EUROPE: FROM A CHAMPION OF COSMOPOLITISM TO EUROPEAN NATIONALISM

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Abstract

Recent Roma expulsions from France, Mrs Merkel's, as well as Mr Cameron's disappointment in multiculturalism, Swiss referendum on minarets, etc, raise one of ominous questions of the political and cultural future of Europe. Indicatively, this has been happening in the countries of Condorcet and Voltaire, Kant, Lock and Swift, therefore the part of the world where the idea of cosmopolitism has been born and the voice in favour of religious tolerance has been raised. Even Mr Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, has recently had to warn of Islamophobic prejudices. The emerging anti-Americanism is the phenomenon contributing to the puzzle of actual and possibly even more xenophobic developments in Europe. Does this mean that Europe starts building the wall towards the rest of the world? Are we facing the appearance of euro-nationalism? The author is eagerly searching for a response to these questions. The paper undertakes to find out the fundamental causes. Quite hypothetically, it raises the question whether democracy itself, as defining feature of political culture in Europe, is appropriate to multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, cultural diversity etc, as the prerequisites of any cosmopolitan role of Europe in the forthcoming future. It is namely people of Europe, not only leaders, who share such prejudices. The author maintains that Europe's troubles with itself, and the rest, rests on the inappropriate comprehension of freedom as the basic assumption to democracy. He reminds of Hegel's concept of freedom and challenges and risks of wrong applying of freedom. Freedom is fundamental to both Europe and democracy but it has its limits as well. Following Hegel, the author is trying to detect these limits.

Key words: *freedom, democracy, cosmopolitism, multiculturalism, diversity management*

Introduction

Two the most shameful pages of human history – colonialism and fascism (Nazism) – have been written down by the states which are today democratic. These states were writing them while they were democratic. Colonialism and fascism are socio-political-economic systems which were based on nationalism, thus on the social prejudice on the superiority of chosen social groups. Although a political form of society based on the equality of people, democracy thus was not sufficient hurdle to nationalism – neither in its colonial nor in fascist (Nazi) manifestation, as the form of inequality among people(s).

Nationalism is also today, perhaps more than ever, a widespread social prejudice. Our thesis is that nationalism currently manifests primarily in the form of anti-multiculturalism. Recent ideas on the failure and, consequently, impossibility of multiculturalism, are instances of such a social prejudice. Political frame within which anti-

multiculturalism appears is modern European nation state. Does it mean that the nation state in the current phase of its development, after having, more or less, finished national assimilation on social level, puts the setting up of mono-culturalism as its forthcoming goal?

It is indicative, however, that the carriers of these social prejudices are just democratic states which marked the history of nationalism by its most extreme forms. Such a state of affairs opens the serious theoretical dilemma on the (in)compatibility of nation state and mono-culturalism (multiculturalism) with democracy. In other words, will the nation state, after erasing ethnic pluralism, in order to be more efficient, undertake cultural assimilation as well?

Therefore, it is indicative that the prime minister asserting that multiculturalism failed appears in the country (and culture) of Immanuel Kant, more than 200 years after his ideas of world's law (*ius cosmopoliticum*), the principle of universal hospitality, and the eternal peace. It is also indicative that Roma are declared unwelcome and drive out from the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen/Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, the country of Marquis de Condorcet (abolitionist, the member of Society of the Friends of the Blacks in 1780!) and Voltaire (who even dared to fall in love with French girl who was not catholic!) It is indicative, in particular, that the prime minister of the country of John Lock, the author of *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, on religious tolerance, as the aftermath of ghastly religious intolerance (within Christianity!) in Europe, and the country of Jonathan Swift, the author of the essay *The Art of Political Lying*, repeats and confirms the words of his German colleague on multiculturalism.

It might be of importance to be aware that these great, cosmopolitan ideas of European thinkers had emerged before these countries became democratic. For it is indicative.

Ambiguity of Freedom:

Does Europe know what its fundamental value is?

The beauty of human *dream* on cosmopolitan unity of humankind breaks out as soon as it faces state of waking. The same occurs with the most humanistic *ideas* on world's political order facing the hurdle of political pragmatism. And yet, neither dreamers nor philosophers renounce their dreams and their ideas. Both the dream and idea of cosmopolitism became the value of numerous individuals, movements, and even social upheavals (revolutions). The value of cosmopolitism is one of fundamental human, meaning universal values. No matter how imaginary, the value of cosmopolitism rests on the real, i.e. biological state of unity of human species.

Yet, in spite of the sustainability of human dreams and ideas one is to ask the question whether the European dream and idea of cosmopolitism are simply wishful thinking if existing democratic states do not bear, do not want or fail in multiculturalism. Moreover, if European democratic states are not ready or capable of multiculturalism, how can Europe itself and any form of European political unification be possible?

The question of missing assumption of Europe to be cosmopolitan is hence simultaneously the question of the assumption of Europe. The value of Europe is just a *specific* form of cosmopolitism as a *general* political value. These two questions are thus one question. The answer therefore can be only one. Europe implies multiculturalism. Even without Muslims. The purpose of these lines is to try finding out what such a missing assumption and condition *sine qua non* of Europe, as well as political unity of the world. Is there certain connection between the assumption that misses and the recent anti multicultural assertions of European leaders and growing anti multicultural sentiments among Europeans? (I almost do not dare to proceed with logical question: is there a connection between the missing assumption of Europe and cosmopolitism, on the one hand, and new emerging anti multicultural terrorism, on the other?)

a) Freedom (Europe) as value and as virtue (the excess of freedom and the deficiency of freedom)

In order for Europe to be a value, it has to be wanted by its citizens. There is a difference between Europe as a value and Europe as a (supra)nation state which might be essential. What determines the character of political unification of Europe is its purpose: whether Europe unites in order to set up endogamous borders which will separate it from the rest of world or Euro-politism is established for the sake of wider integration up to cosmopolitism?

If the value of Europe does not imply (and does not include) already now (and in itself) the value of cosmopolitism, then Europeism risks to become Euro centrism, i.e. nationalism lifted to a higher level, mega-nationalism. If Europeans really want Europe, then multiculturalism must become (remain) their value already within the existing states, and before their political unification. There are reasons enough – and the statements of two European leaders are not only ones, to assert that Europe stands at the crossroad where it must choose between cosmopolitism, as the assumption of the value of European political unification, and mega-nationalism, as particularism that is going to separate it from the rest of world.

The question of missing assumption of Europe is the question which value Europe lacks. Has Europe prospects at all if citizens of several European states do not want to join it, nearly half of Swedes want to get out of it, if almost half of Polls are disappointed in joining Europe etc.? Before answering which value Europe lacks, let us examine what we take as the value. What is, thus, value?

The point of origin of value is the will, "which is free, so that freedom makes its substance and determination". (1) In other words, the value is the expression of man's free will. The value which is not the expression of will which is free would not be the value. Imposed value does not count as value. It concerns either the value of cosmopolitism so too the value of Europe. There is no value without the will. In fact, freedom is will. "That which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, and freedom becomes actual only as will, as subject." (2) To be understood, Hegel compares the relationship of freedom and will with matter and weight. As weight is fundamental of bodies, so freedom is fundamental phase of will. Matter is weight itself, and therefore the will without freedom is matter without weight, thus empty.

Under fundamental political value I mean freedom. Fundamental value of Europe is will which is free. If it does not exist Europe as value is feasible neither. The value determining, shaping and defining Europe is the value that Europe lacks.

Although the point of origin of every value freedom itself is a value. Hence freedom can not be imposed. That means, and for the reason of that we speak about free will as the point of origin of value as such, and thereby of every specific value, that the value as such, as well as every specific value, is the *purpose* of free will. As the point of origin and as the purpose of freedom, the value of freedom is the purpose of itself. Freedom is the purpose of itself. Only essential things are the purpose of themselves. The value of freedom is thus essential, while every other value, including the value of cosmopolitism, Europe or multiculturalism, is the realization of free will. However, freedom can also be imposed. Then, there is more freedom than it should be. The excess of freedom can be dangerous just like the deficiency of freedom. Freedom can also be withheld, something which is known without saying. Both the imposed freedom, i.e. the excess of freedom, and the withheld freedom, i.e. the deficiency of freedom, are *contradictio in adiecto*, do not count as freedom, but frequently featured as freedom. It is taken for granted that the withholding of freedom, that is the deficiency of freedom, is a perversion, thus vice. But the imposing of freedom, that is the excess of freedom, is also a perversion, thus vice.

In order for freedom to become *value*, one needs freedom as virtue. Only freedom in its middle, righteous form can be the virtue of freedom. Without the virtue of freedom grasped in Aristotelian manner the value of Europe, thus Europe itself, is unachievable. The ambiguity of freedom is what makes Europe very ambiguous.

How about freedom as European value?

Europe, including, I suppose, Mrs Merkel and Mr Cameron, declare freedom its fundamental value. If it is really so, why do not they mind the value of multiculturalism? After their statements, it turns to be inescapable asking the question whether Europe, first of all political one, knows at all what freedom is, which means, *ipso facto*, does Europe know what Europe itself is? Putting this in another way: does Europe know that freedom is ambiguous, both virtue and vice? Europe must be aware of temptations should it answer this question in a wrong way.

What actually Europe wants when it wants freedom, but without multiculturalism? Europe namely suffers of two vices: the excess of freedom and the deficiency of freedom. This is to say that Europe lacks just what it takes to defining itself, its fundamental value – freedom in righteous, middle form. In order to grasp this one should remind of Hegel's dialectical analysis of the concept of freedom. The analysis includes three elements of freedom.

b) First element of freedom

Will is, in the words of Hegel, on the one hand, "absolute possibility that one can abstract from every determination…, escape from every content as a fence". (3) Such a will, thus freedom, Hegel – protestant, German and European, deems "negative freedom or the freedom of reason". (4) The word *freedom* is today used with too ease in European as well as American political discourse (5), when it comes to democracy and nation state, i.e. the rule of people and peoples' diversity. It is very important to see what the content of freedom is in democracy as a form of political order, and what kind of freedom of peoples (ethnic groups) one can speak within the frame of nation state. Let us once more remind, not for the sake of Hegel and theory, but because of ourselves and actual political praxis, that Hegel also terms "freedom" without fences, without limits, abstracted from every determination – "freedom of emptiness". (6) The consequence of such a freedom, freedom without limits, in reality, either in politics or in religiosity, is:

> a "fanaticism which would destroy the established social order, remove all individuals suspected of desiring any king of order, and demolish any organization which then sought to rise out of the ruins. Only in devastation does the negative will feel that it has reality. It intends, indeed, to bring to pass some positive social condition, such as

universal equality or universal religious life…So what it thinks it desires, can be for itself an abstract preconception, and its realisation nothing but the fury of desolation." (7)

Can it be that European will to establish democracy and nation state transforms, as a matter of fact, into the freedom without limits, the final result of which, in spite of good will, but deprived from thinking which disagrees, will be "state of universal equality and universal religious life", thus "the fury of desolation" of multiculturalism, every diversity, including religious and political one, but ethnic diversity before all? Does Europe approach, led by the value of freedom without content, to negative and empty freedom?

Let us attempt, just as Hegel does, to explain this inductively, in order to make it clear even to one who will disagree with us. Society or State can act not only against its own parts or other entities, but against itself as entirety. Suicide is not simply individual but also social and political impetus and is, as such, the consequence of this element of freedom, freedom without limitation. Yet, one should not rush in judging this element of freedom, for – Hegel goes on now dialectically – even this negative freedom or freedom of reason "is not to be discarded", though one-sided, for "the defeat of the understanding is that it exalts its one-sidedness to the sole and highest place." (8) Because negative freedom, freedom without limits, is still not freedom, not freedom in its conceit, but only its nascent, negative element.

Negative freedom, freedom in its only one, the first element, was happening in the past too. Repeatedly. Hegel reminds of the case to which he was contemporary. (We, contemporaries of the 20th century, have more numerous and more blatant examples.) French revolution was free will having proclaimed freedom for its purpose, thus its value, and yet it ended in:

> "the fanaticism of political and religious life. Of this nature was the terror epoch of the French revolution, by which distinctions in talent and authority were to have been superseded. In this time of upheaval and commotion any specific thing was intolerable. Fanaticism wills an abstraction and not an articulate association. It finds all distinctions antagonistic to its indefiniteness, and supersedes them. So it happened that people in revolution destroyed again institutions made by itself, for every institution is contrary to abstract self-conscience of equality." (9)

French revolution was only one, perhaps paradigmatic, sample of European freedom at work. Later on, Europe recorded other cases of good will that *wants*, although without knowing what it wants, the cases of "negative freedom", freedom that abstacts from everything concrete, which *wants*, but nothing specific, will which is undetermined. That will is dangerous, for will "which wills only the abstract universal, wills therefore nothing and it is not a will". (10)

Admittedly, Europe wants, as said, democracy and nation state. Whether Europe wants today, as France before, "to abolish all diversities in talents…" fanatically, to supersede all political and religious distinctions? French revolution did not only remove monarchy and establish republic. French revolution was also a cultural revolution. Does the current process of democratization of Europe and world, lead by America (and Europe), remove only totalitarianism, authoritarianism and dictatorship, or something in addition? Does the value of freedom, i.e. democracy and nation state, transform into a fanaticism that is going to deny freedom?
In order to avoid it happening, it is necessary to consider second element of freedom, as seen by Hegel, on his dialectical path toward the concept of freedom – and the salvation of Europe.

c) Second element of freedom

The first element of freedom, let us remind of, is the state of abolishment of every distinction, "intolerableness of anything specific", and setting up a "state of universal equality". "Freedom of emptiness". Second element of freedom should be contrary to the first one, the fulfilment of the emptiness.

"This second element in the characterization of the determination is just as negative as the first, since it annuls and replaces the first abstract negativity." (11) Negation of negation. Minus plus minus. How concretely this sounds in Hegel's speculative philosophy. In contrast to the praxis of "vulgar communism" which "will abolish *everything* that all can not possess as *private property*; it will to abstract from talent etc., in a violent way." (12) This sounds rather known, isn't it, and not Marxist at all. Quite the reverse, these Marx's words appear to be very Hegelian and European. Communist limitless freedom wanted to abolish every content, any distinction, to abstract from talent, thus from the Excellency, and from genius who does not think evenly in particular. Communist revolution, just like French one, missed that second element of freedom and has never approached freedom. Neither of them finished the realization of the concept of freedom in praxis. And both were primarily the attempts of European will to achieve freedom as its value. After two failed tries, it is necessary to ask whether Europe is capable and ready for one more. Has European freedom strength for the second element of freedom? Is Europe ready for the negation of freedom in forms it declared as its own values – democracy and nation state? French and communist Europe was apparently not.

Has current Europe strength to grasp that that labelling everything as democracy does not have to be based on freedom, but on its first element, "freedom of emptiness", in which only what matters is to satisfy democratic procedure irrespectively of its content? Likewise, has Europe strength to grasp and admit that the transformation of states into nation states is only the first element of freedom, "negative freedom", hindering a wider, European but also cosmopolitan integration, the element necessarily in need for the second element of freedom, the negation of negation, in order to become a realm of freedom in its conceit at all?

The second element of freedom, as the negation of negation, however, is not rejecting of the first one, it dos not demand the renouncement of the first. In the first element the will wants, but not everything, not the universal. "Not only I want, but I want something, that is something specific – as distinctive from the universal…" (13) That element:

> "…makes its appearance as the opposite of the first; it is to be understood in its general form: it belongs to freedom but does not constitute the whole of it…I do not will merely, but I will *something*. Such a will, as is analysed in the preceding paragraphs, wills only the abstract universal, and therefore wills *nothing*. Hence it is not a will. The particular thing, which the will wills is a limitation, negation, since the will, in order to be a will, must in general limit itself. Hence the undetermined will is also on-sided just as the one standing merely in a determination." (14)

Both elements, both limitless freedom and freedom limited to something specific, taken separately, neither of which still is freedom, are simply the elements of unrealised conceit of freedom.

It is not sufficient that Europe wills merely democracy, but it should will democracy that has content, for it is not every rule of people *eo ipso* both the rule from people and for people. Likewise, it is not sufficient that Europe wills nation state, all citizens of which will be equal, but provided that they loose every specificity, particularity, concreteness. Both democracy and nation state are forms of political fanaticism, although very sophisticated, should one wills the abstract rule of people and annulment of all distinctions. Europe needs both elements of freedom if it wants freedom to become its value. Have democracy and nation state in Europe prospects to fulfil the will of European citizens with freedom, with both, limitless freedom and freedom setting up limits where they should indeed be?

d) Will: the conceit of freedom

How to understand Hegel's negation of negation in the case of freedom? So clear, and yet so complex. How to understand Hegel's requirement that will limits freedom without renouncing of it in its first element? Limitation of freedom does not renounce the limitless freedom:

> "The will is the unity of these two elements…" (15)
> "This is freedom of will, freedom that contains its conceit or substantiality, its weight, as weight contains the substantiality of body." (16)
> "These both elements are nevertheless just abstractions; the concrete and true (and everything the true is concrete) is universality, which has as its contrariety the particular, which is, then, by its reflection united with the universal. – This unity is *individuality*." (17)

Freedom therefore is not mere sum of the elements. After all, they exclude each other. The *universal* is limitless freedom. Freedom is not that if not universal. Only as universal freedom is true, and hence concrete. However, freedom has its limitation, and that is the *specific*, which is its contrariety. Their unity is not the sum but the third of freedom, something more not only than each of these two elements, limitlessness and limitation, the universal and the specific, but more than their sum. The third, although the outcome of the first and second element of freedom, is what gives them the sense and makes them possible. Without the third the freedom of the universal and the freedom of the specific are possible neither. These two first elements, taken separately or in sum, are just abstractions of each other. Only their unity makes them concrete, i.e. mutually equal. Both the universal, thus freedom without limits, and the specific, thus freedom that knows its limits, need unification, i.e. equality. The unity of the universal and the specific, limitless freedom and freedom having limits, in which the contrariety vanishes, is the *individual*.

> "What we properly call will contains the two above-mentioned elements…The third is now that that is in itself in its limitation, in the second, and that, as determined, it nevertheless remains in itself and does not stop being the universal: this is then the concrete conceit of freedom, while both previous elements one finds entirely abstract and one-sided." (18)

Freedom is therefore both the general and specific, but it is that only when is concrete and true, that is the *individual, subjective*. If the individual is not included, even as only one, then both the universal and the specific – is abstract and pseudo true.

Hegel's dialectic, i.e. the skill of dialog (debate), achieved here the perfect realization of Socrates' method of induction, called by Aristotle the "path from the individual to the universal". (19) Namely, Hegel debates with himself, unlike many unable to discuss with others only because they think differently. As if one can discuss with those thinking evenly. Only when Hegel begins to think differently from what he said at the beginning, in the first element, Hegel gives right himself in what he opposes.

Three elements of freedom having just been set out, thus, are the freedom in its conceit. Can freedom conceptualized this way become our, European *value*, the subject of our will, the goal to which aspires the *virtue* of freedom? As a matter of fact, neither value of democracy, nor value of ethnic diversity, including cosmopolitism as its highest form, is not possible if freedom is not its assumption. Every concrete value must be the expression of man's free will. For, man "can also be without will, he can allow to be forced…" (20)

Cosmopolitism of Kant, Condorcet or Swift is, undoubtedly, based on the will which is free, thus the true unity of the universal (cosmopolitan) and the specific (European) in their individualism. Their cosmopolitism is true and concrete. As such cosmopolitism is a value, *eo ipso* European value, but the attitude that multiculturalism failed excludes not only the value of cosmopolitism from Europe, but it brings into question the idea of Europeness as well, in particular the idea of political Europe, europolitism. Before concluding to what extent European values are free or imposed, let us remember the words, valid eternally and universally – for they are anthropologically and not ideologically founded, by Jonathan Swift: "Taking into account natural propensity of many people to lie, and many to believe, I am confused what to do with the maxima, so frequent in everybody's mouth, that the truth will prevail." (21)

European mega-nationalism, as any nationalism, which so blatantly nocks on the door instead of multiculturalism, is not the matter of couple of European leaders with conspicuous propensity to lie, but much more a matter of European masses to believe. Euro-nationalism is not oriented only toward cultures, ethnic identities and religions arriving to Europe. Europe disliking multiculturalism determines also who in Europe fulfils conditions to be Europe. So it happen that even part of Europe from which it borrowed its name – the Balkans, is not recognized as Europe. (By the way, the part of Europe not fulfilling fully requirements to be Europe, invented and lent to Europe even one of its main values – democracy.)

If freedom is a fundamental, determining value of Europe, is Europe aware that it misses just freedom in its conceit? If values of democracy and ethnic diversity spring from the basis that misses, then the question arises whether Europe is what it holds itself and what kind of Europe is possible: mega-nationalist or cosmopolitan? Europe can be a Union of *states*, as is today, it can be a federation of *regions*, as some desire, it can also be a confederation of *communes* (or city-states), something what comes to the idea only for few, for it sounds anarchist. Whatever would be case, Europe will remain abstractly free if it does not rest on freedom in its conceit. Only as Europe of *citizens*, thus Europe of *individual* Europeans, Europe can count on the realization of freedom in its conceit. Such a freedom will give sense to both freedom of states, and regions, and communes. Under that assumption democracy and ethnic diversity, as values taken from the value, as well as virtue of freedom, can count to be true, for they are concrete.

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Europe between an 'alafranga' and 'alaturca' multiethnicity

Peace of Westphalia (1648) was not the consequence of clash between the West and East, Europe and Asia/Africa, Christianity and Islam. The peace came after one of the most ruthless clashes within the West, within Europe and – within Christianity. The emergence of Protestantism (16th century) was neither the first nor the deepest cleavage within Christianity, but it was the least tolerant. Not even the Great Schism (1054) and the division of Christianity on eastern and western one was so severe and conflicting. The peace, just like any peace, meant the end of war, but it did not create the assumptions of preventing future conflicts. Its meaning consists in opening the question of religious tolerance. Regrettably, the Peace of Westphalia, just like many other peace accords, has laid the latent foundations for a new intolerance. The principle *cuius regio, eius religio* has actually established the current religious intolerance within specific political creations. And yet, the mere pointing to the necessity of tolerance within religion, reminded of the preference of tolerance in relation to war. The ending of thirty years war (1618-1648) has inspired hope that religious tolerance can be spread outside Christianity as well.

Unfortunately, post-Westphalian experience with Judaism and Islam in Europe has corroborated that the hopes were unreal and that tolerance did not become the trait of European political culture. After Holocaust, i.e. what

Jews have experienced in Christian countries, it is impossible to speak about the *tolerance* of distinctive religions. The *respect* of different one is almost excluded after terrorist acts in Christian countries (New York, Madrid, London, Amsterdam, Beslan, Moskva) which were committed as outcomes of fanaticism and extremism within Islam. At last, the *joy* in the different one appears today elusive if one faces what Jewish state – which was supposed to be European compensation to the victim for the crimes committed against Jews in Europe – has been doing against Palestinians, both Christian and Muslim ones. And yet, has Europe right to renounce tolerance that goes over the boundaries of Christianity? Will Europe become tolerant if it lifts itself to the "only one and the highest"? Moreover, will Europe be threatened by the resurrection of intolerance within itself, and within Christianity, should one continue with intolerance towards different ones, Muslims above all?

To answer these questions it is necessary to find out if Europe is intolerant indeed, or the author of these lines, burdened by his own experience, perhaps exaggerates? Instead of me, I give the floor to Europe itself, other Europe, to respond this question. Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, in his Human Rights Comment, published on the 28th of October 2010, in Strasbourg, says:

> "European countries appear to face another crisis beyond budget deficits – the disintegration of human values. One symptom is the increasing expression of intolerance towards Muslims.
>
> The Swiss referendum banning the building of minarets was no exception: opinion polls in several European countries reflect fear, suspicion and negative opinions of Muslims and Islamic culture.
>
> These Islamophobic prejudices are combined with racist attitudes – directed not least against people originating from Turkey, Arab countries and South Asia. Muslims with this background are discriminated in the labour market and the education system in a number of European countries. There are reports showing that they tend to be targeted by police in repeated identity controls and intrusive searches. This is a serious human rights problem.
>
> Recent elections have seen extremist political parties gaining ground after aggressively Islamophobic campaigns. Even more worrying is the inertia or confusion which seems to have befallen the established democratic parties in this situation. Compromises are made which tend to give an air of legitimacy to crude prejudices and open xenophobia.
>
> When the German President Christian Wulff in a recent speech confirmed the obvious, that Islam – like Christianity and Judaism – is part of the national context, this was seen as controversial. One newspaper reported that two thirds of the population disagreed.
>
> A more ambitious survey initiated by Fridrich Ebert Stiftung shoued that 58 per cent agreed that "religious practices for Muslim in Germany should be seriously limited". Though not totally clear, this statement appears to reject freedom of religion for one group – Muslims. The broad support for this opinion is a bad sign…
>
> President Wulff was of course right: Islam is already part of our culture. Muslims in Europe – including the approximately 1.6 million Muslims in the United Kingdom, 3.8 million in Germany, 5 million in France and 15-20 million in Russia – contribute to our economies and societies. They belong. Most of them are in fact born in these countries, the majority are not particularly religious and very few can be characterized as Islamists.
>
> The diverse groups of Muslims are now blamed by politicians in some countries for not "assimilating". However, integration is a two-way process based on mutual understanding. Anti-Muslim bigotry has in fact become a major obstacle to respectful relationships. Indeed, the islamophobic atmosphere has probably been a factor enabling extremists in some cases to recruit young and embittered individuals who lack a sense of belonging.
>
> Instead of discussing such problems seriously, we have had a debate about methods to penalise women wearing the niqab and to prevent the building of minarets. This is hardly the way to give depth to our *European values*." (22)

Before our own conclusion, and after this inspiring self critical acknowledgement, and a discrete painfulness it provokes, let us add several facts: the expulsion of Roma people from France, the prohibition of wearing niqab, threat to prohibit circumcision of male children, overt threat to multiculturalism in two historically compromised countries, the ban of building minarets in Switzerland, the blatant fact that one of the EU member state does not recognize the existence of minorities at all, constitutional definition of Israel as democratic and Jewish state, and eventually, above all, the constitutional shaping of Bosnia – once a paradigm of multiethnic society and the state which tolerated at least three religions and churches on its own soil in the middle ages, before the Peace of Westphalia – as the state of three constitutional ethnic groups, and not as a civil state.

No doubt that Europe is intolerant. What is to be asked is: who is to blame? We have already assumed that Europe did not realize its own fundamental proclaimed value – freedom. Democracy is build as political system of Europe on such an unrealized assumption. Hence this question appears as logically indispensible: Is

democracy responsible for Europe's intolerance towards religious diversity, multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism?

In fact, one should make the question even more radical: Is democracy possible at all in multicultural, multiethnic and multi religious societies? Not without irony, this question might be asked reversely: Are multicultural, multiethnic and multi religious societies a threat and obstacle to democracy? If we gather according to the odiousness toward multiculturalism expressed in the statements of chiefs of some European governments, it seems this question is correct only if raised in the second form. In order to save democracy, thus, one should renounce of multiculturalism. And everything else following multiculturalism. One should renounce everything but controlled diversity, that is diversity management.

And indeed, multi-ethnicity that rests on this European cultural concept, within political frame ensured by nation state, and the experience of religious tolerance in post Westphalian Europe, I call "alafranga" multi-ethnicity, as a metaphor which does not associate only to France but to a considerable part of Europe.

There is one more concept of multi-ethnicity and I call it "alaturka", emphasizing that it is just a metaphor relating not only to ethnic diversity which existed in Ottomans' Turkey, but also in Habsburgs' Austro-Hungary. This metaphor does not refer to well known millet system in Turkey nor to religious tolerance practiced in Austro-Hungary. To illustrate this let us remind of the case of Bosnia. After only 200 years of colonial rule of Great Britain, all in India, the country of one billion people, now speak English, in addition to local languages. In Bosnia, nobody today speak Turkish after almost five centuries of the Ottomans' rule, but the language which everybody can call as wishing. Not a few Turks having remained in Bosnia after Turkey's withdrawal, speak Bosnian, assimilated, even though there had not been any state politics of 'integration' in Bosnia. On the other hand, for forty years of Habsburgs' rule in Bosnia, which was both European and Christian, Muslims had all rights, including the rights of Bosnian (Muslim) landlords to keep their assets, after the occupation and annexation.

Moreover, I deem that Bosnian Muslims in Austro-Hungary, including vast majority of those who were not land possessors, were more equal, although they spoke other language and even wrote (then) in other alphabet (Arab), than Algerian, Tunisian or Moroccan Muslims in France, even though they already spoke French and wrote in Latin alphabet while they were in the countries of Maghreb.

Only distinction separating these two states, the Ottomans' and the Habsburgs' one, from the rest of European states is that they were aristocratic states. And theocratic, to some extent. Does this mean that democracy can, nevertheless, be blamed for the failure of multiculturalism, consequently both multi-ethnicity and religious intolerance?

Notes:

1) Quotations from G. W. F. Hergel, *Philosophy of Right* (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Recht), Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996, § 4)
2) Hegel, § 4
3) Hegel, § 5
4) Hegel, § 5
5) See Dzemal Sokolovic, "Hegel o Bushu i bin Ladenu", *Zarez*, Zagreb, br. 178., 20. 04. 2006
6) Hegel, § 5
7) Hegel, § 5
8) Hegel, § 5
9) Hegel, § 5
10) Hegel, § 6
11) Hegel, § 6
12) Karl Marx, *Rani radovi*, Zagreb: Naprijed, 1967, p. 273
13) Hegel, § 6
14) Hegel, § 6
15) Hegel, § 7
16) Hegel, § 7
17) Hegel, § 7
18) Hegel, § 7
19) Milos Djuric, *Istorija helenske etike*, Beograd: BIGZ, 1976, p. 250
20) Hegel, § 5
21) Jonathan Swift, "Umijece politickog laganja" (The Art of Political Lying), *Erasmus*, No. 2, (1993) Zagreb, translated from "The Examiner", br. 15, 1710)
22) www.coe.int/congress; se also: Patrick J. Buchanan, "The Rising Tide of Ethno-Nationalism: Multiculturalism Fails in Europe", *Global Research*, October 23, 2010)

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More: http://www.rokkan.uib.no/bihdemocracy/