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# Political Subjectivization between Identification and Dis-Identification – Understanding new social movements with Jacques Rancière

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After a short introduction I will present some important concepts in the work of Jacques Rancière (part 2). After that I concentrate especially on his work “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization” (1992) in order to understand the logic of political subjectivization as a “heterology, a logic of the other”<sup>1</sup>, mainly for three reasons, as Rancière writes: “First, it is never the simple assertion of an identity; it is always, at the same time, the denial of an identity given by an other, given by the ruling order of policy. Policy is about ‘right’ names, names that pin people down to their place and work. Politics is about ‘wrong’ names – misnomers that articulate a gap and connect with a wrong. Second, it is a demonstration, and a demonstration always supposes an other, even if that other refuses evidence or argument. [...] There is no consensus, no undamaged communication, no settlement of a wrong. But there is a polemical commonplace for the handling of a wrong and the demonstration of equality. Third, the logic of subjectivization always entails an impossible identification.”<sup>2</sup> (part 3). Starting from these more theoretical points I would like to argue in my forth part that more recent social movements are thoroughly affectively attuned assemblages that are characterized nonetheless by their preliminaryity and their unpredictability. Their members oscillate between moments of identification and dis-identification and expose themselves in their singularity. For example the idea of “urban communism” can function as a concrete materialization to the extent that in Occupy Wall Street questions of identity and alterity, and also issues of access and participation, are of central importance.

Key words: Subjectivization, Identification, Dis-identification, Social Movements, Occupy

## 1. Introduction

As we all know there is time for a change in society. Many problems have occurred during the last years, e.g. the climate change, the rising of social inequality, the success of new right and left-wing populism etc. These kinds of problems are not limited to the European societies but can be found all around the world. This kind of diagnosis is related to questions as the following ones: How can there be a transformation in society achieved? Who might be the actors in a “(post-) capitalistic” (Mason 2015) and often so-called “post-democratic” (Crouch 2004) world? My argument is: We cannot only rely on classical politics in order to think (and dream) of another society which will be more equal, sustainable and also in charge of social justice. Instead we have to look for new social innovations that mean: new social movements and projects. Therefore I present in this paper some ideas about new (postmodern) social movements and also new forms of community as one answer with regard to a possible change in future societies. I am convinced that (among others) the work of Jacques Rancière can provide some fruitful insights and this work can help us to understand how postmodern social movements function and how (and why) they may be limited. I will focus on the Occupy movement, not only because Rancière himself has commented on this movement as “the most interesting”<sup>3</sup> for what he defines radical democratic politics. As Isabell Lorey wrote: “It is this oxymoron between representation and democracy that characterizes the movements that arose in 2011. And it is this same oxymoron that structures the political philosophy of Jacques Rancière as well.”<sup>4</sup>

Overview:<sup>5</sup> After this short introduction I will present some important aspects in the work of Jacques Rancière (part 2). After that I concentrate especially on his work “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization” (Rancière 1992) in order to understand the logic of political subjectivization as a “heterology, a logic of the other”<sup>6</sup> (part 3). Starting from these more theoretical points I would like to argue in my forth part that more recent social movements are thoroughly affectively attuned assemblages that are characterized nonetheless by their preliminaryity and their unpredictability. Their members oscillate between moments of identification and dis-identification and expose themselves in their singularity. For example the idea of “urban communism” can function as a concrete materialization to the extent that in Occupy Wall Street questions of identity and alterity, and also issues of access and participation, are of central importance (part 4). In my conclusion I point out my main argument and I finish with some open questions (part 5).

## 2. Some important concepts in the work of Jacques Rancière

Unless I am mistaken, the French emeritus professor of philosophy Jacques Rancière (born in Algiers in 1940) is currently enjoying a dramatic rise in fame, especially in aesthetic and philosophical discursive contexts. But sociology or social theory – and this is the idea behind the following remarks – would also do well to try out the provocative theses of this “political philosopher”, influenced by Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser. I will therefore attempt to bring into play at

least three of Rancière's central concepts or philosophical starting points, using a sociological terminology. The processes of translation which this necessitates never go smoothly, something is always lost, but in my view the opportunity offered here is as follows. Philosophical/political reflections and sociological ways of explaining things do still (have to) differ, but – at least in the work of Rancière – they have a tangible meeting point: history, or to be more precise, the particular historical situation. This is what I would like to illustrate by means of three comparisons: firstly, dissensus and social integration, secondly, police/politics and social inequality, and thirdly, difference and community. It should be clear that a certain way of thinking the political provides the connecting framework for the ongoing reflections.

## 2.1 Dissensus and social integration

The first question to be asked is: What is the connection between politics and dissensus for Rancière? “The essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space. It is to make the world of its subjects and its operations seen. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one.”<sup>7</sup> In the field of politics, the political only ever occurs in the concrete, historical case (which can be described as practice); this then has to determine what actually constitutes commonality/the common, and who has a say in this context. The political thereby loses its generally assumed self-evidence. Unlike the political theory tradition influenced by liberal thinking or discourse ethics (prominently represented by Habermas 1984, 1987), Rancière's concept of the political is one of conflict, of dissonance, indeed of the polemical. Events in the realm of the political are determined not by communicative understanding (the counterfactually assumed ideal case), but by dispute, in French “le litige”. Political action and communication demand an intertwining of argument and metaphor; they thus possess a poetic-polemological dimension.

Rancière emphasizes another thing: in political conflict, at least two parties are at pains to create a common situation and to represent it. At precisely the point where a part of humanity is excluded from this situation, this ‘common’ or commonality – which Jean-Luc Nancy, with Derrida, reminds us of so often – must be described as increasingly precarious, especially in globalized conditions (Nancy 1991, 2007). This can only be articulated by thinking dissensus. To prevent misunderstandings and possible objections, it should be emphasized that the political dissensus evoked by Rancière is not a simple conflict of interests, opinions or values; instead it is a conflict about the common/commonality, about what is actually at stake on the political stage and what is not. Rancière summarizes with the observation: “The essence of politics is dissensus. Dissensus is not a confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself.”<sup>8</sup>

Sociological concepts which assume the primacy of identity rather than difference believe that it is possible to construct a community based on shared values – we can think here of Durkheim, but also of more recent communitarian approaches. If however, we assume with Rancière that dissensus plays a fundamental role in the determination of the common, precisely because it helps to make visible the ‘share of those who have no share’, then we have to think the process of social integration differently. On the one hand, social integration is decreed by hegemonial institutions (I will come to the police shortly), from above, by the state, but on the other hand social integration must be thought processual as being complemented from below. Only then do excluded groups have the right to appeal and to contradict, which helps us to conceive the political community overall as something which is open and can never be closed off or concluded (see also part 4)

## 2.2 Police and Politics

There is the nowadays famous and often discussed opposition between Police and Politics.<sup>9</sup> What does Rancière exactly mean by this? How does this way of thinking the police relate to social inequality and community? In his most important work to date, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (1998), Rancière argues for a sharp distinction between politics and police. Here he uses the term police to designate administration, order and state interventions. The traditional understanding of politics can be understood as a continuous situation or intervention (police, administration), and thus also in the sense of an institutional arrangement. These very institutions supplement, replace the actual void of the political.<sup>10</sup> Politics, as Rancière understands it, does not represent any order, any reason or any foundation. The political, on the other hand, exists, according to Rancière,

“(…) precisely in the narrow and hazardous space between two embodiments, in the space between the identities of the police distribution of functions and these new identities, in which every subjectification is threatened by the possibility of failing and of wanting to realize itself as the true and exclusive essence of the community.”<sup>11</sup>

For the political to be brought to life at all, Rancière continues, there has to be a place, a space in which police logic and egalitarian logic meet. In his book *Le Maître ignorant (The ignorant Schoolmaster)* (1991), originally published in 1987, one can find the example of the teacher Joseph Jacotot, whose teaching method Rancière uses not just to clarify his

postulate of a fundamental equality in intelligence, but also to show that equality, as a central desideratum of politics, can be realized. The act of realization associated with this must however – according to Rancière – remain a singular action, though this singular act of equality does not represent any form of social connection. As soon as equality, which for Rancière embodies the central concern of politics, attempts to occupy a place in the social and state organization, it turns into its opposite. Whenever intellectual emancipation is institutionalized, it is transformed into instruction of the people. It therefore becomes an institution ensuring their continued minority. An example which imposes itself here is the Bologna Process, initiated by the EU, and its consequences for the European educational sector as a whole. The formalization, standardization, unification and transferability of Europe-wide courses of study leads to a reversal of the idea of education, in which freedom, emancipation and creativity are lost, replaced by a governmental regime with a division into elite excellence on the one hand and superficial mass education on the other.<sup>12</sup>

## 2.3 Against the cementing of inequality in times of neoliberalism: difference and community

According to Rancière the modern principle of equality is not actually based on identity; instead he introduces difference as the experience of freedom. This equality, understood as a fundamental political concept, does not mean the homogenization of the world, but points to the uncertainty of human relations.<sup>13</sup> The democratic assertion of equality is not based on the identity of all, but on the possibility that anyone, any political being, can potentially be everything. This addresses the fact that a level must exist on which teacher and pupil, master and servant must be identical, if the relation of subordination between them is to work at all. The principle of political equality resists totalization, yet it is articulated in the mode of conflict, in the struggle of the disadvantaged for their share in the universal. So for example the struggle for recognition of women's equality should not be misunderstood as a plea for uniformization, and thus it does not mean that the citizen-subject has an abstract identity beyond sexual difference.

Rancière does not identify equality with an abstract (philosophical) principle; instead he aims to present it using certain historic experiences as examples. A good example is the already mentioned teacher Jacotot in “The Ignorant Schoolmaster” (1991): Jacotot taught his pupils something which he himself did not have complete command of; a further example from the same book is the figure of Menenius Agrippa. I will elaborate somewhat on one of these historic examples with regard to community and equality. A brief word on the historical background: In 1968, on the occasion of the unrest surrounding May 1968, a French minister declared that the student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit should keep out of the events, since he was only a German Jew. The response of the student movement is well known: ‘Nous sommes tous des juifs allemands’, in English: ‘We are all German Jews’. What are people who say something like this doing? They are including in the community, as an indefinite ‘we’, the person who, by virtue of being a German Jew, is supposed to remain excluded. They are behaving as though they were German Jews and are thereby saying: ‘If you have negotiated with us, then you have also just negotiated with those you wanted to exclude from the negotiations. Therefore you have already shown your agreement with the thing you are contesting: the right of German Jews to be involved in this conflict. By negotiating with us, you have already accepted the indefinite equality of the students with all German Jews, the equality of every German Jew with all the students!’<sup>14</sup>

Important to note: We see here that, for Rancière, political conflict is always about the creation of a common situation, at the exact point where a part of humanity has previously been excluded from this. In this example an attempt was made by the French political authorities to exclude Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the charismatic leader of the student revolt in France. So what does this mean for a (sociological) way of thinking community? Whoever speaks out politically, whether it is an individual or a collective, creates the community of those present and those absent, and speaks in its name. In the example it is the German Jews who are denied speech and even (political) presence. As in the work of Jean Luc Nancy, however, the alterity of the members of the political community does not contribute to neutralization in union.<sup>15</sup> In this respect Rancière, thus inscribing himself into the French discourse on alterity, is concerned with a double difference – that of the community from itself and that in the self – and the assertion of political equality revolves around precisely these two elements.<sup>16</sup> I would now look closer to Rancière's thinking of community.

## 3. Community and Subjectivization

### 3.1 Thinking Community

One could say that there exist at least two different approaches in thinking and conceptualizing community. On the one hand there are the more empirical and often sociological and political approaches (Anderson 1983) which refer to Ferdinand Tönnies (2002) and Max Weber (1978). The aesthetic-poetic approaches pursued by Giorgio Agamben, Jean

Luc Nancy, and Jacques Rancière contain an eminently political dimension. Starting from a radical and ultimately ineluctable equality of all, Jacques Rancière thinks of political conflict as a manifestation of at least two parties that encounter one another in the production of a common situation, frequently belligerently and anything but voluntarily. In that process, “La part des sans-part” (“the share of the shareless”) plays a central role insofar as it struggles for potential participation, not least of all because it is at risk of exclusion and non-sharing:

“Whoever has no part – the poor of the ancient times, the third estate, the modern proletariat – cannot in fact have any part other than all or nothing. On top of this, it is through the existence of this part of those who have no part, of this nothing that is all, that the community exists as a political community – that is, as divided by a fundamental dispute, by a dispute to do with the counting of the community’s parts even more than of their ‘rights’. The people are not one class among others. They are the class of the wrong that harms the community and establishes it as a ‘community’ of the just and the unjust.”<sup>17</sup>

Speaking for others in accordance with (democratic) representation also comes up for criticism here because there is a danger of appearing on the political stage as a representative of (groups of) others and not meeting their singular demands in the process, for instance when the state-organized police (as an element of the political) represent order and deny or exclude un-orderly demands by non-established groups. Also important for Rancière is the assumption that politics means always ‘dividing the people’. ‘Normal participation’ is not enough because this kind of participation stands for consensus-oriented politics which comes close to that what Rancière calls ‘police’. Genuine participation’ differs for example from an identity-based politics of recognition and, important to note, needs another thinking of community than e.g. an “imagined community”<sup>18</sup> developed by Benedict Anderson. As Rancière mentions: “the community of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social institution. It is tied to the act of its own verification, which is forever in need of reiteration.”<sup>19</sup>

### 3.2. Subjectivization

Subjectivization as Rancière thinks it creates permanently a subject which oscillates between identification and disidentification. It’s a subject in the process of becoming. We have to think this becoming of a subject as a political process: “A politics of subjectivation corresponds to this, which in the break with the police order of representation means a ‘politics as disidentification’ [...]. This subjectivation through disidentification appears on the stage of politics [...].”<sup>20</sup> Following this argumentation Keith Bassett writes in his inspiring work on Rancière with regard to politics and subjectivization:

“Furthermore, by its very nature, such a politics cannot be defined on the basis of preexisting subjects (those who occupy places in the police order). A genuinely political struggle is thus not a struggle for identity by pre-given subjects or classes (this would simply involve a reclassification within the police order) – it is the collective action through which one becomes a subject. Such a subjectification process involves both a ‘disidentification’ with the existing order, and the emergence of a new subject name different from any already identified part of that order.”<sup>21</sup>

And here we can already draw some connections to the Occupy movement, because generally spoken “no identity, closed and exclusive ‘We’ was accepted on these movements”,<sup>22</sup> as e.g. Isabell Lory pointed out. Rancière conceptualizes a subject which one can find in the streets, in assemblies, and even in communities

“born of nothing but democracy itself. [...] it is the continual renewal of the actors and of the forms of their actions, the ever open possibility of the fresh emergence of this fleeting subject. The test of democracy must ever be in democracy’s own image: versatile, sporadic – and founded on trust.”<sup>23</sup>

The proclaimed alterity of the members of the political community does not abolish this directly through unification but it does ensure the possibility of a debate. Community is therefore seen as inherently different just as its members must be conceived of as inherently different. Rancière shows in “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization” (1992) how he tries to understand the logic of political subjectivization as a “heterology, a logic of the other”<sup>24</sup>, mainly for three reasons:

“First, it is never the simple assertion of an identity; it is always, at the same time, the denial of an identity given by an other, given by the ruling order of policy. Policy is about ‘right’ names, names that pin people down to their place and work. Politics is about ‘wrong’ names – misnomers that articulate a gap and connect with a wrong. Second, it is a demonstration, and a demonstration always supposes an other, even if that other refuses evidence or argument. [...] There is no consensus, no undamaged communication, no settlement of a wrong. But there is a polemical commonplace for the handling of a wrong and the demonstration of equality. Third, the logic of subjectivization always entails an impossible identification.”<sup>25</sup>

Policy tries to establish identities and control these constructed identities right after, while (real) politics refuses an identification or wants even to interrupt constructed identities in the name of a wrong (“le tort”). Rancière relies on the ‘polemical commonplace’, a kind of political stage where equality is a founding assumption. On this stage different claims should be articulated. A full identification is impossible because any kind of subjectivization implies power, resistance and a lack of fulfilment.

#### 4. Occupy: A Postmodern Social Movement?<sup>26</sup>

Occupy was a (protest) movement that appeared on the scene with Occupy Wall Street and the occupation of Zuccotti Park in New York City on September 17, 2011 and would (seemingly) disappear again just as quickly. The enduring impact of Occupy Wall Street is indisputable insofar as the problematic of increasing social inequality has been (likewise increasingly) on the political and national agenda. There exists also a fundamental distrust with regard to the political form of the representative democracy. As has been written on a flyer of Occupy Wall Street (2012):

“Since we can no longer trust our elected representatives to represent us rather than their large donors, we are creating a microcosm of what democracy really looks like. We do this to inspire one another to speak up. It is a reminder to our representatives and the moneyed interests that direct them: we the people still know our power.”<sup>27</sup>

Just to remember: Occupy was never limited to a single country. Instead, movement hot spots followed in various cities around the world. Characteristics that might be defined as ‘postmodern’ can be identified due to the activation of the network structure of the internet, which is famously oriented to the principles of structural indeterminacy, essentially endless expansion, sustainability, and distribution of intensities as well as the rejection of any center and hierarchies. The uncanny thing about this postmodern movement is precisely its ghostly appearance and disappearance (which was forced by the police). In other words, Occupy can become active again at any time anywhere in the world – and that is precisely what makes the movement so difficult for the political establishment to contend with. In connection with this, the American literary scholar Richard Grusin uses the expression “premediation of financial market clientele”:

“#occupywallstreet opens up paths to potential futures in which the occupation of Wall Street (or the political occupation of other sites) is actualized. No matter what its goals, tactics or conclusion, #occupywallstreet successfully premediated the future occupation of Wall Street, even though such an occupation may never happen again.”<sup>28</sup>

The preparation of such possibilities is one of Occupy’s important (and enduring) merits because they mean that future movements can inscribe themselves in that affective-emotional and politically prepared field and benefit from the occupations that preceded them. And if that is not enough, there is more. Occupy’s targeted occupations pointed out the grievances of the world. This has to do with the matter of another critical (counter-) public, as has become characteristic and significant for present-day societies. The authors Mörtenböck and Mooshammer (2012), for example, argue that regardless of the numerous actions and interventions in the urban field, a crisis of representation of the public sphere has become evident and can be felt at urban protests. On one hand, it appears to be rooted in the altered interplay of real and symbolic spaces in the constitution of the public sphere and, on the other hand, it is due to the fact that the contemporary concentration of power in the economy effortlessly succeeds at accessing the (non-economic) representation of our coexistence. Both phenomena are occasions to consider the likelihood of a self-determined ‘protest public’ that does not comply with the rules of the financial markets. Occupy managed to penetrate public consciousness with the slogan “We are the 99%”. It is interesting that the movements that arose with and from Occupy are less concerned with concrete political demands (for which Occupy was promptly criticized by the political establishment) than with the transformation of public space into a political common. For Grusin, it is precisely “because of the virtuality and resistance to the formulation of specific demands or establishing a platform”<sup>29</sup> that lasting success can be attributed to Occupy. Judith Butler also sees a collective emergence as an essential aspect, for instance in the way that political demands are articulated without pursuing hasty consensus-based demands.<sup>30</sup> But in difference to Rancière she focusses in her newer work on a “Performative Theory of assembly”<sup>31</sup> which seems to be important for an understanding of postmodern social movements as Occupy. But the crucial question remains: What links the Occupy movement with the work of Rancière? I would like to summarize (and condense) five points which Keith Bassett lists in his aforementioned article:<sup>32</sup>

- (1) Both, Occupy and Rancière, keep the distance to “identity politics” and “consensual party politics”<sup>33</sup>
- (2) A strong belief in radical equality from the beginning and no hierarchies and therefore ‘flat’ organizations.
- (3) Occupy seems to be an example for what Rancière calls “insubstantial communities”.
- (4) “In the Rancièran sense, new ‘in-between’ subjectivities emerged in the gap between identity in the police order and active, daily participation in a ‘presentist democracy’ (Lorey 2014)”<sup>34</sup>
- (5) The street, the square and other open places (of the public) are the places where politics emerges and a dissensus is articulated.

## 5. Conclusion

To summarize, we can conceive of Occupy as a postmodern movement and address the essential motifs of the previously introduced Rancièran philosophical discourse. Alongside the structural indeterminacy of the community movement and its members (alterity), the ideas of contiguity and contingency arise. The (apparently) incidental and therefore unpredictable in community formation is just as evident as the emphasis on the spatial-temporal juxtaposition of singularities as most clearly expressed in ideas of an “insubstantial community”. The politico-aesthetic dimension manifests itself in concrete, on-site (protest) actions, i.e., in concrete occupations, discussion forums, etc. Following once again the argumentation presented by Keith Bassett, Rancières impact here is obvious: His understanding of

“politics has a much more dynamic and central role as a driver of democratic debate and political subjectivization, revolving around the axiom of radical equality, which by its nature continuously questions and destabilizes any consensual order. [...] Such a dissensual politics can be seen as a minimal requirement for any genuine, democratic politics whose central dynamic is this continuous opening up of new spaces for new voices and subjectivities powered by egalitarian logic.”<sup>35</sup>

Of course, some open questions still remain:

- (1) First, can there be a real change with a movement (comparable to the Occupy movement) which is rather ‘fragile’, ‘non-identical’, and which forms a kind of ‘insubstantial community’ against state oppression?
- (2) How can (or radically put: should) a movement be represented without falling into the logic of the police and the mechanisms of the state?
- (3) Is the ‘weakness’ of Occupy a weakness or is it – what Rancière seems to believe – a strength in a political sense?
- (4) What kind of institutionalized practices and structures are necessary to maintain postmodern social movements? (Difference between anarchy – institution)

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### Short bio-note on the author:

PD Dr. Dietmar J. Wetzel is a private lecturer and senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Basel. He has been habilitated at the Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena in 2012. Among his most relevant contributions to the topics of (dis-)identification, identity and alterity and community is his book *Diskurse des Politischen. Zwischen Re- und Dekonstruktion* (München, Fink 2003), which develops an ethic-political interpretation of community, justice, gender and the role of the third. Wetzel's work concentrates permanent on ethics, politics, social theories, economic and cultural sociology and he is the editor of *Perspektiven der Aufklärung – zwischen Mythos und Realität* (München, Fink 2012) and of *Soziologie des Wettbewerbs – eine kultur- und wirtschaftssoziologische Studie zur Marktgesellschaft* (Wiesbaden, Springer VS 2013). He is the co-author, with Thomas Claviez, of the first German introduction to the work of Jacques Rancière, *Zur Aktualität von Jacques Rancière* (Wiesbaden, Springer VS 2016). He has also given numerous talks on the topics of identity, alterity, and community.

<sup>1</sup> Jacques Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization." *October* 61 (1992): 62.

<sup>2</sup> Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 62.

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Rancière, "L'élection, ce n'est pas la démocratie", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 28. May, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Isabell Lorey, "The 2011 Occupy Movements: Rancière and the Crisis of Democracy." *Theory, Culture & Society* 31 (2014): 1–23.

<sup>5</sup> Personal remark: I would like to add that I am very interested in the work and texts of Rancière since many years (Wetzel/Claviez 2016). I also work for almost fifteen years now on the subjects "community", "social movements" and "life forms" (Wetzel 2003, 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 62.

<sup>7</sup> Jacques Rancière, *On Politics and Aesthetics*. Edited and Translated by Steven Corcoran. (London: Continuum, 2010), 37.

<sup>8</sup> Rancière, *On Politics and Aesthetics*, 38.

<sup>9</sup> I agree with Keith Bassett (among others) that there is no clear and absolute distinction between politics and the police: "Politics and police cannot be reduced to opposition between 'spontaneity and institution' (Rancière 2011: 249) but reflect a complex interaction between two different logics." (Bassett 2014: 894).

<sup>10</sup> See here the important work of Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*. Translated by David Macey (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

<sup>11</sup> Jacques Rancière, "Gibt es eine politische Philosophie? In *Politik der Wahrheit*, edited by Rado Riha (Wien: Turia + Kant, 1997), 72–73, my own translation).

<sup>12</sup> See Dietmar J. Wetzel, *Soziologie des Wettbewerbs. Eine kultur- und wirtschaftssoziologische Analyse der Marktgesellschaft* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), 63–102.

<sup>13</sup> Christian Ruby, *L'interruption. Jacques Rancière et la politique* (Paris: La Fabrique éditions, 2009), 9.



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- <sup>14</sup> See Antonia Birnbaum, "Die unbestimmte Gleichheit. Jacques Rancières Entwurf einer Ästhetik der Politik." In *Von Michel Serres bis Julia Kristeva*, edited by Joseph Jurt (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1999), 204 f.
- <sup>15</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*. Edited by Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
- <sup>16</sup> See Dietmar J. Wetzl, "Gemeinschaft – oder: vom Unteilbaren des geteilten Miteinanders." In *Poststrukturalistische Soziologien*, edited by Stephan Moebius and Andreas Reckwitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 43f.
- <sup>17</sup> Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 9.
- <sup>18</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
- <sup>19</sup> Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics* (London: Verso, 2007), 84.
- <sup>20</sup> Lorey, "The 2011 Occupy Movements: Rancière and the Crisis of Democracy," 10.
- <sup>21</sup> Keith Bassett, "Rancière, politics, and the Occupy Movement." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32 (2014): 887.
- <sup>22</sup> Lorey, "The 2011 Occupy Movements: Rancière and the Crisis of Democracy," 5.
- <sup>23</sup> Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*, 61.
- <sup>24</sup> Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 62.
- <sup>25</sup> Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 62.
- <sup>26</sup> I refer in this part to my work „Two Examples of recent aesthetic-political forms of community: Occupy and sharing economy, in: Claviez, Thomas (ed.), *The Common Growl*. New York: Fordham, 159-173.
- <sup>27</sup> Occupy Wall Street. 2012. What is Occupy Wall Street? Why are we here today talking? What is the problem we are trying to address? Flyer distributed in New York in April 2012.
- <sup>28</sup> Richard Grusin, "Die Prämediation von Finanzmarktpublika: Der Fall #occupywallstreet." In *Finanzmarktpublika. Moralität, Krisen und Teilhabe in der ökonomischen Moderne* edited by Langenohl, Andreas and Dietmar J. Wetzl (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2014), 221, my translation.
- <sup>29</sup> Richard Grusin, "Die Prämediation von Finanzmarktpublika: Der Fall #occupywallstreet.", 221.
- <sup>30</sup> See Judith Butler, "For and Against Precarity: tidal – Occupy Theory." *Occupy Strategy*: 1 (2011): 12f.
- <sup>31</sup> Judith Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 154f.
- <sup>32</sup> Keith Bassett, "Rancière, politics, and the Occupy Movement," 892–893.
- <sup>33</sup> Keith Bassett, "Rancière, politics, and the Occupy Movement," 892.
- <sup>34</sup> Keith Bassett, "Rancière, politics, and the Occupy Movement," 893.
- <sup>35</sup> Keith Bassett, "Rancière, politics, and the Occupy Movement," 899.