and/or political origin, all these initiatives, projects and drafts were naturally seen by the Serbian hierarchs as an ultimate proof of the danger that the ideas of secularization pose to the Church and society in general. An official Church comment on the draft of the Kešeljević's law compared the idea with the policies implemented in communist Russia: "From such thunders fired at the church there is only one step to the communist order of the state and society".^{xvii}

The period from the mid-1930s to the break up of the country in 1941 was characterized by the escalation of tensions between the federalists, mostly Croatian, and the central government in Belgrade. Against the background of a political conflict, which took on more and more the form of a Serbo-Croatian conflict, the renewed strategy of the Serbian Church, put together in the previous decade, contributed to cementing the association of the Church and East Christianity with Serbian nationalism and Serbian national interests. In the latter part of the 1930s a phenomenon referred to here as *Political Orthodoxism* took form. It signified the new type and level of political involvement of the Serbian Church. The primary difference with the preceding period was the formulation of a number of theoretical justifications for both, open political participation, and association with the national cause of the Church. The Serbian Church (following the path and drawing upon the experiences of other European Churches) put together its own response to political modernity.

It is important to underline a fundamental difference between a national narrative, which the Serbian Church had since the nineteenth century, and an elaborated theological and conceptual understanding of nation as a modern social and political phenomenon. The latter was generally speaking missing from the Serbian religious scene up until the late-1930s. The celebrations of St. Sava in 1935 present a result and a certain summary of previous developments. During the year of festivities devoted to the glorification of the main Serbian saint and a patron of the nation, the ideology of *Svetosavlje* which fused Serbian Orthodoxy with Serbian national essence was articulated and presented to the general public. The Concordat crisis of the 1937, very often seen as a singular event in the history of church-state relations, originated from the very same logic of the Church taking an open political stance and entering the confrontation with the government.

Orthodox political theories in the region engaged in the discussion of “community” and were focused on the nation as a community, on the one hand, and on the issue of communal piety and spirituality (as in the religious movements mentioned above), on the other. From the Church perspective, church-state relations should have been organized according to the nature of both, church *and* state. ‘Church’, in the eyes of the Orthodox clergy was not so much the sum of the clergy and institutions, as it was a community of believers, which in case of the Serbian Orthodox Church meant *national community*. This essential statement lies in the core of the conflict between the church and the government, religious and secular authorities. The clergy translated the Evangelical idea of Church as a community of believers in national terms and kept it as an axiom for much of its further thinking and reasoning.^{xviii}

The first conceptual disagreement between the clergy and secular authorities derived from this position. For the secular power (i.e. the government) saw the Church and treated it first and foremost as an *institution*. Such was the logic of a modern secular state. In this respect the government did not have any preferential treatment and behaved towards all religious communities in a more or less equal manner. This is not to say, that there was no religious inequality in the first Yugoslavia; but this explains why the government was eager to sign the Concordat with the Vatican, or why earlier it rushed to pass the law on the Serbian Orthodox Church: they regulated the institutional aspect of religious life, the aspect most important for a modern secular state.

The second problematic aspect was the way the “Church is a community” argument was translated into secular political terms. To put it shortly, a community of Orthodox believers in the eyes of the Serbian Church overlapped fully with the national Serbian community, i.e. the nation in order to create a *national-ecclesiastical body* [narodno-ckveno telo].^{xix} This position was the most troubling for the opponents and the most cherished by the supporters, for it gave the Church an almost infinite number of possibilities for mass political mobilization, and thus made institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church into a powerful social and political actor. The use of *sobornost* by the Serbian religious thinkers that served as an important justification of the bond between religious and national communities comes from the same logic. Alternative understandings of ‘church’ and its role in society, intellectually present but not commonly accepted, could have led to very different political results.

While themes discussed and questions faced by the Serbian Orthodox Church remained more or less the same throughout the whole interwar period, the emphasis in the post-1929 period was on the national question. Overall, one could argue that in the second half of the 1930s the Serbian Orthodox Church continued to fight against its main enemy, modernity and secularization, and as a collateral damage the state turned out to be under its fire. In the intellectual Orthodox milieu in this period the idea of fusion between Orthodoxy and Serbdom prevailed and other options that were more cautious about such mixture were marginalized. This development by no means strengthened the Yugoslav political project, and only added fuel to the disagreement with the government who was trying to save the common state in one form or another by accommodating Croatian demands. The reasons for this evolution were many, external as well as internal: weakness of the Yugoslav state; strengthening of Croat and Serb nationalisms, both were eager to use religion for self-legitimizing and as a means of mobilization. The fact that in 1941 the Serbian Church sided with the Serbian national cause and against the Yugoslav state can be seen as a logical result of the developments of the preceding twenty years.

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- ⁱ Michael B. Petrovic, *A History of Modern Serbia: 1804-1918* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 10 quoted in Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6.
- ⁱⁱ Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism and Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994). For a critical interpretation of Kitromilides' argument and its applicability to other Balkan cases see e.g. Carsten Riis, *Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 129-134.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Brian Porter-Szucs, "Introduction" to *Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe*, eds., Bruce R. Berglund and Brian Porter-Szucs (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 5-6.
- ^{iv} John Kent, "Religion and Nationalism," in *Religion in Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, eds., Sean Gill, Gavin D'Costa and Ursula King (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1995), 180.
- ^v For an account of the changes in the discipline see Jeffrey Cox, "Master Narratives of Long Term Religious Change," in *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000*, eds., Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 201-217; the volume addresses the issue throughout. For the discussion on the secularization theory itself, see an informative collection of texts: Steve Bruce, ed., *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis* (Oxford, 1992).
- ^{vi} Mark Edward Ruff, "The Postmodern Challenge to the Secularization Thesis: A Critical Assessment," *SZRKG* (2005): 385-401.
- ^{vii} Božić, "Sveštencima narodnim poslanicima," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1903): 981.
- ^{viii} Nikola Božić, "Sveštenici i učitelji u službi narodne prosvete," *Vesnik Srpske Crkve* (1903): 215.
- ^{ix} The first to voice a substantial critique of this point was the American historian of Serbia Gale Stokes. See e.g. Gale Stokes, "Church and Class in Early Balkan Nationalism," *East European Quarterly*, 13 (1979): 259-270.
- ^x Radmila Radić, *Život u vremenima*, 129.
- ^{xi} This interesting point is analyzed in John Paul Newman, "Forging a United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: The Legacy of the First World War and the 'invalid question'," in *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies*, eds. Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay (New York: Routledge, 2010), 46-61.
- ^{xii} "Naša Reč," *Glasnik Ujedinjene Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve* No.1 (1920): 16. Note the symptomatic "ujedinjena" (united) in the name of the journal. The prewar title did not contain it, nor was it kept for a longer period of time in the Interwar period.
- ^{xiii} Kristina Stöckl, "Modernity and Its Critique in Twentieth Century Russian Orthodox Thought," *Studies in East European Thought* 58, No. 4 (2007): 248.
- ^{xiv} Miloš Parenta, "Opasnosti za pravoslavlje," *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 12 (1927): 180.
- ^{xv} Branislav Gligorijević, "Russkaya pravoslavna tserkov' v period mezhdu dvumya mirovymi voinami", in *Russkaya Emigratsiya v Jugoslavii*, ed. A. Arsenyev (Moscow: Indrik, 1996), 109-117.
- ^{xvi} Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske Pravoslavne crkve*, Vol. 2, 570.
- ^{xvii} *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 15-16 (10 April 1933): 250.
- ^{xviii} See e.g. the Speech of the Patriarch Gavriilo at the occasion of his enthronement in Peć, *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije* No. 20-21 (1938): 522.
- ^{xix} "Sumorne teze u obliku apela Crkvi," *Hrišćanska Misao* No. 10 (Nov. 1939): 137