Pragmatism and the Turkish Strict Position towards the 2013’s Coup in Egypt

    • Bologna October 2016
    • Presentation speakers
      • Ali Abo Rezeg, Turkish State Anadolu Agency and Yildrim Bayazit University, Turkey


    On the third of July 2013, the Egyptian Defence Minister, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, had managed to topple the first democratically-elected civilian president in the Egyptian history, Mohamed Morsi. The General had announced the dismissal of the president and jailed him in an unknown location, then he had declared that the constitution became disabled, and issued arrest warrants for hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had been later referred to military tribunals, many of them were sentenced to death. Different responses had been adopted by the Western powers as a reaction to this coup, but it did not reach to the level to condemn or reject it. Most of these reactions came as expressing concern for the military move without naming it a coup, calling for a quick return for the democratic process in the region. At the same time there are welcoming Arab reactions for this move, especially from the Gulf states by blessing it and submitting a hand of help for its leadership. Turkey was one of the strongest voices that rejected this move and called it a coup since the first hours, hence the high-level representatives of the Turkish foreign policy had strictly criticized the coup, its leadership, and the international silence on the heinous atrocities that had been committed by the Egyptian army following the 2013’s coup, most notably what had taken place in Rabia square, in a position that was considered as non-pragmatic and in odds with the zero-problems’ policy that had been adopted since the AKP receiving power in 2002. This research studies the motives behind the Turkish position and identifies what pragmatism is in order to analyze the Turkish position towards the Egyptian coup in light of the school of pragmatism, hence this paper attempts to answer the question: What are the motives that had driven Turkey to strictly reject the coup in Egypt, and was the Turkish position in this regard a pragmatic?