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Model change in Polish and Hungarian cultural diplomacy throughout the transition period (1990-1999)

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Using broadly defined culture to promote states abroad and, most of all, to seek support for political goals is not a new phenomenon in foreign policy. By presenting their cultural achievements in various art forms, teaching their native languages and establishing cooperation between cultural institutions - activities referred to as cultural diplomacy - states create positive images of themselves and their citizens. At the same time, they contribute to building mutual understanding and trust between nations. Post-communist states, such as Poland and Hungary, have engaged in the above-described sense of cultural diplomacy only since the beginning of the 1990s. Before 1989, culture had been a neglected factor in their foreign policies. For almost fifty years under the communist rule, they had tended to promote political ideology rather than cultural heritage. The basic objective of the paper is to demonstrate that the practical activity of Poland and Hungary with regard to a broadly defined promotion of culture abroad was very much dynamic in the transition period (1990-1999). Changes in the choice of tools and instruments of cultural diplomacy as well as means of influence resulted from current priorities and objectives of these states' foreign policies (particularly before their accession to the European Union and NATO). A comparative analysis of Poland and Hungary's cultural diplomacy presented here identifies similarities and differences in the development of cultural diplomacy models. The reasons for these similarities and differences can be found in political and institutional factors. In order to fully illustrate the change in the Polish and Hungarian models of cultural diplomacy, the author examines Polish Institutes and Hungarian cultural centres – Balassi Institutes – as examples. A comparison of the functioning of cultural diplomacy institutions has enabled the author to draw a thesis concerning the impact of determining characteristics of each state.

Key words: Cultural diplomacy, Hungary, Poland, academic exchange, cultural institutes

Introduction

This paper focuses on changes that occurred in Poland and Hungary's cultural diplomacy models in the decade after 1989, when they were undergoing the democratic transition. Over the recent centuries, both countries have shared several similar experiences: a lengthy loss of sovereignty and a brief period of independence during the interwar years, followed by 45 years in the Eastern Bloc as, effectively, satellite states for the USSR. With a major shift in international political situation brought about by the demise of the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary were finally free to pursue their national interest through genuinely self-determined foreign policies. One aspect of these policies involved presenting their cultural heritage to audiences abroad.

The purpose of this paper is to establish what role Poland and Hungary envisaged for cultural diplomacy in their post-1989 catalogues of measures addressed at foreign audiences, as well as to what extent this diplomacy was influenced by pre-World War II practices. This is why the first part of the paper is devoted to presenting the birth of Polish and Hungarian models of cultural diplomacy. Subsequently, I move on to examining the factors that have

driven changes in these models and whether or not the process has actually finished. To answer these questions one needs to analyse actions undertaken by government agencies (most of all, ministries of foreign affairs and cultural institutions abroad) and other entities engaged in cultural diplomacy. Using the comparative approach enables pointing out differences between the two models and their causes. The analysis is preceded by a section setting up a theoretical framework for cultural diplomacy in international relations.

1. Theoretical framework

The subject of this paper calls for a clarification of the concept of cultural diplomacy. As cultural diplomacy has long been present in the practice of diplomacy, it was examined primarily by its historians and practitioners. As a result, it was conceptualised and perceived mostly as an instrument with which states advance their interests and achieve political objectives.

Literature contains numerous definitions and perspectives on cultural diplomacy. This leads to a situation whereby the same activity is sometimes described by various terms. Cultural diplomacy may refer to institutions and activities that aim to spread certain ideas and values; it may signify the way in which a state (or other transnational entities) attempt to influence other actors; finally, it can describe the process of communication between actors of international relations. Cultural diplomacy may refer to institutions and activities that aim to spread certain ideas and values; it may signify the way in which a state attempt to influence other actors; finally, it can describe the process of communication between actors of international relations. Dilemmas around this concept are only compounded by the emergence of new terms, such as 'public diplomacy' or 'new public diplomacy' (Melissen 2005, p. 7), as well as by continued controversies surrounding some long-known and commonly used terms - for instance, propaganda (Gienow-Hecht 2010, p. 9; Haigh 1974, p. 12). The term 'cultural diplomacy' has also been associated with cultural imperialism (Ferguson 2004, Topić & Sciortino, 2012), cultural policy and cultural relations (Dewey and Wyszomirski 2003). The assessment of cultural diplomacy and its importance for foreign policies, a country's position on the international scene or the shape of relations between various participants of international politics is also highly divergent. Varying understanding of the concept means that its analysis is conducted mostly from the standpoint of its practitioners: governments, organisations, transnational actors or a broad international community. In order to explain the term of cultural diplomacy I shall refer to the most frequently cited definition presented by Milton Cummings, who specified cultural diplomacy as the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding (Cummings 2003, p. 1). It is also worth noting that Cummings goes on to state that it can also be more of a one-way street, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting its language, explaining its policies and point of view, or 'telling its story' to the rest of the world (ibidem).

One key component of cultural diplomacy is cultural exchange - i.e. all kinds of art programmes, exhibitions, concerts, spectacles etc. that are usually prepared directly by cultural institutions. In this perspective, dimensions of cultural diplomacy include, among other, musical diplomacy, arts diplomacy (focused on the so-called high arts: music, literature, painting), historical diplomacy (Hamilton 1993, p. 175), as well as teaching and popularising languages. The target groups for such exchange are foreign societies, groups (scholars, artists) or even individuals. One key difference between the 'standard' diplomacy and cultural diplomacy is that the latter engages foreign audiences (Finn 2003, p. 18). The above-mentioned definition by Cummings emphasises two-ways exchange, but also indicates that such exchange should be aimed at explaining a state's policies and point of view, or 'telling its story' to

the rest of the world. This means that cultural diplomacy is inextricably linked to the pursuits of various actors: states, IGOs, NGOs, as they try to shape a positive perception of their actions among foreign audiences.

Having in mind the multiplicity of entities involved in cultural diplomacy (both as its creators and recipients) and its goals, one can consider it, referring to contemporary studies on diplomacy, as a form of international communication. In this view, through instruments such as various art forms and scientific achievements, cultural diplomacy familiarises foreign audiences with a country and its culture, and serves to shape its positive image. At the same time, it is capable of spreading values held by a given society, e.g. individual freedoms, democracy, human rights, etc.

At this point, it is wise to examine two approaches to cultural diplomacy that are present in the broad theoretical framework of international relations.

As far as theoretical perspective is considered, cultural diplomacy has appeared most of all in relation to the concept of soft power. Nye treats culture as a resource of soft power.

> 'Culture is a soft power resource that produces attraction that can be measured by asking people through polls or focus groups. Whether that attraction in turn produces desired policy outcomes has to be judged in particular cases. The gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behavior is no unique to soft power. It occurs with all forms of power.' (Nye 2009).

As a form of soft power, cultural diplomacy had existed long before it was put forward as a new concept within the framework of international relations. However, although it had been employed by practitioners of diplomacy, it was only after Nye developed the concept of soft power that the soft resources have been attributed greater role in contemporary international politics.

It seems that defining cultural diplomacy requires us to establish its purpose. If one adopts the view linking it to political activity of state institutions, then cultural diplomacy remains one of the instruments for advancing national interests. The latter category is strongly rooted in theories of international relations. Its complexity aside (it becomes more complex when it represents a combination of features) (Burchill 2005, pp. 9-14), one should make note how the concept is reconsidered, particularly through the lens of social constructivism (Wendt 2008). While in neorealist rhetoric national interest comes down mostly to physical survival, other theories broaden its scope to include economic welfare, or prestige and image of a country among the international community. One particularly interesting approach to cultural diplomacy stems from constructivist premises as to the shaping of actors' identity in international relations. Constructivists consider identity as being socially constructed. Hence, they object the notion that it is a 'primal' characteristic given 'once and for all'. Acknowledging that identities may change has further implications, especially with regard to international image. As pointed out by Davis Cross, “”*identity creation and international image are actually mutually constitutive in significant ways and there is a continuous feedback loop between image and identity*”” (Davis Cross 2013, p. 7). Identity is constructed by ideas and values which, if seen as attractive by foreign audiences, may shape a country's positive international image. Here, image is an outcome of subjective views as to the attractiveness of the language, culture, norms, ideas and values attributed to a given actor. In such approach, cultural diplomacy directly reflects the identity of the people it represents. At the same time it conveys a credible message about a country's culture and so shapes the way it is perceived, both by the international environment and by the originating society. Cultural diplomacy fits well into this theoretical approach, as it is ultimately representative of a complex, social process. It gives credit to the notion that foreign public's perceptions are crucial to determining a state's behaviour and outcomes in international relations.

2. Historical setting of cultural diplomacy In Hungary and Poland

2.1. The birth of the Hungarian model of cultural diplomacy

Presenting cultural heritage and spreading knowledge about their own country is not a new phenomenon to Hungarian authorities. When Austro-Hungarian Empire ceased to exist at the end of World War II and Hungary once again became an independent state, its new government immediately took up initiatives to promote cultural and scientific achievements of its citizens abroad. The 1920s saw the formation of academic institutions, located in various European countries, that aimed at spreading knowledge of Hungary's historical heritage. One of the first such entities was the Hungarian Historical Institute of Vienna, established in 1920 (Simon 1999, 145). A continuation of this idea came in the shape of Collegium Hungaricum - institutions that, starting from 1924, were formed in several European capitals (first, in Berlin and Vienna, and later also in Rome and Paris). Based on regulations adopted in 1927 and a 1936 decree, Collegiums were tasked with research and supporting Hungarian citizens who studied in foreign capitals. Furthermore, they were turned into centres for the popularisation of Hungarian culture.

The brain behind Hungary's approach to cultural diplomacy was its minister of culture, Kuno Klebersberg. He maintained that, even for small states, cultural isolation could have catastrophic consequences and that advocating one's culture among foreign audiences was beneficial not only to the government, but also the entire society. Internal cultural policy was equally important to Klebersberg's idea, as it had a strategic role in helping the country overcome a national trauma of having only a fraction of its former territory left. Therefore, both internal and external cultural policy were set up as an intense programme of activities. Additionally, external cultural relations were institutionalised through a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation and establishment of culture centres abroad. Such documents were signed with the governments of, among other states, Poland, Germany, Austria and France.

For obvious historical reasons, the biggest recipient of Hungary's efforts in cultural diplomacy was Austria. At that time, Vienna was also the most popular destination for Hungarian students who decided to continue their education abroad.

After World War II broke out, institutions set up abroad to conduct cultural diplomacy-related activities were forced to either severely limit or completely cease their operations. Some of them did not recover from this setback for as long as several decades.

2.2. The beginnings of Polish cultural diplomacy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated its efforts for promoting Polish cultural achievements abroad during the interwar period. Newly established diplomatic and consular posts included a representative whose job was to spread information about Polish culture in the host country. Nonetheless, Poland's promotional efforts were predominantly directed towards the areas of economy and trade, with culture having only a marginal role.

It took Polish governments over a decade to find more appreciation for the importance of cultural promotion. In the second half in the 1930s institutions responsible for presenting Polish culture abroad became more professionalised and better staffed. The process of establishing Polish culture centres in other countries began just shortly before the start of World War II. The first such entity, geared specifically toward presenting Poland's culture, the Polish Institute in Budapest, was launched in 1938. The basis for its establishment was the bilateral agreement on cultural cooperation, signed when Gyula Gömbös, Hungarian prime minister, visited Poland in October 1934. Its first

head was a Polish language lecturer at the University of Budapest. The Institute began operating in the early months of 1939 and was officially opened on 24th of May that year.

The second oldest centre of Polish cultural diplomacy network was the Institute of Polish Culture in London. Preparations for its establishment were undertaken in late 1930s and its official opening came in 1938. However, in its early years the Institute largely limited its operations to administrative aspects.

Further development of the network was halted by the outbreak of World War II. As it turned out, for both Poland and Hungary, the conflict marked the beginning of a lengthy period when they were unable to independently shape their cultural diplomacy.

2.3. Cold War period

As a consequence of Yalta and Potsdam agreements, Poland and Hungary became parts of the Eastern Bloc. Completely dominated by the Soviet Union, it was treated by the rest of the world as something of a political and cultural monolith. Being members of the Warsaw Pact, they were both single party dictatorships and were forced to adopt the Soviet model of cultural policy, designed primarily as an instrument enabling the ruling communist parties to exercise the control Soviet leaders thought necessary to prevent the breakup of the empire and its ideological unity (Macher 2010, 76).

Foreign policy that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dictated to satellite governments across the Eastern Bloc was centred around the purpose of spreading communism and had little or no regard for national cultural heritages and identities. If it contained a cultural element, such element was distorted by a strong ideological bias. Cultural institutions in Central and Eastern European countries controlled by Moscow were nationalised to ensure they would work toward the overarching goal of promoting socialism. The lack of independent, non-governmental bodies meant that any cultural content outside the "ideologically appropriate" mainstream was virtually absent from mass media and programmes of state-controlled institutions. Culture, both in its internal and external dimension, was strongly politicised. As cultural diplomacy became subordinate to purely political goals, ministries of culture and science were excluded from the process of its creation and execution. Instead, this task was given to departments of propaganda in ministries of foreign affairs (Umińska-Woroniecka 2013, 98).

Since the 1940s, both Poland and Hungary turned to institutions established before World War II (described earlier in this paper) to conduct external cultural policy. In the case of Hungary, posts in Paris and Vienna were used as mere cultural diplomatic missions. Toward the end of the 1940s the governments established two more branches, in Warsaw and Sofia. In the early 1950s, it added another one, in Prague. The first genuine efforts to actually promote Hungarian cultural heritage to Western European societies - through typical measures such as concerts, exhibitions or translations of Hungarian literature - came after 1953, in the thaw of De-Stalinisation. That, however, was halted by the 1956 uprising, after which "the Soviet leadership set out to strengthen the unity of the Eastern Bloc and to control the communist parties in power" (Macher 2010, 80). Following the Soviet propaganda's mantra of "unity of all communist parties under the leadership of the Soviet Union", Hungarian government attempted to divert the society's attention from repressions and persecutions against the participants of the revolt.

The trend toward a less restrictive approach to cultural diplomacy returned in the 1960s. Key goals of the foreign policy adopted by the government in Budapest included re-establishment or normalisation of bilateral relations with some Western countries, as well as putting an end to the debate over the so-called Hungarian issue. To do so, Hungary concluded several bilateral agreements on cultural and academic exchange with countries of Western Europe

that allowed Hungarian youth and scholars to undertake studies or research abroad, mostly in France (Ibidem, 94). Subsequent years saw the broadening of cultural centres network with new posts in East Berlin, Cairo, Helsinki and New Delhi. It is worth noting that these institutions were often located in spacious facilities in historical city centres - a fact that greatly facilitated successful organisation of various cultural projects, often accompanied by a film show.

One elements that stands out in Hungary's cultural diplomacy throughout the Cold War is the academic exchange. It has been continually emphasised and promoted over several decades, even though it often led to Hungarian scholars leaving their *alma mater* for extended periods of time. The government also supported initiatives to create chairs or institutes of Hungarian studies at universities abroad. As a result, the Hungarian language was taught both in Eastern and Western Europe. Budapest's efforts in this aspect have - particularly since the 1970s - been reciprocated by several Western European governments which undertook intense programmes of cultural diplomacy addressed at Hungary. These included invitations to academic exchange initiatives, such as the Fulbright programme launched in 1978.

Polish post-1945 cultural diplomacy was also noticeably "”dual purpose"” in its character. Reports sent by diplomatic posts do the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1950s and 1960s reveal that they could hardly focus on actual promotion of culture, since Warsaw expected them most of all to engage in propaganda. One example of this attitude was an instruction dispatched to one of the posts, urging its staff to ‘"organise lectures and discussions that would clarify our country's political and economic situation"”. The content of these politically motivated activities was diligently devised by officials in the Ministry, but usually failed to account for the specific cultural or social profile of the host country.

Although reports compiled for their superiors in Warsaw always emphasised strong focus on propaganda, the staff of Polish Culture and Information Centres did organise strictly cultural events, many of which were positively received in other Eastern Bloc countries. Concerts, film shows and meetings with Polish artists attracted a wide audience, including Poles living abroad. The network of Centres was enlarged by the addition of new branches in East Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Bratislava, Leipzig and Moscow, as well as in several Western European capitals: Stockholm, Paris and Vienna. This meant that together with the two branches established in the 1930s in Budapest and London, until 1989 Poland had eleven institutions acting as cultural diplomacy centres. However, the initiatives undertaken by posts located in Western Europe failed to attract interest from the citizens of host countries. Polish immigrants' communities in the West often avoided Centres altogether, treating them as mere loudspeakers of the communist regime they so hated.

For the government, the Centres provided the source of information on how its policy was perceived by foreign decision-makers and societies. Just one year after the opening of the Centre in Berlin, for example, its staff was tasked with reporting the reaction of German media and public opinion to the events of October 1956, which saw personal changes in the leadership of the Polish communist party and the beginning of De-Stalinisation in Poland.

Organisation of exhibitions, festivals, book fairs and concerts constituted another vital aspect of Polish cultural diplomacy, particularly in other Eastern Bloc states. While such events drew substantial audiences, they were always supervised by government-controlled institutions, while Polish artists travelling abroad were closely monitored by intelligence and counterintelligence services. In Western Europe, a vital contribution to the promotion of Polish culture came from artists who had previously immigrated from Poland. However, most of them were adamant about the fact they did not endorse the communist regime.

3. The 1989 shift and its consequences for Poland and Hungary's cultural diplomacy

The historical landscape and its dramatic change in 1989 were the dominant factors that shaped cultural diplomacy developed by Poland and Hungary during the 1990s. Both countries were now free to shape their political system and pursue their external interests through fully independent foreign policies. Both placed democratisation and creating closer ties with the West at the top of their priorities. However, while Polish government initially focused on external security and resolving the issue of Western borders, largely skipping over the promotion of the country's culture, the authorities in Budapest were quick to emphasise the need to shape a positive image of Hungary abroad.

The policy of promoting Poland abroad adopted by the government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 1989 proved rather ineffective. The country's successful political and economic transition into a free-market, democratic state - a feat definitely worthy of world's attention - could and should have been used to shape a positive image and spread knowledge about Poland. Unfortunately, the authorities failed to organise coherent informational activities that would capitalise on these circumstances. As a consequence, the democratic transition of the entire Central and Eastern Europe came to be associated primarily with the iconic image of the falling Berlin wall, while Poland's role and importance in this process remained largely overlooked. As Warsaw focused on external security and resetting bilateral relations with its neighbours, promotion through culture was absent from foreign policy priorities.

In the early 1990s the implementation of foreign policy tasks related to culture and science rested largely on the shoulders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1990, the structure of the Ministry included the Department of Cultural and Science Policy, as well as the Department of Press and Information. Additionally, some competences with regard to promoting Polish culture abroad were distributed among other parts of the government, particularly the Ministry of Culture. Responsibility for promoting scientific achievements, in turn, was later partly shifted to the Committee for Scientific Research and the Polish Academy of Sciences, as well as the Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland and the Foundation for Polish Science, together with several newly formed non-governmental bodies. The involvement of growing numbers of institutions was not accompanied by sufficient coordination of their activities. The resulting incoherence meant that, overall, Poland's cultural diplomacy had limited impact on its recipients, while its conduct still rested largely in the hands of the diplomatic service.

After 1989, Poland opened several centres for the promotion of its culture: in Rome (1992), Düsseldorf (1993), Minsk (1994) and Vilnius (1996). From 1994 onwards, both the new and the older branches functioned under the common name of Polish Institutes. However, while their number steadily grew, the intensity of their operations did not. With no unifying concept for the promotion of Polish culture and limited funding, some of them turned into something of community centres for local Polish diasporas, making use of the one resource they had in abundance - spacious facilities that often included concert halls, libraries, halls suitable for organising exhibitions or, in some cases, even small cinemas. The possibility of using all this infrastructure and administrative support was highly appreciated by many immigrant communities, who saw Institutes as animateurs of cultural life. Most Institutes used their resources to organise Polish language classes, although their efforts fell well short of what countries such as Great Britain or Germany were doing in the same respect. Usually, the Institutes operated predominantly within their own facilities, rarely (if at all) using cultural infrastructure available in their host countries.

4. Toward a new model of cultural diplomacy

The next challenge for diplomatic services of both countries was accession to the European Union. It was this goal that prompted the question of how Polish and Hungarian diplomats could and should shape the image of their homelands, as it was understood that a positive perception of the state and its citizens could contribute to the achievement of certain foreign policy-related goals. Both countries' accession to the Union depended on the approval of decision-makers and societies of the EU-15, but their image across Western Europe, often driven by stereotypes, prejudice or simply insufficient knowledge, remained largely negative. This forced Polish and Hungarian governments to undertake substantial efforts in this area and make the promotion of their respective states a vital foreign policy goal. One of the instruments to be used to that end was the popularisation of their cultural and scientific achievements.

At that time, the conduct of cultural diplomacy was also hampered by problems typical for all fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Cultural institutions (museums, art galleries, etc.) were suddenly subjected to the strain of economic efficiency which now applied to all tasks performed by the state. Similarly to other post-communist states, Poland decentralised and privatised the sector of culture. Together with lowered funding, this made it difficult for culture to thrive and be promoted abroad.

Similar processes occurred also in Hungary, although the possibility of privatising certain sectors of economy was accepted much earlier than in Poland - as early, in fact, as 1978. However, the timing of these early initiatives proved unfortunate, as they coincided with a worldwide economic recession that triggered a crisis in the financing system for culture. "In the 1990s, the third sector exploded and several foundations and associations assumed an important role in the production and support of cultural projects. During the period between 1998 and 2002 there was a recentralisation process, with culture enjoying one of the government's highest priority rankings. In 1993, the National Cultural Fund was established as an arm's length body to the ministry with the aim of financing cultural projects. Between 1993 and 2010 this fund was financed by a 1% cultural contribution paid on cultural goods and services, including advertising" (Ratzenböck, Okulski, Kopf, 2012, p.35).

The government in Budapest utilised the experience of its interwar period predecessors and put a lot of effort into developing academic and scientific exchange. Already existing programmes - for instance the aforementioned Fulbright, as well as DAAD and the Humboldt's Foundation programme (both supported by German authorities and in existence since late 1970s) - were very helpful in this respect (Meusburger 2001, p.13). "Hungary's most important advantage was that its new elite, promoted in the 1990s, had studied abroad and gathered international experience much earlier than that of most other communist states" (Ibidem, p. 15). Intensification of academic exchange was further facilitated by bilateral agreements on scientific cooperation that Hungary signed with over 30 different countries.[1] There were also new entities, such as the International Centre for Hungarology (ICH), created on the basis of a decree issued on 1st July 1989. ICH was an entirely new type of institution, with functions encompassing research on international education in Hungarology, exploration and analysis of the history, structure, programmes and methods used by research institutes abroad, development and maintenance of documentation to be used by the Centre and third parties, selection and publication of textbooks, lecture notes or other materials to be used in higher education (Kosa, 1991, p. 15). The government's efforts were aided by Hungarian diasporas in several countries, which actively supported the establishment of independent cultural and academic bodies. The Central European University, founded

[1] Essentially, their content was largely identical and focused on promoting and supporting direct co-operation, exchanges and joint research projects between the Academies, research institutes and institutions of higher education in the two countries. An exception to that rule was the agreement with Great Britain, which included regulations on cultural cooperation.

in 1991 by George Soros's foundation, solidified Hungary's reputation for substantial, well-developed capital of knowledge.[2]

Such broad support for academic exchange was not accompanied by equally strong efforts in other dimensions of cultural diplomacy, which at that point were largely limited to teaching the Hungarian language and organisation of cultural events. There was no single, coherent strategy, and the competences were distributed among too many government agencies. The Hungarian Ministry of Education and Culture was responsible for Hungarian culture and education inside and outside of Hungary. Academic exchange was managed by the International Centre of Hungarian Studies, founded in 1983 (until 1989 known as the Centre of Hungarian Lectures). The Centre coordinated the sending of visiting lecturers to foreign universities. Later on, it was also tasked with teaching the Hungarian language and culture to foreigners coming to study in Hungary (Kovacs 2005, p. 325). Nonetheless, the leading role in Hungary's cultural diplomacy was still played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - primarily by its Department of Culture and Science with its subordinate posts abroad. The latter entities grew in number over the course of the 1990s. Institutes of Hungarian culture were formed in Stuttgart, Bucharest, Bratislava, Tallin and London, while Collegium Hungaricum were established in Moscow and Belgrade. It is worth noting that the Ministry treated cultural diplomacy as an integral part of the entire foreign policy that is meant to facilitate the pursuit of foreign policy goals (Marton 2003, p.1).

1. Toward a new model of cultural diplomacy

In the second half of the 1990s, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to "reform cultural diplomacy" by differentiating its measures depending on the host country's sociological and cultural characteristics, cultural infrastructure and the attitude of its citizens toward Poland. The initiatives undertaken in the first stage of the reform - i.e. between 1998 and 2000 - encompassed three major areas. The first one referred to modifying and clarifying the division of competences between various bodies. The idea was to establish new entities with clearly devised scopes of responsibilities, but at the same time ensure the Ministry would oversee and coordinate all relevant efforts. The second one, linked closely to the new organisational model, was the issue of funding. The establishment of new entities called for increased funding, particularly for those institutions abroad directly involved in implementing cultural projects. The third one was related to the execution of tasks within cultural diplomacy. Poland's cultural institutions abroad (primarily Polish Institutes) were to be reorganised so as to shift the focus of their efforts from Polish diasporas to foreign societies. The entire profile of their operations and measures used to influence audiences in host countries was changed. Funding system, staff selection and training were also modified accordingly. Furthermore, diplomatic and consular missions and representatives were to become directly involved in the implementation of cultural and, later, also public, diplomacy. Altogether, the new model envisioned a much more open mode of operating, whereby most events and undertakings would be organised in cooperation with local partners, using the host country's cultural infrastructure. The Institutes were given the goal of broadening the audience of their projects. Although initially the execution of this phase was planned to end around 2000, the process is still continued today.

[2] It is worth noting that the Andrássy Gyula German-Language University of Budapest (AUB) was founded in 2001 and is the only exclusively German-language university outside the German-speaking countries. As a European University in Hungary, it is jointly funded by five partners (Germany, the Free State of Bavaria, the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg, Austria and Hungary) as well as Switzerland and the Autonomous Region of Trentino-South Tyrol.

As for Hungary, its forms and directions of cultural diplomacy remained the same until the beginning of the 21st century, with emphasis still on academic and scientific cooperation. The only notable change in other areas was the intensification of the so-called "Hungarian months" (periods of numerous concerts, exhibitions and meetings with artists) toward the end of the 1990s. These were organised by Collegium Hungaricum and Institutes of Hungarian Culture. Despite differing organisational forms, all these entities worked to promote Hungary's cultural heritage. However, their efforts lacked coherence due to excessive dispersion of competences and the emergence of new bodies that replaced some of the older ones. For instance, bilateral cultural agreements, usually in conjunction with educational and scientific cooperation, were managed by the cultural state secretariat of the Ministry of Human Resources. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was responsible for promoting the country abroad and supervising all posts (including, of course, embassies and consulates) abroad. This changed in 2002 with the formation of the Balassi Institute - a new government agency, tasked with coordinating all cultural diplomacy efforts. Since then, Hungary has been developing a more coherent network of bodies involved in this area and integrating cultural diplomacy with internal cultural policy.

Conclusion

In the early 1990s, both Poland and Hungary treated cultural diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy, but failed to grant it sufficient priority. This fact, together with difficulties typical for young democracies, meant their efforts in promoting their cultural heritage among other nations were fraught with certain shortcomings. Only when faced with the challenge of joining the European Union, governments in Warsaw and Budapest engaged in more coordinated and meaningful plans to creating their models of cultural diplomacy. The process of shaping these models is essentially still underway today, as indicated, for example, by very recent (2014) establishment of a dedicated Department of Cultural Diplomacy in Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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