

# European Parliament and its Administration: What do we know and where do we go next?

Andreja Pegan, University of Luxembourg\*

Draft, 9th November 2011

## Abstract

What would be a parliament without its administration? This is the question we look at in this paper. More specifically we deal with the second biggest assembly in Europe, i.e. European Parliament. The scope of the study is restricted to officials working in committee secretariats within the Secretariat and officials working in political groups of the European Parliament. By looking into literature on the Congress of the United States, we propose a mixed-methods investigation on the roles and attitudes of officials in the policymaking process. From the available literature on the administration in the European Parliament, partisanship arises as significant variable shaping life in assembly under study. The purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, we demonstrate that studying legislative staff in the European Parliament is worthwhile. Secondly, we propose a methodological way to investigate it. The need for this research is further emphasized by the lack of empirically driven research on the topic.

**Key words:** legislatures; staff; policymaking; mixed-methods

## 1 Introduction

Are officials working in parliaments across Europe important? Judging by the low interest of scholars and consequently limited amount of literature on the topic, the answer is negative. However, based on literature on the US Congress (see Hammond, 1996) and recent media concerns on the civil service in the European Parliament (EP) (Brand, 2010), I am driven to prove European legislative staff is central to policy-making.

The scope of the study is restricted to the second biggest assembly in Europe, i.e. European Parliament. To further narrow down the subject, we focus to the subunit of parliamentary administration, whose tasks involve the assistance of members of the parliament (MPs) in substantive policy rather than technical-administrative work. As the bulk of legislative work in the EP takes place in committees, the research explores the role of officials in the committee setting. For this reason, we consider staff working in the secretariats of individual committees within the Secretariat of the EP. In order to gain a comparative perspective, we include in the study officials working in the EP for political groups' secretariats.

There are several reasons to look into the dichotomy between Secretariat and political groups officials. Historically, until the 1990s, the Secretariat used to be an important source of assistance compared to political groups. Today, it has been observed its role has diminished due to the following reasons: 1) Members of the EP (MEPs) tend to be experts in the committee subject they participate; 2) The access of information is facilitated by new technologies and multiple sources of information; 3) Political groups have taken over many tasks similar to those of elected officials (Costa, 2003, 155) and their influence keeps increasing (Hix et al., 2007; Lindberg et al., 2009). As it is broadly acknowledged that political groups play a central role in the activities in the EP (selection of President, Committee chairs, rapporteurs etc.) (Hix et al., 2007; Lindberg et al., 2009), it seems pertinent to explore the role political groups play in the legislative assistance to MEPs.

The scope of this paper is to present a possible way to explore legislative staff in the EP. In order to fulfill this aim, the paper is structured in the following way. At first, a brief overview of the EU administrative system is given. This is followed by the presentation of academic literature on legislative staff in the parliamentary setting of the USA Congress and Western European parliaments. The third part proposes a research methodology to tackle the the problem, while the conclusion set out a summary.

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\*Andreja Pegan holds a MA from Leiden University. She is a doctoral student at the University of Luxembourg under the AFR grant scheme.

## 2 The administrative system of the European Parliament

The administrative system of the EU resembles to the ones in states, as it has organized itself by developing an administration in the form of a European Civil Service. As in any other state system in Europe, public administration is a legally well-defined subject in EU institutions. Law governing public administrations are a safeguard against clientelism and corruption (Peters and Pierre, 2007, 5). Moreover, in Western Europe the development of a vast legal framework over public administrations signifies professionalization (Rouban, 2007, 203).

The conditions of employment are not regulated per institution, but for the EU civil service as a whole.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, officials working for the EP are covered by the same statute as those in the Commission and Council. This differs from the practices in the UK and France, where the House of Commons and National Assembly have a different statute from government officials in line with the theory of the separation of powers (European Parliament, 2000). The conditions of employment for officials in the EP differ alongside their permanent or temporary status.

According to the permanent/temporary division there are three types of administrative actors in the EP: permanent officials, who work for the Secretariat, temporary officials who work as assistants in the personal offices of MEPs and temporary officials who work in the secretariats of political groups. They have at least three things in common: 1) Together they assist MEPs and other political figures in the EP; 2) They form the internal source of information within the EP compared to external sources such as the Commission, national or local government, NGOs and interest groups (Neunreither, 2003, 53); 3) They are financed from the budget of the EP. Besides the difference in the contract type seen above, their tasks and recruitment also differ.

While officials from the Secretariat are recruited through competitions, the recruitment of assistants and political groups officials is left to the discretion of individual MEPs and political groups, which is unique for the EP compared to the Commission and Council. The employment practices for political groups officials and assistants differ alongside parties and MEPs. Political ties and loyalty count (Michon, 2005). However, they are not the sole qualification for recruitment, as professional and technical competences are also taken into account. Moreover, some parties have recently started to organize competitions for the recruitment of staff (Neunreither, 2003). The staffing policy is a fundamental difference between the USA and EU system. While each congressional committee has its own hiring policy, recruitment of committee staff in parliaments across Europe and EP is centralized and not in the discretion of committee members (European Parliament, 2000, 225). Committee staff in the US Congress can have very strong partisan preferences (Fox and Hammond, 1977 in Hammond, 1984; Cochrane, 1964, 340), as recruitment is left to committee chairmen. In Europe the requirement of nonpartisanship and independence is of utmost importance. Although the possibility to integrate partisan staff in EP committee staff isn't so obvious, it can occur with staff mobility between political groups and Secretariat services.

The great part of the Secretariat work enables a smooth functioning of the EP by taking care of translation and technical-organizational matters. Legislative assistance is left to the officials working in the committee's secretariats. Together with assistants they are involved in the assistance of the rapporteur: drafting reports, amendments, briefings. Officials from political groups do not have a direct role in supporting rapporteurs (Neunreither, 2003). However, they coordinate the work of MEPs in the different committees. They also draft amendments for their respective parties.

## 3 State of the art in academic research on studying legislative staff

In the following findings on legislative staff from the USA Congress and Western European parliaments are documented. As a result of minimal research of parliamentary staff in Europe, the American literature is a valuable source for hypothesis building. Research on the EP administration is presented and shows: 1) The lack of empirically based research; and 2) The need to research partisanship among officials. The shortcoming of both American and European research on legislative staff, is the theoretical vacuum: most datasets are not linked to theory. The underlying idea of this study is that bureaucratic (organizational) structure has an impact on policymaking (see Egeberg, 2007). Bureaucracies behaviors and attitudes are explored in order to discover the consequences bureaucracies have on policymaking.

### 3.1 USA Congress

The study of legislative staff in the parliament is mainly in the domain of American scholars and focuses on the Congress (Senate and House of Representatives). As one authors writes: "[research on] staff assistance for both Senators and Representatives appears with a frequency that stamps it as one of the most important of Congressional concerns" (Butler, 1966, 3). First studies were published in the 1940s and were mainly descriptive (Hammond, 1984). From the 1970s

onwards research became more quantitative orientated. The first comparative studies were then published and dealt with Senate-House and different policy committees. Parliamentary staff was acknowledged as part of the political system and a variable affecting the legislative process. From the mid-1980s onwards scholars have addressed the question on how legislative staff influences and impacts the legislative process. As seen in the following, it is the latest literature that has the most value for the present study.

From today's view point and based on literature on the USA Congress we can assert that parliamentary staffs are important participants in the policy process. Their influence capabilities originate from the work they do: gather information on which policy is based, plan and execute public hearings and draft legislation and committee reports (Patterson, 1970, 26). However, their importance varies depending on different variables and no general statement covering committees can be made. Scholars have explored how several variables impact the role of officials. These variables are here grouped in 4 categories:

- Individual attributes relate to the individual characteristics of officials. Price (1971) has identified professional and policy-entrepreneurial staff orientations. Policy entrepreneurs are activists and partisan, who continuously seek policy opportunities, bring new initiatives and push proposals towards their desired outcome. They freely express their policy preferences. Professionals are non-partisan experts, who rather than act *react* to the needs of committee members by analyzing and objectively presenting policies. Based on Price's division DeGregorio (1994) hypothesized how staff orientations influence members' willingness to include them or exclude them from the policy process. She discovers that when staff is motivated by loyalty, members are more willing to involve them in the policy process than when they are motivated by personal considerations (see also Patterson, 1970, 29; Butler, 1966, 12). However, the importance of partisan and non-partisan staff varies depending on the subject of a committee (Butler, 1966, 12). While some committees comprise partisan officials, others don't (Malbin 1980 in Hammond, 1984). Besides non-partisanship, specialization, experience and anonymity (to not take a public stance or being associated with a specific policy) also positively influence the involvement of staff in the policy process (DeGregorio, 1994; Patterson, 1970, 29-31).
- Individual attributes of committee members: The extent to which officials will be involved in the policy process doesn't solely depend on staff's attributes, but also on the ones of committee members. Malbin (1980 in DeGregorio, 1994) has for example theorized how political ideology of legislators affects their dependence on staff.<sup>2</sup> Patterson (1970, 25) and DeGregorio (1994) conclude there is no significant difference on how frequently Democrats and Republicans involve committee staff in the policy process. A variable to take into consideration is the knowledge of a committee members on the subject: the general influence capability of committee staff increases if politicians are not experts on the topic (Patterson, 1970, 28).
- Relationship between staff and legislators: Parliamentary staff cannot affect legislation directly, as they don't have the right to vote (Light, 1992 and Binsnow, 1990 in DeGregorio, 1994; Patterson, 1970, 32). Legislative staff can affect policy to the extent legislators empower them (DeGregorio, 1994, 2). To understand the behavior of legislative staff, scholars have thus looked into the relations between staff and their political superiors, such as the longevity of their partnership. However, no significant pattern has been discovered.
- Context: The context variables don't depend on officials or committee members, but rather on the characteristics of a bill or the subject/organization of a committee. For example, it is hypothesized that with the complexity of a bill, the involvement of staff increases or that with the saliency of the issues (i.e. how attractive is a bill to the public) the involvement of staff diminishes. While when dealing with technical issues legislators are more willing to consult staff, there is no relationship between the saliency of issues and staff participation (DeGregorio, 1994). Patterson (1970a in Hammond, 1984) and Brady (1981 in Hammond, 1984) hypothesize that staff capability is constrained by the institutional environment: the less partisan a committee, the greater will be the support for staff performance. Cochrane (1964, 340) writes that committees which tend to have more partisan staff are those dealing with subjects characterized by party political lines. When it comes to organizational characteristics, it is asserted that the number of staff per committee does not necessarily improve efficiency (Patterson, 1970, 35). Committee staff can be isolated from other committees, due to the institutionalization of committee, where each committee has its own characteristics which create prestige and jealousies between services. Isolation is also favored by the high degree of specialization.

## 3.2 Parliaments in Western Europe

Although the research of legislative assistance is mainly in the domain of American academics, there has been some research on parliamentary administrations in Western Europe too. The nature of these studies is descriptive (Campbell

and Laporte, 1981; Ryle, 1981; Blischke, 1981; Hammond, 1984, 296).

The European system of parliamentary assistance are similar and different at the same time. The actors providing assistance to MPs can be divided into 3 categories: parliament staff, party staff and personal aids to MPs. The tasks they carry out and their legal statuses vary per countries. In France and the UK, parliamentary administrations have different statutes than government administrations.<sup>3</sup> As a result, independence and autonomy from governments are essential characteristics of the French and British system (Campbell and Laporte, 1981; Ryle, 1981; Perez, 2007). Parliaments need their own source of informations and expertise to remain independent from the government. In Germany, the civil service in the parliament is covered by the same legal framework as the federal bureaucracy. According to Schramm (1965 in Blischke, 1981, 525) this was done to stimulate mobility between the parliamentary and executive civil service.

Mobility is an issues rarely discussed in the US literature. However, alongside multinationality, compulsory mobility between services is a distinctive characteristics of the EU civil service. In the EP this is emphasized by the possibility of officials from political groups to become permanent officials of the EP. Demands for mobility between parliamentary services in European countries vary. In France internal mobility is the rule. In most countries (UK, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal) mobility is not required (see European Parliament, 2000). Similarly to the EP, parliamentary administrators have the possibility to take leave and work for parties in Germany. The available data shows that in the UK, Germany and The Netherlands intra-service mobility is low. Whether mobility in the EP is high or low and what are the consequences is one of the aims of this study.

Another relevant research on parliaments has been done in Holland and explores the information sources of MPs (Schendelen, 1976, 238). The Dutch MPs have more trust in internal sources of information than external (pressures groups, media and public opinion). The type of influence will vary per party: larger parliamentary parties rely more on their own MP specialist, while middle size parties rely on a multitude of sources. It appears that MPs own knowledge, government information are more influential than parliamentary staff and party information.

### **3.3 European Parliament**

The EU's administration is a broad research area, which has attracted different attention through time. First researches of administrative actors in the EU institution were published already in the 1960s, and dealt with the socialization of national civil servants working in the European Economic Community (Scheinman, 1966; Scheinman and Feld, 1972; Smith, 1973). Interest in EU administration became particularly evident from the 1990s onwards and is directed towards the Commission (Trondal, 2007, 971).<sup>4</sup> While the role of European Commission's civil service has been extensively studied, the Council<sup>5</sup> and especially the EP's civil service remain mostly unexplored.

The EP has attracted greater attention since it gained important legislative powers through the introduction of co-decision by the Maastricht Treaty. There has been extensive publication on political parties, MEPs and committees.<sup>6</sup> However, EP bureaucracy has not been a subject of significant empirical based scrutiny.

The limited literature we have on the administrative actors in the EP is scattered throughout different topics. There are some contributions on the Secretariat, personal assistants to MEPs (Michon, 2005; Andreone, 2010) and stagiers (Michon, 2004), while political groups' officials and seconded officials are not studied at all (to the best of my knowledge). The literature on the Secretariat of the EP can be further divided into at least 3 topics: organization and reforms (Priestley, 2000; Kungla, 2007), autonomy from politics (Camenen, 1995; Costa, 2003; Perez, 2007), legislative assistance (Neunreither, 2003; Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2011). Most of this literature is prescriptive in nature and doesn't provide empirical evidence behind observations. It is only very recently, that scholars have started systematic empirical research on legislative assistance to MEPs (Winzen, 2011).

#### **3.3.1 Partisan or political influence in legislative assistance**

The literature sets out some common, but also differing observations. For example most of researchers stress the obvious politicization of officials from Secretariat (Camenen, 1995; Costa, 2003; Perez, 2007), while some say it forms an independent non partisan service (Neunreither, 2003). According to Staff Regulations officials have to be neutral (Article 11). However, there are several practices that can undermine official's neutrality. For example, officials in the EP have the possibility of mobility between the Secretariat and political groups that goes both ways. Secretariat officials can be detached from their service to work in political groups secretariats, with the possibility to reenter the service. Political groups' officials have the possibility to stand internal competitions, as opposed to the much more competitive external competitions, through which they can become permanent officials in the EP. The mobility witnessed in the EP in

uncommon for national parliaments (see European Parliament, 2000). For example, in France and Belgium secondment from parliamentary administration to political groups is not possible.

Taking as another example the post of EP's Secretary General, we see that most of them have had a political profile before taking up the position: Hans Nord (Secretary General from 1961-1979) was a member of the Dutch liberals, Hans Joachim Opitz (1979-1986) was the first Secretary General of the European People's Party (EPP), Enrico Vinci (1986-1997) started his career in the Italian liberal party; Julian Priestly (1997-2007) is a member of the British labour party and prior to his appointment the Secretary General of European Socialists; Harald Romer (2007-2009) was the Secretary General of the EPP as well as the present Secretary General Klaus Welle. Whether the political background of the Secretary General plays any role in how officials carry out their duties has not been studied. It is also true that Vinci, Priestly and Romer started their career in the EP Secretariat as administrators selected by competition. Some believe that this confirms the observation on how officials need to politicize in order to access the highest posts in the Secretariat (Costa, 2003, 156). Others are of the opinion, that the Secretariat managed to develop in a non-partisan service. For example, Neunreither points out how most of director generals in the Secretariat have started their career within the service.

These examples show how the political component of the EP is present in the administration of the assembly. What are the effects of politics in the administrative activities such as legislative assistance is empirically unexplored. There are divergent opinions on whether the Secretariat operates independently, under political constraints or somewhere in between. As already discussed above, most of those who write on the Secretariat believe the Secretariat bureaucracy is submitted to political groups (Camenen, 1995; Costa, 2003; Perez, 2007), i.e. politicization as partisan control over bureaucracy.<sup>7</sup> A survey in the 1990s concluded that Secretariat officials drafted reports far more often than political groups (Provan, 2001). According to Neunreither (2003, 29) the situation has changed, as political groups are now responsible for around half of the work in the main legislative committees. The main problem of these studies is the lack of empirical evidence confirming these observations.

This empirical gap has been addressed to a minor extent by the most recent researches based on qualitative research methods including interviews and case studies (Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2011). Their work focuses on the Secretariat and their relations with MEPs rather than political groups. The variables they research are: partisan division in a committee or policy, report type (legislative or not), rapporteur's experience and expertise. Winzen found out that the role of Secretariat officials is both technical and political. The type of work they carry out depends on their political superiors, i.e. it is in the politician's discretion on what role will an official play. This is in line with the legislative staff research on the American Congress. Secretariat officials have a greater chance to play a political role when a dossier is not subject to partisan divisions. Moreover, Secretariat officials have a greater role in initiative (non-legislative) reports than legislative ones (Winzen, 2011, 35). In their preliminary study, Dobbels and Neuhold inquire when do Secretariat officials take over policy-making tasks from their political superiors. They see two patterns across the migration and fisheries policy cases they study. The role of the Secretariat depends on the rapporteur's experience and on political importance of a dossier. When a rapporteur is experienced and expert, Secretariat will be limited to making briefing notes and writing compromise amendments. On the opposite, a rapporteur with little experience and expertise, can involve Secretariat also in activities that shape policy outcomes, such as negotiation. Similarly, when a dossier is considered politically very important, Secretariat will tend to have a minor role and the opposite. For example, officials will be more guided by MEPs in co-decision than in consultation.

## 4 Method

Most of the research quoted above gathered evidence with qualitative interview based research. The proposed study will be examined with a mixed method research composed of a quantitative and qualitative part. The quantitative part will consist of a survey, while the qualitative of semi-structured interviews. The research design will be a two phase one, meaning that the qualitative part will follow in sequence the quantitative one (Creswell and Clark, 2007, 43). The research question described above will be divided in two subquestion: the first one capturing a quantitative logic, the second one capturing a qualitative logic:

- Integrated research question: How does the Secretariat of the European Parliament matters *vis-à-vis* European Political Groups in the legislative process?
- Quantitative research question: How and how often is legislative staff in the EP involved in the policy making process?
- Qualitative research question: Why legislative staff members adopt the approach they do in policy making?

**Why a survey?** As there is little empirical evidence based on systematic research and most of it is based on theoretical or logical assumptions (Costa, 2003) and experience (Camenen, 1995; Priestley, 2000) the first aim is to discover new facts by measuring legislative assistance. Compared to the USA, there is no tradition in the EU to publish data on staff, such as staff tenure, demographics etc.<sup>8</sup> For the purpose of gathering descriptive information on officials characteristics, tasks and attitudes, a survey will be administered to officials in Secretariat (committee secretariats) and political groups. By using a representative sample a researcher gains the possibility to generalize. When dealing with a large number of people on which little information is known, the survey becomes of practical value compared to interviews. Quantitative research tends to have higher credibility in the eyes of people in power (politicians). This is highly important, as the research aims to have a practical purpose.

**Legislative tasks** The purpose of the survey will be to clarify the tasks carried out by legislative staff. Much is known on the tasks carried out by committee staff (Manley 1966 in Hammond, 1984, 276; Patterson, 1970; Ryle, 1981; Campbell and Laporte, 1981; Blischke, 1981), while the role of political parties staff remains unexplored. The central tasks are to provide information, draft reports, prepare briefings, handle the committee correspondence and communication. DeGregorio (1994) established a hierarchy of services, where protecting one's boss, providing factual information and reporting on a political reception a bill faces are the most common tasks. Negotiations, coming up with new ideas, providing judgments on political implications and constituency related work rates low and are performed more selectively (DeGregorio, 1994, 6). A similar hierarchy of functions will be created for the EP. Furthermore, tasks will be compared by Secretariat/political groups and committees.

It is expected that Secretariat officials will be involved more often in legislative tasks than political groups officials. As the role of political groups is increasing, we expect political groups to not only perform coordination tasks, but also legislative tasks. The tasks carried out by committee secretariats will not vary per committees as in the USA, as the administrative system in the EU is centralized. More variation is expected within political groups, whose recruitment is decentralized and more similar to a free market as witnessed in the USA. Even though, it is assumed that tasks will not vary per committees, different chairmen or rapporteurs might imply different working styles. Therefore, the significance between committee and chairmanship will be explored. Moreover, it is expected the tasks will vary depending on the nature of the issue. With a sensitive issue (either politically sensitive, or codecision/consultation decision-making) the role of committee secretariats is expected to vary.

**Policy orientation** Based on Price (1971) categorization of legislative staff into policy entrepreneurs and professionals, the orientation on policy making (or working style) will be researched. It is expected that a policy entrepreneur orientation is more common for political groups officials than committee secretariats. Political groups officials work in a partisan environment, while neutrality and impartiality is demanded from Secretariat staff in general.

**Multinationality and mobility** The EU enhances two special characteristics compared to USA Congress and parliaments across Europe. The first one is its multinational nature. The second one is the mobility for EU officials and mobility between political groups and Secretariat. To see if nationality matters, respondents answers will be compared based on nationality. If in parliaments across Europe mobility is low, it is expected to find out high rates of mobility (and low level of tenure of a position) in the EP, due to the mobility requirement. Political groups officials become permanent officials of the Secretariat more often than the reverse, as the employment type is more stable and secure.

**Why semi-structured interviews?** The qualitative part of the research intends to explain a phenomena: the analysis will move beyond description by exploring larger questions driving the patterns reported by the survey. If in the quantitative part of the research we ask questions with *what* and *how*, the qualitative part aims to discover *why* things are as such. Depending on the survey results, it will be determined why legislative assistance is more in the domain of political groups or Secretariat. Besides expanding the scope of the research, already tested hypotheses on a representative sample with a survey will be verified with in-depth interviews on a non-representative sample. Consequently, a researcher can reduce inevitable shortcomings arising from the survey analysis. The greatest advantage of interviews is the possibility to probe deeper into the answers of the interviewee and to get new insights. With this aim in mind, the following questions will be explored: Do Secretariat and political groups officials share views and values? To what extent is their collaboration necessary for successful legislation? How are their relations with political figures similar or different? Does mobility between Secretariat and political groups affect the EP? Finally, are political groups really responsible for

the decreasing role of Secretariat as suggested (Camenen, 1995; Costa, 2003)?

**Why mixed methods?** The greatest strength of mixed methods is that it provides better understanding of a phenomenon than quantitative and qualitative methods alone (Creswell and Clark, 2007, 5). Follow up qualitative findings help explain initial quantitative results, as a researcher develops a personal contact with individuals from the studied population or other experts. In this way information previously unobservable can be observed and data is analyzed alternatively. Topics related to European integration have been thoughtfully studied with qualitative and quantitative methods within the theoretical frameworks of intergovernmentalism and social constructivism. However, few are the studies integrating theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches, even though there has been an increasing call for interdisciplinarity.

## 5 CONCLUSION

This article doesn't give an answer to the question whether legislative staff in the EP is important or not for the policy process in the EU. However, it shows EP's legislative staff is worthwhile investigating. Literature on the American Congress gives us an example on how tasks and policy orientations can be researched. Literature on the EP administration indicates partisanship as a significant variable shaping life in the EP. The purpose of the study presented in this paper is to discover whether this is true or not. We will do so by analyzing the role of EP officials working in the committee secretariats and compare them with the role of officials working in political groups. It's expected that political groups, which are already significant actors in shaping the political life of the EP, are gaining competences also in the legislative assistance of MEPs compared to Secretariat officials. To verify this hypothesis a survey will be administered. Why have political groups gained legislative capabilities compared to Secretariat officials or not will subsequently be investigated by semi-structured interviews. The use of mixed methods in this research is driven by the question on how to best solve the problem on legislative assistance in the EP without being restricted with one methodological approach. Since surveys might not uncover subtleties in the processes of the EU, semi-structured interviews seem to be a good way to do dig further.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>See Articles 223 and 336 of the TFEU as modified by the Lisbon Treaty in Appendix E.

<sup>2</sup>Democrats tend to expand federal programs and need staff. Republicans want to limit federal programs, therefore, they need less legislative staff.

<sup>3</sup>Moreover, the two chamber in France decide their own status for staff. In Spain the two chambers have a common administration.

<sup>4</sup>Literature on the administrative aspects of the Commission focuses on many topics: socialization (Hooghe, 2005), elites, administration reforms (Metcalfe, 2000; Cini, 2007; Bauer, 2009), administrative culture (Cini, 1995, 1996), control over administrative actors (see chapter 6, 8 and 9 in Hofmann and Türk, 2006) and socio-graphic characteristics (Georgakakis and Lassalle, 2004). Among the Commission literature, we can count also more general works such as those of Stevens and Stevens (2001) and Page (1997). Their works are real pioneers in mapping the European bureaucracy in terms of historic evolution, judicial framework, recruitment etc. However, even if they attempt to draw a broad picture, their data in most parts deals with Commission officials.

<sup>5</sup>For literature on Council administration see Beyers (2005) for socialization, Mangenot (2004) for sociographic characteristics, Fouilleux et al. (2005) for working groups and Christiansen (2006) for the Council Secretariat General.

<sup>6</sup>For example Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix et al., 2007; Lindberg et al., 2009; Scully, 2005; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003.

<sup>7</sup>In general, politicization of administration takes up three forms (Costa, 2003, 157; Rouban, 2007, 200-208). It can mean the submission of bureaucracy to political parties (politicization as partisan control over the bureaucracy), the manifestation of political preferences and acting according to them by officials rather than following superiors' orders (politicization as participation in political decision-making) or the pursuit of political goals rather than solely administrative ones by the bureaucracy as a whole (politicization as political involvement). In the first two cases, administration loses its autonomy and becomes weak. The third cases indicates a powerful administration able to pursue its own political ambitions.

<sup>8</sup>For examples see <http://www.aei.org> and <http://www.congressfoundation.org>.

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