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Critical Theory in a Global(-izing) Context: The Relevance of Rosa Luxemburg

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Abstract:

Current discussions of critical theory range across a series of themes including class, race, gender, and other identities, as well as how to frame the question of emancipatory politics in a globalizing world. This paper argues that the insights of Rosa Luxemburg, though a century old, remain relevant to contemporary debates in critical theory circles. With an approach marked by a sensitivity to dialectical thought, totality, and difference, and with original contributions on the themes of imperialism, conscientization and democracy, the work of Rosa Luxemburg offers much to critically-oriented intellectuals committed to the idea that a better world is not only necessary but possible.

Maybe there are periods when one can get along without theory, but at present its deficiency denigrates people and renders them helpless against violence.

Max Horkheimer¹

What the masses need is ... theory which gives them the chance of making a system out of the detail acquired from experience, and which helps to forge a deadly weapon against our enemies.

Rosa Luxemburg²

Introduction:

Nancy Fraser has rightly observed that "no one has yet improved on Marx's 1843 definition of critical theory as 'the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age'".³ What is undeniable is that in the current context, the "struggles and wishes of the age" are increasingly intertwined with global-level structures and processes. As a consequence, the "self-clarification" of emancipatory struggles and wishes at the beginning of the 21st century perforce must be conducted in globally-sensitive terms.

In fact, the view that what is required is "global" thinking - "act locally, think globally" - is hardly controversial. Put simply, a view of politics restricted to local or even intra-state processes and structures limits both knowledge and action. This observation holds no less for the project of developing a critical understanding of the world that allows for emancipatory practice.⁴

Problems arise, however, when we fail to recognize that while global-level thinking may indeed be a necessary condition for critical understanding, it is not sufficient. Indeed, one need only think back to early attempts to come to terms with the phenomenon of multi-national corporations as harbingers of what is now called globalization to see that a global perspective has long marked the thinking and practice of transnational elites themselves.⁵

The obvious point is that global thinking is not inherently critical. Accordingly, care must be taken to identify what kinds of global-level thinking are critical - that is, promote emancipatory change - and which do not. This undertaking is, by definition, a (meta)-theoretical one and, as such, cannot suffice on its own.⁶ It is, nonetheless, an

unavoidable task if theoretically-informed practice is to serve the ends to which progressive social movements are committed.

To this end, in this paper I will engage the work of one of the early 20th century's most original globally-sensitive critical theorists - Rosa Luxemburg. I will argue that a sensitive "rendering" of her arguments can provide useful insights for those hoping to support emancipatory social forces in the current context.

(Re)-Encountering Rosa Luxemburg:

To affirm that Luxemburg has something to offer current discussions about the nature and role of critical theory is, by necessity, to confront her unfortunate reputation, still too common among Western Marxists, that her thought reflects a highly suspect deterministic – if not economic – view of political change.⁷ That such an interpretation reflects a serious mis-reading of Luxemburg has become more than clear, however, as a series of scholars have contributed to a "retrieval" of the contribution of Luxemburg over recent decades.⁸

To begin, consistent with current forms of critical theory, Luxemburg was an inherently "dialectical" thinker, both in terms of epistemology and ontology.⁹ In terms of the former, she distinguished clearly between non-critical "bourgeois" forms of theorizing and the critical, marxist tradition. In terms of the latter, she consistently adopted the viewpoint of "totality" in viewing history as a process.¹⁰ Indeed, as Lukács noted with reference to Luxemburg in his *History and Class Consciousness*, "It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality".¹¹ Indeed, if "totality" taken to be the defining characteristic of the 20th century "Western Marxist" tradition then not only can Luxemburg stand alongside other Western Marxists like Gramsci, she can stand as one of the very originators of that tradition.¹²

A second clear point of commonality between Luxemburg and the Western Marxist tradition is the stress upon the masses as active agents of history, and of the central role of human consciousness in the making of history. This perspective, moreover, directs the theorist to write history from a particular perspective - what Kaye has termed "history from the bottom up".¹³ It also directs the theorist to conceive of the future as something made in the present through self-conscious mass struggle, and not as the result of inexorable tendencies working themselves out behind the backs of social agents – in short, the very opposite of iron-law determinism.

A third point of convergence with current currents of critical theory is Luxemburg's attentiveness to "difference". Given her varied international experience, living in Poland, Russia, Switzerland and Germany, Rosa Luxemburg was well aware that "context matters", and that theory and practice must be sufficiently sensitive to any given context. As a Jew and a woman she also understood the important of gender and race identities. In contrast to certain currents with postmodernism,¹⁴ however, Luxemburg was concerned not just with recognizing difference, but with the commonality within difference –for example, shared inequalities in wealth and power across particular identities of race or gender –that make collective action both necessary and possible.¹⁵

Last but certainly not least, Luxemburg shares contemporary critical forms of theorizing the growing recognition that politics must be viewed not just in local or even national terms, but from a global perspective. Her work on imperialism, notwithstanding its limitations,¹⁶ remains as one of the most creative and original efforts of the 20th century to theorize capitalism with due regard to its global dimensions.¹⁷ It was her commitment to "totality" that led her, as other Marxists of her era did not, to attend not just to race, nationalist and class tensions, but also to the way capitalism reproduced itself globally and necessarily through violent, militarized and racist means, AND, that in so doing, it elicited active resistance on the part of those affected. As one author has noted,

By shifting the focus from inter-imperialist rivalry in Europe to the forceful "destruction of the natural economy" abroad, and, furthermore, by highlighting the dialectic of accommodation and resistance to this process in the periphery, Luxemburg reintroduced the historical dynamics of social and cultural antagonism into a

predominantly economic and structuralist conceptions of imperialism prevailing among Marxist discussions of the subject.¹⁸

As such Luxemburg's writings on imperialism continue to inspire critically-oriented theorists who find Luxemburg's questions - when not all of her answers - of continuing relevance in the study of capitalism.¹⁹ Perhaps most importantly, the originality of her interpretation of the inherently violent and exploitative nature of imperialist expansion not just in the past but in the present and into the future as well retains its relevance in our present situation.

Indeed, it is the continuing relevance of Luxemburg's understanding of imperialism for conceptualizing globalization today that underscores the present-ness of her thought. To recall Rosa Luxemburg's contributions from the beginning of the last century now at the beginning of the current one is no exercise in nostalgia. As proof of this statement, I turn now to a consideration of how her thought might be used to guide current debates in contemporary critical theory.

Luxemburg's Offerings to a "Critical Theory" Research Programme:

Before turning to a discussion of the specific contributions of the thought of Rosa Luxemburg to a "Critical Theory" research programme, it is worth reflecting on how research programmes can be understood, and how they are to progress.²⁰ First, research programmes should be understood as broader than a single theory; rather, they regularly involve a theoretical tradition or what might be called a "family of theories". As such, intellectual work within a given research programme focuses on a broad range of problems or "puzzles" that are thrown up by the programme itself. Sociologically-speaking, research programmes by definition are never individual in nature, but always involve a community of scholars who share its broad suppositions. What binds these scholars together as a community, moreover, is not that they share the same conclusions - they may well have serious differences of opinion in this regard. Rather, what binds them is a shared set of questions and a shared set of successfully-solved puzzles which stand as "exemplars" to guide the community as a whole as it works through those puzzles which are not yet solved.²¹ It is only to the degree that puzzles continue to be solved that a research programme remains "progressive". To that end, the greater the number of exemplars available to inspire and guide, and the greater the extent of creative questioning which can suggest new ways of thinking about unresolved puzzles, the greater the chance a research programme will remain vibrant.

From this perspective, the point in reviewing the thought of someone like Luxemburg is not so much to find definitive answers to the questions that now elude us, but rather to appreciate the novel kinds of questions she raised and the exemplars for successful "puzzle-solving behaviour" she offers. To that end, I will consider her work in relation to a few of the common discussion points of contemporary critical theory to see how Luxemburg's thought may point us in a direction that will involve a "progressive" - and not a "degenerative" - problem-shift.²²

Let us begin, then, with the question of the relation of theory to practice. Fay has argued that a defining characteristic of critical forms of social theory is what may be termed an "educative" - as opposed to "instrumental" - notion of the relationship of theory to practice.²³ Nor is there any question that Luxemburg shared this perspective, in particular the conviction that theory was not a distraction from the "real work" of organizing or a "luxury" which the marginalized cannot afford until after radical change is achieved.

Nowhere is this more in evidence than in her defence of her theoretically-oriented teaching at the Central Party School. The right-wing of the SPD, fearing the Central Party School would serve to propagate radical doctrines, called for a shift in the teaching programme to emphasize "practical teaching". For Luxemburg, in contrast, the school existed precisely to fill a gap by teaching what the normal school of practical life could not provide - theory.²⁴

Luxemburg minced no words in defending the teaching of theory to the masses. The critics of the school, she argued

have not the slightest conception of the fact that the working classes learn "their stuff" from their daily life.... What the masses need is general education, theory which gives them the chance of making a system out of the detail acquired from experience, and which helps to forge a deadly weapon against our enemies.²⁵

There is no question that many contemporary critical theorists share Luxemburg's commitment to theory as a "weapon" of struggle, and of its production and dissemination by the specialized group known as "intellectuals". But what Luxemburg offers is not only a validation of the place of theory as a tool to educate the masses, but also the invaluable and neglected insight that participation in critical practice has an educative component as well; that theory, which has an educative function to sure, does not exhaust the education process. The exemplar she offers in this regard is to be found in her discussion of the role of the mass strike. While always stressing that the mass (general) strike presupposes the existence of both objective and subjective conditions which make it possible, Luxemburg simultaneously stressed how participation in the mass strike served an educative function by "bringing situations to a head, clarifying conditions, exposing the reality of society" and thereby "conjuring up new forces, new energy, a new will". As she noted,

... the most valuable thing in all this ebb and flow is the spiritual residue left over which will be permanent: the intellectual and cultural growth, in fits and starts, of the proletariat which is a firm guarantee that the future progress of its economic and political struggle is irresistible.²⁶

Given her Marxist commitments, it comes as no surprise that the notion of the revolution was central to her work. And as usual, and in contrast to her reputation as a determinist, she consistently formulated her conception of the revolution in inherently dialectical terms. Specifically, for Luxemburg radical change was conceptualized in the terms of the movement of history not as a self-regulating series of "double movements",²⁷ but as the product of class struggle, of the active - but not automatic -resistance of conscientized masses. In short, central to Luxemburg's thought was the notion of "revolution as process". As Basso notes, until the time of her death, Luxemburg clung steadfastly to this conception of the movement of history:

...for Rosa Luxemburg revolution is not an unheralded settlement of accounts between the proletariat and capitalism but a fact in the course of capitalist development which occurs whenever the contradictions and tensions produced by this development have reached their climax.... the triumph of the socialist revolution is not to be regarded as an act in a single moment of time, as a final violent collision, but as the conclusion of a revolutionary process²⁸

As she noted, "the seizure of power by the working classes can only be the end result" of a lengthy period of day-to-day struggle and "For this reason this task can also not be achieved at one blow but similarly over a long period of gigantic social struggle".²⁹

As Luxemburg offers alternatives to structural-functionalist conceptions such as the "double-movement", so Luxemburg also suggests ways of rethinking the domain for practice appropriate to a global(-izing) context. To begin, Luxemburg accepted Marx's view that "the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle.... [that] the proletariat of each country must ... first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie".³⁰ However, in her willingness to apply the dialectical method to Marx's thought itself, she showed a willingness to recognize that nationally-based responses could not proceed without regard to the context beyond their borders. Indeed, anticipating the globalizing context of the present –in particular, the notion of transnational business elites as constituting an incipient“international civil society”³¹ - Rosa Luxemburg "precipitatively imagined ... an imperialistic state of development ... which would create supernational, organically linked economies, possessing their bourgeoisies, capable of competing with the solidarity of the working classes".³² Indeed, it was Luxemburg's sense that such a moment had already been reached at the beginning of this century that moved her to emphasise socialist internationalism as the only response appropriate to a bourgeoisie which was as much global as national in character.

None of this is to argue in favour of the neo-Idealist position according to which global capital must be controlled through the extension of democracy at the international level.³³ On the contrary, what is needed are nationally-based strategies - but ones which are fundamentally internationalist in orientation. Nor should this be understood as mere rhetorical flourish. Taking internationalism seriously involves implications for thought and practice.

Once again, Luxemburg provides an excellent exemplar in this regard. It should be remembered that in the early part of this century German's Social Democrats saw themselves, not entirely without reason, as the "core" - the centre of insight and sophistication in regard to socialist thought and practice. Russia, in contrast, was seen, again not entirely

without reason, as the "periphery" - an under-developed backwater of limited import for questions of analysis or strategy. Yet it was to Russia's experience that Luxemburg turned in developing her insights on the mass strike and revolution as a process. Furthermore she chided the SPD leadership for their unwillingness to consider that the experience of the Russian opposition would have anything to teach them. "Every day", she reproached them, "you read reports of revolution in the newspapers ... but it seems that you have eyes and you see not and ears and you do not hear... We can see the Russian Revolution and we should be silly fools not to learn from it".³⁴ And from the scene of the revolution itself she evidenced the same openness to learning from those struggling not just in the core, but in the periphery. "To be sure", she wrote,

this will probably be quite different after the revolution and the return to "normal conditions", but these events will not pass on without leaving some trace. Meanwhile, the achievements of the revolutions are immense: class antagonism has been deepened, social relationships exacerbated and clarified. And none of this is seen abroad!³⁵

Luxemburg's example could serve as a useful corrective to the parochialism and arrogance of the "North", where, lamentably, northern activists too often seem bent on reproducing the same paternalistic - when not patronizing - attitudes to the "peripheral South" manifest in the attitudes of Northern bankers and industrialists. A willingness to see oppositional movements elsewhere as being in a position to teach us something - rather than as needing to be tutored by we Northerners who always know "better" - may not exhaust the meaning of nationally-based internationalism, but it is surely a necessary component.

Finally, as she stressed internationalism an integral part of her understanding of socialism, so also Luxemburg stressed the centrality of democracy. Her critiques of Lenin and the Bolsheviks on this score are well-known and need not be repeated here in detail.³⁶ It will suffice to make two points. First, notwithstanding her appreciation of the vital role of intellectuals in building effective popular movements - indeed, in part because of it and the recognition of the centrality of freedom of expression to intellectual activity - she was openly critical of the Bolshevik tendency to equate the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the "dictatorship of the party", from which it is but a small step to the "dictatorship of the central committee". Liberal-bourgeois notions of freedom and human rights were insufficient (though, as she noted, even they proved too much for the bourgeois order), but they were suspended by socialists at their peril. Accordingly, affirming that "freedom is only and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently", she called for unrestricted freedom of the press and assembly since "without the free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element".³⁷ And when it was countered that intellectuals should do more than contribute their specialized theoretical insights - that they must actually direct the struggle to ensure there would be "no false steps" - Luxemburg's response was typically blunt and to the point:

The false steps which a real revolutionary labour movement makes are historically immeasurably more fruitful and valuable than the infallibility of the best central committee.³⁸

One may, of course, ask if Luxemburg limited herself to identifying what did not qualify as democratic governance (i.e., not Leninist "democratic centralism"; not bourgeois "liberal democracy"), or whether she gave indications of what would qualify as democratic. Once again, while one cannot claim she gave a definitive answer to the question of what constitutes democratic governance, it can be argued her writings provide a useful exemplar in this regard.

Significantly, Luxemburg did not focus in on the formal institutions of democracy. Rather, her emphasis was on democratization - democracy as a process. Following Habermas,³⁹ what is fundamental to the process of democratization is the development of a "public sphere",⁴⁰ which has the function of organizing human experience and "mediating between the changing forms of capitalist production on the one hand and the cultural organization of human experience, on the other".⁴¹ More recently Habermas has come under criticism for conflating the notion of the public sphere with that of the bourgeois public sphere tout court. Here again, Luxemburg's work on socialist democracy has been hailed as anticipating the critique of the bourgeois public sphere as an increasingly integral part of the capitalist production process, and the consequent need to create a robust "proletarian public sphere" to "oppose the organized interests of the bourgeois public sphere through its organization of human needs and interests".⁴² As Oskar Negt has noted,

The foundation of the Rosa Luxemburg's perspective of totality is neither an imaginary class-substance, for example, the proletariat as historical subject, nor an organization, rather it is the working class itself, more

precisely, a proletarian public sphere... distinguished by its refusal to recognize fundamental life-spheres such as production and socialization (education) as private⁴³

All of the implications for practice in the present are not immediately clear, of course. At the very least, however, the notion of the necessity of a proletarian public sphere for a fully-functioning democracy would suggest that "Ideology Critique" of the "consciousness industry" - television, the traditional mass media, as well as the new social media - must figure centrally in any collective research programme.

Conclusion:

We have been focusing in this paper on possible contributions to outlining a collective research programme consistent with traditional aims of critical forms of theorizing. I have argued that Rosa Luxemburg's insights on conscientization, internationalism and democracy - warrant serious consideration.

I wish to conclude by reflecting once again on the more general question of a collective research programme. Recalling our discussion of research programmes above, it might be objected that to append the modifier "collective" is redundant, given that research programmes, by definition, always involve a collectivity - the community of intellectuals. I wish to argue in favour of retaining the modifier, however, and for the following reason. What we are talking about here is not just any research programme, but one which seeks to promote human emancipation in a global(-izing) context.

Put simply, what is being advocated is a "critical" research programme. Now it is worth noting that critical forms of theorizing must be validated on two distinct levels. At one level, they must, like conventional forms of theorizing, be validated by developing reasoned arguments in support of their claims which are successful in gaining the assent of the relevant intellectual community. Yet while this level of validation is crucial, it is not sufficient. In the words of Horkheimer:

General criteria for assessing critical theory as a whole do not exist, for they are always based on the recurrence of events and thus on a self-reproducing totality....⁴⁴

This being the case, how then is the value of a theoretical offering to be determined? Again, Horkheimer suggests an answer:

The value of a theory is not decided alone by the formal criteria of truth ... the value of a theory is decided by its connection with the tasks, which in the particular historical moment are taken up by progressive social forces.⁴⁵

In short, a "critical" research programme must also validate itself in terms of the lives of those to whom it is ultimately directed; it must validate itself through its contribution to the concrete emancipation of human beings. This is the "collectivity" which is not included in the community-based validation process of mainstream theorizing, and to which the word "collective" in "collective research programme" refers, and to whose welfare our intellectual efforts must be committed.

Endnotes:

¹ Die gesellschaftliche Funktion der Philosophie", in Alfred Schmidt, (ed.), *Kritische Theorie: Eine Dokumentation* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), II, p. 308, my translation.

² Quoted in J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 394.

³ "What's Critical about Critical Theory", in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, (eds.), *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 31.

⁴ In this regard it is striking that one of the more prominent among critical theoretical traditions - the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School - has been largely silent on global-level issues or processes. As a leading American Frankfurt School theorist has noted, with the

exception of occasional comments by Marcuse in the 1960s, a macrological critique of imperialism or of systems of world domination was "inexplicably absent from most of Critical Theory". See Douglas Kellner, "Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, and the Philosophy of Liberation", unpublished manuscript: URL: <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell7.htm> Indeed, this obvious lacuna has prompted calls from contemporary proponents of Critical Theory for its reformulation in more globally-sensitive terms. Note, for example, the following comment from Thomas McCarthy: "I have wanted to underscore the need for critical theory to adopt a consistently global perspective, so as to locate the received problematics of the nation state in a broader web of interconnected histories." Thomas McCarthy, "Philosophy and Critical Theory: A Reprise", in David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, *Critical Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 92-93.

⁵ See Richard Barnet and Ronald Mueller, *Global Reach* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), as well as the more recent Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). The content of mainstream theories of international relations, arguably all concerned with developing a global perspective, stands as further (lamentable) support for this position. See Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁶ It is important to resist the temptation, visible in some circles, to assume that any kind of "empirical" work is, by definition, tainted with the brush of non-critical thinking; that truly "critical work" can be done only in the most obtuse realm of meta-theory. Such a stance, if widely adopted, would rob critical thinking of exactly the kind of productive engagement with the world around us that theory is meant to facilitate - not to supplant. The important question is, therefore, what kinds of empirical work are critical and which are not. The answer to this question should, then allow for the kind of empirical work needed to move critical understanding and emancipatory practice forward. See M. Neufeld, "Who's Afraid of Meta-Theory?" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 387-93, as well as M. Neufeld, "What's Critical about Critical IR Theory?", in Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Tooze, (eds), *Critical Theory and World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1998).

⁷ No less than the paradigmatic Western Marxist Antonio Gramsci promoted such a misconception when he referred derogatorily to Luxemburg's "ferreodeterminismoeconomicistico" - her "iron-law economic determinism" (Quaderni, 859).

⁸ See, for example, Stephen Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times*, Norman Geras, *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg* (London: NLB, 1976), Andrea Nye, *Philosophia: The Thought of Rosa Luxemburg, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt* (New York: Routledge, 1994), and Lelio Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg: A Reappraisal*, translated by Douglas Parmée (London: André Deutsch, 1975).

⁹ See Basso, "The Dialectical Method", in Rosa Luxemburg, chapter two, pp. 17-47. For an overview of dialectical thought, see Scott Warren, *The Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and Political Inquiry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). For an accessible introduction to dialectics, see Robert Heilbroner, *Marxism: For and Against* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980).

¹⁰ On the notion of totality, see Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (University of California Press, 1984).

¹¹ Georg Lukács, "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg", in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, translated by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 27.

¹² For an alternative definition of Western Marxism - one which makes its defining characteristic its "estrangement from political praxis, its emphasis upon cultural matters, its abstruse use of language, as well as its domination by 'philosophers'" (Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 96) - and, as a consequence, one from which Rosa Luxemburg is excluded - see Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London: NLB, 1976). For a rebuttal of Anderson's position - and one with which I am in basic agreement - see Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg*, chapter twelve.

¹³ See Harvey J. Kaye, "E. P. Thompson, the British Marxist Historical Tradition and the Contemporary Crisis", in H. J. Kaye and Keith McClelland, (eds.), *E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 254. See also Harvey J. Kaye, *The British Marxist Historians* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1984).

¹⁴ See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

¹⁵ See, for example, "Women's Suffrage and Class Struggle", in Dick Howard, (ed.), *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 216-222.

¹⁶ I refer here to Luxemburg's controversial claim that capitalism **required** other non-capitalist modes of productions in order to reproduce itself.

¹⁷ Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951).

¹⁸ See Alejandro Colás, *Empire* (London: Polity Press, 2007), p. 110. In this regard, it can also be argued that in this Luxemburg re-captured - in a way most of her contemporaries did not - Marx's of capitalism as being beset by "globalizing" tendencies. See Colin Leys and Leo Panitch, "The Political Legacy of the Manifesto", *Socialist Register 1998 - The Communist Manifesto Now* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 18-48.

¹⁹ Indeed, it can be argued her work foreshadowed more recent theoretical traditions from development studies to post-colonial theory. See, for example, Samir Amin, *Re-Reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary*. Michael Wolfers, trans., (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994, chapter three, and Roger Burbach, Orlando Nuñez and Boris Kagarlitsky, *Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), chapter five.

²⁰ This is an extensive literature on this subject within the philosophy of science as generated by figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos. For an accessible introduction, see A. F. Chalmers, *What is This Thing Called Science?* Second Edition (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982). For the original exchanges, see I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

²¹ Exemplars are particularly important for socializing new generations of scholars so they may replace senior scholars and, thereby, keep the research programme alive beyond a single generation.

- ²² The term is taken from Lakatos. See his "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, pp. 91-196.
- ²³ See Brian Fay, *Critical Social Science: Liberation and Its Limits* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- ²⁴ See Nettle, *Rosa Luxemburg*, I, pp. 392-396.
- ²⁵ Quoted in Nettle, *Rosa Luxemburg*, I, p. 394. Luxemburg was, by all accounts, a committed and popular teacher. Her pedagogical experience was also crucial to the development of her own thinking, noting that it was "only by sharpening the subject matter through teaching that I was able to develop my ideas" (quoted in Nettle, p. 392). A number of her lectures have been gathered together. See Rosa Luxemburg, *What is Economics?*, translated by T. Edwards (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1954).
- ²⁶ Luxemburg, quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, pp. 93-94.
- ²⁷ See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Beacon Press: 2001).
- ²⁸ Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p.84.
- ²⁹ Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 84
- ³⁰ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, reprinted in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, (eds.), *Socialist Register 1998 – The Communist Manifesto Now*, p. 250.
- ³¹ This insight is central to the Neo-Gramscian School of International Political Economy. See Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Timothy J. Sinclair, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- ³² Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, 114.
- ³³ See Held, "Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?" for an example of the neo-idealist position.
- ³⁴ Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 91.
- ³⁵ Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 93.
- ³⁶ For a useful discussion, see Geras, *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg*, chapter four.
- ³⁷ Quoted in Bronner, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 185.
- ³⁸ Quoted in Basso, *Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 103.
- ³⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (1962) Trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
- ⁴⁰ . *Öffentlichkeit* can be translated as publicness, the public, publicity or, most commonly, the public sphere. As Miriam Hans notes, the German term *Öffentlichkeit* refers not only to the social space implied by the English phrase "public sphere", but to "an ideational substance or criterion -glasnost or openness (which has the same root in German, *offen*) - that is produced both within these sites and in larger, de-territorialized contexts. See Hansen, Foreword, *Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere* by Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. ix. For a useful introduction and overview to the literature on this theme, see Craig Calhoun, "Social Theory and the Public Sphere", in Bryan S. Turner, (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 429-70.
- ⁴¹ Eberhard Knödler-Bunte, "The Proletarian Public Sphere and Political Organization: An Analysis of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge's The Public Sphere and Experience", *New German Critique* No. 4 (Winter 1975), p. 51.
- ⁴² See Knödler-Bunte, "The Proletarian Public Sphere", p. 51. See also Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*.
- ⁴³ Oskar Negt, "Rosa Luxemburg: Zur materialistischen Dialektik von Spontaneität und Organisation", in *Rosa Luxemburg oder Die Bestimmung des Sozialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), pp. 190, 191, my translation. See also Oskar Negt, *Keine Demokratie ohne Sozialismus: Über den Zusammenhang von Politik, Geschichte und Moral* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976).
- ⁴⁴ "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," in Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie: Eine Dokumentation*, I, p. 190, my translation.
- ⁴⁵ Quoted in David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 192, emphasis in the original.

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