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Social democratic parties and political competition in the EU.

Evidence of a tri-dimensional space

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Abstract

This paper's aim is to describe the structure of political competition in the EU as it is constructed by national parties. The analysis shows that the political competition in the EU is tri-dimensional. Social democratic parties in Great Britain, Germany and Italy are the case in point. Although the left-right economic dimension and the libertarian-authoritarian cultural dimension have been part of the space of political competition in the EU, the quantitative thematic analysis of party manifestos reveals a third component. It concerns the role of the European political regime, relative to the Europeans and the international community. Indeed, since the 1970s, it has always been tri-dimensional. Therefore, the emergence of a struggle on the European political regime which is *proper European* has not managed to impose itself. This is social democratic parties' missed opportunity.

Introduction

Since the 1990s, political parties have responded to mass politics on the implications of European integration. Therefore, scholars refer to the *politicization of Europe*: Europe has become a subject of political contestation (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Amongst party families, the politicization of European integration has been particularly dramatic for social democratic parties. This is because the furthering of European integration has been challenging, for instance, the compatibility of the nation to control economy and labour market regulation (Kriesi et al. 2008; Marks and Wilson 2000; Bonoli and Powell 2004).

Yet, once European integration has been accepted, social democratic parties had to choose not only how much (degrees of) European integration to support, but also which vision on Europe to favor. How do social democratic parties try to construct types of identification with Europe in order to be electorally appealing? Provided that Europe is a vector for party competition, which dimensions of conflicts do parties try to mobilize?

This paper addresses these questions by focusing on the case of social democratic parties in Great Britain, Germany and Italy from the 1970s to present. It brings the perspective of parties into analysis and it studies visions on Europe as they are constructed in party manifestos. The contribution of this paper is descriptive.

One key expectation, guiding the analysis, is that the conflicts' dimensions of parties' contention about Europe are the same dimensions of conflicts which structure party competition at national level. Therefore, one would find that parties' references to Europe underline economic or cultural motives (Kriesi et al. 2008). This expectation is based on the assumption that the type of Europe parties try to construct is ideological. In this sense, contention about Europe reflects deep social interests held by electorates at national level and expressed in economic and cultural terms.

Conversely, it may be that, Europe is not under the baton of national competition. Therefore one may expect that the dimensions of conflicts which structure references to Europe touch upon neither socio-economic nor cultural interests. In this view, European competition would be about the development of Europe as a political regime per se, rather than a second-order competition (Fuchs et al. 2009). This

expectation is based on the assumption that Europe is becoming a political regime in its own where social democratic parties may mobilize non-aligned constituencies.

The paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the relevant literature and presents expectations. Then, it details the methodology used for the analysis. This is followed by the discussion of the results. The final section summarizes the main findings: in the last two decades, instead of asking questions about the make-up of the European polity itself, social democratic parties have transformed Europe into a space for national confrontation.

Theoretical background

Recent studies in the literature have shown that the structure of political competition of social democratic parties has become bi-dimensional. Constitutive of the bi-dimensional structure are an economic dimension and a cultural dimension. Traditionally, national political competition of social democratic parties has focused on socio-economic issues. Developed as a response to the relatively uniform class cleavage cutting across advanced capitalist societies, this party family has supported material equality, social welfare spending and political control of markets. Yet, in the last two decades, when internationalization of capital and goods markets and demands for labour market flexibility have increased, and the salience of social class declined, a new range of left-libertarian policy areas have become relevant to social democrats. These parties became more sensitive to equality of opportunity, political participation, cultural tolerance, environmental concern and a new relationship between the community and individuals, whose initiative should be prioritized (Kitschelt 1999). To date, social democratic parties try to mobilize and structure their policy position along both the old socio-economic dimension and the new cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008).

The bi-dimensionality of party competition is mirrored also in party's preferences for European integration. Not until the 1990s have social democratic parties become less sceptical of European integration. The increasing support for European integration has been used as a vessel into which national political competition has been poured. On one hand, by supporting European political integration, social democratic parties have tried to mobilize voters inclined to cosmopolitan and left-libertarian values. For these voters, European integration is welcome as a new form of cosmopolitan-like political community within which universalistic principles bind the collective. On the other hand, the degree of the positive attitude towards European economic integration remains a divisive issue amongst social democratic parties. Scholars differentiate between the 'new Left', which tries to combine free trade with a core concern with social justice, and the classical left, which has remained clear on opposing neo-liberal policies (Giddens 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006; Paterson and Sloam 2006).

Contrary to the mentioned literature, this paper studies what the structure of political competition on Europe looks like, when Europe is the subject of the debates. Therefore it does not focus on how much integration parties want. Yet, this paper takes shares with research on parties' preferences for integration the assumption that parties' contention at European level depends on electoral dilemma at national level (see Kitschelt 1999; Bornschier 2010).

Hence, when studying the space of competition on Europe, one may expect to find dimensions of conflicts that touch upon class interests, traditionally referred to as leftist and rightist interests. This dimension of conflict pertains to socio-economic interests, traditionally constitutive of societal divisions between employees and owners of capital, thereby supporting welfare policies against neo-liberal market policies.

Yet, one may hypothesize that other dimensions of conflicts have become important in social democratic parties' disputes over Europe. In particular, one may expect the increase of salience of a dimension that is not about class-related interests but it is about the new social division which is a function of the nationalization–denationalization processes. As argued above, this new social division opposes those people (the winners) who are open to de-nationalization and those people (the losers) who are against the opening up of national boundaries favored by European integration (Kriesi et al. 2008). Interests of winners and losers, in particular, are mainly fought out in cultural terms, for instance by mobilizing issues such immigration threats and protection of national tradition (as well as employment) vs. the penetration of 'the others', favored by the loses borders' control within Europe (Kriesi 2010: 680).

Both the sets of issues touching upon left–right class-based cleavage and touching upon the emerging liberalism-authoritarianism divide are about *material effectiveness* of the European political regime (e.g. promotion of economic benefits and security). It is straightforward in which sense the class-based cleavage is about economic material interests. It may be less clear how it is justified the use of *material effectiveness* when referring to the liberalism-authoritarianism cleavage. The assumption is that the distinction between cultural and material threats triggered by globalization and Europeanization is unclear to people. Hence, it is herein argued that the winner-loser divide which is often expressed in the form of *cultural competition* between different values and tradition, ultimately boils down to the opposition between different interests, the interests of a (national/regional/local) groups to the interests of ‘others’ (immigrants, other European populations, and so forth).

Nonetheless, contention about Europe may be about ‘the specificity of the phenomenon’ of the European political regime. For instance, the ideal of peace in Europe may be found to be common to both mainstream Left and Right, linked to the anti-nationalist rhetoric in the post-World War II era. The ideal of Europe as people’s Europe may be found in the references to Europe to both the Left and Right, even though it may be used to either delegitimize Europe (not sufficiently close to people) or to legitimate Europe (allowing the empowerment of people). References to Europe such as the above-mentioned are not rooted in objective traits and material long-term interest-based societal divisions (e.g. Stoll 2010). Rather, they are about an ideal role of Europe relative to the Europeans and to the world. They may be said to touch upon a *role dimension*.

Building on these theoretical expectations, in the following sections I analyze the structure of the space in which social democratic parties have ‘located’ their references to Europe. Before the findings of the analysis are shown, I describe the method used for the analysis.

Method

The paper focuses on social democratic parties in main Western European states: in Great Britain, the Labour party; in Germany, the Social Democratic party (SPD); and in Italy: the Italian Communist Party (PCI); then transformed into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) in 1992, reformed into to the Democrats of the Left (DS) in 1998. The analysis focused on four decades: from the early challenges of globalization and Europeanization to national politics in the 1970s; throughout the years of the acceleration of the processes of globalization in the late 1980s; until years in which the implication of denationalization became part of party’ politicization, in the 1990s and the 2000s.

The sources of the analysis were party’s manifestos written for national elections. Manifestos are regarded as important sources for understanding party-defined political agenda from the voice of parties themselves, namely without relying on secondary sources, such as expert surveys and media analysis. Furthermore, the analysis of manifestos allows one to perform a longitudinal analysis.

The analysis of the document started with a quantitative content analysis aiming to identify topics mentioned by parties when Europe was being referred to. Topics are defined as very concrete goals which parties refer to, such as European fiscal policies, the development of European defence cooperation and so forth. The unit of analysis was ‘any full sentence’ included in the manifesto pertaining to Europe. All the other statements which did not refer to Europe’s goals and interests were disregarded. Per each sentence referring to Europe, it was decided which was the topic mentioned. A sentence could include more than topic and hence received more than one code. A code scheme of topics mentioned by parties on Europe in their manifestos was constructed inductively. The identified topics did not necessarily exist in each of the manifestos at the same time, but at least some of them were present in party’s documents at some point.

Subsequently, topics were assigned to dimensions of conflicts. While the identification of topics followed an inductive procedure, the assignment of topics to dimensions of conflicts drew on the relevant literature. Table 1 summarizes the three identified dimensions and the two identified sub-dimensions. Certain topics were associated to *interest-based dimensions* of conflicts, namely conflicts touching upon deep societal cleavages. Topics concerning the protection of national traditions, freedom and, more generally, “the fabric of society” were taken as indicator of the *cultural dimension*. Topics concerning economic references in general, as well as specific welfare policies and social groups were taken as indicators of the *socio-*

economic dimension. For the association of certain domains to cultural or socio-economic dimensions two studies have been taken as guidelines: the work of Stoll (2010) on the dimensionality of party political competition and the work of Kriesi et al. (2008) on the relationship between level and dynamics of party mobilization.

Table 1. Categorization of dimensions of conflicts

Dimensions of conflicts	Description
<i>Socio-economic dimension</i>	references to economic policies; social groups; welfare policies
<i>Cultural dimension</i>	references to multiculturalism, protection of traditions, European cooperation on law and order (e.g. vs. international crime), individual freedom

<i>Role dimension</i>	
<i>domestic role sub-dimension</i>	references to European federalism, empowerment of European institutions, the role of European parliament
<i>foreign role sub-dimension</i>	references to European external relations, internationalism, relationship with the USA, environmental concerns

Note. The dot line separate dimensions which touch upon social cleavages a priori and not

At the same time, there were certain topics which did not fit in any of the abovementioned conflicts. It was possible to distinguish a ‘common line’ shared by all the set of references. They were about the role of Europe, with respect to the Europeans and with respect to the world. Therefore, I introduced a third dimension, and called it *role dimension*. Associated to this dimension there were topics concerning European external relations, environmental policies and European political models. For analytical purposes, it was possible to distinguish further two sub-dimensions of the role dimension. One was called *foreign role sub-dimension*, concerning the role of Europe in the world, such as a pacific actor, an actor driven by environmental concerns, and so forth. The other was called *domestic role sub-dimension*, and it included references to European institutions and their development.

Results

In this section, the main results of the analysis are described (and details are provided in Appendix I). This section has two parts. The first part concerns the changing salience of dimensions of conflicts structuring references to Europe which touch upon social cleavages. I call conflicts which are based on social cleavages interests-based conflicts. Two dimensions structuring interests-based conflicts were identified, a socio-economic dimension and a cultural dimension. The second part of this section focuses on conflicts which are not rooted in social cleavages and are structured along a dimension of conflicts which I called role dimension.

Interests-based conflicts


The manifestos of the Labour and the PCI-PDS-DS show an increase of issues structured along the socio-economic dimension in the late 1990s. This increment has not held steady in the case of the Labour’s manifestos. In fact, there has been a visible reduction of frequency of references structured along the socio-economic dimension by the mid-2000s. In the case of the SPD, references touching upon the socio-economic dimension have increased in frequency in the early 1990s. These references have then reduced dramatically in the late mid-2000s. In the case of the cultural dimension, it is visible the absence of any dramatic increase, in terms of frequency. The main relevant exception appears to be the case of the PCI throughout the 2000s. In the manifestos of this party references to Europe touching upon the cultural dimension doubled in the early 2000s relative to the late 1990s.

The analysis of the results pertaining to the salience of the socio-economic dimension shows that during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the salience of the socio-economic dimension has increased in the case of

the Labour and PCI-PDS-DS manifestos. Noticeably, references touching upon the socio-economic dimension were not included in the manifesto of the PCI-PDS-DS in the late 1980s. In the case of the manifestos of the SPD, on the contrary, the Cold War period has been characterized by a certain stability of the salience of the socio-economic dimension. In general, the salience of this dimension has fluctuated around 20%. Nonetheless, in the post-Cold War period, the salience of issues touching upon the socio-economic dimension has constituted close to 40% of whole references to Europe included in the SPD's manifestos. The salience of the socio-economic dimension consumed more than 40% of the Labour's manifestos, and around 35% of the PCI's manifestos, between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s.

As the analysis of the standard deviation indicates, the salience of the socio-economic dimension in the case of the SPD and, mainly, the PCI-PDS-DS, has varied much more than in the case of the Labour. For instance, in the late 1990s the PCI manifestos devoted 43% of references to Europe indicating socio-economic dimension, but only 23% in the early 2000s. As another example, one may take the fact that in the early 2000s, about 43% of references to Europe included in the SPD manifestos were about the socio-economic dimension, but only 30% in the late 2000s. Visible differences between parties may be pointed out as well. As an exemplification, at the beginning of the XXI century, the socio-economic dimension has increased its importance in the case of the Labour. Conversely, this dimension has lost salience in the case of the SPD, and more markedly in the case of the PCI. By the late 2000s, the socio-economic dimension has regained salience in the PCI's manifestos relative to the late 1990s, whereas it has lost importance in the case of the Labour and SPD.

Figure 1. The salience of the socio-economic dimension



Overall, changes in the salience of the identified dimensions have been both incremental (from lower to higher values of the salience) and vice-versa. In the case of the socio-economic dimension, most changes have occurred from lower to higher values of the 0-1 point scale, measuring the salience of the dimension. This is shown in figure 1. The prevalence of arrows pointing bottom-up rather than top-down is visible. One may also notice that the arrows of parties often point in different directions in the same lustrum. In general, however, it appears that there have been more small shifts than radical transformations relative to the salience of the socio-economic dimension. Small shifts have occurred especially in the 1990s in the case of the Labour. In the case of the SPD they have occurred between the 1970s and the 1980s. There has been a reduction of salience of the socio-economic dimension in the early 1980s in the case of the Labour

party. A reduction of the socio-economic dimension occurred in the late 1990s in the case of the PCI-PDS-DS. In the late 1980s, the PCI-PDS-DS has not made references to Europe touching upon the socio-economic dimension. Therefore, I may conclude that when radical transformations have occurred, they have concerned the reduction of the salience of the socio-economic dimension.

Turning to the salience of the cultural dimension, particular attention is deserved by the late 1980s and early 1990s. As one may notice, in the case of the Labour, the years following the Treaty of Maastricht have been characterized by the growing of cultural dimension. This included more than 20% of references to Europe. Yet, already in the early 1980s, 20% of the references to Europe in the manifestos of the Labour touched upon cultural dimension, 10% in the late 1980s. The fluctuation of the salience of the cultural dimension is visible also when comparing the early 1990s and the late 1990s. In the 1992 manifesto cultural issues raised to 23%, but the salience of such dimensions dropped to 8% in the late 1990s – in the XXI century, the salience of cultural conflicts remained stable, around 10%.

In the case of the SPD, the late 1980s have been characterized by an increase of the salience of cultural dimension in the SPD manifestos. For instance, the cultural dimension occupied 11% of the SPD manifestos in the late 1970s, 5% in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, the launch of the EU in the early 1990s has not supported a further increase of the cultural dimension. The salience of this dimension increased to 19% in the late 1980s but reduced to 9% in the early 1990s. As for the case of the Labour, also for the case of the SPD, the early 2000s have not suffered any dramatic changes, with regards to the salience of the cultural dimension. This has nonetheless become more important in the late 2000s. In the case of the PCI-PDS-DS, the salience of cultural dimension has much more visibly increased by the 1990s. This dimension, which was hardly mentioned in the 1980s, occupied 11% of party contestation of Europe in the early 1990s. In the post-Cold War period, the salience of the cultural dimension held steady, aggregating just more than 10% of references to Europe, with the exception of the early 2000s. In these years, the cultural dimension structured 23% of references to Europe.

Figure 2. The salience of the cultural dimension




Figure 2 shows the changes of the salience of the cultural dimension. The overall pattern is one of a certain degree of stability. Shifts have been tiny, as the low value of the standard deviation (shown in appendix I) has pointed out. However, the Labour party and the PCI-PDS-DS shifted more than the SPD. Changes of the Labour party and the PCI-PDS-DS have differed from changes of the SPD also with regards to the

directions. Often, they have been towards lower locations on the 0-1 point scale. The opposite applied to the case of the SPD. Furthermore, changes have not been dramatic transformations. In general, most visible changes have occurred in the 1980s and in the late 2000s. By the second half of the 2000s, there has been a dramatic reduction of the salience of the cultural dimension, in the case of the PCI-PDS-DS, conversely, one may notice a visible increase of the salience of this dimension in the case of the SPD and, to less extent, the Labour. In the 1980s transformations occurred in the case of the Labour and SPD have been almost randomly, meaning that a general trend is not visible. No arrows connect certain points in the case of the Labour and the PCI-PDS-DS because no reference to the considered dimension was included in the manifestos.

In sum, in this section, I showed that both the socio-economic dimension and the cultural dimension have been structuring references to Europe in the last two decades. In general, the salience of the socio-economic dimension has always remained more salient than the salience of the cultural dimension. There are few exceptions, though. The salience of the socio-economic dimension over the cultural dimension is less clear in the case of the SPD in the late 1980s and in the late 2000s; and the PCI-PDS-DS in the early 2000s.

Non-interests based conflicts

As argued previously in this section, it is possible to observe the significance over time of topics which touch upon neither the socio-economic dimension nor cultural dimensions. These non-cleavage related references to Europe are about *role of the European polity relative to its members and in world politics*. Therefore, I suggest to call this dimension *role dimension*.

For analytical reasons, the role dimension may be further specified in two roles: one is about the 'domestic' role of Europe and one is about the 'international' role of Europe. Therefore, I may distinguish further between a domestic role sub-dimension and foreign role sub-dimension. I called them role sub-dimensions to indicate that conceptually they are part of one sole dimension, but for the purposes of more analytical details I keep components of the role dimension separate.

The domestic role sub-dimension included references concerning people's empowerment and increasing democratic accountability in Europe as well as the issue of subsidiarity and the definition of the relation between the European competencies and national sovereignty. The foreign role sub-dimension included references about the role of the EU in world politics, such as internationalism, peace, and EU-USA/ EU-Nato relations.

Figure 3 shows the pattern of changes of the salience of the role dimension. The picture is one of certain stability in the 1970s and mostly in between the late 1990s and the 2000s. Yet, few dramatic shifts have occurred between the 1980s and the early 1990s. Indeed, the value of the standard deviation concerning the role dimension has been very high (see Appendix I). In terms of direction of the shifts, there have been more shifts from higher positions to lower positions in the case of the Labour and the SPD. The contrary occurred in the case of the PCI-PDS-DS. Some radical transformations are visible in the 1980s for the PCI-PDS-DS and Labour party. In the case of these parties, the salience of the role dimension has reduced during the 1970s and it has been fluctuating in the 1980s. One may also notice that contrarily to the PCI-PDS-DS and Labour, there has not been a dramatic change in the salience of the role dimension throughout the 1980s in the SPD. Furthermore, the small shift which occurred in the case of the SPD in the 1980s has pointed to the opposite direction of the changes in the case of the other parties.


When focusing more specifically on the domestic role sub-dimension (see appendix I) the most striking findings concern the numerous peaks and drops of the frequency of references to the role of Europe relative to the member. One may only notice that the post Cold War period has in general brought an increase of the frequency of references to domestic role sub-dimension. In the case of the frequency of the foreign role sub-dimension, one first remark is that this dimension has been much more mentioned, in general, in the SPD manifestos than in the manifestos of the other parties. The beginning of the XXI century has been characterized by an increase of references to the foreign role sub-dimension in the case of each of the analyzed parties.

When turning to the salience of the domestic role sub-dimension, it is possible to notice the high level of the standard deviation, in the case of the Labour and the PCI-PDS-DS. This indicates that the salience of

domestic role sub-dimension has been very different amongst the manifestos of these parties. In particular, in the case of the Labor, most dramatic variations occurred throughout the 1980s. The manifestos of this party did not refer to the domestic role sub-dimension in the early 1980s, but this sub-dimension structured 50% of the references to Europe in the late 1980s.

In the case of the salience of the foreign role sub-dimension, there has been little homogeneity in the salience attribute to the sub-dimensions by the manifestos of parties throughout (high standard deviation). The salience of the foreign role sub-dimension has been high in the case of the SPD in the 1970s and early 1980s, when this dimension structured around 50% or more of the references to Europe. A dramatic reduction of the salience of this dimension occurred in the late 1980s. The progressive reduction of the relevance of the foreign role sub-dimension has continued until the late 2000s. In the late 2000s, this dimension regained some salience, but it remained much less salient in the SPD manifestos, relative to the Cold War period. One may also notice the dramatic salience which the foreign role sub-dimension had in the late 1985 in the manifestos of the PCI-PDS-DS. As for the case of the Labour and the SPD, already discussed, the 2000s have been characterized by a return of the salience of the foreign role sub-dimension.

Figure 3. The salience of the role dimension



In sum, the analysis allowed on to find the presence of references to Europe which do not touch upon interests-based conflicts. That is, the parties have referred to Europe by mentioning issues which cannot be a priori defined in either left-right terms or libertarian-authoritarian terms. These set of issues have about the role of Europe, in the world and vis-à-vis the Europeans. The salience of this set of issues, touching upon the role-dimension of Europe, has been mainly salient in the Cold War period. It has visibly reduced in the 1990s.

Conclusion

This paper described the structure of political competition amongst national parties, when Europe is the subject of the contention. Much research has studied the relationship between party's stances on European

integration and party's positions along an economic and a cultural dimension at the national level (Bornschieer 2010; Kriesi et al. 2008). This paper did not engage with degree of European integration but with visions on Europe parties try to construct. The assumption was that parties aim to mobilize certain constituencies when constructing their visions on Europe. Therefore, the question which the paper addressed was which dimensions of social conflicts parties' references to Europe touch upon.

The structure within which references to Europe have been mentioned by parties is tri-dimensional. The analysis of parties' manifestos allowed one to identify economic references to Europe structured along the traditional left–right dimension; and also references to Europe which were culturally fought. In addition it was found a third set of references to Europe about the role of the European polity vis-à-vis the action capacity of the state and the empowerment of the people in European institutions, as well as the role of Europe in world politics.

This set of references is 'qualitatively' different from the economic and cultural set of references because it cannot be related a priori to social cleavages. It has in fact to do, more generally, with the role of Europe relative to the members of the European collective, and the role of Europe relative to the international community— therefore a domestic role sub-dimension and a foreign role sub-dimension were distinguished.

The presence of a third dimension along which parties compete on Europe suggests the possibility for a new struggle which is proper European. On one hand, discussions on Europe have been about everyday questions of policy making which touch upon established social cleavages. On the other hand, references to Europe have focused on the make-up of the European polity itself. It is this set of references to Europe which could open a window of opportunity for the formation of political contention about Europe which is not really anchored in national structures.

Yet, the emergence of a new struggle on Europe which is proper European seems to be reducing. The end of the Cold War seems to challenge the possibility for the formation of party confrontation which is distinctively about Europe. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the role dimension has not managed to impose itself over the socio-economic and cultural dimensions. Discussions on Europe have turn towards national-driven agenda. Europe has become increasingly a vessel for everyday questions of policy making, opposing left–right economic programmes and liberalism–authoritarianism understandings.

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Appendix I

	<i>Domestic role sub-dimension</i>		<i>Role dimension Foreign role sub-dimension</i>		<i>Cultural dimension</i>		<i>Socio-economic dimension</i>				
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Mean</i>			
Labour	1970	1	0.08	6	0.50	7	0.58	1	0.08	4	0.33
	1975	2	0.22	3	0.33	5	0.56	0	0.00	4	0.44
	1980	0	0.00	1	0.20	1	0.20	1	0.20	2	0.60
	1985	5	0.50	1	0.10	6	0.60	1	0.10	2	0.30
	1990	3	0.23	1	0.08	4	0.31	3	0.23	4	0.46
	1995	10	0.38	3	0.12	13	0.50	2	0.08	9	0.42
	2000	8	0.28	6	0.21	14	0.48	2	0.07	13	0.45
	2005	6	0.24	7	0.28	13	0.52	3	0.12	7	0.36
	<i>Std</i>		0.16		0.14				0.07		0.09
	SPD	1970	3	0.15	11	0.55	14	0.70	2	0.10	4
1975		6	0.22	12	0.44	18	0.67	3	0.11	5	0.22
1980		2	0.11	12	0.63	14	0.74	1	0.05	3	0.21
1985		4	0.25	5	0.31	9	0.56	3	0.19	3	0.25
1990		11	0.24	14	0.31	25	0.56	4	0.09	14	0.36
1995		4	0.15	7	0.26	11	0.41	3	0.11	9	0.48
2000		11	0.24	10	0.22	21	0.46	5	0.11	17	0.43
2005		2	0.20	3	0.30	5	0.50	2	0.20	1	0.30
<i>Std</i>			0.05		0.15				0.05		0.11
PCI		1970	3	0.43	2	0.29	5	0.71	0	0.00	0
	1975	6	0.40	2	0.13	8	0.53	0	0.00	6	0.47
	1980	2	0.12	6	0.35	8	0.47	1	0.06	6	0.47
	1985	1	0.25	3	0.75	4	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
	1990	7	0.37	3	0.16	10	0.53	2	0.11	5	0.37
	1995	7	0.33	2	0.10	9	0.43	3	0.14	9	0.43
	2000	6	0.23	8	0.31	14	0.54	6	0.23	6	0.23
	2005	15	0.30	12	0.24	27	0.54	5	0.10	18	0.36
<i>Std</i>		0.10		0.21				0.08		0.16	

Note. *Std* means standard deviation