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Distant and apolitical? A comparative study of the domesticisation and politicisation of the EU in Yorkshire (UK) and Galicia (Spain)

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Abstract: This paper draws on Carl Schmitt's conceptions of democracy and 'the political' to explain the seemingly apolitical and distant character of the European Union. Schmitt conceived democracy as a regime of identity between the government and the governed, and 'the political' as 'friend versus enemy' relationship. When a political regime is domesticised, that is, when identification between representatives and represented exists, the 'antagonistic' politicisation between enemies would be replaced by the 'agonistic' politicisation between the members of a polity, that is, by an ideological, rather than inimical, left-versus-right contest. We test this intimate relationship between positive domesticisation and agonistic politicisation by interviewing the networks of EU-related political and social actors in two contrasting regions in Europe, Yorkshire in the UK (the paradigm of British euroscepticism) and Galicia in Spain (where the EU has been supported by most political elites), and by content-analysing the news that link the EU to these regions in their respective benchmark newspapers (*The Yorkshire Post* and *La Voz de Galicia*). In Yorkshire the predictions of the theory hold true (lack of identification leads to a friend-versus-enemy relationship), but in Galicia a positive domesticisation does not lead to an agonistic or left-versus-right politicisation. We explain our findings by resorting to an explanation based on three components: The way the EU has been integrated (through a neofunctionalist avoidance of popular participation), the way the EU is governed (diplomacy and corporatism are intrinsically against the publicity of procedures), and the absence of a cohesive European identity that would allow for redistributive political decisions at a pan-European scale. The workings of the proverbial 'communications gap', by which the lack of political engagement with the EU would be attributed to the role of the news media, find little support in our study. A positive regard of the EU in Galicia by the political elites and the mainstream media has not made the EU popular there. Paradoxically, the EU is more 'political' in Yorkshire (in an antagonistic sense), with the EU embodying the enemy.

Keywords: Carl Schmitt, communications gap, European Union, domesticisation, politicisation, Yorkshire, UK, Galicia, Spain, neofunctionalism, diplomacy, corporatism, identity.

1.- Introduction: The twin deficit of 'domesticisation' and 'politicisation' in EU politics

Europeans face a political *décalage*: more and more policy areas are managed by (or are enacted by) the European Union's supranational layer of power, but the distance between European citizens and EU institutions is growing, with the latter being perceived by remote, obscure, and unaccountable (Heller, 2008; Anderson, 2009; Koopmans & Statham, 2010). The existence of such an emotional gap is a matter of debate, as the authors of the inter-governmental school claim that these mores are the product of federalist academics and commentators, who are reluctant to admit that the EU is a sort of stable pseudo-confederation where the most important matters are still the turf of national governments, therefore making understandable the low popular appeal of continental politics (Majone, 2005; Moravcsick, 1998). The debate on the EU's 'democratic deficit' has filled the pages of academic journals for about a couple of decades now, but two recent events have reopened the discussion about the popular control of EU powers: a) the impossible ratification by popular referenda of the European Constitution in 2005, which had to be transformed into an international treaty (the Treaty of Lisbon), and b) the 'Great Recession' that began in 2008, which has put the future of the European common currency in jeopardy, forced the financial rescue of Greece from default by the EU and the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and made Brussels the main supervisor of eurozone member-state annual budgets. As a consequence, not only the monetary policy, but also the fiscal policy areas are being clearly influenced by the European supranational layer of power.

With more and more evidence of this *décalage* between the increasingly European scope of Europeans' lives, the disengagement of Europeans from EU-level politics is still a matter of concern for scholars. If we take Pippa Norris' (2000) three indicators of political engagement (political information, political participation, and political trust) Europeans score badly in the first and second, whereas the EU is endowed with more trust than national governments, although with relevant variations: according to Heller (2008), the longer the democratic tradition of a European country, the bigger its distrust of Brussels.

In order for a political system to become popular, it has long been agreed that there is a need of a 'public sphere' where issues of communal concern are voiced out, contributing to the process of popular opinion-formation, which will have its more decisive say in elections that could change a government and therefore the policy direction of an executive (Eriksen, 2009).

The EU does not have a public sphere commensurable to the reach of its institutions. There is no European forum, but national fora where European issues are debated. Despite the role of English as lingua franca, the EU does not have a 'national' language, so at best Europeans must rely on 'Europeanised' (national) public spheres, where ideally a series of common European topics would be discussed with the same intensity and the same frames of reference (Risse, 2010). After the referenda backlash of 2005, European leaders (be they Commissioners or national prime ministers) blamed much of the results on 'communication'. The media were not doing their role, it was claimed. It was not about blindly supporting every Brussels proposition, but about encouraging and enlightened debate on the issues of common concern to all Europeans, it was suggested.

In this paper we propose a different look at the EU's 'communications problem'. Instead of focusing on the media or journalists, we shift the light towards the EU as a political regime and to its incentives against popular involvement. Instead of a 'communications gap', we talk about a twin deficit of domesticisation (lack of identity with the EU) and politicisation (the irreducibility of EU politics to a left versus right political contest). Indeed, if Europeans felt the EU as their own, as a home (domestic) reality, and if they felt their participation would make a difference in terms of policy change, the EU malaise would be over. But Europeans do not feel this and –contrary to popular and many academic claims–, this has little to do with journalistic mediation. The answers must be found in the way Europe has been integrated (by stealth), the way Europe is governed (through diplomacy and neo-corporatism) and in the

impossibility of going towards majoritarian (democratic) means of government without some sort of European identity that could hold the polity together.

This paper applies the concepts of 'domesticisation' and 'politicisation' to a comparative analysis of two regional newspapers, one from a very Eurosceptic region (Yorkshire, in the UK), and another one from a very pro-European region (Galicia, in Spain). As we will show, the news stories that can be read on a left versus right axis are practically inexistent. This holds true even in the case of Galicia, where the EU is an unquestionable fact of life and is seen as broadly a positive influence. Interestingly enough, in Yorkshire, where the identification with the EU is low or, better said, is seen as 'the other' or 'the enemy', the EU is more 'political' (civil society and politicians have more voice than governments), but this politicisation is not agonistic (left versus right, between adversaries), but antagonistic (the UK versus the EU, friend versus enemy) (Mouffe, 2000). Obviously, this kind of politicisation of the EU in the UK is inevitably linked to the particular non-identification with the EU. In the case of Galicia, acceptance of the EU does not lead to 'normal politics' but to its absence. The mere analysis of public discourse on the EU at the regional level reveals something strange about the EU as a political regime: its difficulty to translate policy into (agonistic) politics, or vice-versa. Again, this is an issue that goes beyond 'communication'.

The relational content analysis of newspapers reported on this paper was used to select a sample of interviewees among the sources quoted in the news stories, in order to explore with them the issues of domesticisation and politicisation through in-depth interviews. That is, the content analysis of newspapers was used as a sampling method for informants, a technique coined by Philip Howard as 'network ethnography' (Howard, 2006). The domesticisation and politicisation deficits are then explained by resorting to the informants of the Galicia and Yorkshire EU networks (i.e. environmental groups, business associations, MEPs, regional government agencies).

2.- Theoretical inspiration: Schmitt and Habermas on domesticisation and politicisation

It is indeed ironic that Habermas, who in the 1960s was criticizing the Adenauer governments for their back-room corporatist dealings and their subsequent presentation to the mass media as manufactured pseudo events of a 'demonstrative publicity' reminiscent of feudal times, has been so reluctant to criticize the EU for the very same reasons. The Adenauer governments made politics for the public to consume, Habermas denounced in his well-known seminal book on the public sphere (1994 [1962]). However, his reflections on bureaucratisation and corporatism have not been properly applied to the supranational layer of European power. Habermas claimed that (at least in the case of Germany) bureaucratisation and corporatism were inherently de-politicising, but this thought has not been extended to the EU case. On the issue of identity, Habermas' main contribution has been his idea of 'constitutional patriotism', a sort of 'civic nationalism', or a 'nationalism of values', with which Europeans could identify despite their linguistic differences.

Carl Schmitt is also a key author for study of domestication and politicisation. In a way, much of Habermas' work could be read as a response to Schmitt's ideas. If a political system wants to be democratic, Schmitt sees no other avenue than the homogeneity of its population. With no homogeneity, decisions based on majority (democracy) can be self-destructive for the polity if losers do not see winners as part of them. As for politicisation, Schmitt believes that liberalism, with its insistence on rational deliberation, is the Trojan horse of technocracy, which takes politics out of populations and restricts it to the hands of bureaucracy and interest groups. In sum, for Schmitt, liberalism is depolitising, and its end-point is technocracy (McCormick, 2008).

2.1.- Habermas on politicisation: the perils of 'demonstrative publicity'

The 'transformation' that Habermas deals with on his seminal work has to do with the shift from a 'critical public sphere', typical of the bourgeois times, to a 're-feudalised public

sphere' in the age of mass democracy, where critical deliberation on state matters is artificially aroused on electoral periods, and is not geared towards the best solution, but to the commercial-style choosing of political options in the marketplace of ideas. The public sphere of mass democracies is feudal because the separation between the public (the state) and the private (society) is over: the (welfare) state, in response to mass demands, manages the economy to a degree not seen in the liberal age, making more and more features of private life depending on the state. Likewise, private actors, namely corporatist associations, assume public functions. For Habermas, collective bargaining is one of the most prevalent features in this mix of the public and the private: "Collective agreements between employers' associations and trade unions lose their private character; they must have a public character, because the regulations they produce act as if they were law." (Habermas, 1994 [1962]: 180).

There is a transition from (liberal) discussion to (corporatist) bargaining, a shift from publicity (where power, in Habermas jargon, is 'rationalised') to backroom dealings that are later 'sold' to a passive public. The Parliament, the quintessential institution of liberalism, is weakened in favour of the dealings between the administration and trade unions or employer's organisations. And, just like in the Middle Ages, publicity or the public sphere of mass (welfare) democracies becomes 'demonstrative' again. The public sphere is not that independent realm where the bourgeoisie assembles to criticize state affairs. In the age of welfare mass democracies, notoriety comes only after the agreements have been reached between the state and corporate organisations. Publicity is not about debate, but about public relations to win the public's acquiescence. Publicity becomes medieval ('representative', 'demonstrative') again, with political actors not representing citizens, but power. Publicity is no longer about (rational) discussion. The modern prince (the government, the bureaucracy) and the modern estates (business groups and labour unions) "represent their power 'before' the people, instead of for the people." (Habermas, 1973: 51). That is, "publicity imitates now that aura of personal prestige and supernatural authority so characteristic of representative publicity" (Habermas, 1994 [1962]: 222).

The view of the EU as a neo-corporatist pseudo-state has a long tradition in the literature. It is not hard to tell in the real world, as both local chambers of commerce and trade unions receive money from the European Social Fund to (re)train, respectively, small business owners and workers. The European Council, who has replaced the Commission as the main de-facto policy initiator in the EU, is still not collectively responsible for its decisions. Much of its publicity is limited to press releases and family photos of strong monarchical reminiscences. The COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) diplomats, who care about the groundwork of legislation that is later discussed at Council meetings, are at least as decisive as MEPs, but their workings are ignored by most Europeans. The EU publicity is much about a Medieval 'showing of power', the Council of the EU being its finest exponent.

This said, it would be fair to admit that, as many critics have warned, no liberal democracy in this world can meet the ideal requirements of strong and inclusive deliberation advocated by Habermas. After all, EU neo-corporatism is just a pan-European translation of what has been going on for years on its respective constituent states. However, at the EU level the 'emergency break' of ousting governments through popular elections is unavailable for Europeans. If elections change little at the national level, they change even less at the EU level. This is in great part due to the two deficits we want to highlight, the domesticisation and the politicisation deficits.

2.2.- Habermas on domesticisation: the quest for a 'constitutional patriotism'

Constitutional patriotism is one among the many 'Germanisms' that characterise the EU. The indirect German federalism, which endows Länders with the task of implementing the law of an elusive federal power, is said to have been copied onto Europe by the EU and its member states. Up to a point, with constitutional patriotism there is a similar German-to-EU translation.

After the Second World War, German nationalism was still tinged with the essences of National Socialism. Popular loyalty to the new federal state could not be based on traditional nationalism, but on an allegiance to the values and procedures enacted by the Constitution. Jan-Werner Müller, author of the most comprehensive survey on constitutional patriotism available (2007), defines it as "the idea that political attachment ought to center on the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal democratic constitution" (p. 1). Though still quite abstract and, as Müller puts it, 'bloodless', German constitutional patriotism is nevertheless grounded on two sentimental assets: memory and militancy (Müller, 2007: 10). Germans share a "self-critical remembering of the Holocaust", they are negatively defined by a genocide. The German constitutional 'we' is comprised by those who regret and shall never repeat the killing of Jews. Also, the German 'weness' springs from a "militant democracy" that renders the "enemies of democracy" incompatible with the democratic game. Hence the banning of the Nazi and Communist parties by the Constitutional Court in the 1950s.

Jürgen Habermas is not the father of German constitutional patriotism, although he has been one of its main definers over time. What he can indeed claim is his proposal to endow Europe with its own version of constitutional patriotism, linking the identity of Europeans not to their particular nations, but to the shared values enshrined by the (failed and then resuscitated) Constitutional Treaty.

Interestingly, Habermas' constitutional patriotism is intimately linked to his ideal of an ever-deliberating public sphere. Just like the liberal public sphere was an attempt to 'rationalise power' through the publicity of state proceedings, constitutional patriotism can be understood as a "rationalisation of collective identities" (Müller, 2007: 29). For Habermas, constitutional patriotism relies on a constant debate that gives way to a "reflexive identity" that questions tradition and is re-negotiated in the public sphere: "Where Steinberger's civic friendship had essentially focused on the state, Habermas envisaged civic solidarity as an outcome of unconstrained discourse leading to mutual civic recognition, and an ongoing process of mutual learning." (Müller, 2007: 31).

It is very unlikely, if not impossible, that Europe will ever find its own continental version of traditional nation-state nationalism. Europeans are not, and may never be, ready "to die for Brussels", as as Müller comments with a grain of sarcasm (2007: 128). Constitutional patriotism might therefore be the only sort of political attachment valid for EU citizens, but also for other diverse, multicultural democratic polities. However, and also according to Müller, this 'post-patriotic' EU (p. 128) has yet failed to address the two key Schmittian questions: "Who decides?" and "Who is the enemy?" Müller's response to the Schmittian imperatives strongly resonates with my discussion on the domestication and politicisation deficits of the EU: "The Union has no single identifiable locus of sovereignty, and it does displace 'the political' into the economic and the ethical –just as Carl Schmitt claimed liberalism always would" (p. 127, his italics). And, further to this point, "the Union is a liberal civil association, which is designed to liberate its members from the political, if the political is understood in a Schmittian manner." (p. 128, his italics). So, risking a daring interpretation of Müller words, we could conclude that the EU was invented to liberate Europeans from politics, from enemies, from the 'others' inside. In ruling out war, the EU ended up ruling out politics. The EU, following Schmittian language, is highly liberal (conflict-avoidant) but poorly democratic (people do not feel as the true sovereign of the polity due to lack of identification with a ruler).

2.-3.- Schmitt on domesticisation: democracy as homogeneity

In a multiethnic and multicultural world as ours Schmitt's claim that homogeneity is an essential principle in democracy may stand out as anachronistic at best, and xenophobic at worst. After all, modern democracies are proud of their ethnic and religious diversity. However, as the important electoral gains of xenophobic parties in countries like France and the Netherlands show, the survival of multiculturalism owes more to liberalism (and a constitutional order guaranteeing freedom of cult and no racial discrimination) than to democracy. This is the

(often difficult) equilibrium between liberalism and democracy, the 'democratic paradox' in Mouffe's terms (Mouffe, 2000), that Schmitt believed to be impossible or hardly sustainable in the early 20th Century. Despite its stridence to cosmopolitan ears, Schmitt's defence of the inextricability of homogeneity and democracy enjoys considerable support in the literature of European Studies.

In contemporary studies on European integration, the claim that lack of homogeneity prevents the existence of a true European democracy is far from outlandish. For Majone, the decreasing participation in European elections is largely related to the absence of a true 'European demos' (Majone, 2005). For Jolly, the psycho-sociological deficit of the Union (the lack of a 'European political people') should prevent the EU from taking decisions with truly distributive consequences. After examining public opinion data, Jolly concludes that "Europeans do not see themselves a part of one democratic whole, but rather constituent units cooperating within an institutional framework called the EU (…) Areas that demand a high degree of solidarity should not be subjected to supranational government" (2007: 237-238).

According to Schmitt, democracy needs homogeneity because democracy is built upon a series of identifications. These identifications are easier to hold with homogeneity. Schmitt admits no population, big or small, can be completely homogenous, which means that most democratic identifications will be fictional. They must be understood to be true, even if they aren't. To put it in Schmitt's words,

> "All democratic arguments rest on a series of identities. Belonging to these series are: the identity between governors and governed, sovereigns and subjects, between the subject and the object of state's authority, between the people and its representation in the Parliament, between the State and the voters, between State and the law and, eventually, identity between the quantitative (the majority or the arithmetic unanimity) and the qualitative (the fairness of the law)." (Schmitt, 2008 [1926]: 57).

In sum: although the liberal half of our liberal democracies is nation-free and actually quite universalistic, the democratic half calls for a people, for identification, for homogeneity. A 'world democracy' would make no sense, according to Schmitt: "The equality among all men as persons is not democracy, but a given kind of liberalism; is not a form of State, but a moral and a worldview of the individualistic and humanitarian sort. Modern democracy is based upon the confusing linkage between the two" [that is, between these two conceptions of equality: the 'liberal' equality as humans and the 'democratic' equality as members of the same people]. (Schmitt, 2008 [1926]: 31). For Schmitt, the liberal conception of human equality (individuals are all the same when considered as human beings) is not enough 'political' to sustain a democratic regime, which is based on a people who is always in opposition to other people. This is why, for Schmitt, universal suffrage only makes sense when there is homogeneity. Inviting every other human being to decide upon the public affairs of a given territory would make the political equality of the citizens of that territory useless. Hence the need of a more 'substantive' equality, that of national homogeneity. Equality is then related to identity, and identity to alterity (to the existence of a foreigner).

As we shall try to demonstrate in my empirical study, the need for identification for polities to be felt as legitimate is useful to understand the British-EU relationship. When the eurosceptic wing of the British Conservative party says it wants to renationalise regional policy, it argues that Brussels is doing things in England that Englanders would not do if they were given the chance to autonomously manage regional development funds. This is a denunciation of an alien power mingling in the internal affairs of a state. In this view, Brussels is seen as 'the foreigner', and therefore an illegitimate influence. This is a clear example of the (Schmittian) lack of identification between the governed and the governors, a lack of identification that has nothing to do with race or language (albeit some would argue there is some underlying Germanophobia, as the continent and the EU are, in some extreme cases, identified in Britain with the former World War II enemy). It can also be seen as a consequence of the EU being the result of a "plural constituent power" (as compared to a single or 'national' power) that is likely

to "reassert itself against the executive elites which drive the European project" (Müller, 2000: 1794) .

In any case, it is time now to deal with Schmitt's concept of 'the political', based on the dialectic opposition between friend and enemy (Schmitt, 1996 [1932]).

2.4.- Schmitt on politicisation: liberalism as the Trojan horse of technocracy

How can we tell the political? When we see categories of opposites, of entities whose existence is challenged by the existence of the other. This can happen within a state (e.g. left versus right) or among states (e.g. Britain versus Germany). A relationship can be qualified as political when a friend-enemy opposition can be delineated, when a distinction between existential opposites can be made. This is why Schmitt derides liberalism as apolitical. Liberalism calls for the equality of humans as human beings. It is hardly compatible with a friend-enemy distinction. The parliament, the quintessential liberal institution, is all about discussion and consensus. It is very slow at making executive decisions, and least effective at declaring wars. Rational discussion is a close relative of technocracy, and the rule by the experts is impersonal, diffusing the responsibility for the decisions taken. Liberalism, therefore, is a sort of Trojan Horse of technocracy in liberal democracies. A true political contest is about a "you or me" existential battle. Left or right. Britain or Germany. Liberalism dissolves the political, the antagonism, by appealing to negotiation, to bargaining. In Schmittian politics, the goal is victory. In classic liberal (bourgeois) parliaments, the goal is consensus, or compromise.

When discussing European Union politics, the 'drama' of national politics is often compared to the consociational politics of the European Parliament. Indeed, the EP has been defined as a 19th Century style parliament . It is my argument that much of the EU's 'communication deficit' is due to the liberal bias of European politics. EU politics is deliberative, technocratic, and apolitical. In order to be engaging, communicatively viable, EU politics must find a way of identifying governors and governed, and a way of agonising politics, of encouraging partisanship, of creating rivalry between "authentic principles that lead to very different approaches to governing" (Dionne Jr., 2010).

Our Schmittian suggestion is not hundred per cent Schmittian. It is actually closer to Mouffe's revision of Schmitt's theories (Mouffe, 2000). Observing the rise of 'deliberative democracy' and the end of distinction between left and right brought by Clintonism and Blair's (or Giddens') Third Way, Mouffe reacted claiming that such depolitisation was favouring the rise of the extreme right in European countries, which was introducing itself as the only authentic alternative to the establishment. Inspired by Schmitt's concept of the political, Mouffe argued for an 'agonistic' model of democracy, whereby the friend-enemy distinction is transformed into a contest between rivals with radical differences that must result in the temporary 'hegemony' of one of them, that is, on the implementation of a given political programme, as long as constitutional guarantees are respected. Mouffe's victory over a rival is not Schmitt's annihilation of the enemy. It keeps the antagonistic (or, in Mouffe's terms, agonistic) nature of politics, while keeping the common ground of a liberal constitution intact. Taking agonistic politics to the European level would imply believing in some sort of European demos, where opposition between Europeans is based on left-right divisions rather than on ethnic or national confrontations (e.g. eurosceptic countries versus federalist member states). This is a move Mouffe herself is not likely to make, as thinking of ourselves as Europeans instead of nationals of our particular countries would be a too strong 'libidinal inversion.'

Mouffe rescues Schmitt's warning that politics, or antagonism, is not something that can be ruled out from this world. Politics exists, precisely, because there is not a definitive rational solution to social problems. Both Mouffe and Schmitt claim that, if the political is not made explicit, if sides are not allowed to fight and declare victory or admit defeat, the political will somehow come back, sometimes in undesirable and unexpected forms. For Mouffe, the left's contemporary surrender to neoliberalism, its denial to confront the right with a radically different political project and instead disguising itself as 'centre-left' or 'third way', is making

the labour class turn to extreme-right parties, as they are regarded as the true alternative to 'the system'.

As we will show in my empirical study, The EU is rarely politicised in left-right terms, at least in the two cases examined (eurosceptic Yorkshire and pro-European Galicia). In Yorkshire, there exists a true politicisation of the EU, but the friend-enemy distinction is not displayed along party lines. It's a political fight between Britain and Brussels. It's a politicisation conditioned by the identification deficit between the British and the EU superstructure. In Galicia identification with Europe works relatively well , but politicisation is neither a matter of ideological opposites, it merely consists in the defence of the regional interest, in the fight for limited resources (namely regional development aid).

3.- Methods: Content analysis and network-interviewing

One of the outcomes of Commissioner Wallström's communications review was to try to 'communicate Europe in partnership', with regional and local media playing a bigger role in reporting EU news. In many cases, for particular regions the local press is far more relevant than the national one, so it is of particular interest to study how the EU is domesticised and politicised in benchmark regional newspapers. Our comparative cases are the Yorkshire Post, the broadsheet most widely read in the Yorkshire region, in the north of England (UK) and La Voz de Galicia, read by half of newspaper readers in the northwest Spanish region of Galicia (Spain). Both Yorkshire and Galicia enjoy a strong local identity (stronger in Galicia given the existence of a language of its own, Galician, and minority claims for nation status for the region). However, both regions defer in their degree of acceptance the EU (contested in Yorkshire, accepted and supported in Galicia).

In order to assess how the EU is domesticised and politicized in the regions through regional newspapers, we devised a list of frames, following Tankard's approach (2001). Initially we listed all the possible frames, deriving them from the relevant literature, defining them with catchphrases or keywords, and then using them as a list of categories in a content analysis. In composing the two familes of frames (domesticisation and politicisation), we drew from two strands of literature. First, the literature on political theory, with Schmitt, Habermas and Mouffe as my main guides, who provided me with the two elements that make a political system 'engaging': the identification between government and constituents (domesticisation) and the voicing of conflict, either on an agonistic or antagonistic fashion (politicisation). A second strand of literature came from European political communication studies, and in particular from the work of the Europolcom research group (Koopmans and Statham, 2010), which performed much of their content analyses by resorting to a two dimensional scheme of vertical integration (relationships between the home member state and the European institutions) and horizontal integration (relationships between and among the members states of the European Union). A third source of inspiration came from a careful initial reading of the news stories compiled, which showed two relatively frequent patterns of vertical identification: resource mobilisation (of regional governments or interest groups to keep European funding) and institutional interpenetration (referring to the presence of EU agents in the regions, or regional agents in Brussels). Given that these patterns could also happen horizontally (by member states or different regions joining up forces to defend their interests at the European level, or by having institutional representatives in each others' territories), I also devised the frames of 'horizontal resource mobilisation' and 'horizontal institutional interpenetration').

The pilot reliability tests, however, revealed a relatively low reliability (67% of agreement) for the domesticisation variables. This was an indication that the frames were not mutually exclusive: for example, a story where a regional official was interviewed in Brussels after meeting with a Commission representative to discuss the alocation of more regional funding could be coded as "institutional interpenetration", or "resource mobilisitation". The pilot test revealed, in a sense, that these two categories were subsets of the broader "vertical identification" frame, so they were collapsed into just one single frame with that label. When a second coding was performed with the simplified list of four domesticisation frames, reliability

reached 85% in La Voz de Galicia subsample and 88% in the Yorkshire Post subsample. The reliability test for the politicisation variable reached an agreement of 94% in the La Voz de Galicia subsample and of 89% in the Yorkshire Post subsample.

The coding scheme was developed both deductively and inductively. I knew from the start I wanted to code for the degree of identification with and legitimacy of EU institutions (domesticisation) and for the sort of politicisation that sparked the connection between the regions and the EU (agonistic or antagonistic). For this goal the literature was helpful, but the families of domesticisation and politicisation frames were only completely developed after reading about a fourth of the news stories in the sample of each of the two newspapers under study. It was after this reading that I decided to add two more frames to the politicisation family: regional or national mobilisation to defend the regional or national interest against others (be they the European institutions or other member states) and scandal or controversy regarding public management.

The unit of analysis were articles (stories and comments) published in the Yorkshire Post and La Voz de Galicia newspapers from 10 June 2004 (the date of the 2004 European elections) to 9 June 2009 (the date of the 2009 European elections) including the terms "EU" and the name of their respective regions ("Galicia"/ "Yorkshire")[1].

Drawing inspiration from Philip Howard (2006), who observed and interviewed the network of 'e-politics' activists and consultants in the United States after performing a network analysis of speakers invited to specialized conferences on Internet and politics, we decided to treat the first six sources quoted in each of the news stories as nodes of a non-directed network. In this way I planned to see, from the sources that show up whenever the regions and the EU are related, which are the ones that appear most frequently related. That is, whenever the region and the EU are discussed, we wanted to know who were the political actors that journalists put in relation with each other when writing their stories.

For the coding of news sources we used two sorts of criteria: their geographic location within the multi-level European polity (local, regional, national, European, etc.), and their role in the public sphere (executive, legislative, judicial powers, specific and diffuse interest groups, etc.). For the geographic classification I adapted the coding scheme used by Koopmans (2002) in the Europub.com project. For the public sphere role classification I used the list of political actors that, according to Habermas (2006), constitute the public political sphere.

The coding was recorded on an Excel spreadsheet. For computing the frame analysis, I exported the data to SPSS. To compute the social network analysis of news sources, I exported the data to NodeXL, an application that works as a macro for Excel. I coded for a maximum of six sources in each news story, which yields a maximum of fifteen non-directed dyads per news story.

The network of news sources was a means of sampling for interview cases, as the network captured the public figures that linked the two regions under study and the EU. A total of 93 subjects in the two regions and in Brussels were approached for an in-depth interview (politicians, journalists, environmentalists, businesspeople, civil servants). Besides performing this interviews, we also participated in campaign activities on the eve of the European elections (e.g. party conferences) and worked as an intern in the European Parliament in Brussels during three months in the Spring of 2010, just when the first Greek rescue package was agreed. We attended parliamentary committee meetings, European Commission press conferences, and

[1] Within that data range, the sample of news stories was selected through a keyword search for the combined appearance of the terms "EU" and "Yorkshire" in the headlines and the leading paragraph of the stories published by the Yorkshire Post as filed by the Nexis database in that five-year period yielded 127 stories. An equivalent search in the online archive of La Voz de Galicia for the same period using the terms "UE" and "Galicia" yielded 245,364 documents. The search engine of this newspaper has among its searching methods one called 'concordance', which ranks news stories by the degree of co-occurrence of the searched terms. I took the first 150 results. The Yorkshire Post sample had two duplicate stories, so the final number of stories computed for the analysis was 125. In the case of La Voz de Galicia, some of the news stories selected linked to other information sub-packages, which were also included in the analysis, yielding a total of 158 stories. Therefore, the final sample was formed by 125 from the Yorkshire Post, and 158 articles from La Voz de Galicia.

covered the EU summit of 7 May 2010 along with other Spanish correspondents from the Council's Justus Lipsus building. This ethnographic effort lasted nearly two years, with one-year observation and interview period in Galicia, plus another year-long interview and observation period in Yorkshire.

4.- Content analysis results: Irrespective of its degree of domesticisation, the EU is apolitical

The results of the content analysis show that the EU is almost never a matter of left versus right. In Galicia, the main means of politicising the EU is the pursuit of the regional interest (the funds for the region). In Yorkshire, the EU is political in an antagonistic way. The raison d'être of the organisation is permanently in question. The EU is seen to be working for Galicia, but in Yorkshire the EU is seen as some sort of foreign parasite, especially in the claims of some political actors, be them MPs, MEPs, or Eurosceptic writers of letters to the editor.

Surprisingly, the content analysis results show a tie between differentiation and identification frames in Yorkshire. However, a closer look to the results shows that most 'identification' frames refer to stories in which the EU system is accepted to pursue instrumental goals (e.g. achieving a European denomination of origin for a local cheese). My interviews would later show that the political centre of gravity in Yorkshire is grounded on the idea Yorkshire or England would do things differently if they kept all the power transferred to the EU. At the same time, the content analysis reveals an uneasy finding: that the EU can be accepted cynically, as long as it brings some economic benefit. In Galicia, the 'vertical identification' frame is the most important one, implying that the EU works for Galicia, and that both the region and the EU share the same goals. In Yorkshire the EU is politicised through a legitimation debate and the portrayal of the EU as an enemy (euroscepticism versus europhilia). In Galicia this frame is absent, so the EU is politicised through a regional interest frame: there is a contest with other regions or countries that pursue the limited regional development funds that Galicia wants to keep. All in all, the most salient fact is that neither in Galicia nor in Yorkshire the EU is politicised in a 'normal' manner, that is, through a left and right divide. If the situation in Galicia is extensive to other pro-European regions, it could be said that domesticisation (accepting the EU) does not lead to agonistic politicisation (left-right divide). Again, in Schmittian terms, the EU is actually more political in Yorkshire (with the EU or 'the alien power' as enemy) than in Galicia, where the EU is essentially about money (See figures 1, 2, 3, and 4).

The networks of sources, besides being a good recruitment method, have analytical power themselves. As it can be seen in figures 5, 6, 7, and 8, in Yorkshire the key nodes are the UK Government, the MPs and the MEPs, with an important presence of regional individuals (the YP readers who write letters to the editor, who were coded as sources themselves) and the 'moral entrepreneurs' (eurosceptic groups). In Galicia the legislative power of any level (regional, national, European) is conspicuously peripheral, with the regional government (the Xunta), the Spanish government, and the European Commission forming a strong 'triad of executives' in the network. It is striking the relevance of other national European governments, probably because they are seen as competitors for the same funds that Galicia and Spain are pursuing.

5. Network-interviewing results

5.1.- Explaining the domesticisation deficit

Our concern with the domesticisation of EU political institutions is inspired by Carl Schmitt's claim that democracies are, in essence, a regime of identity between the ruler and the ruled (Schmitt, 2009 [1932]; Schmitt, 2008 [1926]). If in a democracy the ultimate power-holder is the demos, the government must be seen as representative of that political community, to the point that the demos feels it is being governed by itself. In the case of the EU, the distance

between the governing institutions and the people is so wide that, according to Eurobarometer figures, half of Europeans ignore that the European Parliament is a popularly elected institution (Farrell and Scully, 2007).

The constant clash between Europhiles and Eurosceptics in the UK obscures the fact that full identification with the EU is not a matter of positive or negative feelings towards their institutions or towards the idea of Europe. In Spain the EU is positively regarded, but it is still seen as remote and distant. There seems to be a glass ceiling of identification and politicisation as regards to the EU. It can never be felt as domestic, as a home reality, neither can be easily politicized on a left versus right axis. The reason is disappointingly simple, and has been much debated in the political science literature but frequently ignored by communications scholars: the no demos problem, or the absence of a European people.

> "The Commission produced a video with a case study of cooperation between a Swedish and an Italian company. It's funny to watch, because it just doesn't work. The over-dubbing has that… it sounds silly, but it has a European feel to it. The voice over doesn't sound like an English person. It doesn't sound like anyone… it just sounds 'European'. The whole thing has a kind of air of Europeanism about it, and so appeals to nobody. I would never show that video to someone in England to encourage them to look for European partners, because they would laugh at it. And I get the impression the same would be on any other country. Somewhere in Brussels it looks good, [but] nowhere else does it look good. And I think that's the issue. By trying to appeal to everyone, Europe is appealing to nobody."
>
> Yorkshire business consultant (Leeds, 8 May 2009)

In our interviews and observations with the EU network of political actors I found positive and negative domesticisations of the EU. Negative domesticisations are more frequent, even among the pro-EU Galician actors. My informants have some indigenous explanations for this: the elusive European identity, the lack of a common language, and the inexistence of a European space of communication. Interestingly, I detected some instances of a conscious separation of the civic and cultural identity, which offers dim prospects for a European democracy, but a stable basis for the current managerial state whose legitimacy is grounded on efficiency and delivery rather than on direct popular sovereignty.

> "Think about a young person who takes a flight to London for 10 euros, and on arrival there he breaks a leg. But since he is taking with him the European health card and his national ID, he is assisted in hospital like any other Briton. Do you think that this young fellow is worried about the presumed democratic deficit of the EU, or would like to directly elect the president of the EU? Democracy is something more than voting. It is, above all, the guarantee of a given set of rights. And the set of rights endorsed by the EU is first class. What the average European wants, more than participating in European elections, is to phone his brother who is studying in France for the same cheap rate he would pay for a call to Zaragoza in Spain."
>
> Expert on EU regional funds (Santiago de Compostela, 20 November 2009)

To some MEPs, and also to some relevant EU scholars like Andrew Moravcsik (1998), the remoteness of European institutions is unavoidable. This would be because the EU takes care of important-but-low-salient issues. Most basic services like education, health care and pensions, are still managed at the national level. According to the inter-governmentalist school, the EU would be just a framework for international cooperation among commercially inter-dependent nations.

This rationale has been the object of much contention. To begin, there is not a clear division of competences between the EU and its member states. Competences that intergovernmentalists hold as exclusively national, such as education or health care, are highly determined by EU-level regulations. Nation states do not have the ability to exercise exclusive competence in areas of policy which rely on freedom of movement treaty rights. Much to the despair of British eurosceptics, national labour legislation has a clear EU-imprint on every member state.

The EU, then, takes care of important and and highly salient issues. But the EU is a framework that also involves the nation states, who thanks to subsidiarity preserve their protagonism among their domestic audiences, while at the same time manage politics at a pan-European level in a unique combination of corporatism, diplomacy and technocracy. Rather than being an ally of federalism, as Burgess (2000) suggests, subsidiarity is an ally of confederalism. It very much helps to dissipate any scent of supranational governance:

> "As you know, in rural Galicia there are still quite a few families who breed and slaughter pigs in their small, family subsistence farms. At the European level it has been agreed that pigs should not suffer when being slaughtered, so killing them with a knife is no longer allowed. Now imagine that the implementation of this regulation were carried out directly by European civil servants. You would have, say, a German guy arriving to a remote village to stop a farmer from killing his own bred pig. The poor German fellow would be lucky not to be the one sacrificed there. Villagers would say "Who's this guy to prevent me from killing my pigs the way I have done all my life? Down with this EU thing!" But thanks to the indirect administration, the only person showing up there will be a local policeman. If the farmer is upset, he will protest to the local mayor, and the mayor will tell him that this is a law coming from Madrid or somewhere from above. Eventually the mayor may tell his constituent to kill the pig with as less fanfare as possible so that nobodoy notices. This is the good part of indirect administration."
>
> Law university professor (Santiago de Compostela, 15 December 2009)

The domesticisation deficit (the incomplete identification between Europeans and EU institutions) is explained in large degree by the absence of a European demos. Europe is still, to borrow an expression from Bellamy and Castiglione (1997), a bricoleur of 'bits and pieces'.

> "In the Spanish Parliament you may find specialized representatives or not, but each of those guys represents the whole 45 million Spaniards. In Spain representation is like this: a single member represents all the electoral body, not only his/her constituency or his/her province. But here in the European Parliament is not the same. We vote our representatives in closed lists by country. And they represent, exclusively, the interest of their country of origin. You can't ask a Danish MEP to defend the interests of the Galician fishing sector. Nor you can ask the EP to be other thing than the sum of the particular interest of each country."
>
> La Voz de Galicia correspondent (Brussels, 18 May 2009)

British Eurosceptics (of whichever party) have more clear-cut view about the possibility of a European democracy. For them, democracy can only exist in the context of a single nation. Given their scorn of a federal Europe, I asked a noted Eurosceptic Conservative MEP whether he thought a democratic EU would be possible without a federation:

> "No, because to have a democracy you need a demos, you need a unit with which people identify when they use the word 'we'. And if you don't have the demos, you have only the kratos, you have the power of the system that has to compel by law what it can't ask in the name of civic patriotism."
>
> Conservative MEP (Cheltenham, 24 April 2009)

5.2.- Explaining the politicisation deficit

The politicisation deficit could be described as the inability of the EU political regime to facilitate agonistic political choices between left and right. Despite at the European Parliament representatives sit by political groups and not by nationality, and even though the post-Lisbon EP is theoretically on equal foot with the Council in terms of law-making power, European legislation is not the result of a popular mandate. Instead, EU directives and regulations are designed by a combination of European and national administrative elites whose main goal is continental stability (in a social, economic and political sense) and economic growth. The EU political regime creates domestic legislation, but it does it in a way that largely avoids ideological politics. Of all the possible means of politicisiation (agonistic, antagonistic, and de-

politicisation), the EU encourages the two latter over the first. At the EU level, inter-state bargaining is characterized by a soft antagonism that is diffused through compromise. The European Parliament, where left versus right agonism should reign, is affected by two limitations: on the one hand, MEPs' divided loyalty when parliamentary votes pose a challenge to a particular country or set of countries; on the other, the absence of a majority party in the parliament, along the absolute majority requirements to amend legislative proposals on second reading (which most of the times demands a 'grand coalition' between the PES and the EPP) have encouraged consensus between left and right. At the regional level, the administration of EU funds is beyond the reach of political debate, with strong technocratic and neo-functionalist overtones, as shown in our interviews.

> "You can't pretend to apply for an EU grant from morning to night. It's as if I went to a hospital and entered the theatre of operations while surgeons discuss how to do a by-pass. I would not understand half of what they're saying. So if you want to get EU funding, you have to make the effort, you have to get the training."
>
> Galician business association spokesperson (7 October 2009)

> "Among our applicants we always deal with the same 20,000 people. They might seem many, but in Europe we have 20 million SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises). No matter how much advertisement we do, I don't know how can we reach to them. In the end, everything is decided among the Commission, the member states, and the same old folks. It is very difficult to get out of this circle."
>
> European Commission civil servant (Brussels, 20 May 2009)

Diplomacy, technocracy and neo-corporatism, three key features of the EU political regime, are depoliticizing and, therefore, difficult to translate into the language that journalists are and citizens are used to. Although the constant contact among Commission officials and national civil servants has developed into a 'spirit de corps' that makes war or enduring conflicts among European countries unthinkable, a soft diplomacy, identified by my informants as "a merchants' Europe" is still alive among member states.

> "This Europe is a Europe of merchants. The interests of individual countries take priority over the common interest. Irrespectively of the money they put in [into the EU budget], those who pull it off are the countries with better lobbies, like Britain. The Treaty of Lisbon, which grants a bit more power to the European Parliament, could change this somehow, but I don't believe it. Brussels is essentially a city of lobbyists. You just go to Brussels to do lobbying."
>
> Canned Fished Industries Association director (Vigo, 10 December 2009)

> "Alas, there is not a global idea of Europe. I have seen it in the three negotiations in which I have been present: Each government, be it left or right-wing, tries to grab as much as possible for Spain when the financial perspectives are being debated. But I don't know for how long this Europe à la carte can last."
>
> Ministry of Economy civil servant (Madrid, 24 November 2009)

Inter-state bargaining needs discretion and, given that many times the national interest is sacrificed in exchange of a future reward, national governments are not interested in being completely open about their dealings. This finding would seemingly support one of the tenets of the 'communications gap' theory (the lack of involvement of national governments in explaining Europe). However, I would say this is more an effect than a cause of the EU sui generis regime. The current confederal setting works for national governments, as it allows them to push through the European legislative machine laws that would be far more contentious and difficult to pass if discussed at their national parliaments alone. It is better to keep on portraying Europe as that remote affair than a domestic ground, as this sets governments free to praise it or despise it at their convenience.

> "Europe is a way of government that all of Europe's leaders share (…) The EU is like an institutional practice which is shared by all the different member states (…) I always argue the EU is a way of doing politics in a very bureaucratic, very secretive way (…) National referendums on the EU express a general European uneasiness, perhaps, with the direction that politics has taken to this technocratic and managerial kind of form (…) Those kind of officials, those kind of civil servants, particularly the ones who have been in diplomacy, they are used to doing things, essentially, not in public. They are not elected, they're not public people. Quite often they will exercise their political influence and role without ever been known, generally, by the public. And Brussels is the place that they run. It's their place."
>
> Bruno Waterfield, The Daily Telegraph correspondent (Brussels, 20 May 2010)

> "When I was in Brussels I found that civil society organisations were very much part of the system, I think. They became Brussels insiders, if you like. Business Europe, for example, this lobby group, essentially represents a sort of Germanic view of industry: the idea of workers' councils, and the idea of sitting down with trade union representatives and the European Commission… it was a very cozy, and in fact, sterile, environment. There was a consumer organisation called BEUC, who never, or at least it seemed to me, was particularly vocal in defending consumer interests, or promoting them. So it sounds good for civil society representatives to have an input, but I'm not sure how effective they were, and how willing they were to rock the boat."
>
> Former FT Brussels correspondent (London, 12 May 2009)

The intergovernmentalist school has put the role of neo-functionalist technocracy into question. My research does not prove or disprove any of these theories of European integration (that was not the goal of this thesis), but rather finds evidence of the plausibility of both approaches. The EU looks very inter-governmental in Brussels, but also very neo-functionalist in the regions. The isolation of EU regional fund administration from public debate (both in Yorkshire and Galicia, with the first not having regional tier of government, and the second having an autonomous government and parliament since the early 1980s) reveals a clear technocratic spirit: civil servants in Spain and the UK declared politics would get in the way of efficient fund allocation. The result is a thorough financial control of investments, but a poor political control of their necessity and suitability.

> "There is a problem of political control. Financial control is quite rigorous (for every euro spent, you have to provide a certification) but the items where money is spent are not put into question. Is it a priority to build a motorway at the Costa da Morte that is only used by the young lads who go to disco parties? Is it a priority to build a motorway from Santiago to Lugo? Aren't sewage treatment plants a higher priority?"
>
> Political science university professor (Santiago de Compostela, 18 January 2010)

Finally, the EU regime also shows strong signs of neo-corporatism, with a peak business association (Business Europe) and a peak trade union confederation (ETUC) as main social partners in continental co-governance. Both in Brussels and in the regions EU activities attract a highly selective group of organized civil society groups. On occasions, their independence is compromised by their financial reliance on Commission contributions. The modern discourse of governance (involvement of public and private actors in policy-making and policy-delivery) nicely fits with the principle of subsidiarity (making lower-level administrations the executors of upper-level regulations). Corporate groups are consulted on European legislation, and regional elites (be they academics, business associations or local or regional administrations) participate in European projects. But in the world of this 'associative democracy', the individual citizen is left aside.

> "The EU has very segmented publics. Local administrations, trade unions, professional organizations, interest groups... all these people follows EU activities closely. Therefore there are lots of publics who are concerned about the most strategic, the most symbolic, the most transcendent issues on a medium to long term. Those groups are involved in European politics and are very sensitive to any development, they react quickly. We the MEPs notice it

> immediately when one of us is named rapporteur or shadow on any topic. Immediately we begin to receive lots of messages, phone calls, appointment requests… But what we have have to reach the public at large. We are doing policies, but we also have to do politics. We already have an associative base around the parliament. What we lack is a popular base."
>
> Galician Socialist MEP (London, 16 June 2009)

The politicisation and domesticisation deficits should be seen as mutually interdependent. The immature state of the European demos corresponds with the immature state of the European polity. Both are likely to develop in tandem, with European party federations becoming more credible the higher the intra-European mobility of citizens. However, it could also be argued that the established administrative structures have settled down in a status quo of confederal diplomacy, technocratic management and corporatist dealings that place the EU as something out there (distant), beyond the left-right divide (apolitical).

6.- Conclusion: Can journalistic mediation fix the twin deficit of domesticisation and politicisation?

If policymakers understand the EU's communication problem as a matter of journalists and the media, the results of this study show their aims might be wrong sighted. In Galicia the EU is broadly seen as a positive influence that has improved the well-being of the region. Being Galician means being Spaniard and European, with little conflict of identity. However, EU politics in Galicia are about getting money from the EU. There is little, if any, discussion about policies from a left versus right axis. EU politics, even in those regions like Galicia where the EU is an uncontested and settled institutional framework, are not normal. There is little journalistic mediation can do, it seems, when the EU political regime itself offers so little opportunity for the visualization of political conflict.

The case of Yorkshire and the UK is exceptional, but offers and interesting point for reflection, borrowing from Schmitt's understanding of politics as friend-enemy relations. In Yorkshire the EU is a highly political matter. Whereas in Galicia the EU is rarely discussed, in Yorkshire the dangers of a super-state are discussed in the five o'clock tea of a family or group of friends of any social status. The EU is the 'other', is the 'enemy', and that makes the UK-EU relation very political, in an antagonistic sense.

In sum, low identification leads to high antagonistic politicisation in the case of Yorkshire, but in Galicia high identification, though certainly not compatible with antagonism, is not conducive to agonistic politicisation. Instead of blaming journalists and the media, both policymakers and communications scholars may want to direct their efforts at discovering why EU politics are so 'apolitical'. The problem might not the communication of the EU, but the sort of political regime the EU is.

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Note: The coding protocol used for this study (and the corresponding inter-coder reliability measures) are available from the author upon request. To contact the author:

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

Figure 1.- *Yorkshire Post*: Frequency of domesticisation frames

The number of articles that imply a difference of interest between the EU and Yorkshire (n=51) is slightly superior to the number of articles that imply that the EU works in line with the regional interests (n=47). A closer look at the data allows for some explanation to this apparently surprising finding: most 'identification' is instrumental and sees European institutions as a lesser evil to deal with (e.g. lobbying for the recognition of a denomination of origin). The vertical identification frame is also pumped up by the letters to the editor written by Europhiles in contestation to those sent by Eurosceptics.



Figure 2.- ***La Voz de Galicia*****: Frequency of domesticisation frames**

In Galicia the EU is perceived as an entity pursuing the same goals of the region (vertical identification, n=101). The vertical identification frame includes several instances of lobbying (resource mobilisation), which implies the rules of the European game are broadly accepted by Galician political actors.



Figure 3.- *Yorkshire Post*: Frequency of politicisation frames

The politicisation of the EU in the Yorkshire Post is mainly carried out through the legitimacy debate, through the permanent questioning of the very existence of the EU (n=54), but is closely followed by the regional and national interest frame (n=43). The left-right politicisation is virtually absent, with the Scandal, Corruption or Controversy frame showing up in five occasions.



Figure 4.- ***La Voz de Galicia*****: Frequency of politicisation frames**

The regional interest (the struggle against others for the limited resource of European funding) is the main means of politicising the EU in Galicia (n=123). EU politics in Galicia is not about a left-right division. It could be hypothesised that, even in those regions where the EU is something perfectly domesticated, as in Galicia, the EU is not politicised along the left-right divide. In Galicia the EU is not about politics, but about money.



Figure 5.- Network graph of sources cited by the *Yorkshire Post* (weighted edges)

This graph shows the network of the political actors cited as sources in the *Yorkshire Post* articles. The sources were coded by location (local, regional…) and role (executive, legislative…). The edges are weighted so that the thicker the line linking two given actors, the more frequent their co-citation in news stories. The national executive (the UK Government) claims are frequently co-occurring with those of Westminster MPs and MEPs. The UK government also attracts the claims of regional and national specific interest organisations (e.g. farmers). The EU executive (the European Commission) is connected to the UK Government, but surprisingly weakly connected to the legislative power, be it national or European.



Figure 6.- Network graph of sources cited by the *La Voz de Galicia* (weighted edges)

This graph shows the network of the political actors cited as sources in the *La Voz de Galicia* articles, coded by location (local, regional…) and role (executive, legislative…). Edges are weighted so that the thicker the line linking two given actors, the more frequent their co-citation in news stories. There is a clear 'triangle of executives' formed buy the regional executive (Galicia's autonomous government, the Xunta de Galicia) the EU executive (the European Commission) and the Spanish national government. The 'multi-level' character of the EU is reflected in La Voz's journalistic discourse. Interestingly, the three parliaments (regional, national, and European) are conspicuously peripheral in the EU-Galicia network, at least from what is reflected by the region's benchmark newspaper.



Figure 7. Network graph of sources cited by the *Yorkshire Post* (Eigenvector and betweenness centrality)

In this graph, node size reflects Eigenvector centrality (the bigger the node, the more links it has to other well-connected actors), while node opacity reflects betweenness centrality (the more opaque the node, the bigger its meadiating or bridging role between or among actors that would not otherwise be connected). In Yorkshire the most central actors are the national Government and the the European Parliament MEPs. They are also the actors with more betweeness centrality.



Figure 8. Network graph of sources cited by *La Voz de Galicia* (Eigenvector and betweenness centrality)

In this graph, node size reflects Eigenvector centrality (the bigger the node, the more links it has to other well-connected actors), while node opacity reflects betweenness centrality (the more opaque the node, the bigger its meadiating or bridging role between or among actors that would not otherwise be connected). In Galicia the most central actors are the European Commission and the regional Government, the Xunta. They are also the actors with more betweeness centrality.