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Title: Self/Other and Nation-State Identities: the Case of the Special Relationship and the Syrian Conflict
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Abstract

This paper examines nation-state identity construction through the lens of the Self and Other nexus. In doing so, we have chosen to focus on the Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom and how the Syrian conflict configures Self-Other identity constructions of the alliance. Although taken for granted, the UK-US[1] alliance is neither unproblematic nor uncontestable, particularly during times of conflict or crisis. Three conceptual approaches are employed. First, through a discourse analytic approach, political elite perceptions uncover patterns of language or discourses in which each state has a certain meaning or role for the other. Secondly, nation-state identities are articulated through such patterns. Finally, these identities can be amalgamated to produce US-UK Others. These symbolize the roles each state is perceived to have by the other and elucidate complimentary and conflictual Self-Other configurations. These structures we categorize as friendly, non-radical and radical Others.

Using an inductive, qualitative approach, we have examined key British and American political spokespeople from parliamentary debates, presidential/prime ministerial speeches and formal official addresses covering the period 2011 to 2015. Identity-based statements have been extrapolated for meaning and interpreted using a discourse analytic method utilizing predication (the meaning attributed to who the states are), presupposition (the background knowledge assumed to exist) and subject positioning (how the meanings relate to one another).

Here we present the findings of this analysis and they can be summarized as follows:
- Both states imbue the other with agency created the conditions of a 'logic of intervention'.
- Values rather than interests continue to forge the alliance although such perceptions have more dominance for the US readings of Britain.
- The traditional political values of democracy, rule of law and freedoms have given way to human values based on humanitarian aid, assistance and refugee support.
- UK multilateralism is sometimes at odds with US unilateralism with fears attached to regional instability.
- America's militarist identity creates tensions in the UK-US alliance.

Key Words

Introduction

With a wealth of scholarship on the composition, impact and effects of identity, its study has become a permanent, invaluable and information-rich area of investigation. Within the discipline of International Relations, identities have also become more and more the window from which to peer into the political soul. Identities determine the character and subsequent behaviour of IR-dominant actors including, most prominently, states but also transnational organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and the like. As Wendt has elaborated, "…interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is."[2]

The process of othering, however, has perhaps not permeated the political landscape of identity with quite the same vigour as it has other disciplines. De Buitrago labels othering as functioning at the margins of IR work and its underexposure may well be due to its location at the crossing of other fields.[3] In addition, when it is employed, othering has been dominated by a radical reading; namely, that the Self is configured via the Other as a mirror image of oppositional values, beliefs and structures. Common binaries may include, for example, civilized vs. uncivilized, modern vs. traditional, rational vs. irrational, and so on.

Why do IR explanations when analysing identity resort to radical othering? Principally, due to the predominance of the state. Weber, in 1918, defined the state as any "…human community that successfully claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."[4] As the recognized authority in waging war, states have been a powerful producer of identities, particularly national identities, which are closely aligned to Self/Other perceptions. As Black has stated:

'State'-building generally required, and led to, war and also was based on medieval structures and practices that included a eulogization of violence. War was very important, not only in determining which dynasties controlled which lands, or where boundaries should be drawn, but in creating the sense of 'us' and 'them' which was, and is, so important to the growth of any kind of patriotism.[5]

As such, more than naturally occurring phenomena within the realist mould, war "…is a major aspect of *being*, it emerges as a production, maintenance, and reproduction of the virtuous self, a way (for men) to achieve an ideal form of subjectivity."[6] War is, therefore, not what a state does but what a state is. States, as key determiners of international affairs, have defined the strengths of their superiority and values through a system of othering that are acted out most potently in conflict.

What about states that have less than antagonistic relations with one another? States that have not defined their histories through conflict with one another or, at least, have not engaged in hostilities for a long time? Friends as well as foes also play out the practices of identity construction and othering. To explore what can be called "…different kinds of difference: more or less exclusive, antagonistic and violent ones",[7] we focus on the Special Relationship – the historical alliance between the US and UK – during the

Syrian conflict. Although it has been argued that mythdom, emotionalism and even self-delusion hound the Special Relationship, it has none the less functioned as a significant foreign policy anchor even if far more so from the British perspective. Historical references attest to this. Popularized by Winston Churchill in 1946 as a plea against American isolationism, the phrase has metamorphosed many times. From "kindred systems of society"[8] envisaged by Churchill, to then Vice President Richard Nixon's accusation of Britain's ill-fated 1956 Suez policy that "reflect the colonial tradition."[9] From the Thatcher-Reagan "sentimental relationship"[10] to the "essential relationship"[11] during the Cameron-Obama administrations. Most recently, in January 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May became the first foreign leader to meet the newly elected President Donald Trump, and the meeting produced broad agreements over economic sanctions against Russia, trade, defence and even underscored US support for British withdrawal from the European Union. Even if not uniquely special, the relationship appeared far from moribund.

However, a preoccupation about arguing what the Special Relationship is can be circumvented by an examination of the nation-state identities of the two states and their grouping around the Self/Other nexus. It is these identities that construct whatever the relationship is or isn't. A myriad of historical events has shaped both states. Dramatic events or critical junctures force statespeople to articulate images of the other. We have taken the Syrian conflict as the event by which each state constructs the other's identity. The choice of Syria is threefold. First, as a present-day conflict, it enables us to draw a contemporary analysis of what the current relationship is between the US and UK is. Second is its impact. A medievalist enemy in the form of the so-called Islamic State, a horrific body count mounting to an estimated 500,000 people,[12] biblical-sized migrations of people impacting on Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Germany and elsewhere, and jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks taking place in Europe, North America and the Middle East which have popularized anti-immigration parties in Europe and galvanized vigorous debate on questions of identity, multiculturalism, Islam and security. Finally, starting as a civil war, the conflict quickly spread into the international sphere and hosts a range of domestic, regional and international actors all vying for influence. As such, Syria functions as an "arena for strategic competition"[13] in which states play out their roles according to competing identities. The conflict – much like the first Gulf War of the 1990s and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s – has become the struggle that has effectively defined the decade. As such, the globalization of the conflict has caused the Special Relationship, amongst of course many other alliances, to redefine what it is in terms of values and in terms of how to respond to such a worldwide threat. Syria is the means to 'test the water' of how the relationship embodies complementing and conflicting Anglo-American nation-state identities.

Our research question asks how the Syrian conflict constructs the Special Relationship in the light of Self/Other relations. It proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the methodological steps taken. Then, we present the empirical findings by grouping the nation-state identities into three categories of othering: friendly, non-radical and radical. These three configurations are defined and then discussed. The results are then summarized in *Figure One*. The conclusion summarizes the outcomes and reiterates the patterns of commonality and difference between the two states. Finally, we highlight the contributions of such an approach.

Methodology

Prominent spokespeople, or official discourses,[14] are employed in this study as such individuals are closest to the instruments of policy; i.e. party elites, "have always been major vehicles for the transmission of ideas".[15] High ranking political figures articulate perceptions of the nation and the state, or nation-state identities. These identities, therefore, are readings of both what the state as a political unit and the nation as a cultural one are. In terms of how British spokespeople construct certain US identities, House of Commons and House of Lords debates, presidential/prime ministerial speeches and formal addresses by foreign secretaries are utilized. These total 77 sources. For American perceptions of Britain, secretaries of state and other officials at the departments of state and defence have been employed. These amount to 39 sources. The search criteria range from March 2011, when the Syrian conflict started, up to the end of 2015. Key word searches included 'Syria' linked to 'UK', 'Britain', 'US', 'USA' and 'America'. Only statements directly relating to the war and revealing meanings about the nation and/or the state have been extracted.

These statements have been grouped together to produce patterns of language or discourses. This grouping is based on a threefold discursive approach presented by Doty in her analysis of US identity construction of the Philippines.[16] First, the speeches are analyzed to extract predicates, nouns, verbs and other word parts that give the Other meaning. Second, presupposition employs the background knowledge that is taken for granted. Such context enables us to understand the world within which the Self and Other function. Finally, subject positioning situate the meanings in relation to one another to build a picture of how such connotations relate to one another. These practices taken together construct a number of identities.

These nation-state identities are italicized in the empirical section for clearness. Naturally, one or two utterances of an identity-grounded observation is not in itself a nation-state identity. As such, only those meanings that are recapitulated are included as identities. From these nation-state identities, configured by how each state perceives the other, we amalgamate such findings into composite Others: ideal type nation-state perceptions. These are highlighted in bold in the text again for the purposes of clarity. We summarize all of these findings within *Figure One*. Finally, our methodology is inductive and interpretive. By interpreting the data, and taking note of the inherent fluidity and instability of identities, we create a recent snapshot of how the Special Relationship is defined though the Syrian conflict and how the bond encompasses configurations of similarity and difference between the two states' identities.

Friendly Othering

Friendly othering can be defined as a set of practices creating a clear association between Self and Other. Friendly Othering can thus be both inclusive and exclusive, while other forms of Othering directly target the latter. This means that in the process of identification, the Self does not discriminate against elements that make the Other a distinct entity. In other words, similarities are far

more important than differences when forging the sense of the Self. There may be references to common and shared values, culture and interests. What is more, such linking draws upon historical bonds of friendship to suggest that such a closeness is not merely context specific or based on here-and-now factors, but stretches back to a deeply embedded past. In addition, friendly othering may include a far more potent malevolent Other which has the impact of binding Self to Other in dealing with the existential threat.[17] In our case study, from the perspective of the history of the Special Relationship, the alliance during the Second World War is an obvious example of this concept.

Firstly, a sense of agency is completely naturalised. That is, both states are perceived as possessive of influence and the alliance is the means to strengthen each state's impact. References to a coalition are abundant with the term 'ally' deeply embedded and the US constructing Britain also as a 'friend'. The conflict in Syria is cultivated as simply one more event in a series of shared histories in which the alliance is inexorable. The British Foreign Secretary at the time remarked that "…our defence will always be anchored in our unbreakable alliance with the United States of America and in the primacy of NATO."[18] Similarly, his US counterpart, John Kerry, echoed the same: "…the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States is really never more prominent than it is right now at this period where we are cooperating on so many different challenges all at the same time."[19]

Secondly, both states view the other as defined by a noticeable humanitarian role. That is, each state constructs the other as a paternalistic entity in which we see a shift away from state to human security. Many statements refer to both states as the world's largest contributors of aid and there is a fusion not merely of interests – the need to address the humanitarian cost of the tragedy based on issues of regional instability, but of values – that ameliorating human suffering through aid, assistance and refugee support is who the states are. Traditional political values, perhaps most obviously democracy, rule of law and indelible freedoms, have given way to human values. The Special Relationship, therefore, becomes characterized as an "alliance of values".[20]

Britain constructs the US as having a number of identities closely aligned to Britain's sense of Self. America is an *ally*, *civilian protector*, *codependent*, *defender* and *historical partner*. Its codependency is due to the perception that British support helps or enables a proactive United States to function. Taking place against background British fears of unilateralist military responses, the US can be influenced and bolstered. The historical partner motif is deeply embedded. As one Conservative minister said during a 2013 House of Commons debate, "…the special relationship is economically, socially and historically beyond single events."[21] Nation-state identities cultivated by US elites construe Britain as an *ally*, *civilian protector*, *driven by ideals*, *ethical* and *friend*. The dominant status each state has of the other leads to a 'logic of intervention' in which military involvement must naturally include both states. Minor differences might focus on how the US slightly sentimentalizes the Special Relationship. Britain, therefore, tends to construct US identity in more instrumental terms; that the Special Relationship is defined more through common interests whereas the US perceives the UK in slightly more sentimental and ethical terms. Nonetheless, friendly othering permeates the perceptions each state has of the other. There are clear linkages of historical similarity, solidarity and partnership. Consequently, an amalgam of the various identities produce US as a **cosmopolitan security ally** and the UK as a **transatlantic cosmopolitan security ally**. Cosmopolitan refers to the promotion of human welfare and the promotion of humanitarian efforts. The security-based nature of the alliance is telling. The potency of the relationship comes to the fore when conflict occurs. It is war that solidifies the alliance, not peace. Finally, the transatlantic nature of the British Other is based on its geographical position. America, one might argue, actually has several special relationships dotted around the globe. However, its view of Britain is lodged uniquely within America's historical commitment to Europe.

Non-radical Othering

Non-radical othering can be characterized as a process of mild differentiation. Patterns of cooperation and agreement certainly exist focusing on what the Other and Self share, but such configurations function with major qualifications that exclude what the Self is not. There is collaboration between Self and Other whilst each retains its independence and sovereign decision making. Altercasting, persuasion and pressure are also typical. Such an example might be Britain's policy towards the US during the 1960s. The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson resisted the appeals from President Johnson to send British troops to Vietnam despite the fact that Britain supported US foreign policy in relation to the containment of Communism.

A principal tension exists over the role the US has in Syria. Britain configures America as the natural leader; Syria as a conflict within which the United States, due to its superpowerdom, must be logically drawn. The US, from the British perspective however, appears unstable and rudderless. For example, a Conservative Minister stated that "President Obama, who has been hugely reluctant to be involved, in any way, militarily in Syria, has nevertheless been persuaded",[22] with Lord Ashdown, former leader of the Liberal Democrats, castigating the American leader as "…nervous, hesitant and cautious".[23] The frustration stems from the way the UK constructs an American power headed by an administration that is abrogating its global responsibility.

Identity agreements exist in terms of how both the US and UK see the need for a network of other states and powers to tackle the forces ripping Syria apart. Fears of unilateralist action, and concerns over Middle East interference with the shadow of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq undoubtedly looming, galvanize both states to support a global coalition. NATO, the UN, France, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states and particularly Iran and Russia due to their support of the Assad government all play a major role. Thus, rather than a regional conflict, the war has become globalized with the Special Relationship perceived as having a defining role in galvanizing international support for the conflict's resolution. As President Obama announced in separate statements at the end of 2015, "We look forward to having British forces flying with the Coalition over Syria"[24] and "Just as the United states is doing more in this fight – just as our allies France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Australia and Italy are doing more – so must others."[25] As such, Britain configures the US as an entity that can be influenced and shaped by itself whereas America sees Britain as having a notable although by no means necessarily leading role in the conflict.

To sum up, Britain construes the US as being a *global actor*, *malleable*, *pragmatist*, *role model* and *unstable*. US power is unquestionable although doubts relate more to American leadership. The US has the potential to function as role model for resolving international conflict, as a global galvanizer to settle disputes, but such capacity must be influenced by other states including Britain. The US constructs Britain as a *balancer*, *cooperator*, and *global actor* as well as being *rational* and *unified*. As a balancer, Britain is able to counter threats whilst its cooperator and global actor statuses enable it to be an agent to animate a badly needed consensus of regional and global commitment to the Syria campaign. As a unified and rational actor, Britain's contributions are seen as strategically significant and legitimate. As such, a composite of the identities produces a US as a **coalition leader** and a UK as a **coalition builder**. The process of othering produces some notable commonalities about how each defines the other in terms its role. The necessity of each being part of a broader coalition sits once again against the backdrop of fears over unilateralist responses and the broader anxiety over producing another Iraq. American power is naturalized as the global leader due to its capacities and capabilities but the governance of such a leviathan is questioned. In short, does the US leadership possess the will to carry out America's historical role?

Radical Othering

Radical othering depicts clear patterns of dichotomization and the 'enemy Other'. This form of othering is the most distinctive way of excluding what the Self is not. Clear nexuses of difference position the Self unambiguously in contrast to the Other. Such divergences might also be indicative of shifting identities and realities. Despite the notion of radical othering being attached to enemy images, it can also play out less violently although be no less indicative of difference. For example, the 1956 Suez Crisis, with what Bially Mattern very aptly labels the British lion and American eagle identities, revealed unquestionably how the British Self or "the going" had been supplanted by the American Other or "the coming".[26]

Patterns of difference cluster around two dominant identity clashes. The primary friction concerns the issue of militarism. From the UK perception, armed responses are demonized in three important ways. Firstly, such reactions are seen as destabilizing, counterproductive and neo-colonialist. One Labour party member argued that "…the idea of the west on its own – America and Britain – taking a war to the middle east is completely wrong".[27] Secondly, military action is simply seen as unpopular by the vast majority of states. As Jeremy Corbyn remonstrated in 2013 when asking the Prime Minister if he had told President Obama and Secretary Kerry:

> 'Stop spending all your energies flying desperately around Europe and north Africa looking for allies in a war that nobody wants. Instead, put them into bringing about a diplomatic peaceful solution that must include Iran, Russia and all the neighbouring countries, most of whom do not support a war anyway?'[28]

Finally, an unquestioning commitment to the US raises important fears over sovereignty. Anxiety exists over a Britain whose foreign policy is effectively determined by the United States. For example, "…why a sovereign independent state called Great Britain should automatically fall into line in support of military action."[29] As such, statements such as "…not simply following America's coat tails"[30] and "[t]his government is not America's poodle"[31] underscore the argument that any British involvement should not be taken for granted and the development of a common strategy for Syria does not supplant the self-determining nature of the contributing states.

The second identity can be identified through a multilateralist/unilaterlist nexus. Despite America spokespeople highlighting the need for coalition building, such responses are orchestrated through a hard power response. Curiously, one core of British political figures see the US administration as prevaricating and hesitant. Nonetheless, a dominant US nation-state identity is still one ensconced in military terminology. The language of hard power is a dominant quality of America's own self-image and, as a consequence, it recognizes those same attributes in close allies. US configurations of Britain are structured in this manner, insisting on Britain's leading role yet emphasizing its preeminent role. Multilateralism must effectively fit in with America's terms and therefore is interpreted as unilateralism in another name.

Consequently, US nation-state identities are overwhelming negative: *bellicose*, *destabilizer*, *hyper-militarized*, *nationalist* and *volatile*. The UK and other states have a notable mentoring role: to try to check and influence American power. With Syria plagued by a myriad of vying actors, the need to try to harness American stimulus seems essential. America's nationalist identity seems predicated on the argument that it alone possesses the authority to harness other states' involvement in the conflict. Britain is constructed as *activist*, a *combatant*, *dedicated*, *dominant* and *legitimate*. UK presence is seen as right and proper and it is undeniably configured as an important, respected and necessary actor. As such, America is configured as a **military unilaterlist hegemon**. Britain is construed as a **major military power**. Othering occurs over fundamental misperceptions between Self and Other. The American self-image views its own military identity as positive and subsequently projects Britain as America-like. Britain itself, certainly not objecting to its own historicized military past, nonetheless views action as occurring both as a last resort and as part of a global alliance. In addition, American pre-eminence creates the belief that the US leads and others simply follow. Such a presupposition sits uneasily with British perceptions.

The following figure summarizes the findings in relation to friendly, non-radical and radical othering. US nation-state identities, produced from the British discourses, are listed along with UK nation-state identities generated from the American political elite perspective. These have produced distinct 'US as Other' and 'UK as Other' categories. These images are linked by patterns of friendly, non-radical and radical othering that are also explicated:

Figure One: Self/Other Configurations within the Special Relationship

US Nation-State Identities	US as Other	UK as Other	UK Nation-State Identities
Ally Civilian protector Co-dependent Defender Historical partner	COSMOPOLITAN SECURITY ALLY	TRANSATLANTIC COSMOPOLITAN SECURITY ALLY	Ally Civilian protector Driven by ideals Ethical Friend
Global actor Malleable Pragmatist Role model Unstable	COALITION LEADER	COALITION BUILDER	Balancer Cooperator Global actor Rational Unified
Bellicose Destabilizer Hyper-militarized Nationalist Volatile	MILITARY UNILATERIST HEGEMON	MAJOR MILITARY POWER	Activist Combatant Dedicated Dominant Legitimate

Friendly Othering (strong linking): ◄••••••••►
Non-radical Othering (mild linking/differentiation): ◄ — — ►
Radical Othering (strong differentiation): ◄————►

Conclusion

Othering is certainly an inevitable and permanent condition of identity construction. However, an obvious question concerns which Other(s) win(s) out? Is there any configuration, either how the US constructs Britain or how Britain that constructs the UK, that is dominant and hegemonic? Any essence of meaning that defines the Special Relationship in its entirety? There are two aspects to this. First, the contestable and ever-reinventing nature of othering and identity construction ensures their constant evolution. No Other is the perennial Other; no identity that produces the Other never changing; no Self subsequently static. The identity of a state produces policies that are a product of the identities and also inform and reshape those very identities. Secondly, that is not to say that the Special Relationship does not have dominant characteristics that cannot be surmised. The othering each state has of its counterpart does illuminate certain key elements that cluster around positive and negative meaning.

Three elements can be highlighted. The Special Relationship is fundamentally agential. It is simply deemed to matter within international politics. Born out of historical practices, wedded to a common approach to necessity and governed by an interventionist logic, it has two instrumental purposes: it enables the USA to adulterate unilateralist fears by locking its foreign policy into its ever-ally, Britain; and it affords Britain a voice on the international stage it would never ordinarily have. The Special Relationship is the mechanism both states have to bolster and globalize their self-images. Friendly othering underscores this strategy as both states share a historically embedded common approach of engagement. They effectively both articulate the same dangers and both behave in similar ways towards such threats.

In addition, the alliance is underscored by values. As already mentioned, there has been a notable shift away from privileging political values to human ones. Political values might centre on indelible freedoms, democratic institutions and the rule of law, to name a few. Noticeably, there is less fraternalism articulated from the British perception. There is less of an appeal to an almost spiritual and ethereal sense of belonging and, instead, the Special Relationship is more of a strategic mechanism for shoring up British defensiveness. In short, it seems that both states have somewhat grown out of the original articulation of the Special Relationship. With a host of other important states and international organizations mentioned, the urgency of international relief over mere bombing and the need for multinationalism, we can say that such global issues are seen as unresolvable either by a single superpower, a special relationship or any small alliance of states. Global threats require global action and the strength of the Special Relationship lies in its

ability to galvanize such an internationalist response. Non-radical othering certainly emphasizes some of these similarities and divisions.

The final observation concerns the role of the military. It has been observed before that a Hobbesian-Kantian schism divides the US and Europe.[32] From the discursive analysis, one can see that although Britain could not be regarded as Kantian as some of its European partners, and certainly possesses a militarized identity, one might configure the differences over perceptions of military action by the US-UK as indicating a Hobbesian-Lockean divide. The US is clearly at home with its self-image as military hegemon. Britain casts two notable shadows of doubt on this. One is simply fear of American unilateralism that can destabilize Syria further and mire the US, Britain and others in protracted, costly and much broader conflict. The other concerns the aimlessness of the American administration that lacks impetus and direction, and is in dire need of influencing. From the American point of view, British hawkishness is perceived positively which certainly jars with the UK's self-image. As such, radical othering permeates these perceptions and such contrast is indicative of identity clashes between the two states. To sum up, in terms of our analysis, the Special Relationship is agential, value-laden and lodged within the proactive use of military force.

What contributions can such a theoretical approach make? There are two points worth closing with: one specific to this research and one general. First, in terms of the Special Relationship, or other such international alliances, our approach opens up the vista to incorporate both stasis and change. Stasis, because identities can be read with an eye to seeing common articulations of identity in previous crises or critical junctures; change, because identities, although 'sticky', are subject to change due to the very crises that shape them. Instead of the 'taken for granted' meaning of the Special Relationship whereby it is simply assumed to exist, or indeed its counterpoint whereby it is perceived as a fantasy, any relationship and its meaning can be tested empirically through a discursive analysis that creates meaning and identities and, in turn, uncover whatever the affiliation is or isn't.

In terms of a general observation, otherness within international relations, as iterated earlier, has frequently been predicated on the radical enemy Other and this study attempts to open up such parameters to envelop how articulations of commonality and not just difference might impact on a state's sense of Self and subsequent behaviour. As Hansen has remarked:, "...I would hold that there might be a tendency within poststructuralism to conclude too quickly that the only possible relationship between state and Others is the latter one, and that all foreign and security policies therefore have to be built on a conquest of the Other."[33] Our approach, therefore, contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on other Others. Wæver, for example, has highlighted how Europe's past functions as its Other – a violent, nationalist history shaping a post-sovereignty, integrationist present.[34] Patomäki has also investigated this notion of temporal othering, or "...what we are can be defined in terms of critical distance from what we once used to be. And what we may become – and would like to become – can be defined in terms of critical distance from what we are now."[35] Finally, conceptual or imagined othering adds further light to practices of identity formation. Chimerical or fabricated allusions also function as potent generators of Others. As Taylor elaborates: "Long-standing historical notions of identity are not rendered irrelevant for all the arguments that they may be 'mythical' or 'imagined'. Imagined essences of identity are potent social forces".[36] In short, different forms of othering can contribute to building a more detailed and comprehensive account of how states' identities become shaped by a wide range of Others: Manichean and hostile, cooperative but cautious, fraternal and collaborative, real or imagined, past or present. Such investigations can all help build up a more comprehensive and nuanced picture of who states are. In keeping with constructivist thinking, we argue that such findings are fundamental for determining what states do.

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[1] Anglo-, British and UK are by no means synonymous. However, for the purposes of this paper, they are all used to define the United Kingdom as a political, national and historical entity.

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[17] From the perspective of the Copenhagen School, this process can be seen as a means of Securitization. The securitizing agent, namely the Self, sees its Selfness threatened. It makes sense of the potential threat to its security to an external audience (such as other states or an international organization) or an internal one (the state itself). The Other becomes the ally to tackle the threat facing the Self.

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