Adjustment In The Us And European Monetary Unions: The Cases Of Puerto Rico And Greece

  • Abstract:

    Form an Optimum Currency Area perspective this paper provides a comparative analyzes between the (ongoing) Puerto Rican and Greek debt crisis and between the United States and European monetary unions. More specifically, the thesis engages with two of OCA’s criteria required to sustain monetary unions in the long run: the Insurance Principle and homogeneity of policies. The contribution aims to answer the following research question: how to share the cost of adjustment in a monetary union? It is argued that there are flaws in the institutional design of both the US and European monetary union, namely the lack of an OCA insurance principle, and that this has exacerbated the debt crisis of Puerto Rico, who is part of the US monetary union, and the debt crisis of Greece, who is part of the Eurozone. However, both Puerto Rico and Greece have also pursued policies that contributed to the root causes of their debt crisis, what confirms the homogeneity of policies criterion of OCA theory.